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Contemporary international relations scholars view Western interventionary practices as having 
undergone deep transformations since the nineteenth century, from colonial interventions, to 
humanitarian interventions, to contemporary interventions under the “responsibility to protect” 
paradigm. This thesis offers a counter-argument based on an in-depth comparative historical 
examination of the evolution of British interventionary practices from the nineteenth to the twenty-
first century. Grounded in the analysis of the interconnections between practices, representations, 
and discourses as embodied in British interventions from the colonial to the contemporary era, the 
thesis demonstrates that paternalism is a constant of British interventionism, regardless of the 
transformations in the ideological and normative frameworks governing the international system 
throughout that history. 
The thesis does so by looking at the interventionary practice and discourse of Britain in the 
following four historical periods: nineteenth century Imperialism, the Mandate period, the Cold 
and Post-Cold War, and the Twenty-first century. In each period, specific cases of intervention 
addressed by the existing empirical literature are examined in depth, on the basis of a 
comprehensive definition of paternalism that takes into account the interconnections among 
discourse, representation, and practice. The objective of each empirical chapter is to identify the 
manner in which British paternalism manifests itself in each case and to present what is 
characteristic of British paternalism in each period. Then by comparing the manner in which 
British paternalism manifests itself across the historical periods examined the thesis demonstrates 
the factor of continuity in British interventionary practices from the 19th century onwards. Two 
further conclusions are made in the process. First, the paternalism deployed by Britain since the 
colonial era is grounded in a longer socio-ideological history of domestic paternalism within the 
English social order, which was first exported to England’s closest neighbors. Second, the current 
“responsibility to protect” paradigm supposedly based on a universalist humanitarianism manifests 
an alignment of international interventionism with the same form of paternalism that has 
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Contemporary international relations scholars view Western interventionary practices 
as having undergone deep transformations since the nineteenth century, from colonial 
interventions, to humanitarian interventions, to contemporary interventions under the 
“responsibility to protect” paradigm. This thesis offers a counter-argument based on 
an in-depth comparative historical examination of the evolution of British 
interventionary practices from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. Grounded in 
the analysis of the interconnections among practices, representations, and discourses 
as embodied in British interventions from the colonial to the contemporary era, the 
thesis demonstrates that paternalism is a constant of British interventionism, 
regardless of the transformations in the ideological and normative frameworks 
governing the international system throughout that history. 
1.1 Western Interventions: The State of the Art 
Contemporary accounts on western interventionism display a tendency to focus on 
establishing change in the interventionary practice and discourse of western states and 
international organizations. This is particular to scholarly accounts on humanitarian 
intervention and R2P. Turning first to the humanitarian intervention literature, change 
is mostly defined in normative terms by both scholars who engage with the long 
history of such interventions (Finnemore, 2003; Bass, 2008; Barnett, 2011; Simms and 
Trim, 2011) and by those who address recent instances of intervention (Rasbotham 
and Woodhouse, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; J. Welsh, 2004; Newman, 2009; Weiss, 2012).  
Accounts considering historical instances of humanitarian intervention attribute 
change to motives, justifications and state interests (Weiss, 2012). International norms 
as carriers of change occupy a central position in these accounts (Finnemore, 2003; 
Simms and Trim, 2011; Barnett, 2011). Another line of argument considers that 
change in interventionary practice pertains to the identity of the people who are 





of the concept of humanity is also said to have produced change in interventionary 
practice (Finnemore, 2003; Simms and Trim, 2011; Barnett, 2011). Scholars 
addressing recent instances of humanitarian intervention focus their analyses on the 
Cold-War and Post-Cold War periods. Common to these is the argument that 
interventionary practices have been subject to transformations due to normative and 
legal changes (Wheeler, 2000; Newman, 2009; Falk, 1996). The Cold War 
environment itself has also been acknowledged as a variable causing change 
(Newman, 2009) as have been the purpose, context, means and consent of 
interventions (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996). 
That change best characterizes interventionary practice in the Post-Cold War Period 
is an argument also endorsed by accounts on R2P. These analyses focus on the Post-
Cold War era and the 21st century, locating change in the R2P norm itself (Evans, 
2008; Thakur and Weiss, 2009; Bellamy, 2015). In order to understand why change 
has been considered as an essential pattern it is important to see how these analyses 
explain interventionary practice and discourse.  As will be exposed in detail in Chapter 
2, explanations provided by scholars working on humanitarian intervention regarding 
the occurrence, expansion, transformation and legitimacy of such interventions center 
on norms, expanded notions of security and the global context.  
The Constructivist influence in many of these writings is apparent from the overt focus 
on norms. Contemporary scholars also present justifications regarding 
interventionism. In these, one can identify a similarity to justifications offered by 
states. For example humanitarian interventions in the Post-Cold War era are justified 
through human rights (Wheeler, 2000; Finnemore, 2003). This thesis, then, responds 
to these contemporary accounts on humanitarian intervention, and R2P, which posit a 
radical change in interventionary practice and discourse in the Post-Cold War era. The 
argument advanced in this thesis is one of continuity, namely, that the interventionary 
practice and discourse of states has not undergone deep transformation, and is rather 





1.2 Paternalism as a Constant of British Interventionism  
At the start of the research the leading hypothesis was that by focusing on a state’s 
history one could identify a pattern of paternalism. This hypothesis led to the 
formulation of the following core research question, with respect to Great Britain, a 
state with a long history of interventionism:  
What are the constitutive features of British paternalism and how are they 
manifested and sustained through time in the discourse, practice and 
representation (legitimation) of Britain’s domestic and external 
interventionism?  
 
The general research question was in turn broken down into these partial questions: 
 
Q1. What are the specific characteristics of British Paternalism? 
Q2. How does British external paternalism extend from internal paternalism? 
OR What is the relationship between external and internal British                           
paternalism? 
Q3. What features of British paternalism remain constant and what features 
have changed in the UK’s military interventions from the nineteenth to the 
twenty-first century? 
Q4. How is paternalism manifested in the practice, discourse and 
representation in a changing normative and global context?  
 
Paternalism is a subject addressed in the literature on interventionism, by scholars 
holding a critical stance on humanitarian intervention, R2P and post-conflict 
reconstruction (Jackson, 1998; Bain, 2003; Cunliffe, 2010; Stefano, 2011; Weiss, 
2012). However, their treatment of paternalism is limited to characterizing 





concept. As a result there is a need to turn to the wider IR literature’s treatment of 
paternalism. Apparent is the fact that only a handful of works address paternalism in 
IR, leaving behind many unanswered questions (Hetherington, 1978; Barnett, 2011, 
2017; Hobson, 2012). To date, paternalism has been employed to address 
humanitarianism (Barnett, 2011), British discursive and ideological construction in 
Africa during the inter-war period (Hetherington, 1978) and to lead investigations at 
the level of theory (Hobson, 2012).  
The recently published edited volume Paternalism beyond Borders, embodying the 
most recent academic contribution on paternalism in IR addresses paternalism in 
humanitarian governance and informs on multiple issues such as: asylum policies, 
peacebuilding, gender and violence, FGM/C, humanitarian aid and sex trafficking 
(Barnett, 2017). Through these investigations current scholarship on paternalism in IR 
offers insights into its relevance and utility in addressing un-equal relations in practice 
and in theory, and establishes that paternalism, albeit subject to shifts, is still a reality 
characteristic of present times. Be it as it may, paternalism has yet to be examined vis-
à-vis interventionism as a means to demonstrate continuity in states’ interventionary 
practice and discourse. Reference to a broader, cross-disciplinary literature is therefore 
necessary to develop a comprehensive and efficient definition of the core concept of 
this thesis.  
As shown in Chapter 3, paternalism has been the subject of much investigation 
attracting the interest of scholars working in various disciplines such as medicine 
(including nursing and mental health), sociology, philosophy, anthropology, public 
health, social work, welfare economics, social policy, governance, management and 
industrial relations. What is more, paternalism has been equally employed to 
investigate inter-societal relations in the context of Imperialism/Colonialism. Here, the 
meaning of paternalism is captured by historical and post-colonial accounts. All these 
accounts reflect a lack of unanimity in grasping what paternalism entails, which 
reflects the complex nature of the concept’s signifier in empirical reality. This lack of 





The first speaks to the concept’s context specificity. The context in which paternalism 
manifests itself determines the particular characteristics attached to it and the form 
they take. Consequently, the context in which paternalism is studied determines 
whether it is characterized as coercive, less coercive or as not involving coercion. The 
second factor relates to the literature’s tendency to treat paternalism as either a 
practice, a discourse or a representation. This results in a fragmented understanding of 
paternalism. Finally variations in the literature’s understanding of paternalism are a 
result of treating it as a concept relating either to social or to inter-societal relations. 
However, the comparative analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 exemplifies similarities 
in the characteristics ascribed to the concept between contexts and between realms. 
Based on this literature I have adapted a conceptual framework to my specific object 
in order to capture practices, discourses and representations of a state’s 
interventionism.  
1.3 Conceptual Framework  
As I explain in detail in Chapter 3 I have developed a working definition of paternalism 
that is based on my analysis of the cross-disciplinary literature examining paternalism 
in social and inter-societal relations, and that serves my objective of testing and 
demonstrating continuity in British interventionism. Accordingly, this research adopts 
the following working definition according to which paternalism  
is a coherent system of practices, discourses and representations that legitimate 
the actions, and their objectives, of groups claiming to have an obligation 
towards those they view as inferior, incompetent, and in need of being 
protected as in a parent-child relationship. 
The above exposes the following elements as characteristic of paternalism: 
benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, difference and incompetence. It also 
exemplifies my conceptualization of paternalism, which differs considerably from 
what is envisaged in the cross-disciplinary literature. My working definition 





representation. In fact these are so co-constitutive and mutually supportive that they 
cannot be considered independently of one another. For example, discourses pre-exist 
or co-exist with practices. Also a paternalistic discourse constitutes a practice in itself 
manifesting representations and ideologies. A practice can also produce 
representations. What is more, paternalistic representations can involve representing 
other groups as incompetent and inferior which is considered as a practice itself.  
This working definition also stresses that paternalistic practices, discourses and 
representations are unidirectional. Domestically it is the government or a minority of 
rich and powerful who are responsible for the majority being depicted as unable to act 
left to its own devices. Similarly, on the international level certain states are 
responsible for the protection of people inhabiting foreign territories due to their status 
as victims. Finally, my conceptualization of paternalism acknowledges the 
relationship between the social and the inter-societal manifestations of paternalism. 
This enables conceptualizing paternalism’s external manifestations as a co-extension 
of its internal manifestations. Having established a working definition for paternalism 
and identified the elements characterizing it, it is then an issue of laying down the 
methodology which allows to demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary 
practice and discourse through paternalism.  
1.4 Research Methodology  
In line with the objective of this research, namely to establish continuity in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse since the colonial period, I adhere to a 
comparative methodology. I focus on one particular state and I compare a number of 
historical periods. Within each period I examine specific cases of British 
interventionism. This allows me to counter arguments advanced in the dominant 
empirical literature regarding radical change in instances of interventionism, 
especially in the Post-Cold-War era. I chose Britain as a referent to investigate state 
interventionism for a number of reasons. Britain intervened extensively throughout 





British interventions in non-Western territories include the Sudan in 1898, Operation 
Sheepskin in Anguilla in 1969, Sierra Leone in 2000 and Libya in 2011. Britain also 
intervened in Western states such as Greece in 1821-27 and Germany in 1945-49. 
Britain is a country with a long history of interventionism. Additionally, Britain 
headed one of the largest Empires whose reach extended across the globe. She was a 
major actor internationally and still retains a considerable position.  
The four historical periods examined in this thesis include the imperial nineteenth 
century, the Mandate period, the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, and the twenty-
first century. The majority of cases explored in this thesis were selected because they 
were treated by the empirical literature of interest. By taking on the same cases I 
provide an alternative interpretation accounting for the manifestation of British 
paternalism. This, however, was not feasible for all the periods under analysis simply 
because the cases investigated by the empirical literature did not always consist of 
interventions undertaken by Britain. In view of this, I conducted an in-depth 
investigation based on secondary literature as well as Parliamentary debates, which 
led me to select the following case studies as especially relevant ones: the British 
intervention in the Sudan 1896-98 examined in Chapter 5, and the reconstruction of 
Germany 1945-49 and the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66 investigated 
in Chapter 7.  
I now turn to the rationale behind the cases selected for each period subject to this 
thesis, starting with the nineteenth century. The intervention in Greece 1821-1827 by 
Britain, France and Russia, British rule in India during 1830-60 and the British 
intervention in the Sudan of 1896-98 are the three nineteenth century cases I analyze. 
The interventions in Greece 1821-1827 and in Syria-Lebanon 1860-61, and the 
Bulgarian atrocities of 1875-78, are instances presented by the literature as nineteenth 
century practices of humanitarian intervention. The decision to study the case of 
Greece rested on the fact that out of the three above instances it is only in Greece that 
Britain was involved in the intervention. Current interpretations of the intervention in 
Greece rest primordially on religion as the primary factor for humanitarian 





religion is but one element amongst many present during the intervention, and that 
British paternalism manifested itself in the practice and discourse of Britain.  
British rule in India during 1830-60 constitutes the second nineteenth century case I 
examine. The post-colonial literature employs this case to draw parallels between 
imperialism and more current events. I employ the case of India in order to show 
continuity in British paternalism and build on my counter-interpretation of nineteenth 
century British interventionism. Finally I explore the British intervention in the Sudan 
1896-98. This case enables me to demonstrate how nineteenth century interventions 
did not predominantly focus on white, Christian people and that British paternalism of 
this period is not ultimately defined by the element of religion. This case is treated by 
historians studying imperialism and described as “one of the main military 
commitments to the Middle-East at the height of Empire” (Dighton, 2016). As regards 
the second historical period under analysis in this thesis, the Mandate period 1920-
1948, I selected two cases examined by the post-conflict literature: the British mandate 
on Palestine (Class A) and Tanganyika (Class B).  
Both were administered by the British government and each informs on the 
administration of a distinct class of territories reflecting the ideology prevalent at the 
time. At this point it is essential to note that the classification of mandated territories 
instituted by the Mandate System included Class C mandates such as Nauru and South 
West Africa. The decision not to include a territory of this class was based on the 
following consideration. These territories were administered in a manner reminiscent 
of nineteenth-century colonial rule, a topic addressed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The 
third period subject to analysis incorporates the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods. 
As regards the Cold War period the empirical literature examines three cases of 
interventionism initiated by non-western states, namely East Pakistan 1971, Cambodia 
1978 and Uganda 1979 (Wheeler, 2000, pp. 140, 172; Ocran, 2002, p. 2; Chesterman, 
2004, p. 149). 
Given my focus on British interventionary practice and discourse I undertook a 





numerous instances of British interventionism within but also outside the empire, 
focusing on secondary accounts in the wider literature and debates in Parliament 
regarding them. During the selection process I assessed thirteen instances of British 
interventionism, namely: the Greek civil war 1944-47, the Vietnam war 1955-75, the 
Korean war 1950-53, the Indonesian revolution of 1945-46, the Malayan emergency 
1948-1960, the Anglo-Egyptian war 1951-52, the Mau Mau uprising 1952-56, the 
Oman war 1957-59, the Jordan crisis 1958 and 1970, the reconstruction of Germany 
1945-1949, the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66, Biafra 1966-70, the 
Dhofar rebellion in Oman 1963-1976. During the period 1945-1989 Britain intervened 
within but also outside the Empire, focusing on small states and new nations and in 
territories she entertained treaties of friendship and/or defense agreements.  
The assessment I carried out involved identifying in British practices, discourses and 
representations the defining elements characterizing paternalism discussed in Chapter 
3. This in turn brought forward the two cases I have selected to investigate for the Cold 
War period: the reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949 and the Malaysian Indonesian 
Confrontation 1963-66. Aside from identifying all elements defining paternalism in 
the case of Germany, my decision to move forward with this case was further 
reinforced by its identification as an instance of post-conflict reconstruction by 
Knowles (2013), hence placing it within the scope of this thesis. Next my decision to 
include the case of the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation was driven by the fact that 
it combined different policies and objectives characterizing British interventionism 
during 1945-89. Malaysia was part of the British Empire until 1957 when she became 
an independent territory and subsequently joined the Commonwealth. This case is a 
good example of a trend in British military interventions of the time, highlighting how 
Britain rarely intervened alone. 
Concerning the Post-Cold War period the following cases have been previously 
treated by the humanitarian intervention literature: Northern Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992, 
Bosnia 1992-95, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia 1990-1996, the US-led 
intervention in Haiti 1994, Rwanda 1994, Sierra Leone 1997-2000, Kosovo 1999 and 





Ocran, 2002; Chesterman, 2004; Heraclides and Dialla, 2015; Roberts, 2004; Bass, 
2008). Out of these, I chose to focus on the Kosovo intervention 1999. This decision 
was based on the following considerations. First, unlike the intervention in Sierra 
Leone led by the Britain in May and October 2000, the case of Kosovo took place in 
the 1990s, hence falling within the scope of the period I examine. Second, the Kosovo 
intervention stands out from other instances of interventionism involving Britain cited 
by the literature. The intervention was undertaken without explicit authorization from 
the UNSC.  
What is more scholars point to Kosovo as a case demonstrating a newfound activism 
by the UNSC and a willingness to employ Chapter VII powers in the domestic matters 
of states (Chesterman, 2000; Finnemore, 2003; Wheeler, 2000; Weiss, 2012). Finally, 
for the fourth period focusing on the twenty-first century I chose to address the R2P 
intervention in Libya in 2011. This is because Libya is the case most often employed 
by the literature to stress R2P’s normative and precedential novelty. It is not the only 
instance of an R2P intervention, take for example the 2010 intervention in Cote 
D’Ivoire. At this point it is important to elaborate on the types of interventions 
examined in this research. Predominantly focus is directed to instances of military 
intervention and post-conflict reconstruction. However, with a view to demonstrate 
the underlying paternalism of military interventions, these need to be interpreted in 
the larger interventionist pattern of British foreign policy, as defined by the full set of 
discourses, representations and practices.  
To identify British paternalism in the four historical periods examined I focus on 
particular practices, discourses and representations. The practices I investigate in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis (5, 6, 7 and 8) include specific laws and policies 
(native policy, education, land/agricultural policies), ways of governing (management 
of resources, infrastructure, and representation of natives in government), counseling 
and institutional practices towards populations abroad. I also look at British military 
practices such as training, the defence of territory and the use of force. The discourses 
I examine are those articulated by the British political elite which include public 





and on Security Council decision-making processes and results. This sheds light on 
the manner in which British policy and practices become legitimized and the place of 
strategic and other interests in defining these practices. 
In regards to representations, I look at the narratives of British elites who enacted the 
various policies abroad, with a specific focus on the nature of representations (how 
were the others represented). The above enables me to study paternalism in its 
unidirectionality. I focus on how this paternalism is enacted in particular practices, 
discourses and representations by the interveners instead of looking at how it is 
received by the subjects intervened upon. The decision to study paternalism in this 
manner does not result from conceptualizing the subjects of intervention as passive or 
as lacking agency. In fact as I discuss in Chapter 3, I conceptualize that coercion does 
not fully define a paternalistic practice since paternalism also operates on the level of 
legitimation of action of the agent and his/her status. The subjects of intervention are 
active participants who in some instances accept an intervention because they have 
previously internalized the paternalistic relationship as “normal”. 
In terms of primary data this thesis looks at Parliamentary debates (Houses of 
Commons and Lords) extracted from the Hansard database and correspondence 
between British officials collected from the National Archives in Kew. These are 
particularly significant since they bring forth the discourses articulated by the British 
political elite and the ideologies underlying them. The secondary sources consulted 
include historical accounts, narratives and British newspaper articles. British 
newspapers (which also serve as primary data reflecting the elite’s views) are 
enlightening on public opinion and allow to draw parallels with the discourses 
expressed by the British political elite.  
The primary data examined in this thesis are texts. In order to analyze these texts and 
identify British paternalistic representations, discourses, and practices in Britain’s 
internal and external interventions I employ critical discourse analysis (CDA) and 
practice theory. Both reflect the way I approach paternalism since they look at the 





my material is not directly observable I indirectly reconstitute praxeographic elements 
reported in primary and secondary sources. Due to the nature of my material my 
methodology is more informed by CDA, which, as I explain in Chapter 3, I adapt to 
my specific objectives and objects.  
I draw on my working definition of paternalism developed in Chapter 3 in order to 
compare instances of British interventionism within but also across the historical 
periods of interest. In light of employing Britain as a test case, there was a need to 
identify the particularities of British paternalism, which is accomplished in Chapter 4. 
British paternalism is anchored in a particular history. I therefore adopt a history 
specific approach taking into account paternalism’s context of emergence and 
development. Accordingly, Chapter 4 reconstitutes the social and intellectual history 
of British paternalism. It identifies the characteristics of English paternalism as 
manifested in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries by looking at the Poor 
Laws and the establishment and evolution of the welfare state in England. It also looks 
at the ways in which English paternalism manifests itself when exported to other 
countries, notably to Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  
1.5 Thesis Structure  
Having introduced the subject of this thesis, the research question and the conceptual 
and methodological foundations underlying it, what follows will present the structure 
of the thesis:   
Chapter 2 engages with the literature on interventionism and examines accounts of 
scholars working in the areas of humanitarian intervention, R2P, post-conflict 
reconstruction and state-building and post-colonialism. The chapter assesses these 
accounts by looking at how they justify or explain interventionism (and whether 
paternalism is included in their analyses) and whether these analyses link current 
instances of interventionism to previous historical context, which can be revealed by 
how they address continuity and change. Additionally the chapter assesses academic 





Chapter 3 presents the theoretical and methodological aspects of the research. In a first 
instance it reviews conceptualizations of paternalism in the cross-disciplinary 
literature and then presents my working definition of paternalism and the main 
characteristics attached to it. While doing so the chapter also introduces my 
conceptualization of paternalism based on a complex inter-connection of practice, 
discourse and representation. Then, the chapter moves to elaborate on the comparative 
methodology adopted in this research informing on the case study selection, on the 
historical periods examined and the criteria referred to, to carry out comparisons 
between the cases employed in the historical periods considered.  
Chapter 4 inscribes British paternalism in its social, political and intellectual history 
by examining its origins and evolution at the domestic level. It builds on the working 
definition of paternalism presented in Chapter 3 in order to identify the characteristics 
of British paternalism. The chapter first identifies the characteristics of English 
paternalism in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries focusing on the 
structure of English society, the Poor Laws and the Welfare State. It then turns to 
examine the ways in which English paternalism has manifested itself when exported 
to the outside world, and in the first instance to England’s closest neighbors, namely 
Wales, Scotland and Ireland. 
Chapter 5 constitutes the first foreign intervention case-study focusing on nineteenth 
century British interventionary practice and discourse. It examines the Allied 
intervention in the Greek struggle for independence of 1821-27, British rule in India 
during 1830-60 and the British intervention in the Sudan in 1896-98. Within each case 
the chapter reveals how English paternalism, as examined in the previous chapter, 
finds an ideological, discursive, and practical continuity in Britain’s relations to 
foreign others. This chapter illuminates British diplomatic and military practices 
towards Western and non-Western territories and on policies relating to the 
administration and education of a colonial territory.  
Chapter 6 proceeds to examine the Mandate period 1920-1948, during which “new” 





international law. The cases investigated here include the British Mandate over 
Palestine (Class A mandate) and Tanganyika (Class B mandate). Here again the 
chapter identifies the ways in which British paternalism manifested itself in each case 
by looking at the practices, discourses and representations of the British political elite 
in the areas of administration, education, land and agriculture.   
Chapter 7 considers the period that follows and examines British interventionary 
practice and discourse from 1945 to 1999. It demonstrates continuity in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse by identifying British paternalism in the 
reconstruction of Germany 1945-49, the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation of 
1963-66 and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The chapter informs on 
British practices relating to administration and education, the defence of a foreign 
territory and the defence of a persecuted population through diplomatic and military 
means.  
Chapter 8 concludes the empirical investigation of this thesis. It engages with the R2P 
literature and examines the 2011 intervention in Libya. It investigates Britain’s 
involvement in Libya in relation to two lines of response: sanctions and military 
action. In doing so the chapter identifies British paternalism in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse in the case of twenty-first century type of 
intervention. Equally important is the analysis of the paternalistic characteristics of the 
R2P norm itself.  
Finally, Chapter 9 presents the argument of continuity advanced in this research. In a 
first instance the chapter presents what was previously identified in Chapters 5, 6, 7 
and 8 as characteristic of British paternalism. Then, a comparison is carried out 
looking at the manner in British paternalism manifested itself across the four historical 
periods examined. The chapter also addresses how the thesis contributes to academic 
discussions on interventionism and presents the limitations it is subject to. 
The three significant conclusions this thesis has generated are the following. First and 
foremost the thesis establishes paternalism as a constant characteristic in Britain’s 





interpretations stressing change in interventionism in the Post-Cold War era. Second, 
it shows that British paternalism as manifested in foreign interventions is grounded in 
a long social, political and ideological history of internal (domestic) paternalism that 
also gives British external paternalism its specific character as ontologically 
constitutive of British foreign interventions. Lastly, the thesis reveals that far from 
evolving into a more universal normative framework, recent interventionism as 
practiced under the R2P actually manifests an alignment of recent international norms 
with the same type of paternalism that has been practiced by the British political elite 









2 Literature Review: Interventionism 
and Paternalism: Accounting for 
Continuity and Change in 
Interventionary Practices 
There are two important lenses through which to address the issue of paternalism in 
Western interventionism: one is to examine how the literature justifies or explains 
interventionism (and whether paternalism is included in their analyses) and the other 
is inquire whether these analyses link contemporary interventionism to previous 
historical context, which can be revealed by how they address continuity and change. 
Approaches to explanation in the empirical literature on interventionism vary based 
on their object and theoretical framework. For instance, within the literature on 
humanitarian intervention explanations regarding interventionism and its expansion 
focus on norms (expanded notions of security) and the global context. The overt focus 
on norms, their expansion and influence on interventionism stems from a 
Constructivist influence within many of these writings.  
Approaches to continuity and change also vary considerably. On the one hand, 
scholars working on humanitarian intervention posit that both the discourse and 
practice of Post-Cold war interventions have been altered considerably due to 
normative changes. The same line of argument is followed by the literature on R2P 
On the other hand, Post-colonial scholarship argues for a continuity of both discourse 
and practice since nineteenth century colonialism. For example Mark Duffield 
observes that “the fragile state discourse reproduces key assumptions and rationales 
of colonial bureaucracy” (2009, p. 116).  
Variations in the literature in explaining interventionism and the approach to 
continuity and change produce very different accounts of its history. The problem is 
when such accounts posit historical novelty and thus obscure the long-track record of 
Western states’ interventionism. To identify and clarify my own investigation of this 





intervention, R2P, post-conflict reconstruction and state-building and post-
colonialism. In assessing these accounts, I am guided by two questions: How are 
interventionary practices explained and/or justified? and How are continuity and 
change accounted for? I propose an alternative approach to studying interventionism 
where paternalism figures prominently.  
The merit of this approach is not explanatory but rather ontological. Paternalism is 
manifested in the discursive practices of Western states. Through a systematic 
exploration of the different literatures concerned with western interventionary 
practices I recognize the contributions of a number of scholars and, drawing on their 
work and insights, I propose to trace continuity and change in western states’ 
interventionary practice and discourse through paternalism. The value of employing 
paternalism is that its continuing existence in the interventionary practice and 
discourse of states sheds light on wider issues such as the structure and working of the 
international system and the manner in which legitimating strategies become 
successful.  
This chapter is structured as follows: first, I examine literatures that either explain or 
justify interventionary practices and I assess whether the concept of paternalism 
figures in such accounts. Within these literatures I also explore how continuity and 
change in western states’ interventionary practice and discourse are grasped, which 
variables are accounted for and how they are followed through time. Second, I turn 
my attention to paternalism in the IR literature, exploring how the concept is 
understood and the manner in which it is studied. In doing so, I explain the role of 
paternalism in my research, and how it can be discerned in the discourse states have 
used to legitimate their interventionary practices from the nineteenth century to current 
events. What I seek to bring forth most of all is that paternalism is not just an unsavory 





2.1 The Literature on Interventionism  
Interventionism can be broadly defined as “governmental interference in economic 
affairs at home or in the political affairs of another country” (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/interventionism). Its broadness reflects the many areas, 
governmental tools and policies falling under the banner of interventionism. This 
research does not investigate all types of interventions that fall within this broad area. 
Rather, it concentrates on military interventions defined as “the blatant use of military 
force in another country” (Van Wingen and Tillerma, 1980, p. 292) and post-conflict 
reconstruction. In order to show their underlying paternalism in the case of military 
interventionism, one needs to interpret these types of interventions in the larger 
interventionist pattern of British foreign policy, as defined by the full set of discourses, 
representations and practices deployed by interventionary Britain. Consequently aside 
from looking at cases cited in the literature on humanitarian intervention and R2P I 
also engage with British colonial policy, post-conflict reconstruction and the 
administration of foreign territories during the inter-war period.  
 
In reviewing the IR literature on interventionism in this section I will be looking at 
two types of narratives, justifications and explanations. Additionally I will be 
examining how continuity and change are accounted for by the literature. Turning first 
to the literature on humanitarian intervention, it is clear that the preoccupation with 
justifying interventionary practices stems from directing focus on issues such as the 
use of force, human rights, the legitimacy of interventions and the tension between 
state sovereignty, non-intervention and human rights. Giving a general sense of the 
necessity and context in which humanitarian interventions are deployed, Nicholas 
Wheeler argues that “humanitarian intervention becomes an issue when a government 
has turned the machinery of the state against its own people, or where the state has 
collapsed into lawlessness” (2000, p. 27). Humanitarian intervention is justified by 
means of a human rights rhetoric, where human rights are depicted as natural and 





As Martha Finnemore argues, military interventions “are now supported by a dense 
web of international legal obligations to protect human rights” and she points to the 
cases in Somalia 1992, Cambodia 1992-93, and Yugoslavia 1991 as illustrations 
(2003, p. 21, 52; Wheeler, 2002, p. 1). The scale of atrocities and human suffering has 
also been utilized in attempts to justify humanitarian intervention (Hopkinson, 1996). 
Fernando Teson has argued that “government tyranny and situations of extreme 
anarchy result in injustice towards people…in such cases external interventions are 
morally permitted in order to end injustices” (2001, p. 3). 
The obligation incurred by certain states or people to intervene also figures 
prominently in discourses justifying humanitarian intervention. Such an example is 
found in Teson’s work, where he claims that “serious violations of human rights 
generate obligations on others” (2001, p. 7). Conversely, other advocates of 
humanitarian intervention view such a practice as being based on a “right” to 
intervene. A good example is Bernard Kouchner, the advocate of “le droit 
d’ingérence” (the right of interference), for whom humanitarian action is more than 
just a duty or a moral obligation (Allen and Styan, 2000, p. 835).  
Although Kouchner also employed the term “devoir d’ingérence” (the duty to 
intervene) the idea of “droit d’ingérence” is much more complicated and problematic. 
First, it totally disconnects humanitarian intervention from sentiments such as caring 
and concepts such as “common humanity”. There is a significant difference in saying 
that practices of humanitarian intervention are “a right” rather than “a duty”. Second, 
“right” brings forth the superiority and a degree of arrogance from the part of the West. 
It also points to a feeling of entitlement felt by powerful states. States do not have “a 
right” to intervene, as such a conception stands against the established principle of 
state sovereignty. In sum, these justifications are in most part based on moral and 
ethical considerations regarding distant strangers. Military intervention is seen as a 
necessary evil in the face of mass atrocities, which, it is said, the West and the UN 





Although humanitarian intervention is justified by scholars through the UN and 
multilateral operations, it still involves single state decision-making, a crucial point 
that is obscured by an overemphasis on the UN. Paternalism does occupy a place in 
discussions regarding humanitarian intervention, found in the literature holding a 
critical stance. While investigating the conditions under which it is morally 
permissible to bypass state sovereignty to defend human rights Paul Di Stefano looks 
at the concepts of non-intervention and self-determination. On this he asserts that 
“freedom gained through the paternalistic intervention of outsiders is an ephemeral 
imposition devoid of lasting intrinsic or instrumental value…an interventionist 
approach denies the possession of autonomous agency to those who are assisted” 
(2011, p. 538). Of value here is the characterization of interventionist practices as 
paternalistic.  
In contrast, Michael Newman relates the international community to “a doctor that 
treats its patients” (2009, p. 111). Although he does not use the concept of paternalism, 
his analogy relates to a relationship among un-equals, where one has certain duties 
towards the (weaker) other. Paternalism also figures in the work of Thomas Weiss, 
who refers to the paternalism of intervening powers in the early twentieth century 
while discussing how the credibility of interveners is undermined. He argues that “the 
paternalism of intervening powers who were self-appointed custodians of morality and 
human conscience as well as the guarantors of international order and security partially 
undermined the credibility of interveners” (2012, p. 35). Weiss’s description does not 
give the impression that paternalism’s presence is a continual one. Even though 
paternalism is employed in the critical literature on humanitarian intervention, the 
absence of a definition points to a tendency to regard the concept as commonsensical 
and self-explanatory.  
Let us now turn to the explanatory narratives provided by scholars working on 
humanitarian interventions informing on their transformation, expansion and 
legitimacy. The constraints imposed by international norms and rules are one way in 
which humanitarian intervention is explained. Wheeler, for example, examines the 





constrain or enable state action (2000, p. 21). Newman similarly explains interventions 
in the post-cold war era in relation to a transformation from the normative assumptions 
of the cold war period when intervention was contrary to state sovereignty and was 
illegal (2009, p. 38). Norms are also employed in accounts interrogating earlier 
practices of intervention.  Finnemore explains patterns of military intervention by 
looking at how states construct rules about using force (2003, p. 1). Additionally, she 
examines the role of humanitarian norms and normative understandings of who is 
human in an attempt to inform on the interventionary conduct of states (2003, p. 11-
15).  
Expanded notions of security, with a particular focus on human security, are another 
focus for scholars who attempt to provide explanations for the occurrence of 
humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Tirman, 2003). The adoption of such 
conceptions enabled explanation of the upsurge of humanitarian intervention practices 
in the Post-cold war era. Jennifer Welsh points to UNSC resolution 688 pertaining to 
the intervention in Iraq in 1991, and argues that for the first time “the Council had 
recognized that a state’s internal repression could have transboundary consequences 
that threatened international security” (2004, p. 33). In the same way Weiss uses the 
example of “Operation Restore Democracy” in Haiti where force was employed to 
remove one regime and install another (2007, p. 49). Having seen how scholarly 
accounts of humanitarian intervention justify and explain western state interventionary 
practices, I now turn to reflect on the way these accounts track continuity and change 
through time.  
Change in the interventionary practices of western states or international organizations 
is determined by changes in norms and rules. This trend can be found in writings of a 
historical nature (Finnemore, 2003; Bass, 2008; Barnett, 2011; Simms and Trim, 
2011) and in those dealing with recent instances of intervention (Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Welsh, 2004; Weiss, 2007; Newman, 2009). What 
is common among scholars who cover the Cold-war and post-Cold War periods is the 





For Wheeler what has changed since the Cold war period are norms concerning the 
legality of humanitarian intervention and the use of force (2000, p. 285). In contrasting 
the two periods, Wheeler finds that in the post-cold war period the intervening states 
are western and their justifications focus on humanitarian arguments (p. 139). He 
illustrates this through the interventions in Cambodia 1978, Uganda 1979 and East 
Pakistan 1971 against the post-cold war cases of Northern Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992 
and Kosovo 1999 (p. 3). In the same way, Newman situates change between the two 
periods in normative assumptions. He observes how the end of the Cold-War “led to 
major shifts in both the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention” (2009, p. 
37). In his account, the Cold-War environment prohibited the practice of humanitarian 
intervention in two ways. First, this type of intervention conflicted with state 
sovereignty and second, “mutual rivalries, ideological conflicts and co-existence built 
on sovereignty and non-intervention” rendered humanitarian intervention unlikely 
(2009, p. 38).  
For Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, change in the practice of humanitarian intervention 
is seen in terms of purpose, context, means, and consent (1996). Concurring with the 
above Richard Falk sees change in terms of the ascendancy of humanitarian norms in 
the Post-Cold War era and argues that “there has been a notable shift in interventionary 
diplomacy away from purely geopolitical interventionism in the direction of support 
for humanitarian claims to alleviate human suffering” (1996, p. 511). The 
aforementioned employ the cases of Somalia 1992, Liberia, northern Iraq 1991, former 
Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor 1999, East Pakistan 1971, Cambodia 
1978 and Uganda 1979 in order to track the expansion of humanitarian intervention 
from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War periods (see also Wheeler, 2000, pp. 140, 
172; Ocran, 2002, p. 2; Chesterman, 2004, p. 149).  
Norms are equally but not exclusively seen as variables to account for change in 
interventionary practices by scholars adopting a historical perspective. In interrogating 
the expansion of humanitarian intervention Weiss accords importance to the nature of 
conflict since the Post-Cold War period. For him the transformed nature of conflict is 





intents (2007, p. 29). Additionally he accords importance to motives, justifications and 
state interests to account for change since colonialism.  He employs to these ends the 
nineteenth century cases of Greece (1827) and Syria (1860) (2007, p. 32), the Cold 
war cases of East Pakistan (1971), Cambodia (1978) and Uganda (1979) and the 
twentieth century cases of Somalia (1992), Sierra Leone and Haiti (p. 38,42,49).  
The insistence on norms as a variable to account for change is also found in 
Finnemore’s work. In conforming to her Constructivist orientation she looks at the 
role of international norms, which enables her to problematize interest and their 
change over time (2003). She argues that “the pattern of intervention cannot be 
understood apart from the changing normative framework” (2003, p. 52). Finnemore 
observes that “although states have been intervening for humanitarian purposes for at 
least two centuries, whom they protect and how they intervene to do so have changed” 
(p. 3). She identifies this change to a change in identification. This argument is 
illustrated by the nineteenth century cases of Greece 1821-27, Syria/Lebanon 1860-
61, the Bulgarian agitation (1876-78) and Armenia 1894-1917 (p. 60), decolonization, 
and instances since 1945 such as Somalia 1992, Yugoslavia, Iraq 1991 and Cambodia 
(p. 52). She concludes that “states now entertain claims from non-white, non-Christian 
people who previously would not have registered on their consciousness” (2003, p. 3). 
Through this Finnemore entertains the idea that the expansion of humanity between 
the nineteenth and twentieth century is a variable accounting for transformations in 
recent humanitarian intervention practices (2003, p. 66). Brendan Sims and David 
Trim are in agreement with Finnemore. For them change in humanitarian intervention 
is provoked by changing conceptions of whom or what should be protected over time. 
They also observe important shifts in “the types of people who were thought to deserve 
interventionist protection, in the rationale for protecting them and in the rhetoric used 
both at home and abroad to justify the use of force to protect foreign peoples” (2011, 
p. 387). These conclusions are drawn by looking as far back as the nineteenth century 
cases of Greece 1827 and Syria Lebanon 1860-61. Concerning the issue of what the 





Christendom to liberty to liberalism and from civilization to universal human rights 
(p. 391). 
Continuity in the practice of humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, is argued 
for by Bass, who asserts that it is possible to identify a discourse of human rights back 
to Victorian Britain and cites the anti-slavery campaign in England and the mass 
uproar against Belgian colonial rule in the Congo as supportive cases (2008, p. 4). 
Finnemore also identifies the use of humanitarian justifications in the nineteenth 
century (2003). On the other hand, Weiss observes continuity in humanitarian 
intervention in terms of who leads decision-making. He asserts that “in spite of 
normative changes, globalization, technological and communication advances, an 
overwhelming continuity in the discussion of humanitarian intervention involves 
decision making by states” (2012, p. 28).  
The next literature of interest to this thesis addresses non-military interventions, such 
as post-conflict reconstruction and state-building. In these accounts justifications vary 
depending on the focus of investigations. In fact, justifications provided in this 
literature can be better understood by dividing the subjects of investigation in two 
themes. The first focuses on the need to save failed states and the second on how best 
to deal with state failure. Works focusing on the need to save failed states tend to 
provide justifications based on security considerations, focusing on the type of states 
concerned. Failed or collapsed states are portrayed as posing security threats 
internationally or to a specific western state (Fearon and Laitin, 2004, p. 14).  
According to Michael Ignatieff “intervening has also become an urgent state interest: 
to rebuild failed states so that they cease to be national security threats” (2002, p. 115). 
Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual envision the threat more broadly in terms of 
global security and offer an analogy whereby state weakness is seen as “constituting 
structural threats akin to dead leaves that accumulate in a forest… no one knows what 
spark will ignite them or when” (2005, p. 155). Safeguarding international peace and 
security is seen as the motive for the UN’s involvement in rescuing failed states 





weapons of mass destruction and the presence of transnational terrorism in such states 
can threaten the security of more powerful states (2004, p. 86).  
Security as a justification is discussed in all its dimensions: national and global. 
Justifications found in works looking at how best to deal with state failure are quite 
different from what has been presented above. Scholars interrogating the ways in 
which failed states can be dealt with examine practices of international administration 
of foreign territory (trusteeship, transitional administration, international territorial 
administration). Justifications presented rest on the idea that international 
administration enables the expansion of freedom. As Lene Søbjerg argues, 
“Trusteeship can be a constructive tool in the re-establishment of freedom, stability 
and peace in post-conflict societies” (2007, p. 475). Further she asserts that the 
ambition of Trusteeship is “to accelerate development of post-conflict societies…to 
enable the individuals to reach their highest self” (p. 480). At the core of justifications 
referring to freedom are those focusing on the agency of non-western states, pointing 
to the need for the West to act as a facilitator. Krasner, for instance, argues that “left 
on their own, collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves because they 
have limited administrative capacity” (2004, p. 86).  
In reference to the usage of political Trusteeships, Perritt justifies it in terms of 
“governing for the benefit of the local population and for the purpose of preparing the 
trust territory for eventual self-rule” (2003, p. 398). Further, Simon Chesterman argues 
that state building enables “a people to be saved from themselves” (2004, p. 1). All in 
all justifications found in the post-conflict reconstruction/state-building literature can 
be seen as a mixture of security considerations and the need to save suffering strangers. 
Scholars focusing on the need to save failed states tend to point to security threats 
posed by such states. On the other hand, scholars working on international 
administration, on how best to deal with failed states, tend to look at suffering 
strangers and how to further freedom. 
Justifying such practices on the basis that they further freedom or that the presence of 





states is inexorably paternalistic. Paternalism makes its appearance in works that 
critically interrogate the place of trusteeship like arrangements in the administration 
of foreign territories, re-surfacing in the late 1990s. Robert Jackson and William Bain 
identify trusteeship with paternalism. Jackson conceives of trusteeship in world 
politics as a form of paternalism “inconsistent in a world of sovereign states” (1998, 
abstract). Bain observes that trusteeship invokes “a paternal mode of conduct” (2003, 
p. 2).  
However, these accounts differ on their definition of paternalism. Jackson defines 
paternalism as “taking at our own initiative responsibilities that lie outside our sphere 
of jurisdiction and operation in the desire to do some good or to reduce some evil in a 
foreign country by placing the people who live there under our control without the 
consent of the government” (1998, pp. 21–22). His definition also includes the practice 
of treating both governments and citizens of foreign countries as children (1998, p. 
22). Bain employs Gerald Dworkin’s definition of paternalism whereby “interference 
with a person’s liberty of action is justified by reasons referring exclusively to the 
welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or the values of the person being coerced” 
(2003, p. 2). However different, both definitions incorporate certain elements such as 
doing good, the absence of consent and interference. What distinguishes these scholars 
from those employing paternalism in relation to humanitarian intervention is that their 
account of paternalism is detailed, providing definitional clarification.  
Let us now turn to this literature’s approach to continuity and change. Here, scholars 
approach change in terms of the international environment. Robert Jackson, for 
instance, sees failed and weak states as challenges brought forth by the end of the Cold 
War. A change in norms is also observed with regards to an increase in the Security 
Council’s resolutions directed at massive human rights abuses in certain states (1998, 
p. 4). In contrast, Fearon and Laitin see change in interventionary practices as a result 
of changing motivations. In contrasting nineteenth century motivations and current 
motivations for intervention they argue that “intervention is no longer conducted in 





acquiring too much power…today major powers have faced significant and justified 
pressures for intervention on humanitarian grounds” (2004, p. 13).  
Writings focusing on the international administration of foreign territories detect 
continuity at the level of practice. Parallels are drawn between current practices of 
foreign administration and the League of Nations Trusteeship system. Perritt argues 
that “recent interventions after the formal termination of the UN Trusteeship system 
exhibit continued viability of the political Trusteeship system” (2003, p. 398). 
Furthermore, Jackson illustrates such parallels by citing UN involvement in domestic 
conflicts such as in Northern Iraq 1991 and in Cambodia (1998, p. 10). Jackson makes 
a very interesting argument, namely that “failed states met with international responses 
earmarks of Trusteeship even if the language of Trusteeship is not employed” (1998, 
p. 10). The latter finds me agreeing and disagreeing at the same time. It is not only that 
current practices adopted by western states resemble past practices, but features of the 
legitimating discourse are also still very much alive. The cases examined here by 
scholars to point to a continued viability of Trusteeships are instances of foreign 
governance in Bosnia Herzegovina (1999), East Timor (1999) and Kosovo (1999) 
(Caplan, 2007, p. 231). 
Next, focus is directed to accounts on  the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P or 
RtoP) or “protective interventionism” (Popovski, 2010, p. 205). The latter is presented 
as one of the most recent normative developments in the area of interventionism 
aiming to protect citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing. Since the R2P principle was introduced by ICISS (International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) in 2001 policymakers and 
academics have focused on clarifying what it means and most importantly on 
operationalizing it.   
The existence of failed or collapsed states is treated as a major threat to security on a 
national and individual level. According to the ICISS report, “failed states are quite 
likely to generate situations which the international community simply cannot ignore” 





turns the discussion to collective rather than unilateral interventions. In his statement 
to the UN General Assembly Informative Interactive Dialogue on the 23rd of July in 
New York, Gareth Evans stated that “the issue is not the right of big states to do 
anything, but the responsibility of all states to protect their own people from atrocity 
crimes and to assist others to do so by all appropriate means” (Evans, 2009). 
Further, interventionism is also justified in terms of “humanity”, resembling 
justifications put forward regarding humanitarian intervention. According to Evans 
“the case for R2P rests simply on our common humanity, the impossibility of ignoring 
the cries and pain and distress of our fellow human beings” (2008, p. 296). A number 
of criticisms have been articulated against the idea of R2P. For instance, Carlo 
Focarelli observes that “the very notion of responsibility is ambiguous, the R2P swings 
between power and obligation to intervene” (2008, p. 210). It has also been remarked 
that the R2P might be misused to justify unilateral intervention by powerful states 
claiming the role of the human protector (Orford, 2011b).  
It is in the critical literature on the R2P that reference to paternalism is found. In 
critically engaging with Louise Arbours’ work on the R2P and her idea of a duty of 
care, Philip Cunliffe identifies that states are pushed in the realm of paternalism with 
domestic and international repercussions. In relation to this he argues that “the doctrine 
fosters the paternalism of strong states over weak states and of states over their people” 
(2010, p. 96). In the domestic realm he observes that “upholding a duty of care under 
the threat of external sanctions pushes representative governments into the realm of 
paternalism where states have responsibilities for their people rather than to their 
people” (2010, p. 81). Although Cunliffe identifies paternalism within the doctrine of 
R2P, his account of paternalism does not go further than that. For him the R2P is 
paternalistic because “it expands responsibilities without accountability” (2010, p. 93).  
Additionally, academics working on the R2P do not engage with establishing 
continuity in interventionary practice and discourse. If they did it would contradict 
their main task, which concerns establishing the consolidation of the R2P as the new 





Weiss argue that “the most dramatic development of our time – comparable to the 
Nuremberg trials and the 1948 Convention on Genocide in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II – relates to the responsibility to protect” (2009, p. 22). Change is here 
conceptualized in normative terms. The R2P is presented as that which effects change 
by envisioning sovereignty as responsibility and not sovereignty as a right.  
I now turn to the post-colonial literature. Given that post-colonial accounts do not offer 
explanations or justifications regarding interventionism what follows will simply 
focus on post-colonialism’s approach to continuity and change. The Postcolonial 
literature addresses issues such as the impact of colonial practices on the production 
and representation of identities, the discursive practices of colonizers, questions of 
race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality and hybridity (Chowdhry and Nair, 2004, p. 
2; Pilario, 2007, p. 52). Scholars in this tradition give special attention to discourse as 
a powerful material to draw parallels between historical periods. Argument as a 
variable accounting for continuity is observed in the volume Empire, Development 
and Colonialism edited by Vernon Hewitt and Mark Duffield. It is valuable in that 
parallels between arguments of the 1840s over “what is Empire for” and current 
debates about the need for humanitarian intervention by the West are identified (2009, 
p. 2). In his chapter Duffield illustrates how the fragile state discourse reproduces key 
assumptions and rationales of colonial bureaucracy, such as the Liberal practice of 
indirect rule or native administration (p. 116).  
Lisa Smirl, a contributor to this volume, detects continuity in the material and spatial 
practices of the international community with previous Anglo-Indian colonial 
experiences (Smirl, 2009, p. 97). Similarly, Rob Skinner and Alan Lester point to a 
resemblance between contemporary humanitarian action and past imperial projects 
(2012, p. 729). A further example is the work of Asselin Charles, who observes 
continuity in colonial discourse from medieval times to today. He argues that 
“colonialist discourse today also assumes the guise of the literature of economic 
development in which the old Western dichotomy of barbarism and civilization is 
replaced by concepts such as development and underdevelopment” (1995, p. 151). The 





and change in interventionist practices. Additionally, it presents the many parallels in 
interventionary practice and discourse identified by this literature. Having reviewed 
the various approaches literatures associated with interventionary practices employ to 
explain, justify and track change and continuity, I now turn to an exploration of both 
the meaning and usage of paternalism in the existing empirical literatures.  
2.2 Paternalism in IR  
It is in the wider IR literature that paternalism is investigated in a more thorough 
manner. The significance of these works lies in their investigation of paternalism on 
various topics, illustrating its utility, significance and relevance. A major contribution 
of these works is that they introduce paternalism and provide a certain clarity in 
conceptualization which is otherwise lacking. However, only a handful of works deal 
with paternalism in IR, leaving behind many unanswered questions. To date, 
paternalism in states’ military interventions has not been the subject of scholarly 
enquiry. In majority, paternalism is investigated in relation to humanitarianism and 
humanitarian governance (Barnett, 2011, 2017).  
The role of the state is often given less importance when compared to that of 
humanitarian organizations, NGOs, humanitarian workers, activists etc. Additionally, 
paternalism has also been studied on a theoretical level (Hobson, 2012). In reviewing 
current scholarship on paternalism I seek to identify the ways in which it is 
conceptualized and employed. In Empire of Humanity Barnett provides a refreshing 
take on the history of humanitarianism illustrating that it does indeed extend further 
back than what is claimed by the standard story where the Cold War is seen as 
signaling a transformation in humanitarianism. He identifies power as a constant of 
humanitarianism and argues that “politics, power and ethics have combined to alter 
the practice of Empire” (2011, p. 8).  
Paternalism is seen as the best candidate to capture these changes and 
humanitarianism’s enduring tensions. He further elaborates on the usefulness of 





paternalism. Humanitarianism is seen as defined by a paradox of emancipation and 
domination resulting from its very nature. On this Barnett argues that 
“humanitarianism is partly paternalism – the belief that some people should act in 
ways that are intended to improve the welfare of those who might not be in a position 
to help themselves” (p. 12). He places emphasis on the issue of consent and adopts 
Gerald Dworkin’s definition of paternalism, which is widely adopted in the literature 
on interventionism (Bain, 2003; Barnett, 2011).  
Further, Barnett uses paternalism to highlight two issues seen as integral to 
humanitarianism’s history. The first centers on “who is the human that demands our 
compassion? and the second on “how do we know what is best for another person?” 
(2011, p. 35). He comes to the conclusion that both questions relate to conceptions of 
superiority and inferiority. By employing these two questions as referent points, he 
observes changes occurring throughout the three distinct historical periods he 
investigates: Imperial Humanitarianism 18th-WWII; Neo-Humanitarianism WWII-
end of Cold War; Liberal Humanitarianism end of Cold War-present (2011, p.9). He 
notes that between the periods of Imperial humanitarianism and Neo humanitarianism, 
“humanitarianism’s once explicit religious discourse was losing ground to the 
discourse of humanity and international community” (2011, p. 94). For an exploration 
of paternalism limited to explaining the expansion of an international ethics of care, 
these two lines of enquiry seem to suffice. Although Barnett’s history of 
humanitarianism accounts for the two camps (emergency and alchemical1) 
constituting it, his account overwhelmingly focuses on relief aid. Consequently the 
role of the state is acknowledged only in so far as it has had any impact on 
humanitarian organizations.  
Unlike Barnett, Hetherington (1978) provides a systematic analysis of British 
paternalism during the inter-war period. Additionally, her investigation centers on 
paternalism in relation to the roles (administration) of Britain in Africa and not on 
                                                 
1 The emergency branch of humanitarianism concentrates on the immediate relief of individuals needing 
help, whilst the alchemical branch goes further, focusing on remedying the causes of suffering (Barnett, 





humanitarian relief. Hetherington’s work is valuable in providing insight on how to 
identify British paternalism. Her account of British paternalism during the inter-war 
period illustrates how paternalism was embodied in beliefs, assumptions and policies 
directly dependent and fueled by racist views, social evolutionary theories and Social 
Darwinism. She looks at how the new roles Britain acquired were influenced by 
various beliefs, which in turn enabled practices of administration. Inequality and 
distinctions of superiority-inferiority as markers of paternalism are clearly and 
explicitly identified in her work. On this she argues that “the paternalist doctrine of 
the inter-war period allowed claims to superiority from the part of Britain …which in 
turn lead to the claim to be able to promote desirable political, economic and social 
development in Africa” (p. 158). She presents only one aspect of British paternalism, 
pertaining to a very specific historical period. As a result she fails to account for British 
paternalism’s multifaceted and complex reality. British paternalism’s external 
dimension is accounted for while its domestic manifestation is excluded from her 
analysis.  
Unlike the above, John M. Hobson’s book The Eurocentric Conception of World 
Politics investigates paternalism in a distinctive way, at the level of theory. He draws 
analogies between past and present Eurocentric discourses and perceives paternalism 
as derivative of Eurocentrism. In this account paternalist Eurocentric discourse is 
followed through time via meta-narratives underpinning each international relations 
theory in terms of a) particulars of standard of civilization, b) degree of agency 
ascribed to East–West and c) position to imperialism (2012, p. 3). A feature of 
Eurocentric paternalism he observes as typical of all Eurocentric variants explored is 
their tendency to separate East from West, ridding the latter of all negative features 
and transposing them to the former (p. 9). Equating paternalism with Western 
imperialism is problematic since it precludes the identification of paternalism outside 
the West. Also the origins of paternalism do not begin with imperialism. Indeed it is 
possible to identify paternalism as far back as the sixteenth century when it was 





Finally, I now turn to the recently published edited volume Paternalism beyond 
Borders (Barnett, 2017), embodying the most recent academic contribution on 
paternalism in IR. Its inter-disciplinary character enables the identification of 
paternalism in humanitarian governance on issues such as asylum policies, 
peacebuilding, gender and violence, FGM/C (female genital mutilation/cutting), 
humanitarian aid and sex trafficking. Its value is that it shows the relevance of 
paternalism in current affairs. The volume looks at paternalism analytically, 
normatively and at its historical institutional variations. The interest in paternalism 
stems from the duality between control and care characterizing it. Thus, it is seen as a 
useful tool through which to consider how power figures in relations of care. Also, the 
contributors to the volume fill an existing gap in understandings of paternalism in IR 
by demonstrating that there are different paternalisms. Richardson distinguishes 
between true and aggravated paternalism, Fassin between soft and hard, Hopgood 
between pure and pragmatic and Barnett between strong and weak.  
Another important contribution of this volume lies in its conceptualization of power. 
It distances itself from the standard definition of power involving A getting B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do, moving to a conception of power where 
circumstances, institutions, and structures do not let an actor make decisions regarding 
his/her welfare. This manner of conceptualizing power leads Barnett to define 
paternalism as “the attempt by one actor to substitute his judgment for another’s on 
the grounds that it is in the latter’s best interests or welfare” (2017, p. 13). The value 
of this definition rests on it being more flexible than existing definitions of paternalism 
and that it does not include consent.  
In unanimity the contributors to the above-mentioned volume see paternalism as 
relational and hierarchical. As such inequality and hierarchy are seen as constituted by 
pre-existing structures and authority relations distributing different roles with 
differential social capacities creating positions of inferiority/superiority. The 
contributors detect several structures and relations of inferiority/superiority such as: 
civilizational, class-based, epistemic, and related to a discourse of humanity. By and 





version described by Barnett as “paternalism light” (2017). Continuity and change in 
paternalism are identified through the following variables: acceptable means, duration, 
basis of confidence, character of accountability and scope. Despite acknowledging that 
not all features have shifted at the same time and pace the only element seen as 
exhibiting continuity is the scope of paternalism. The shift in paternalism is considered 
as resulting from the institutionalization of liberalism and rationalism. All in all this 
volume showcases the relevance of paternalism is discussions of current affairs and 
brings forth a number of interesting contributions as outlined above.  
2.3 Beyond the State of the Art 
Current scholarship on paternalism in IR sheds light on its relevance when 
investigating unequal relations both in practice and in theory. Further it establishes 
that paternalism is indeed a reality and that it did not end with Imperialism. However, 
this scholarship does not engage thoroughly with paternalism and military 
interventions. Although discussions on peacebuilding point to the existence of 
paternalism, and paternalism has been identified in discourses and practices, these 
usually focus on aid workers and NGOs. Paternalism’s utility in exploring the manner 
in which states legitimate their interventionary practice and discourse is left 
unexplored. This is a gap that my research aims to fill. This research will show that 
paternalism is in fact more inherent than just the legitimation, and that it is an 
ontological characteristic of British state interventionism. 
Specifically, the thesis responds to contemporary accounts on humanitarian 
intervention and R2P, which posit a radical change in interventionary practice and 
discourse in the post-cold war era. I make use of justifications provided by the 
literature in order to illustrate that these contain paternalistic features. Unlike 
contemporary accounts on interventionism I do not seek to explain or justify the 
occurrence of states’ interventionary practice and discourse. Rather, I aim to establish 
continuity in interventionism by tracking the manifestation of paternalism historically. 





practice, discourse and representation. Given that my aim is to establish continuity, 
my approach relates to post-colonialism and state-building and diverges considerably 
from humanitarian intervention, R2P.  
I associate with the post-colonial approach first, because they focus on continuity 
between the contemporary period and the colonial period, and second, because of the 
importance accorded to discursive practices and to representations as a means of 
drawing parallels between historical practices. In the same manner I associate with 
scholars on international administration who identify parallels between previous and 
current practices of administration of foreign territory. My approach to continuity and 
change takes into account the importance of power as determining the representation 
that states make of themselves internationally and as structuring the legitimating 
discourse employed by the UK.  
Moreover, I intend to use the R2P to illustrate a continuation in interventionary 
practice and discourse. Although the introduction of the R2P norm alters the narrative 
states employ to justify interventions, the R2P is itself extremely paternalistic, as I will 
demonstrate in Chapter 8. It retains the hierarchy and inequality defining military and 
non-military interventions. Accordingly I associate with critical writings on the R2P, 
which interpret the doctrine as a continuation of humanitarian intervention. However, 
scholars on humanitarian intervention point to norms as carriers of change in the 
interventionary practice and discourse of states, whereas I will argue that international 
norms have often served to mediate or naturalize paternalism, and that paternalism can 
in any case continue despite normative change, as that change mainly affects the way 
paternalist discourse and practice are justified and expressed.  
In fact my analysis of empirical cases from the different periods will rather show that 
the changes in norms have gone in the direction of incorporating elements of 
paternalism characteristic of the paternalistic political culture of the interventionist 
states, the UK in my case. This focus on the interventionary practice and discourse of 
a particular state also differentiates my research from Barnett’s (2011). The fact that 





my conceptualization with that of Hobson (2012). My interest in Hobson’s work 
(2012) relates to the method in which analogies are drawn between past and present 
Eurocentric discourses, but I do not share his view of paternalism as a derivative of 
Eurocentrism because it precludes the existence of other forms of paternalism, 
particularly non-western. In order to proceed further in developing a holistic 
conception of the relations between paternalism and interventionism, the next chapter 








3 Paternalism: Conceptual Framework 
and Methodology 
 
Since this thesis aims to demonstrate continuity in state interventionary practice and 
discourse through paternalism the optimal methodology to deploy is a comparative 
analysis of the most relevant case-studies of the type used in the literature that argues 
for change in the pattern of interventionary practices. The comparison aims to 
demonstrate that paternalism is a constant, by showing that it manifests itself in all 
these cases, across different historical periods and global/international structures and 
norms. This chapter, then, will present the conceptual and methodological foundations 
of this thesis. First I will show how I developed a working definition of paternalism 
based on a critical assessment of its different conceptualizations in the cross-
disciplinary literature.  
Paternalism has been the subject of extensive research and has been of interest to 
scholars of various disciplines. However, there has been a lack of unanimity in 
understanding precisely what is meant by paternalism. Because of this, the existing 
literature offers a broad array of definitions of the concept of paternalism, none of 
which is satisfactory for the purposes of this thesis.  The lack of agreement across 
disciplines about just what paternalism is reflects the complex nature of its reality. 
This has long been acknowledged by scholars who argue that “paternalism is a time-
worn term that has had indefinite meaning in common usage” (Jackman, 1994, p. 10). 
Consequently the lack of conceptual clarity acts as an obstacle for future research on 
the topic and this is the first problem that this thesis needs to address.  
The following review of the literature will specifically highlight three significant 
factors accounting for differences in understandings of paternalism. The first is 
context-specificity. The different contexts in which the concept is examined inevitably 





A second major cause of definitional variation is the conceptualization of paternalism 
as either manifested in domestic social relations or inter-societal relations, both of 
which are in fact relevant to the phenomenon, and even interrelated. The third reason 
for the lack of a common understanding of paternalism is that it is conceived and 
treated as either a practice, a discourse, or a representation (ideology) instead of being 
approached as an integrated whole. This compartmentalization is the source of much 
of the confusion found in the literature.  
The critical examination of this literature that takes into account all these complicating 
factors will lead me to formulate a working definition of paternalism that avoids the 
existing confusion and conceptual fragmentation, while also allowing me to deploy 
my empirical methodology. Once I have ascertained the main characteristics defining 
paternalism I will present the methodological principles guiding my research which 
centre on the comparative approach, the most appropriate methods through which 
paternalism will be studied in the context of British interventionism and the approach 
to data analysis I adopt in this thesis.  
3.1 What is Paternalism? A Holistic Conceptualization 
The literature focusing on paternalism as a form of social relations illuminates on its 
usage and conceptualization in a multitude of contexts such as medicine, nursing, 
mental health, philosophy, anthropology, social work, industry, management, welfare 
economics, social policy and governance, and sociology. As for paternalism’s 
manifestation in inter-societal relations, it is conceptualized in the context of 
Imperialism/Colonialism, whose meaning is captured by historical and post-colonial 
accounts. When paternalism is treated as a practice, the literature unanimously ascribes 
coercion as its defining characteristic. This applies to both realms in which paternalism 
manifests itself. However, the coerciveness of paternalism is identified in differing 
ways. Depending on the context in which paternalism is studied, it tends to be seen as 
coercive, less coercive or as not involving coercion. Conceptualizing paternalistic 





relations, this is best illustrated in the disciplines of philosophy, anthropology, in the 
medical setting (mental health), in public health and in social work. In philosophy, a 
paternalistic practice is coercive because it is carried out without the consent of the 
subject and involves an “interference with the liberty of action or autonomy of another 
person” (Dworkin, 1972; VanDeVeer, 1986, p. 12). Accordingly, laws requiring 
motorcyclists to wear safety helmets when operating their machines are classed as 
paternalistic (Dworkin, 1972, p. 65). 
The same applies to anthropological research on corporate categories and groups, 
where paternalism is seen to “block or destroy the corporate autonomy” of its 
prospective beneficiaries (Goodell, 1985, p. 250). Alternatively, in social work, the 
interference applies “to intentions, actions, emotional states and the right to accurate 
information of another person” (Reamer, 1983, p. 260). Such differences are also 
apparent in medicine, public and mental health. In these contexts a paternalistic 
practice involves “the intentional overriding of one person’s known preferences or 
actions” (Lyerly and Rothman, 2004; Seo, Kim and Rhee, 2013) “the usurpation of 
decision making power by preventing people from doing what they have decided” 
(Buchanan, 2008, p. 15). Unlike in philosophy, in the medical setting and in social 
work a paternalistic practice also entails the withholding of information from the 
patient (Buchanan, 1978, p. 371; Reamer, 1983, p. 260). This difference is owed to 
the context in which paternalism manifests itself.  
As a result, when philosophical accounts theorize doctor-patient relations it is 
acknowledged that “one can act paternalistically by telling people the truth, as when a 
doctor insists that a patient know the exact nature of her illness, contrary to her wishes” 
(Audi, 1999, p. 646). The coercive aspect of a paternalistic practice is also illustrated 
in inter-societal relations by both historical and post-colonial accounts. Turning first 
to historical accounts, Bernard Porter’s study on British imperialism identifies how 
the British did not consult the natives in the Empire. He notes that “for years India had 
been ruled as if she were to be ruled for ever, a ward whose majority was never 
contemplated” (1996, p. 188). Alternatively, Cain and Hopkins note that paternalism 





in Great Britain. The most illustrative is the case of India where improvement was 
“imposed by paternal rather than liberal means” (2002, p. 98). The latter 
conceptualization of a paternalistic practice as involving an imposition is also 
identified by the postcolonial literature. According to these accounts a paternalistic 
practice is coercive because it forces upon other people cultural practices or ideas 
foreign to them. For example, colonial powers relied on coercive religious conversion 
in order to bring spiritual welfare to colonial peoples. The latter were also inserted 
“into the economic infrastructure of colonialism which was to bring the material 
benefits of Western science” (Narayan, 1995, p. 134). The drawback of 
conceptualizing paternalistic practice as coercive is that it excludes the identification 
of a paternalistic practice when consent from the subject is given. 
A review of the literature brings forth an alternative conceptualization based on a 
process of legitimation of authority and deference acknowledged in both social and 
inter-societal realms. In social relations this has been recorded in the industrial and 
management setting. Here, the coerciveness of a paternalistic practice is not easily 
identifiable. Coercion features in an implicit manner. Although paternalism functions 
as a strategy of labor control it develops as a form of personalization where the 
employer individuates relations with his/her employees and features a role 
transcending concern towards them (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 392).2 This also 
applies to the context of paternalistic leadership at the individual level, where 
paternalism is identified as “the care, protection and guidance in both work and non-
work domains” (Aycan, 2006, p. 446). That paternalistic practice is characterized by 
deference is also recognized in inter-societal relations in historical accounts.  
This is consistent with arguments that “paternalistic practices were sometimes 
accepted by non-Europeans (Indians) because they fitted local norms of authority and 
government” (Johnson, 2003, p. 83). The principle on which these people operated 
assumed that those in authority should behave as “the mother and father of the people” 
                                                 
2 This assistance takes the form of housing, mutual benefits, and pension funds, schools, stores and 






(Johnson, 2002, p. 83). A middle way of conceptualizing paternalism is to see at as 
more or less coercive. For example, in social relations in the context of welfare 
economics “the coerciveness of paternalism depends on whether it compels, induces 
or persuades” (Burrows, 1993, p. 562). This also applies to the context of social policy 
and welfare programs. Here, a paternalistic practice takes the form of supervision, 
such as the teaching of parenting skills or the giving of advice on training, or the act 
of compelling the poor to work where the objective is to change their behavior 
(Macgregor, 1999, p. 109).  
Similarly in the area of governance, recorded by historical studies, a paternalistic 
practice is identified as one that rules, guides or helps other people (the rich vis-à-vis 
the poor) (Thornton, 1966, p. 13; Roberts, 1979, p. 4). By conceptualizing paternalistic 
practice in this manner it is also possible to identify paternalism as compelling another 
person and ruling (Thorton, 1966, p.13; Roberts, 1979, p.4; MacGregor, 1999, p.109). 
In the same manner, the discipline of sociology identifies paternalistic practice as 
“persuasion” (Jackman, 1994, p.4). Similarly in inter-societal relations seeing 
paternalism as more or less coercive enables the identification of a paternalistic 
practice as that of rendering a service and guidance (Johnson, 2002, p. 83; Narayan, 
1995, p. 133; Baaz, 2008, p. 168). For instance, in the context of development aid, aid 
workers engage in “teaching the partner how to be independent and how to use their 
own resources” (Baaz, 2008, p. 168).  
As a result, my conceptualization of paternalism as practice can be seen as 
incorporating both the idea that paternalism is based on a process of legitimation as 
involving deference and as operating on various levels of coercion. In my 
conceptualization, paternalism can operate without coercion because it also operates 
on the level of legitimation of the action of the agent and of his/her status. This 
understanding of coercion acknowledges that a country could accept an intervention 
on its territory by another country, because it has already internalized the paternalistic 
relationship as “normal”. As a result, the victim can be seen as enabling his/her own 
subjection to the powerful. However, by conceptualizing paternalism as a practice that 





is not coercive, but rather that coercion is not necessarily visible, since it is not needed 
once legitimacy is internalized by the subject being treated paternalistically. 
As such paternalistic practice is that which involves caring, guidance, protection 
(Thorton, 1966, p. 13; Roberts, 1979, p. 4; MacGregor, 1999, p. 109; Aycan, 2006, p. 
446), supervision, teaching, giving advice, helping (Thorton, 1966, p. 13; Roberts, 
1979, p. 4; Narayan, 1995, p. 133; MacGregor, 1999, p. 109; Johnson, 2002, p. 83; 
Baaz, 2008, p. 168), compelling another person and ruling (Thorton, 1966, p. 13; 
Roberts, 1979, p. 4; MacGregor, 1999, p. 109) and  persuading (Jackman, 1994, p. 4). 
What the analysis of the literature further reveals is that paternalistic practice needs a 
certain justification, visible in discourse. When conceptualized as a discourse, 
paternalism is attributed distinct characteristics. The literature unanimously 
characterizes paternalism in both social and inter-societal relations as benevolent. 
Here again some differences are observed when moving from one context to another. 
In addition the literature also characterizes paternalistic discourse as containing the 
language of obligation, moral responsibility and duty.  
A paternalistic practice is seen as undertaken for the good of another person. This is 
the case in both social and inter-societal relations across contexts. In social relations, 
in the medical context, in nursing, mental health, public health, and philosophy 
practices are undertaken “for the own good of the person interfered with” (Kopelman, 
2004, para. 1), to “benefit the other person” (Lyerly and Rothman, 2004; Seo, Kim 
and Rhee, 2013, p. 217) or with the purpose of doing some good (Cody, 2003). This 
benevolence is also articulated in a more specific manner where the purpose of the 
action is to promote the welfare of people (Reamer, 1983, p. 268) or the welfare, good, 
happiness, and needs of the person who is coerced (Dworkin, 1972, p. 65; Kleinig, 
1983). 
In social work a paternalistic discourse is characterized with benevolence because it is 
concerned with the welfare of people (Reamer, 1983, p. 268). Alternatively, in welfare 
economics and anthropology concerned with corporate categories and groups a 





a net welfare gain” (Burrows, 1993, p. 559), or “provide an economic benefit to the 
other person” (Goodell, 1985, p. 248). This recurring element can also be found in the 
context of governance in 19th century Britain articulated as: “for the benefit of the 
governed, there needed to be a widening and strengthening of the zones of paternal 
authority” (Thornton, 1966, p. 17). Such arguments were complemented by the 
following: “the government must be for the good of the people and not for what pleases 
them” (Thorton, 1966, p. 49).  
Similarly in inter-societal relations benevolence is seen as characteristic of 
paternalistic discourse. However, the conceptualization of paternalism as discourse in 
historical and post-colonial accounts diverges on some points. In historical writings 
paternalistic discourse is characterized by benevolence where practices (legislations) 
are undertaken having in mind “the true interests of people in the Third World” 
(Tomlinson, 1991, p. 119). Similarly, for post-colonial scholarship paternalism 
functions on “a care discourse” where practices are undertaken for “the interest of, the 
good of, and the promotion of the welfare of other people” (Narayan, 1995, p. 134). 
However, in these writings caring takes the form of control and domination exercised 
by the privileged and powerful group (Narayan, 1995, p. 135).  
The above unanimity is complemented by some differences. The first is visible in 
social relations in the medical context, in nursing, mental health, public health, and 
philosophy paternalistic practices have a dual purpose, benefiting and avoiding harm 
to another person (Dworkin, 1972; Buchanan, 1978; Kleinig, 1983; Cody, 2003; 
Kopelman, 2004; Lyerly and Rothman, 2004; Seo, Kim and Rhee, 2013). The second 
difference in the understanding of benevolence is visible in labor relations and 
sociology. Although benevolence is characteristic of paternalistic discourse, in labor 
relations taking the form of “a putative concern for the welfare of the working poor 
provided they are kept within bounds” (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 395; Hay, 1998, 
p. 27), the objective, is the exploitation and domination of the workforce (Padavic and 
Earnest, 1994, p. 392; Wray, 1996, p. 702; Aycan, 2006, p. 455). Similarly in 
sociology, although a paternalistic discourse contains positive feelings for another 





the presence of conceptions of moral superiority prevailing in unequal relations 
(Jackman, 1994, p. 14). As a result, paternalism for Jackman is characterized by a 
mixture of positive feelings and discrimination vis-à-vis another group (1994, p. 11).  
Further, scholarly engagement with paternalism brings to light an additional 
component of paternalistic discourse, namely moral duty and responsibility. In the 
context of governance from a historical perspective paternalistic discourse conveys 
the duties of the governing classes towards those of lower rank (Thornton, 1966, p. 
48,49; Roberts, 1979, p. 4; Lawes, 2000, p. 13). Likewise, in the medical setting 
doctors and personnel have a moral duty to interfere in order to determine whether the 
person is competent (Kopelman, 2004). Conversely, in the management and industrial 
context paternalistic discourse contains moral responsibilities of both employers and 
employees (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976, p. 418; Wray, 1996, p. 704). In the context 
of welfare programs, welfare users have a responsibility for themselves. In case they 
fail to act responsibly, the responsibility falls on the government (MacGregor, 1999, 
p. 109).    
This is also the case in inter-societal relations. For historians such as Porter, this is 
visible in discourses during imperialism articulated as follows: 
I conceive that by the acquisition of its colonial dominions the Nation has 
incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw 
off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful 
instrument, under providence of maintaining peace and order in many 
extensive regions of the earth, and thereby assisting in diffusing amongst 
millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization. 
(Third Earl Grey, in Porter, 1996, p. 30) 
According to the above paternalism conveys a responsibility on the part of the British 
towards the inhabitants of their colonies. Alternatively post-colonial writings see 
paternalism as a responsibility by looking at paternalism as a discourse of difference. 
As was the case in social relations, in this realm a paternalistic discourse incorporates 





whereas the European is constructed as reliable and trustworthy (Baaz, 2008, p. 167). 
Both historical and post-colonial accounts see a paternalist ideology as based on 
Eurocentric ideas about evolutionary development, according to the view that there 
are stages of development for all peoples (Porter, 1996, p. 167; Baaz, 2008, p. 167). 
What this connotes is that some have duties, obligations and responsibilities towards 
a specific segment of the population.  
My conceptualization of paternalistic discourse takes into account all the common 
elements found within the literature. First, that a paternalistic discourse espouses 
benevolence. Second that it contains a language of responsibility, obligation and duty. 
The objective is then claimed to be to benefit another person in a broad sense, 
including the welfare of people. However, I take into account that paternalism also 
espouses a duality between control and care as acknowledged in the industrial setting 
and in sociology (Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 395; Jackman, 1994, p. 14; Hay, 1998, 
p. 27; Aycan, 2006, p. 455). Whereas for some paternalism constitutes a practice or a 
discourse, for others it is conceptualized as a representation of a social/economic order 
(ideology).  
The literature agrees that a paternalistic representation is characterized by a hierarchy, 
inequality and a difference. What is more, the literature makes apparent two types of 
representations, one of an economic or social order and one of a paternal kind. In social 
relations, in the industrial and management context paternalism is seen as hierarchic 
and unequal because the organization of relations functions under a family sentiment 
(Padavic and Earnest, 1994, p. 399; Wray, 1996, p. 702). This relationship is based on 
certain duties ascribed to the superior (care, protection, guidance) and the subordinate 
(loyalty and deference) (Aycan, 2006, p. 446). It is in this context that paternalism as 
a representation of an economic order is observed. Hierarchy and inequality in the 
industrial and management context serve a certain objective, the organization of a 
productive unit (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976, p. 413).  
The same applies to paternalism as a representation of a social order. Here inequality, 





(Kopelman, 2004) or the way in which a certain harmony and order are established in 
society (Roberts, 1979, p.4; Lawes, 2000, p.9). Similarly, in sociology relations 
between unequal groups are seen as hierarchic and unequal, operating on the family 
model (Jackman, 1994, p. 10). However, in this context the relationship is determined 
by ascribing superior characteristics such as “prestige” and “privilege” to one group 
(dominant) over another (Jackman, 1994, p. 3). The family model as an organizing 
principle of healthcare delivery is acknowledged by a minority in the medical setting 
(Kopelman, 2004). However, what renders a representation/ideology paternalistic in 
the medical setting is difference. This involves differentiating the paternalist from the 
paternalized. Patients are represented as missing certain qualities that would allow 
them to take decisions.  
Also found in mental health, nursing and social policy (welfare programs) is that 
patients or welfare users are described as incompetent. Patients are seen as incapable 
of rational decision-making and as a danger to themselves and others (Cody, 2003, p. 
288; Buchanan, 2008, p. 17; Seo, Kim and Rhee, 2013, p. 218). Likewise in social 
policy users are seen as incompetent, as “lacking certain capacities” (Ben-Ishai, 2012, 
p. 151). What differentiates paternalism in these contexts is that in social policy society 
is seen as structured in the following manner: “a first world (global elite), a second 
world (middle class) and a third world (of poor and deviant)” (MacGregor, 1999, p. 
109). A paternalistic representation involving hierarchy and inequality is also present 
in historical accounts on governance. 
Both were characteristic of a paternalist view of nineteenth century society in England. 
Society was viewed as authoritarian, hierarchic, organic and pluralist (Roberts, 1979, 
p. 4; Lawes, 2000, p. 9). In this context, hierarchy was established through the 
acquisition of property, seen as the source of authority. Additionally it required 
dependence on the part of servants and agricultural laborers (Thorton, 1966, p. 62; 
Roberts, 1979, p. 4). Further, what is characteristic of this paternalistic representation 
is that it originated from a class of employers and country gentlemen (Hay, 1998, p. 
45; Lawes, 2000, p. 4). As is the case in other contexts, paternalism functions on the 





good for those depending on them, just as a father knows what is good for his children” 
(Roberts, 1979, p. 53). Quite apart from the above, in the discipline of archaeology the 
characteristics ascribed to a paternalistic ideology are those of concern and help 
(Goodell, 1985, p. 252). This is due to archaeologists’ interest in studying the effects 
of state paternalism on groups within the state’s domain. Although I made a distinction 
between two types of representations, it is important to understand that this distinction 
is not clear-cut.  
In all contexts, the family analogy, the father-child relationship is employed 
unanimously as a way to understand paternalistic practice but also a means by which 
this analogy, relationship helps justify paternalistic practices. It demonstrates the way 
in which authority is established in paternalistic relations. In inter-societal relations, a 
paternalistic representation is ascribed the same characteristics. However, in this 
context the representation is based on civilizational references based on Eurocentric 
ideas about evolutionary development (Porter, 1996, p. 167; Baaz, 2008, p. 167). As 
acknowledged by historical and post-colonial accounts, the representation of the other 
as inferior is corollary to their subjugation. The post-colonial literature makes apparent 
how the self is represented differently from the other and “people are situated at a 
different stage of development and enlightenment” (Baaz, 2008, p. 167). Additionally, 
racist stereotypes about the negative and inferior status of the other (Narayan, 1995, 
p. 133) are also seen as part of this process of representation.  
According to these accounts this process of representation works in the following way 
in practice: “those who are seen as reliable tend to function as informal controllers and 
as sources of responsibility” (Baz, 2008, p. 167). In a similar way, historians view a 
representation as paternalistic when it asserts the superiority of one culture over the 
other (Johnson, 2002, p. 83). For example, during imperialism, non-Europeans were 
                                                 
3 The ideological components of paternalism in this context bear similarities with contexts discussed 
above. As an ideology paternalism is based on a set of duties such as the obligation to “rule firmly and 
superintend” (Roberts, 1979, p. 6). In addition, this ideology entailed a responsibility from the part of 






represented as children (Porter, 1996, p. 346)4. In addition, paternalism is seen as 
hierarchic and unequal in that people are not ascribed similar characteristics. For 
instance, non-Europeans were represented as inferior, signifying a lack in qualities of 
character (Porter, 1996, p. 46). The inequality, characteristic of paternalism, is seen in 
the form of superior knowledge on the part of Europeans articulated as “we in the West 
know better the needs of other cultures than the members of those cultures” 
(Tomlinson, 1991, p. 116). The following is a good illustration of a paternalistic 
representation and its ideological components in the context of colonialism:  
The “master” arrogated to himself, with a good conscience, the right to define 
the ways to happiness and progress for the “slave” or the “pupil”; everyone, left 
and right, used the same standard or model (that is, France) and the same basic 
ideas about civilization and barbarism; the left, then and later, was not immune 
to ideas, encouraged by the anthropology of the time, about “inferior” 
civilizations and one single, inevitable form of human evolution (cited in 
Derrick, 2002, p. 55).  
In my conceptualization of paternalism, I take into account these two interconnected 
manners of representation which, I argue, are decisive in the understandings of 
paternalism. Inequality, hierarchy and difference are seen as a product of a 
representation of social and economic order, and of the differential representation of 
the self and other. By using the common characteristics and elements I have extracted 
from the literature on paternalism I here develop my own working definition of 
paternalism:  
Paternalism is a coherent system of practices, discourses and representations 
that legitimate the actions, and their objectives, of groups claiming to have an 
                                                 
4
 Historically, the British employed this father-child analogy to justify their rule and subsequently its 
relaxation during decolonization (Porter, 1996, p. 346). By depicting non-Europeans as children, the 
superior Europeans could claim that they were helping their children develop. As argued by paternalists 
during the 19th century ‘the object of parenthood was just this, to fit your children for an independent 






obligation towards those they view as inferior, incompetent, and in need of 
being protected as in a parent-child relationship. 
The above definition reflects my conceptualization of paternalism, which differs from 
what has been envisioned by the literature, in that the complex inter-relationship 
between practice, discourse and representation/ideology is acknowledged and the 
concept is defined accordingly. Representation, discourse and practice are so co-
constitutive and mutually supportive that they cannot be studied independently of one 
another. For instance, the discourse of obligation pre-exists or coexists with the 
practice of protection. A paternalistic discourse is understood as a practice itself and 
as manifesting certain representations and ideologies. Further, a representation can 
take the following two forms, as representing other groups as incompetent and as 
representing the other group, speaking on their behalf. The former, representing other 
groups as incompetent, is also considered as a practice itself. A practice can also 
produce representations. For example it is often argued that racism as an ideology was 
the product of slavery as a practice.  
The same is true for paternalism: a paternalistic practice, especially if it is viewed as 
successful, would produce the view that one is naturally predisposed to act as a 
“parent”. By defining paternalism in this manner I provide conceptual clarity in the 
understanding of the concept, which is not apparent in the literature on paternalism.  I 
do this by acknowledging two important issues relating to the concept of paternalism. 
First, the complex inter-relationship between a paternalistic representation, discourse 
and practice, and second the relationship between the social and the inter-societal 
manifestations of paternalism. The latter enables conceptualizing paternalism’s 
external manifestation as a co-extension of its internal manifestation. This chapter will 
now explain how paternalism will be studied in the context of military interventions. 
3.2 Methodological Principles: Comparative Analysis  
While studying British paternalism in the context of British interventionism this thesis 





What are the constitutive features of British paternalism and how are they 
manifested and sustained through time in the discourse, practice and 
representation (legitimation) of Britain’s domestic and external 
interventionism?  
In an attempt to facilitate my investigation, I have developed the following questions 
to guide me through this methodological overview:  
Q1. What are the specific characteristics of British Paternalism? 
Q2. How does British external paternalism extend from internal paternalism? 
OR What is the relationship between external and internal British paternalism? 
Q3. What features of British paternalism remain constant and what features 
have changed in the UK’s military interventions from the nineteenth to the 
twenty-first century? 
Q4. How is paternalism manifested in the practice, discourse and 
representation in a changing normative and global context?  
This thesis hypothesizes that the characteristics I have identified above as defining 
paternalism are always present in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, and 
that what changes is the way these are manifested or expressed in a changing 
normative and global context. More specifically, what changes is how incompetence 
is defined, and the basis of incompetence and obligation in the historical periods 
examined. It is also the manner in which distinctions are articulated between “the self” 
and “the other”, influenced by what is determined as being politically correct and 
acceptable, what is in line with the ideological setting of the time. For instance, one 
would not be disposed to employ the distinction civilized/uncivilized in the 21st 
century, or at least its use would be controversial to say the least.  
To demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse I 
compare different epochs. The periods under investigation and the cases chosen are 





the dominant literature regarding change in the interventionary practice and discourse 
of states and intergovernmental organizations. Each period follows and counters a 
specific literature. Overall I engage with interventionary practices labeled as 
humanitarian intervention, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and post-conflict 
reconstruction. The historical period I address begins with the nineteenth century and 
culminates with current events. Following the literature I have divided this long period 
into four shorter ones: Nineteenth century Imperialism, the Mandate period, the Cold 
and Post-Cold War, and the Twenty-first century.  
The number of cases I examine in each period is determined by the literature I engage 
with and the objective set. For some periods multiple cases are required to emphasize 
the manner in which paternalism manifests itself. These case studies will provide a 
holistic and in-depth understanding of each military intervention and will bring forth 
paternalistic representations, practices and discourses. The nineteenth century 
instances I address consist of the intervention in Greece 1821-1827 by Britain, France 
and Russia, British rule in India during 1830-60 and the British intervention in the 
Sudan of 1896-98. The second period dealing with the Mandate period 1920-1948 
looks at the two cases examined by the post-conflict literature: the British mandate on 
Palestine (Class A) and Tanganyika (Class B). The third period encompasses the Cold 
War and Post-Cold War periods and addresses the reconstruction of Germany 1945-
1949, the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66 and the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999. Finally, the fourth period focusing on the twenty-first century will 
investigate the R2P intervention in Libya in 2011.  
The conceptualization of paternalism provided in the first sections of this chapter will 
be used to operationalize my criteria for the comparison to be effectuated between the 
four historical periods. However, my focus on Britain as a case study calls for a need 
to establish the characteristics of British paternalism. These will be identified by 
focusing on an extended period in time, from the eighteenth century to the 
establishment of the welfare state in England. In essence I will be constructing the 
concept of British paternalism by reconstituting its social and intellectual history 





characteristics of British paternalism. To that end I will be focusing on changes 
occurring in the normative, ideological and global context. 
Let us now turn to the data which will be employed to identify paternalism in each 
case study, and which will in turn be used to compare between cases and historical 
periods. In terms of practices I will look at specific laws and policies (native policy, 
education, land/agricultural policies), ways of governing (management of resources, 
infrastructure, and representation of natives in government), counseling and 
institutional practices towards populations abroad. Regarding discourses I will focus 
on public speeches made by political leaders, on any documentation such as 
correspondence between officials and their envoys abroad, and on Security Council 
decision-making processes and results. This will inform on the manner in which 
British policy and practices were legitimated and the place of strategic and other 
interests in defining these practices. In order to identify dominant British 
representations I examine the narratives of British elites who enacted the various 
policies abroad, with a specific focus on the nature of representations (how were the 
others represented).  
There is a need for a degree of uniformity in the type of data employed. The data needs 
to be amenable to comparative analysis. Given that paternalism consists of an 
interconnection among practice, discourse and representation and is instituted by the 
political elite of a country vis-à-vis those lower on the ladder (nationally or 
internationally) I have employed primary as well as secondary data. Primary data is 
extracted from parliamentary debates, specifically from the Hansard database. Overall 
I analyzed approximately 300 debates and written question sessions. These debates 
reflect the discourse of political elites in Britain and the representational practices at 
play. Moreover I examined correspondence between British officials and policy 
documents available at the National Archives in Kew. The material consulted at Kew 
pertains to all cases analyzed apart from the most recent case of Libya. I examined and 
analyzed around 100 records. The secondary sources I have employed include 
historical accounts, narratives and British newspaper articles informing the British 





3.3 Studying Paternalism in Britain’s Interventionary Practice 
and Discourse 
The identification of British paternalistic representations, discourses, and practices in 
Britain’s internal and external interventions are achieved through the dual employment 
of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and practice theory. Both are particularly 
informative on the way I approach paternalism since they look at the interconnections 
between practices, discourses and representations. CDA and practice theory do not 
provide a unified way of thinking about discourses or practices nor do they have a 
single strategy to study them empirically. Each is characterized by various approaches. 
Consequently, I refer to the literature that is most appropriate. Turning first to practice 
theory, all approaches share certain commitments enumerated by Bueger and 
Gadinger as “emphasizing process, practical knowledge, collectivity, materiality, and 
performativity” (2014, p. 11).  
Practice theory focuses on the relations between ideas and practices, a point conveyed 
in conceptualizations of practices provided in the literature. Generally practice 
theorists view practices as “arrays of activity”. However they diverge on what 
constitutes an activity and what connects them (Schatzki, Karin and von Savigny, 
2001, p. 11). Moreover practice theorists think of practices as “embodied, materially 
mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical 
understanding” (p. 2). According to Reckwitz a practice is “a routinized type of 
behavior which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of 
bodily activities, forms of mental activities, “things” and their use, a background 
knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge” (2002, p. 249).  
Practice theorists share the belief that a close link exists between knowledge and 
action. Additionally they also contend that practice is always linked to a collective 
(Bueger and Gadinger, 2014). Both of these premises are also reflected in my research. 
I focus on the practices carried out by individuals who belong to a collective, the 





practices as linked to their discourses and representations. In recent years the field of 
IR witnessed a renewed interest in the theorizing of practices identified as “the practice 
turn”. Examples of practice theory driven research in IR include studies on NATO 
Russia diplomacy (Pouliot, 2010), private military companies (Leander, 2005), 
security communities (Adler, 2008), Somali piracy (Bueger, 2013), or Cold War and 
Post-Cold War strategic interaction between Washington and Moscow (Adler and 
Pouliot, 2011). Predominantly these look at contemporary international practices. 
The practices I investigate constitute historical international practices that embody 
representations and knowledge. These include policies, laws, institutional practices, 
and practices of education, training, advising, governing and the behavior of British 
officers on the ground. For example in Chapter 4 I look at the institution of the Poor 
Laws and the establishment of workhouses. In Chapter 8 I look at the use of military 
force to help a persecuted population. I employ the elements I have previously 
identified as characteristic of paternalism as markers for its identification in practices 
(benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, difference, incompetence). A benevolent 
practice includes educational and administrative reforms such as teacher training, 
agricultural or administrative training. It is about giving people the tools to develop 
and learn and involves giving advice, help and guidance. Such practices are analyzed 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In Tanganyika, a case explored in Chapter 6, the British in 
charge of administering the territory provided agricultural education to the natives, 
which involved teaching them how to grow new cash crops. In Germany (Chapter 7) 
the British were re-educating German teachers by providing them with training on new 
methods of teaching. Education Control Officers not only provided advice to German 
education authorities at Land Level but they were also supervising to see how they 
were progressing with education reforms. 
Practices of administration display incompetence and protection. When administering 
foreign territories the local population rarely has a part to play. Responsibility for 
administration is given in a step-by-step process and natives usually occupy positions 
of little importance. Such practices also display protection. Practices of protection can 





people of Tanganyika were considered to have reached a level of development 
allowing them to govern on their own, Britain was tasked with the administration of 
the territory. In essence, Britain was protecting them from themselves. A practice is 
also protective when it involves sending an army to another country to save one part 
of the population as was the case in Greece discussed in Chapter 5. Such a policy is 
undertaken not to punish put to protect people in a life-threatening situation.   
To reconstitute practices as they are directly observed, practice theorists use methods 
influenced by ethnographic research known as “praxeography”. Praxeography 
includes techniques such as observing, learning, talking about and reading practices 
(Bueger and Gadinger, 2014, p. 53). Unlike the majority of practice-theory-driven 
research I do not investigate practices that are directly observable. Instead I indirectly 
reconstitute praxeographic elements reported in primary and secondary sources. The 
texts I analyze in order to identify paternalistic practices are policy documents, written 
correspondence between British political elite and histories of interventions. I 
contribute to practice theory by using a historical reconstitution of practices. What I 
do is similar to what has been done, for example, in the social history of science. Due 
to the fact that my material is not directly observable my methodology needs to be 
informed more by CDA.  
On the whole, CDA approaches to language “focus on discourse and on the 
relationship between discourse and other social elements such as power relations, 
ideologies, institutions and social identities” (Gee and Handford, 2012, p. 9). They 
assume that power relations are discursive, meaning that power is both transmitted and 
practiced via discourse (Flowerdew, 2007). The aim of CDA approaches is to increase 
awareness and bring to the fore strategies employed in “establishing, maintaining and 
reproducing asymmetrical relations of power as enacted by means of discourse” 
(Hidalgo Tenorio, 2011, p. 183). An additional aim of CDA is to provide explanations 
regarding power abuse by addressing how it is “enacted, reproduced or legitimated by 






This is of particular relevance to the subject of my research. Paternalism is intimately 
linked with power, and discourse is a way through which it is manifested. To 
demonstrate how my analysis will be carried forward I will now address the various 
ways the concept of discourse is defined in CDA and I will present the particular 
methods, tools and indicators I employed to carry out my textual analysis. All CDA 
approaches move beyond the narrow linguistic definition of discourse as “a passage 
of connected writing or speech” (Hall, 2001, p. 72). For some of these approaches 
discourse is conceived as “a communicative event, including conversational 
interaction and written texts as well as associated gestures, face work, typographical 
layout, images and any other semiotic or multi-media dimension of signification” 
(Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 25). Others see it as a semantic construction of specific 
aspects of reality that serve the interests of particular historical and social contexts 
(van Leeuwen, 2008). 
What distinguishes CDA from other methods of textual analysis is the 
conceptualization of both written and spoken language as a form of social practice 
(Parker, 1990; Fairclough, 2003; Wodak and Weiss, 2003; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). 
It is influenced by Austin’s “speech acts”, for whom “the issuing of the utterance is 
the performing of an action” (Austin, 1962, p. 6; Bourdieu, 2001, p. 18). 
Conceptualized in this manner it implies the existence of a dialectical relationship 
between a specific discursive event and the situation, institution, and social structure 
which framed it (van Dijk, 1997; Wodak & Meyer, 2009 p. 6). According to Van Dijk 
accomplishing discourse as social action requires that we “accomplish not only 
illocutionary acts such as assertions and promises but also locutionary or graphical 
acts of actual speech and writing, as well as propositional acts such as meaning 
something when we speak or write” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 10). 
Following Van Dijk’s conceptualization of discourse, discourse should not only be 
studied “as form, meaning and mental process, but also as complex structures and 
hierarchies of interaction and social practice and their functions in context, society and 
culture” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 6). At this point it is worth noting that CDA goes beyond 





discourse as a manifestation rather than as an interactional practice. Instead of looking 
at discourse as an interactional phenomenon, I approach it as a unidirectional one. I 
am only looking at the speech of one actor instead of the interaction of various actors. 
Consequently I am not employing the whole of CDA methodology. 
Ideology is a concept CDA approaches engage with extensively, focusing on its 
discursive construction and effects. For them discourses contain certain 
representations of agents and social events. For instance, Foucault sees discourse as a 
system of representation, as “a group of statements which provide a language for 
talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a 
particular time” (Hall, 2001, p. 72).  Discourse is for Foucault an abstract form of 
knowledge, understood as cognition and emotion (Tenorio, 2011). CDA approaches 
based on socio-cognitive theory conceive of discourse “as structured forms of 
knowledge and text as the concrete oral utterance or written documents” (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009). Ideology is understood as a systemic body of ideas organized from a 
particular point of view (Kress and Hodge, 1979).  
In practice CDA analysis entails looking at choices of words and grammar in texts to 
uncover the underlying discourses and ideologies (Machin and Mayr, 2012). 
Additionally it requires to look at texts at various levels. In the analysis I carry out I 
focus on the linguistic form of texts and on the context in which these discourses are 
articulated. I focus on texts (written form) such as political discourses, parliamentary 
debates and statements to the media. These discourses fall in the genre of political 
discourse. The analytical categories and markers I employ are based on my working 
definition of paternalism developed above and on the concepts I have identified as 
distinctive of paternalism (benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, incompetence 
and difference). These concepts act as markers directing attention to specific issues 
and aspects characteristic of British paternalism. As my definition of paternalism 






The above analysis demonstrated that paternalism’s first defining characteristic, 
benevolence, characterizes intent, the reasoning behind the enactment of certain 
practices or their justification. Consequently I identify benevolence or words 
espousing benevolence in texts by focusing on processes of legitimation and the 
manner in which they appear in texts. Conceptually benevolence is associated to a 
deep concern, caring and benefiting another person. Since benevolence entails intent 
it can be identified in text by looking at the semantic relationship between sentences 
and clauses (Fairclough, 2003). More specifically, causal semantic relations of 
purpose help identify the intent of certain actions. These are marked in text by 
connectors such as “so that”, “the purpose of this” and “in order to”. In the discourses 
I analyze benevolence also figures through the use of terms such as “for them”, “to 
benefit”, “in their interest” etc.  
Moving on, the concepts of obligation and duty characteristic of paternalism are used 
to explain or justify paternalistic practices. Due to the fact that feelings of 
obligation/duty are directly linked to strategies of classification, to the representation 
of others and to issues of power and authority, it is important to be attentive to 
legitimating strategies employed in text to identify them. Fairclough lists four 
strategies of legitimation: authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and 
mythopoesis (Fairclough, 2003). For the identification of obligation or other related 
words authorization and moral evaluation are most adequate. This is because the 
strategy of authorization legitimates by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, 
law and of persons in whom some kind of institutional authority is vested. 
Additionally, moral evaluation as a strategy of legitimation makes use of value 
systems. 
In the empirical chapters investigated I identify obligation/duty/responsibility as 
attached to Agreements and Treaties Britain was a party to. For example, in Malaysia 
the British sense of duty and responsibility emanated from the Anglo-Malaysian 
Defence Agreement. The way social actors are represented while legitimation occurs 
in text is crucial in identifying obligation. Accordingly I attend to the following 





here is to look at whether participants are nominated in terms of who they are, or 
functionalized in terms of what they do. The crucial point is to identify which actors 
are nominated and which are functionalized. The second classificatory strategy 
focuses on the use of pronoun and noun. By looking at this distinction in text I identify 
the “in-group” and the “out-group”. In addition, this allows me to identify obligation 
in text as a particular aspect of a specific class in society or of a specific group 
(political elite in Britain).  
The concept of protection pertains to the nature of the acts carried out by the dominant 
group in a society and externally. In order to identify how acts of protection are 
articulated discursively I pay specific attention to speech-acts. I am also guided by the 
following questions: what is done, how is it done, by whom? Is it specific of a class in 
society? Is it specific to certain countries in the international system? An additional 
course I pursue to identify the concept of protection in discourse is to look at 
justifications offered. In a number of instances British politicians justify intervention 
in foreign countries on the basis of “protecting populations”.  
The next two elements I employ for the identification of paternalism are markers of 
incompetence and difference. Although these two concepts are intimately related, each 
calls for the employment of varying strategies. The concept of difference underlies a 
specific social order and points to the existence of hierarchy. From representations of 
difference flow distinctions between “the self” and “the other” and representations of 
incompetence. Both concepts emanate from representations formed by the dominant 
group, the political elite in Britain in charge of policy-making at home and abroad. 
These representations are based on ideological considerations. There exist certain 
strategies that help extract such representations in texts. The particular representations 
I look for are representations of social actors, the ways in which these actors are 
discursively constructed in texts.  
Difference between social actors can be identified in texts by looking at the semantic 
relations between clauses and sentences. Contrastive relations marked by conjunctions 





useful in identifying difference (Fairclough, 2003). Also, metaphors and analogies are 
crucial linguistic strategies employed for representational purposes. During the British 
reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949 British politicians and officers on the ground 
made use of a number of analogies to differentiate themselves from the Germans. For 
example, Germans were represented as “cannibals” and the British as “missionaries”. 
Predication is another strategy I employ to identify difference. It requires being 
attentive to stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits 
(adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, 
infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups), comparisons, similarities, 
rhetorical figures, allusions and evocations. In most of the cases analyzed the British 
represented the objects of their interventions as victims. These people were described 
as “defenseless”, “suffering”, “ignorant”.  
This chapter presented the conceptual and methodological aspects of the thesis. It 
provided a working definition for paternalism accompanied by its constitutive 
characteristics by analyzing the conceptualizations of paternalism in the cross-
disciplinary literature. Then, the chapter described the comparative methodology at 
the heart of the thesis stemming from the very objective I seek to accomplish. My 
objective is to demonstrate continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and 
discourse through paternalism. In accordance with that, in the next chapter I 
reconstitute the social history of British paternalism concentrating on its internal and 
external manifestation. In the following four empirical chapters I identify how British 
paternalism manifests itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse by 
looking at Greece 1821-1827, British rule in India during 1830-60, the British 
intervention in the Sudan of 1896-98, the British mandate on Palestine (Class A) and 
Tanganyika (Class B) between 1920-1948, the reconstruction of Germany 1945-1949, 
the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66, the NATO intervention in Kosovo 
in 1999 and the R2P intervention in Libya 2011. The comparative analysis 
demonstrating continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse will be 






4 Investigating the Origins of British 
Paternalism in English Society and 
Politics 
In the preceding chapter, I have presented the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings that will inform the present but also subsequent chapters. On the 
theoretical level, the analysis of differing understandings and definitions of the 
concept of paternalism resulted in me formulating the following working definition:  
Paternalism is a coherent system of practices, discourses, and representations 
that legitimate the actions, and their objectives, of groups claiming to have an 
obligation towards those they view as inferior, incompetent, and in need of 
being protected as in a parent-child relationship. 
The above brings forth the following constitutive elements as characteristic of 
paternalism: benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, and representations of 
incompetence and difference. Further, this definition showcases that paternalistic 
practices, discourses and representations are unidirectional, from classes in society at 
the highest on the ladder, or the government towards a specific segment of the 
population. Additionally, this definition provides a clear insight into my 
conceptualization of paternalism as a complex system of representations, practices, 
and discourses. Although these three components are interconnected, there is no 
particular order in which this connection operates. A practice or a set of practices 
influences and is influenced by discourses and representations. Consequently, 
practices can shape representations, discourses can be used to justify practices and/or 
representations and representations in turn can influence or direct practices.  
The above definition provides a general understanding of paternalism, and acts as an 
entry point into the complex nature of its reality. Given that my research addresses 
paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, there is a need to 
identify the particularities of this British paternalism. This cannot be accomplished 





first instance I focus on England and, building on the above definition, I identify the 
characteristics of English paternalism as manifested in the eighteenth, nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The need to address paternalism in England stems from my 
identification of British paternalism as originating in English paternalism, which is in 
turn expressed towards other British nations. A coherent sketch of British paternalism 
can only emerge once its manifestation is identified in the core and then in core-
periphery relations.  
The importance of the interconnection between core and periphery in drawing a sketch 
of British paternalism rests in those in charge of policy-making. Those arguing for 
certain policies and in charge of drafting them into law are the same persons who argue 
for policy regarding nations of the periphery. In essence policy-makers of the center 
are in charge of both the center and the periphery. Although my investigation has as a 
starting-point the eighteen century, the origins of English paternalism go far back in 
history. David Roberts in Paternalism in Early Victorian England traces these origins 
to Medieval and Tudor England. For the governing classes of Tudor England the body 
politic was seen as “authoritarian, hierarchic and organic” and society was organized 
in terms of “degrees and ranks that ran from kings to villeins” (Roberts, 1979, p. 10).  
During the Tudor period paternalism found a stronger and more coherent formulation 
through the establishment of the poor laws and the creation of a paternalist state 
(Roberts, 1979, p. 13-14). However, both Thompson (1978) and Roberts (1979) 
observe an erosion of paternalism during the eighteenth century. Roberts sees this 
erosion as resulting from seventeenth-century Englishmen who “destroyed the 
paternal state, diminished the role of the church, and undermined the intellectual 
framework of a hierarchic society” (1979, p. 15). For Thompson paternalism in the 
eighteenth century declined as a result of economic relations between landlords and 
laborers which saw the erosion of the benevolent aspect in those relations (1978, p. 
144-145). Despite discontinuities in paternalism’s manifestation Roberts concludes 
that “from the late middle ages to the eighteenth century, the governing classes, 
predominantly landed, held the basic assumptions that define paternalism, but they did 





The continuities in paternalism’s manifestation identified by Roberts in Medieval, 
Tudor and Victorian England demonstrate that despite contextual changes the essence 
of English paternalism persists throughout history. In order to identify the 
characteristics of British Paternalism this chapter will be structured as follows: the 
first section will focus on the eighteenth century and will bring forth the way in which 
domestic paternalism was expressed by looking at the structure of English society and 
at institutions and policies directed at “vulnerable groups” of society such as “the 
poor”. Similarly, the second and third sections will address English paternalism in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century respectively. At the very general level it can be seen 
as an investigation into the Poor Laws (Elizabethan Poor Law/ Poor Law Amendment 
Act 1834) and the development and evolution of the welfare state in England. 
In the following section, a comparative analysis of English paternalism in the three 
periods under investigation will, by way of tracing constants in its formulation, 
provide a concrete image of English paternalism. The next section will address English 
paternalism in its external manifestation, henceforth discussed as British paternalism5. 
This will involve looking at England’s relations with Ireland, Wales and Scotland. It 
is impossible to grasp British paternalism without taking into account the way in which 
it existed outside the domestic realm. In fact the interplay between domestic and 
external British paternalism is fascinating and informative. Looking at the way in 
which domestic policies, representations and discourse influenced the colonies or vice 
versa is of great significance in understanding the origins of and possible shifts in 
British paternalism.  
4.1 English Paternalism in the Eighteenth Century 
The eighteenth century is characterized by the literature as one where “traditional” 
paternalism thrived (Sherman, 2001), indicative of the presence of an older ideology 
                                                 
5 The phrase English paternalism will be employed when addressing paternalism in England in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, when I turn to the relations between England, 
Wales, Scotland and Ireland and the manifestation of paternalism in these relations in section 5 I will 





of paternalism. This older ideology was “one of a stable and hierarchical rural order, 
which while arguing that the poor were to remain in their place, offered them in return 
care and protection of the rich considered as the protectors of the poor” (Novak, 1988, 
p. 39). During this period, paternalism was seen as functioning under a “feudal system 
of personal, face to face relationships” (Scull, 1977). In opposition, Thompson in 
Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture notes the erosion of paternalism in the relations 
between the gentry and the laboring people in the eighteenth century (1974, p. 383).  
This traditional or older ideology of paternalism seen as characteristic of 18th century 
English society coincides with my working definition of paternalism and the elements 
of benevolence, obligation/duty, protection, and representations of incompetence and 
difference identified in the previous chapter. However, in order to gain a complete 
picture of English paternalism in the eighteenth century it is crucial to look at the 
structure of society during this period, at representations of the lower classes of society 
(vulnerable groups) by those at the top of the ladder and at the Elizabethan Poor Laws, 
which since their inception in 1601 dictated the treatment of the poor. 
4.1.1 English Society: Representations of Social Order  
In order to provide a comprehensive image of English paternalism in this period it is 
crucial to focus in a first instance on the particular structure of English society. This 
involves engaging with issues such as class, religion, property, the landed aristocracy, 
particular inclusions and exclusions, and the hierarchical nature of that society. A 
review of the literature reveals that eighteenth century English society was hierarchical 
in nature (Viner, 1968, p. 31; Perkins, 1985; Black, 2001). As observed by Perkins, 
“men took their places in an accepted order of precedence” (Perkins, 1985). This also 
holds true for women of the period, who were understudied or discussed as members 
of a male-dominated society. Nineteenth century notions of class did not impact or 
define society in this period. Consequently, the different parts of society were 





As observed by Jeremy Black, “those with pretensions to social status wore wigs, 
while the poor wore their own hair”. In addition, social status was also visible in the 
seating arrangements in churches and the treatment of the dying and their corpses 
(Black, 2001, p. 95). The hierarchical nature of society has been described by Jacob 
Viner as “a continuous gradation stretching from the dizzy heights of royalty and 
nobility, down to the lowest depths of miserable and hungry and degraded creatures”. 
This gradation was described by theologians and poets of the period as “that admirable 
creation of God, the great chain of beings” (1968, p. 31). This is crucial in that it brings 
forth the important place of religion in English society during this period. 
 In fact, according to Perkins, religion provided the “nearest approach to overt class 
attitudes” (Perkins, 1985, p. 33). An example of the place of religion in society is the 
development of the evangelical movement whose practices will be developed in the 
following sections (Checkland, 1983). Further, status in eighteenth century England 
was based on property, on the amount and kind one owned (Perkins, 1985). It also 
determined who was eligible to sit in Parliament. According to the 1710 Act, a 
minimum landed income of 600 pounds per year was necessary to sit in Parliament 
(Thornton, 1966, p. 62). Hence, the hierarchical nature of eighteenth century English 
society was to a considerable degree determined by property. Landowners in this 
period acted as the state (Viner, 1968).  
According to Perkins the landed aristocracy “held in its hands the strings of connection 
and dependency which held society together in a hierarchical manner” (Perkins, 1985, 
p. 37). Similarly, for Thompson English society was until the 1970s one of “gentry’s 
hegemony” (Thompson, 1978, p. 162). Aside from addressing the hierarchical nature 
of English society in this period, and its corollary, inequality, the above has also 
brought forth the minimal role of the state. In fact, as Kim Lawes argues, English 
society in this period was based on familial and community responsibility (Lawes, 





4.1.2 Representations of the ‘Poor’ 
According to what has been presented above, the make-up of English society consisted 
of “a minority of rich and powerful and a majority of poor and powerless individuals” 
(Perkins, 1985, p. 17). The manner in which the nobility labeled the lower part of 
society and differentiated itself from them is extremely valuable in order to grasp the 
paternalist nature of representational practices in England during this period. A review 
of the literature indicates that the “labels” ascribed to the poor and the ways in which 
they were represented were many. At a general level it is possible to describe these as 
practices of instilling differentiation between the higher classes and the lower classes.  
Before looking at the various ways in which the poor were represented it is important 
to delineate what “poor” meant in eighteenth century England. According to Black, 
although the use of the term varied, it was more often than not employed to refer to 
those people who were on relief or dependent on charity (Black, 2001, p. 104). A 
review of the literature on representations of the poor reveals shifts occurring during 
the eighteenth century. Brundage observes the emergence of harsher attitudes towards 
the poor in the early part of the century. He makes an association between these harsher 
attitudes and the connection drawn by people such as Henry Fielding, novelist and 
London police magistrate, between paupers and criminals (Brundage, 2002). 
Providing a more general description of the representational practices of the upper 
classes, Viner asserts that the lower classes did not usually form part of their 
vocabulary, but when they did “they were included in a qualified sense, in the 
denotation of the word the people” (1968, p. 29).  The words “poor”, “the populace”, 
“the rabble”, “the mob”, the “scum” were used to describe those Viner terms “the 
excluded” (1968, p. 29). The poor people were seen by William Petty as “the vile and 
brutish part of mankind” (cited in Viner, 1968, p. 29). Further, eighteenth century 
English writers explained the growth of poverty as a result of their laziness and luxury 
(Marshall, 1969).  
By the 1750s the term “laboring poor” appeared in usage and was used to describe two 





second, was “the people” referring to those who had a settled income (Black, 2001, p. 
104). During the same period Hollen Lees observed that the poor, in the cultural 
productions of the middle classes most obvious in satirical prints, were “pushed from 
the center to the periphery of the community they inhabited” (1998, p. 93). These 
representations shifted during the last decade of the eighteenth century. At this point, 
the poor were “reduced to skeletal figures shunted to the sidelines of their society” 
(Lees, 1998, p. 94).  
Coinciding with this, Jeremy Seabrook describes how at the end of the period “poverty 
or pauperism in its darker form began to be described as plague or contagion” (2013, 
p. 29). Additionally, the Citizen in 1757 in discussing the poor wrote “they are called 
the vulgar, the mob, the rabble and treated as if they were some inferior species, who 
are designed only for labor” (cited in Black, 2001, p. 105). Overall the negative traits 
accorded to the poor and the manner in which they were represented rendered them 
ignorant, worthless, evil, and incompetent and stripped them of any individuality. In 
opposition to those historians arguing for the rise of harsh attitudes towards the poor 
during the last decade of the period, Marshall (1969) records a new attitude and as a 
result a more lenient treatment of the poor since Gilbert’s Act of 1782 relating to the 
Poor Laws which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
4.1.3 The Poor Laws and Charity 
The second step in the identification of English paternalism involves looking at the 
policies and institutions directed towards the poor. Perkins remarks that the Poor Law 
was the “most symbolic of all paternal protections” (1985, p. 185). As its name 
indicates the Poor Law targeted the poor and albeit with some minor alterations it was 
based on the Elizabethan Poor Law of 16016. As the above section illustrated, the Poor 
Law of the eighteenth century did not espouse benevolence from the higher classes of 
society, quite the contrary, the aim was deterrence (Slack, 1990). In fact, it was the 
                                                 
6 Important to note that the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 was preceded by other Parliamentary 
enactments on the subject of poor relief. Be it as it may, it was only in 1601 that a mandatory system of 





representation of the aged and impotent paupers as a problem that led to the 
development of the workhouses (Brundage, 2002).  
Very characteristic of the period in terms of society and the Poor Law is that its 
administration was in the control of parishes. Each had the power to decide the level 
and conditions of relief and to whom it would be given (Novak, 1988, p. 48). 
Additionally, there was a tendency to discriminate between the deserving and 
undeserving poor. Relief was given to the sick, elderly, young and women with 
children and was denied to the able-bodied (Black, 2001). However, this changed with 
the growing institutionalization of poor relief during this period. The “overseers of the 
poor” were, according to a provision of the Elizabethan Poor Law, to find them work 
(Black, 2001). 
Although deterrence was by and large the objective behind the Poor Laws, when it 
came to the able-bodied poor the help accorded by the overseers in finding them work 
showcases a more benevolent aspect of the system. Reforms instituted during the 
eighteenth century, an example of which was the Workhouse Test Act of 1723, 
showcase a duality of benevolence and deterrence. On the one side the Act encouraged 
the founding of workhouses in parishes in order to offer work and accommodation to 
the poor (Black, 2001). On the other hand, the same Act sought to make unattractive 
the conditions that would provide relief. A special type of institutions accepted 
paupers, and those who refused to enter them were deprived of outdoor relief (Slack, 
1990, p. 40).  
An equally important change recorded during the second half of this period related to 
the transfer of authority from parish overseers to elected and appointed guardians of 
the poor (Brundage, 2002). A Board of Guardians was established, constituted by 
justices of the peace and men of property. This Board appointed “Acting Guardians” 
who would be responsible for the management of workhouses (Slack, 1990). The 
designation “guardians of the poor” is paternalistic in two ways. First it connotes that 
the poor must be protected and second not by anyone other than those of high rank in 





significance because according to some historians it signaled a more positive attitude 
towards the poor (Marshall, 1969; Slack, 1990). The Act altered the powers held by 
both churchwardens and overseers of the poor (Marshall, 1969). Further, as per the 
Act, the able-bodied poor were to be employed outside the workhouse. The latter were 
to only provide housing for the impotent (Williams, 2011).  
Apart from the Poor Laws and associated policies, the lower classes of society were 
also at the center stage of charity initiatives. Williams observes that charity took the 
form of “bequests, benefactions and privately founded charities, face to face charity, 
the gifts of bread and beer at back gates at kitchen doors” (2001, p. 6). The charity 
school, an Anglican 18th century institution headed by country gentlemen, is a further 
example of charity initiatives. Here, the concern was the provision of education to the 
poor. Their education was seen as “good for the poor, good for the country, and good 
for the rich” (Viner, 1968, p. 32). However, a limit was set as to the depth of 
knowledge the children of the poor were to receive. It consisted of an elementary level 
of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Apart from being a benevolent gesture, it can also 
be characterized as leading to and sustaining dependency between the “giver” and the 
“recipient”. When these children would grow up they would be dependent on the 
children of the country gentlemen. 
4.1.4 Justifying the Need for the Poor Laws and Poor Relief  
Discourses being justifications for policies and actions, they are particularly revealing 
with respect to English paternalism. According to the literature, duty and 
responsibility are the most often cited justifications for the conduct of the few towards 
the many “poor” in the Eighteenth century. For instance Beatrice and Sidney Webb 
argued that “The English Poor Law at no time gave the destitute a personal ‘right’ to 
relief… what was enacted was not a right at all but an obligation… the obligation to 
relieve the impotent poor and to provide the able-bodied with the means of earning 
their livelihood by work…the amount of relief and the manner of relief were left to 





Reverend Sherer’s argument in his work Remarks on the Present State of the Poor in 
1796 is crucial in understanding the system of obligation and deference between the 
rich and the poor in this period. He argued that  
mutual is the dependence of the rich and the poor upon each other, and mutual 
are their obligations. Their rights and duties are reciprocal. Whatever are the 
duties of the poor, are the rights of the rich; and whatever are the duties of the 
rich, are the rights of the poor. It is the duties of the poor, to behave to their 
superiors with reverence, to serve them with fidelity, and to obey them with 
clearfulness; these therefore are the rights due to the rich: in like manner, it is 
the duty of the rich to protect the poor, to reward their services, and to supply 
their wants; and these are the rights due to the poor. (cited in Sherman, 2001, 
p. 7) 
The above depicts a paternalistic ideology, whereby the rich protect and tend to the 
poor. It also brings forth the idea of a mutual obligation between the haves and the 
have-nots, which engenders dependency for the poor. In response to the above, 
Sherman has argued that, “in paternalist apologetics” the system described by Sherer 
“was intended to imply that the poor’s inequality ensured their well-being” (2001, p. 
7). The duties and obligations of the higher classes are also illustrated in Bailey’s 
argument: “To provide a comfortable subsistence for the poor is most certainly a duty 
highly obligatory upon every person in whom the traces of moral virtue are not quite 
obliterated, the performance of which is equally required by Policy and Religion” 
(quoted in Marshall, 1969, p. 19-20).  
The above discourses displaying the duty and responsibility of particular groups in 
society bring forth the way in which paternalistic discourses were formulated in 
eighteenth century England and the crucial relevance of religion. Also these discourses 
were complemented by the idea that the aged and impotent paupers were unable to 
care for themselves (Brundage, 2002). Similar arguments were put forward by 
Edmund Burke in 1770 that “men required for their own sake and in their own best 





4.2 English Paternalism in the Nineteenth Century 
The position of scholars on the manifestation of paternalism in nineteenth century 
England is mixed. Scholars like Novak argue the decline of paternalism and the 
appearance of laissez-faire. For others, like Sherman, “traditional” paternalism 
declined with the development of the New Poor Law of 1834 (Sherman, 2001, p.4). 
For her, paternalism during the nineteenth century underwent a shift from its 
traditional kind to one adapted to industrialization. For Lawes the shift in paternalism 
resulted from a shift in the locus of authority, from familial to state responsibility 
(2000). Even if paternalism’s form changed to a certain degree, its manifestation 
persisted from one period to the other because paternalism is ingrained in the social 
structure of a society and its institutions. In fact, the historian David Roberts supports 
that both the industrial and urban revolutions permitted the development of a social 
theory imbued with paternalism, representing “a social remedy for new frightening 
problems” (1979, p22).   
4.2.1 The Structure of British Society: Representations of Social Order  
A review of the literature on English paternalism and more generally on English 
society demonstrates that hierarchy, class distinctions, dependency, “the aristocratic 
ideal”, deference, charity and an increased role of the state were characteristic of 
English society in the nineteenth century. Some of these features persisted throughout 
the century, others were subject to shifts. Hierarchy is unanimously presented as the 
bedrock of nineteenth century society (Best, 1971; Roberts, 1979; Finlayson, 1994; 
Sherman, 2001). Sherman notes that paternalism refers to “the process of legitimation 
by tradition of the hierarchical nature of English society” (2001, p. 6). This 
demonstrates the centrality of the hierarchical nature of society to this period and its 
centrality to paternalism.  
Some historians have argued that the emergence of class signalled a shift from the old 
vertical connections of dependency/patronage characteristic of the previous century 





For Scull (1977), the “traditional” relations between the rich and poor changed as a 
result of the emergence of the capitalist system. In spite of this, a sense of place of 
belonging and hierarchical conceptions still remained. Hierarchy in early nineteenth 
English society was deemed indispensable. The idea that “society was unequal and 
should remain so; the poor should be subordinate to the rich, for that was the 
relationship which a wise Almighty ordained” expressed by Burke in 1780, inspired, 
according to Finlayson, writers of the nineteenth century (cited in Finlayson, 1994, p. 
51).  
Similarly, Tories in Early Victorian England believed that the link between hierarchy 
and inequality would enable the establishment of order in English society (Roberts, 
1979). The existence of hierarchy and conceptions about it during the early years of 
the period exhibit the continuance of ideas from one century to the next. Roberts 
identifies dependency as key to the paternalist hierarchical outlook of the Early 
Victorians (Roberts, 1979). Its value was acknowledged in J.S. Mill’s theory of 
dependency and protection: 
The relation between rich and poor, according to this theory… should be only 
partly authoritative; it should be amiable, moral, and sentimental: affectionate 
tutelage on the one side, respectful and grateful deference on the other. The 
rich should be in loco parentis to the poor, guiding them and restraining them 
like children. Of spontaneous action on their part there should be no need. They 
should be called on for nothing but to do their day’s work, and to be moral and 
religious. Their morality and religion should be provided to them by their 
superiors, who should see them properly taught it, in return for labor and 
attachment, properly fed, clothed, housed, in return for labor, spiritually 
edified and innocently amused. (2004, p. 193) 
The latter is highly instructive in that it clearly displays the authority and duties of the 
higher classes in English society. Apart from dependence and hierarchy, society in 
early Victorian England saw the re-emergence of “the aristocratic ideal” (Perkins, 





of Tories conveying a sense of social responsibility for the lower orders by the 
aristocracy (Lawes, 2000, p. 1-2). It was revived at a time when laissez-faire was 
gaining ground as the strategy for the ideal society. That the poor had a right to relief 
began to be contested by country gentlemen. It became increasingly prevalent that the 
poor should find work on their own and that it should not be the responsibility of 
employers (Novak, 1988; Lees, 1998). 
A certain continuity can be observed between the early and mid-nineteenth century in 
terms of social order. According to Geoffrey Best (1971, p. 228), deference was 
characteristic of the middle part of the period resulting in a situation where “the great 
man helped the poor man, and the poor man loved the great”. In addition Bagehot also 
shared his ideas on the nature of deference in English society: “England is the kind of 
deferential country, in which the numerous unwiser part wishes to be ruled by the less 
numerous wiser part. The numerical majority…is ready, is eager to delegate its power 
of choosing its rulers to a certain select minority. It abdicates in favor of its elite and 
consents to obey whoever the elite may confide in” (Bagehot in Best, 1971, p. 237). 
Religion and the church were, during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, 
a significant aspect of English society seen by paternalists as a means to achieve a 
better society (Roberts, 1979). For example, Samuel Coleridge argued for the moral 
regeneration of the individual and saw the Church of England as the head of a 
paternalist society (Roberts, 1958, p. 324). Accordingly, the primary educator of the 
poor for those such as Coleridge was the Church of England, not state aided schools 
(Roberts, 1958, p. 327). This was acknowledged by the clergy of the Church of 
England, who viewed themselves as “shepherds enjoined by God to protect both the 
eternal and the temporal welfare of their flocks” (Roberts, 1979, p. 150).  
Charity was a central part of English society throughout the nineteenth century, 
intimately related to religion. It was the domain of the bourgeoisie and their response 
to the issue of poverty (Novak, 1988). Middle-class Englishmen focused on the 
morality of the working-class, guided by the belief that personalized charity was a 





was that they established a continuity in the relations between the haves and the have-
nots. In respect to Christian charity, Cruikshank observes that “it encouraged the 
dependence of the poor upon the rich…it ritualized the class order, inspired awe and 
deference in the helped and arrogance in the helper” (1999, p. 48). This is interesting 
not only because it showcases the central place of charity, mostly dominated by the 
rich, but it also illustrates once more how dependency was a crucial aspect of society 
in this period.  
The emergence of class is an additional characteristic of this period. By the end of the 
century the organization of schools, work, housing, welfare, culture and recreation 
combined to compartmentalize English society along class lines (Harris, 1994). A two-
class system formed: on the one side was a property-owning ruling class and on the 
other was a property-less working class (Harris, 1994, p. 6). The role of the state in 
relation to poor relief is also quite characteristic of this century. There is something 
interesting to be said about the idea of the government in the period, which also 
touches upon paternalism.  
The notion of paternal government was a concept that emerged in the early Victorian 
period prior to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (Lawes, 2000). Proponents of 
paternalism like Robert Southey and Samuel Coleridge demanded that the state have 
an active and protective role (Lawes, 2000). Following this attitude the Morning Post 
wrote in 1848: “Direct and protect are the two great offices of a rational and well 
principled government” (Roberts, 1979, p. 198). Although authority began to shift 
from the parish to the state, the notion of protecting those in need remained. What 
changed was the locus of that authority.    
4.2.2 Representing the Lower Classes: Writers, Social Theorists, Political 
Figures 
The situation of the poor was explained in distinct ways in this period. For early 
Victorian Poor Law theorists poverty was an inevitable condition owing to the 





social problem (Harris, 1994). In contrast, the Charity Organization Society classed 
poverty as a problem of “character”. It resulted from the “improvident habits and 
driftlessness” of the poor (Novak, 1988, p. 97). For the members of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws appointed in 1832, poverty was not inevitable, quite 
the opposite, it was a voluntary condition which could be reversed (Englander, 1998).  
Pauperism on the other hand, was from early on labeled as “a social problem” 
(Roberts, 1979, p. 74). It occupied center stage in discussions on the alleviation of 
poverty. Not all poor people were classified as paupers. Paupers were those belonging 
to the group of dependent poor who received poor relief as they could not support 
themselves (Harris, 1994; Lees, 1998). The early nineteenth century saw the beginning 
of practices and discourses of exclusion targeting paupers. Hollen-Lees observes that 
both practices and writers of the period identified paupers as a separate, inferior group 
and that it was a feeling of hatred towards them that influenced the establishment of 
the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act (Lees, 1998, p. 233). One of the problems 
encountered when discussing the place of the poor, lower classes in general is that the 
differentiation between “pauperism” and “the poor” was not always clear-cut.  
Poverty was seen as the product of natural laws, whereas pauperism was due to 
individual human will (Harris, 1994, p. 238). Poor Law reformers, more specifically 
the Commissioners appointed to review the Poor Laws, aimed to render this distinction 
more evident. Their conception of poverty moved beyond the all-encompassing 
concept of laboring poor and included the two concepts of “dependency” and “non-
dependency” (Englander, 1998, p. 6). Despite their efforts the New Poor Law did not 
manage to draw a clear distinction between the poor and the pauper. In fact, the 
“stigma” of pauperism, which was meant to differentiate the pauper from the poor, 
had the perverse effect of stigmatizing the entire body of the poor (Himmelfarb, 1985).  
In addressing how the lower classes were represented in this period, it is crucial to 
address how differently “the poor” were represented in different parts of England. It 
is in London that “the poor” were represented in the more distinct manner. London’s 





(Himmelfarb, 1985). Given that English society in the nineteenth century was one 
headed by aristocratic men, being poor was seen as a problem but being a poor mother 
was even worse. Local guardians questioned the capacity of poor mothers to bring up 
their children competently. In their eyes institutions could do a better job (Thane, 
1978).  
4.2.3 The Poor Laws Amendment Act 1834  
The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (New Poor Law) was the result of calls for 
reform due to the inadequacies of the Elizabethan Poor Law. Prior to its formulation, 
minor reforms such as the Parish Vestry Act of 1818 and the Select Vestry Act of 1819 
were enacted. Both Acts reiterated that the protection of the poor was a responsibility 
vested onto the parish. One of their objectives was to decrease the influence of 
magistrates and overseers and increase that of important landholders. It was based on 
the belief that “the responsibility of distributing and managing parish funds was a duty 
of care which should fall to men of substance and education” (Lawes, 2000, p. 72).  
Steadily, the role of the state in relieving the poor was extended during the century. 
Laws enacted by Parliament were seen as necessary means to protect certain sections 
of the population. Shaftesbury argued in 1840 that laws “should assume the proper 
function of protecting the poor” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 89-90). A number of protective 
legislations in the mid nineteenth century ascribe a role to the state, which was “not to 
enable, but to restrict; not to encourage, but to curtail” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 90). In 
essence the state exercised this role on behalf of people seen as “vulnerable” and thus 
could practice neither mutual aid, nor self-help (Finlayson, 1994). This reveals that 
although the 1834 Act was seen as the ultimate expression of laissez-faire (Novak, 
1988), paternalism was still part of the system. Although the Poor Law Amendment 
Act of 1834 retained certain features of its predecessor, it was distinguished by its two 
core principles of less eligibility and the workhouse test (Goodland, 2001). 
The fist principle dictated that the pauper should at no point be in the same position or 





tested the real need of a pauper by making relief only accessible through a workhouse 
(Goodland, 2001). Consequently, only those in real need of relief would choose to 
enter and endure the workhouses. The Poor Law amendment Act of 1834 has generally 
been described as an Act of discipline and deterrence rather than relief (Poynter, 1969; 
Brundage, 2002). This characterization coincides with the treatment of the able-bodied 
poor. The deterrent and disciplinary aspect of the Poor Laws was embodied in the 
institution of the workhouse, seen as a place of terror and discipline (Novak, 1988). 
Its main purpose was to make paupers feel like “unwelcomed guests” (Goodland, 
2001, p. 592). The conditions within workhouses that paupers were faced with as well 
as the loss of personal freedom and the sense of shame and failure operated as a 
psychological deterrent (Brundage, 2002).  
The need for the strict and deterring aspect of the Poor Law was seen as necessary to 
be maintained. The Goshen Minute of 1869, a minute of the Poor Law Board, 
reiterated that workhouses should maintain their deterrent character arguing that “a 
strict poor law would deal with the undeserving poor in such a way as to jolt them into 
the ranks of the deserving poor” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 92). This displayed harshness, 
an antithesis to benevolence seen as a feature of paternalistic practice, does not 
necessarily indicate that benevolence was absent from the institution of the Poor Laws. 
In fact, benevolence was characteristic of practices under the Poor Law directed to the 
non-able-bodied (Finlayson, 1994).   
 At a general level, the Victorian period can be seen as a period in which protective 
legislation was increasingly promoted by both paternalists and philanthropists. Some 
examples are the regulation of hours and conditions in the workplaces, and the 
regulation and supervision of lunatic asylums (Finlayson, 1994). In many respects it 
was a period characterized by an increased interventionist stance by the state embodied 
in numerous acts of legislation in social and economic life (Novak, 1988). In 
addressing the Poor Laws, it is important to include the place of charity, which was 
overwhelmingly the response of the bourgeoisie to the problem of poverty. Their 
practices were characterized by benevolence. An example of this was the giving of 





4.2.4 Justifying Practices Around the New Poor Law 
According to the literature, duty, protection, and the responsibility of the higher classes 
but also of the government were at the heart of discourses of the time. The motive was 
either the call for protection of the lower classes or a “mission” to alter them. As Thane 
remarks, helping the destitute was an unavoidable obligation of Poor Law 
administrators (Thane, 1978). A characteristic of the paternalism of this period is the 
idea that the Poor Law provided support for poor people who were unable to support 
themselves (Spicker, 2002, p. 24). 
Discourses of protection extended to the laboring poor. Michael Thomas Sadler, a 
Tory Member of Parliament, argued on several occasions for the need to put in place 
protective policies for the laboring poor. In his attempt to push for action in order to 
provide better benefits for this class he urged members of the House “to assume its 
noblest character, that of the protector of the poor, and, seeking that the suggestions 
of humanity, and the dictates of policy have long been disregarded, let the law once 
more interpose its sacred shield, and protect the defenseless and the wretched from the 
miseries they have too long endured” (cited in Lawes, 2000, p. 148).  
The above is a powerful statement illustrating the sense of duty and obligation of those 
in positions of power and the way in which protection was justified by representing 
the object of intervention as wretched and defenseless. This coincides with Roberts’ 
observation that for paternalists of Early Victorian England “the simple call for the 
protection, as a father would protect a child, of the weak, helpless, poor and ill was a 
criterion for government intervention in early Victorian England” (Roberts, 1979, p. 
190). Paternalists such as Coleridge shared the above views regarding the 
responsibilities of the government and its role in looking out for the needs of the people 
(Lawes, 2000). Similarly, the poet William Wordsworth wrote in the 1830s that the 
state should act “in loco parentis to the poor” (cited in Finlayson, 1994, p. 89).   
Departing from discourses which espoused the familial notion of protection and the 
duties of the government were those which focused on reforming or altering the 





reformation. For example, J. Roebuck, a radical MP, stated his objective in 1868 as 
being “to make the working man as … civilized a creature as I could make him”; “I 
wanted to make the working man like me” (cited in Goodland, 2001, p. 591). There is 
a certain mark of duty and obligation emanating from this. A crucial aspect of the 
above pointed out by Goodland is the civilizing mission aspect of it which caught the 
interest and attention of the middle-class of that period (Goodland, 2001).  
4.3 English Paternalism in the Twentieth Century 
The emergence of the welfare state and discourses of collectivism accompanying it 
influenced the structure of society, perceptions of “the self” and “the other” and 
policies towards certain and all classes in England. A continuing element observed 
between the twentieth century and the one preceding it was the problem of poverty 
and the exploration of adequate solutions to manage or alleviate it. With the turn of 
the century surfaced conceptions of organic corporate identity and common 
citizenship in political thought. For Harris (1994), these conceptions and the shift from 
individualism to collectivism weakened the class model as it had existed in the 
nineteenth century.  
Be it as it may, this does not imply that inequality ceased to be a characteristic feature 
of twentieth century English society or that the nature of this society radically changed. 
It is rather the case that paternalism evolved rather than disappeared. Paternalism was 
increasingly seen as characteristic of the government after the establishment of the 
Welfare State. However, this changed when Margaret Thatcher came to power in 
1979. Her objective as described to the Times in January 1984 was for her government 
to be seen as that “which decisively broke with the debilitating consensus of a 
paternalistic government and a dependent people, which rejected the notion that the 
State is all powerful and the citizen is merely its beneficiary; which shattered the 
illusion that Government could somehow substitute for individual performance” (cited 
in Lowe, 1999, p. 3). Although, the welfare state underwent increasing reforms in the 





Major and Tony Blair, some continuities are still observed at a societal and policy 
level. 
4.3.1 The Structure of English Society  
A review of the literature indicates that English society up until the mid-twentieth 
century was hierarchic, un-equal, influenced by universalist principles and saw a 
further extension in the role of the government. Features characteristic of the previous 
century are observed, which are according to Stevenson (1984, p. 17) a result of the 
persistence of both Victorian and Edwardian assumptions and habits in the minds of 
certain classes. English society during the 1940s and 1950s reflected an older order. 
Marr (2008, pp. 46–47) describes this society as one that was hierarchical, ascribed to 
rituals and was “run by cliques and groups of friends who first met at public schools 
and Oxbridge”.  
The role and power of the landed aristocracy as witnessed in the nineteenth century 
was declining. This was also accompanied by a shift in the interests of the upper class 
from land to business (Marwick, 1991). Class was a constitutive feature of society 
during this period that served to organize it in a hierarchical fashion. Despite the 
softening of class distinctions (Marwick, 1991; Marr, 2009) it was nevertheless the 
basis of differentiation between the different groups in society. During the first decade 
of the century, classes in society were differentiated by their clothing, the way they 
spoke, the conditions and hours of work and the educational system they had access 
to (Thompson, 1992). In a similar fashion class differentiation during 1945-50 was 
determined by the way one spoke, one’s place of residence and one’s choice of 
entertainment (Marr, 2008, p. 43). 
A number of scholars identify the softening or blurring of overt class distinctions, 
especially between middle and working class since the 1920s (Marwick, 1991; 
Thompson, 1992; Harris, 1994). It is seen as a direct result of the emergence of 
conceptions of collectivism and common citizenship (Harris, 1994; Marwick, 1991). 





Victorian England (Brundage, 2002). Be it as it may, that class was and is deeply 
anchored, at the core of English society, is undeniable. Lynne Banks, a novelist, 
expressed in 1976 the centrality of class saying that “class is deeply embedded in our 
national sub-conscious it is poisoning every aspect of our lives. Not just industrial 
relations and politics” (cited in Marwick, 2003, p. 166). 
Poverty was another important aspect characterizing society in this period. It was an 
issue of considerable concern, which after the establishment of the Welfare State was 
believed to belong to the past. However, during the 1960s occurred what many 
commentators have described as “the re-discovery” of poverty (Banting, 1979; Lowe, 
1999; Spicker, 2002). It was during that decade that both poverty and inequality took 
once more their place as defining elements of society (Banting, 1979). The 
Universalist principles at the basis of the welfare state were challenged to a 
considerable degree by policies targeting particular classes. Selective targeting was 
observed in the 1950s, prior to the re-discovery of poverty, directing expenditure to 
the most impoverished classes (Whiteside, 1996, p. 84).  
A further characteristic of twentieth century society was the further expansion of the 
role of the government. The first decade of the century saw its area of responsibility 
broaden by legislation enacted on education, children’s rights and working hours 
(Finlayson, 1994). A distinctive aspect of the government’s role in relation to social 
welfare was that it applied to “all” citizens (Briggs, 1961, p. 224; Sleeman, 1973). 
Again here the influence of Universalist principles is observed. The public accepted 
that collective improvement could only result through government initiatives and that 
it was the government that had a responsibility “to promote and protect the well-being 
of its citizens” (Noble, 2009, p. 7). The welfare state resulted in establishing a 
“universal right to welfare” under the responsibility of the state (Taylor and Lansley, 
1992, p. 154).  
However, when one looks at English society in the last quarter or so of the twentieth 
century, some differences can be observed. The first relates to the shift from 





90s. According to the literature individualism, independence, competitiveness and 
self-reliance were encouraged as values to be embraced by society (Abercrombie and 
Warde, 2000, p. 436). The second pertains to the role of the state. From 1979 onwards 
the objective of politicians, exemplified by Mrs. Thatcher was to “roll back” the state 
(Lowe, 1999, p. 317; Fraser, 2017, p. 269). What this meant was that the state’s 
purview in terms of providing welfare was to be restricted. Voluntary organizations 
and the family were encouraged to be more involved as providers for the poor.  
According to the Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher “the welfare state has 
displaced the role of the family as main providers of welfare” (Glennerster, 2000, p. 
196). The role of the state was further re-conceptualized during the late 1990s by the 
New Labour government of Tony Blair. For him the state was envisaged as “an 
enabling force” (Blair, 1998, p. 4). These conceptualizations led to an intensive system 
of welfare characterized by increased targeting (Marwick, 2003). Aside from these 
shifts, continuities are also observed when we turn to the issue of poverty and the 
unequal character of society. There was a significant rise in poverty during 1979-87 
which persevered until the end of the twentieth century (Abercrombie and Warde, 
2000; Powell, 2000). What differentiates the periods 1979-87 and 1987-2000 is the 
extent to which politicians strove to reduce poverty and alleviate it. Unlike his 
predecessors, Blair’s top priority was poverty reduction (Powell, 2000, p. 55). 
English society continued to be characterized by inequality which intensified as a 
result of policies initiated in the 1980s (Mack and Lansley, 1985). Scholars also point 
to the market as responsible for creating further inequalities (Lowe, 1999; Marwick, 
2003) On this, Marwick notes that “inequalities in income and living conditions 
between well-off and badly off were intensifying” (2003, p. 382). Decreased taxation 
for the wealthy wan an additional contributing factor. Aside from this, this period also 
witnessed geographical inequalities. Unemployment levels were higher in the North 
of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and lower in the South (Reitan, 
2002, p. 71). It is crucial to note at this point that from 1997 onwards the government 
was increasingly promoting equality of opportunity and social inclusion (Lister, 1998). 





centuries, class remained a characteristic of English society. However, immigration, 
affluence and individualism did have an impact on its meaning (Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 
2017, p. 298).      
4.3.2 Redefining the Subjects of Compassion in the Welfare State 
The negative representations of the lower classes identified at the end of the nineteenth 
century were still visible during the first decade of the twentieth century. The poor 
were labeled as “diseased” and “contagious”, seen as in desperate need of social 
engineering or even elimination (Novak, 1988, p. 106). They were also viewed and 
treated as “defective members” of British society (Lees, 1998, p. 311). Co-existing 
was a very different manner of representing the poor, based on an opposite 
understanding of poverty. It focused on statistics and economics seeing poverty as a 
result of a lack of income. This view of poverty was at the core of insurance schemes 
introduced in 1909, which in 1948 became the welfare state (Lees, 1998, p. 311). 
Consequently, a shift in representations but also labels ascribed to the poor saw the 
establishment of the welfare state. After 1930, “pauperism” was no longer in use 
(Lees, 1998). Poverty came to be defined through a Liberal definition acknowledging 
that it resulted from numerous factors such as personal misfortune, low wages, large 
families, etc. Banting identifies this with the conceptions enshrined in the Beveridge 
Report of 1942 and recommendations contained therein (1979, p. 83). From 1945 
onwards, distinctions previously made between “respectable” and “rough” working 
classes gave way to representations of a more homogenous class (Marwick, 2003, p. 
25). 
Just like in the previous century women were subject to increased discrimination both 
in the Edwardian period and during the years before the establishment of the Welfare 
State. For example until 1914, unmarried women were differentiated as belonging 
either to the group entitled as “the innocent” or to that of “the depraved” (Thane, 1978, 





emphasized the role of women as mothers and wives and not as workers. Their status 
was as dependents of their husbands (Novak 1988 p. 152; Lowe, 1999). 
In order to forge a holistic understanding of the ways in which the poor were 
represented, it is imperative to turn to the second half of the twentieth century. A 
review of the literature makes apparent certain shifts that occurred during this period 
relating to the definitions employed to characterize and measure poverty. From the 
1950s onwards poverty was defined in relative rather than absolute terms which 
resulted in more people being defined as poor (Jones and Lowe, 2002; Fraser, 2017). 
Its measurement was undertaken in two distinct manners. The first, relied on 
accounting for those who received supplementary benefit (Piachaud, 1987, p. 11). The 
second method employed by the EU and the British government’s series Households 
Below Average Income, measures poverty by accounting for those whose income is 
below 50% of the average income (Abercrombie and Warde, 2000, p. 124).   
Poverty was no longer seen as due to a combination of factors. According to the 
literature victim blaming became common in the 1970s-90s (Mack and Lansley, 1985; 
Jones and Novak, 1999). In fact, as Mack and Lansley note the poor “came to be 
blamed not just for their own problems, but also for the nation’s” (1985, p. 4). This 
gave way to harsher attitudes towards the poor, resembling those found in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Welfare claimants in the 1980s and 1990s were 
labelled as “scroungers”. Numerous policy initiatives were undertaken in order to deal 
with those who were taking advantage of the welfare benefits system (Jones, 2000). 
Abercrombie and Ward (2000, p. 438) note that during those two decades more often 
than not political speeches and the media referred to welfare claimants as “scroungers” 
who were “draining the resources of taxpayers”.   
Those who previously fell in the category of “able-bodied” or “undeserving” poor, 
were subject to negative representations not only from the political elite but from the 
wider public. For example in 1983, a Tory voter stated “people are tired of 
featherbedding for those too lazy or inadequate to fend for themselves” (cited in 





deserving” and “undeserving” poor. The latter is supported by McKay and 
Rowlingson who note that the Blair government’s focus on children and pensioners 
“draws on traditional views about ‘the deserving’ poor” (2008, p. 69). A further 
illustration of this, is the concept of the “underclass” or the “socially excluded” which 
Turner traces back to the nineteenth concept of “undeserving poor” (Turner, 2014). 
Both concepts referred to a group in society characterized as “unskilled, unpowerful 
and often unwaged or low-waged” (Turner, 2014, p. 430).  
4.3.3 The Welfare Sate  
Up until 1945 the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 continued to determine poor 
relief dealing with those at the very bottom of society. The first forty years of the 
twentieth century are crucial in understanding the establishment of the Welfare state 
under the Labor Government 1945-50. In terms of providing relief, The 
Unemployment Workman Act 1904 relieved the “deserving” unemployed who 
temporarily had no work (Novak, 1988, p 109). The protective role of the state 
becomes evident through the Children’s Act of 1908, substituting family with state 
care for neglected or delinquent children (Thane, 1978).  
In order to identify paternalism in light of the development of the welfare state 
portrayed as antithetical to the notion of paternalism there is a need to go back to 1942 
and address the Beveridge report. The latter has been widely seen as the basis upon 
which the Welfare System was established (Novak, 1988). For Marsland the report 
“encouraged widespread reliance on the central state, ever-expanding state 
intervention, bureaucratic control of people’s lives and massively increased public 
expenditure” (Marsland, 1992, p. 146). But more importantly, he described the welfare 
state as established by the Beveridge Report as paternalist and Universalist (1992, p. 
146). This proposes that paternalism is not antithetical to Universalist principles and 
that it eventually finds an expression in the welfare state and in its various branches 





Rather than aid be provided by the rich to the poor, Beveridge’s system of social 
insurance relied on a system of mutual aid such as the contributory insurance of the 
prewar period (Lowe, 1999). Each citizen contributed to this system in order to be able 
to benefit from it at a later date. In practice, the welfare state and two of its central 
policies, the National Insurance Act of 1946 and the National Assistance Act of 1948 
(Thornton, 2009), did not fully ascribe to the Universalist vision of the time. Although 
the National Insurance Act was presented as applying to all citizens in society, it did 
promote inequality rather than equality.  
Those people who were unable to contribute their share to the scheme had to have 
recourse to the supplementary Act of National Assistance and undergo means-tests. In 
Noble’s (2009, p. 2) view this supplementary Act came forth as a replacement to the 
Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. Like its predecessor the means-test benefit scheme 
applied to that portion of the population below the poverty line like women (separated, 
divorced, widowed), the elderly, the unemployed and the sick and disabled (Lowe, 
1999). Another continuity observed between the National Assistance Act and its 
predecessor is the treatment of the poor. Paupers were still seen with suspicion and 
treated badly (Brundage, 2002). 
This is also true for other aspects of the Welfare state. Some conformed more than 
others to Universalist philosophy. A case in point is the National Health Service 
(NHS), seen as that adhering most to that philosophy. Conversely, housing policies in 
practicing selectivity distanced themselves from that principle. Housing Acts and 
council housing subsidized by the state focused on the working classes (Marwick, 
2003). According to Marwick drug control in the mid-twentieth century was based on 
“the most liberal paternalistic principles”. By registering, drug users, identified as 
being mostly middle-aged and elderly citizens, received their dose through the NHS 
(Marwick, 2003, p. 114). 
The Universalist philosophy upon which the welfare state was established came under 
increasing scrutiny after 1979. The Thatcher 1979-90, Major 1990-97 and Blair 1997-





of 1945: dependency, the increased involvement of the state and rising levels of public 
expenditure. It is important to note that especially during the Thatcher years, social 
security reforms were driven predominantly by a need to reduce costs (Reitan, 2002, 
p. 17). Dependence on welfare benefits was tackled through a variety of reforms. For 
example, in 1982 sickness and unemployment benefits were based on price inflation 
rather than wages, resulting in lower benefits for recipients (Reitan, 2002, p. 31). What 
is more, the 1982 Social Security Act made benefits taxable (Fraser, 2017, p. 288). 
The latter severely impacted all welfare recipients resulting in more not less poverty.  
In majority these steps were undertaken to deal with the group previously identified 
as the “undeserving” poor. A further example to showcase this, is the Social Security 
Act of 1986. One of its provisions was that those applying for unemployment benefit 
had to show willingness and availability to work  (Marwick, 2003, pp. 298–99). The 
welfare to work scheme established in 1997 to tackle dependency also showcased the 
principle of conditionality. Various means were employed to incite people to work 
rather than rely on benefits (Fraser, 2017, p. 295). Powell notes that Blair’s 
government, “continued with similar policy goals to the previous Conservative 
government, particularly in relation to the focus on moving people from welfare to 
work” (Powell, 2008, pp. 53–54). At times the New Labour government coerced and 
at others helped people to go back to work.  
While positive assistance was to be given to people who decided to move from benefits 
to work, financial penalties were to be initiated towards those who did not termed the 
“workshy” (Powell, 2000, p. 45). The conditionality principle, a feature of policy 
reforms after 1979 was a means through which personal responsibility would be 
inculcated into those claiming welfare benefits. In the 1980s personal responsibility 
was encouraged by the government through the sale of council houses (Reitan, 2002). 
Moving on, the use of means-tested benefits persisted during the second half of this 
period. There were two types of means-tested benefits. The one applied to all citizens 
when their income fell below an agreed level. In 1948 it was known as National 
Assistance. It was then renamed Supplementary Benefit and subsequently became 





had recourse to this type of benefit, despite being available “to all”. The second 
included a variety of means-tested benefits like for example free school meals, rent 
rebates which sought to aid the most needy (Jones and Lowe, 2002, p. 42).  
Following 1986, the government simplified Income Support by introducing two 
benefit rates, one for the over-25s and the other for the under-25s. Also families, the 
elderly and disabled received additional premiums (Lowe, 1999, p. 323). According 
to Glennerster through the 1986 Social Security Act “more help went to the elderly, 
children and the long-term sick” (2000, p. 171). Families with children received 
increasing support through the Family Credit later renamed The Working Families 
Tax Credit under Blair (Powell, 2000). Overall, it could be argued that reforms 
instigated on the poorer section of society were disciplinary but also at times ingrained 
with a small dose of benevolence. This is particularly true of the 1980s. The 
government distanced itself from universalism in order to reduce costs but also to 
“target aid where it was most needed” (Marwick, 2003, p. 240). It is towards those 
identified as most in need that benevolence is identified. Protection in the second half 
of the twentieth century involved pushing the poor, especially the “undeserving” to 
better themselves to become responsible and active citizens.  
4.3.4 Justifying the Welfare state  
Most explanations and justifications for the development of the welfare state and its 
objectives do signal the decline of paternalism. As referred to above, collectivism was 
the ethos characteristic of the period. According to the literature, the welfare state and 
the role of the government was seen as dedicated to positively promote the welfare of 
all its citizens (Sleeman, 1973; Whiteside, 1996). These ideas were reflected in the 
argument of a historian of British social policy during World War II who saw that “it 
was increasingly regarded as a proper function or even obligation of government to 
ward off distress and strain not only among the poor but among all classes of society” 





Although the concept of obligation is employed here, it is not restricted to a particular 
target group but rather is presented as all-inclusive. The position of the Conservatives 
was similar to that of the historian of British social policy quoted above. In their 1949 
pamphlet The Right Road for Britain they argued that “the social services are no longer 
even in theory a form of poor relief. They are a cooperative system of mutual aid and 
self-help provided by the whole nation and designed to give to all the basic minimum 
of security, of housing, of opportunity, of employment and of living standards below 
which our duty to one forbids us to permit any one to fall” (Briggs, 1961, p. 227).  
Despite this, more current positions reflect the dependence ensued from the Welfare 
State and the conception that “for many of the poor and vulnerable, state action may 
represent the only possibility of substantial progress” (Banting, 1979). Although 
Banting was referring to the 1970s, it is a conception that also holds true for most of 
the twentieth century. State responsibility stemming from an inability of certain 
citizens to look after themselves was also an argument voiced during the 1960s during 
the period of the re-discovery of poverty. In arguing for the abolition of the Rent Act, 
the Ministry of Housing argued that “[w]e just cannot have these poor wretched 
creatures kicked into the streets”; “we have to reintroduce control” (Banting, 1979, p. 
30).  
The 1980s and 90s exhibit similar justifications pertaining to some of the poor and 
especially to those seen as unable to take care of themselves. This was conveyed in 
Thatcher’s speech in 1981 to the Conservative Women’s Conference in London 
according to which “the state must look after some children in care and those old 
people who cannot look after themselves” (Finlayson, 1994, p. 362). What is more, 
discourses espousing the protection of the vulnerable were voiced by key ministers 
and Parliamentarians. In 1982 Norman Fowler, the Secreatry of State for Social 
Services argued at the Conservative Party Conference “‘I did not come into politics to 
ignore the needs of the sick and handicapped. I came into politics to do something 
about their position, not by words, but by deeds” (quoted in Wilding, 1983, p. 5). 
Similarly during a Commons debate in February 1981 Mr. Jenkin, the Secretary of 





those in the greatest need are helped and protected as far as we are able” (HC Deb 3 
February 1981, c170).     
Moreover, responsibility and duty resurfaced in political discourses in a dominant 
way. However, these did not speak of the duties and responsibilities of the state 
towards all its citizens, but rather of mutual duties and responsibilities. Stress was 
especially applied on the concept of individual/personal responsibility. As Thatcher 
put it in “we are all responsible for our own actions…intervention by the state must 
never become so great that it effectively removes personal responsibility” (Finlayson, 
1994, p. 358 quoted in). On the matter of duties and responsibilities Blair argued that  
‘the modern notion of citizenship gives rights but demands obligations, shows respect 
but wants it back, grants opportunity but insists on responsibility’ (quoted in Dwyer, 
2008, p. 199). 
4.4 Constants and Variations in English Paternalism 
The previous sections have shown how paternalism manifested itself in eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth century England. Throughout these centuries, its 
manifestation was influenced or even challenged by the emergence of industrialism, 
differing conceptions of class, of the poor, shifts in the structure of society, new 
policies, wars, famines, etc. Consequently, there is a need to further interrogate how 
developments within each century influenced English paternalism. To these ends, this 
section will focus on the structure of English society, on policies enacted and on the 
prevailing discourses in all periods under investigation. This comparison will allow 
the identification of possible transformations to some of the concept’s elements and 
will culminate in the identification of the constant features defining English 
paternalism in the domestic sphere. The possibility that paternalism is still part of the 
twentieth and even of the twenty-first century is supported by scholarly descriptions 
of the nature of both English society and culture. According to Holme paternalism’s 





created a system of government of the people, and, at its best, for the people but never 
by the people; rather by those who know best” (Holme, 1992, p. 404).   
4.4.1 The Structure of English Society: Representations of Social Order 
and the Population 
The previous chapter addressing various conceptual understandings of paternalism 
concluded that hierarchy and inequality were at the very core of the concept. Both 
elements were present in all three periods examined in this chapter as central aspects 
of English society. Throughout the centuries societies undergo certain alterations due 
to external factors, but inevitably certain aspects live on. In line with this, Lawes 
observes a continuity in the structure of English society between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Nineteenth-century social policy, the author argues, stemmed 
from “eighteenth century ideas about hierarchical responsibility, deference, and 
reciprocal obligation” (Lawes, 2000, p. 1).  
What differentiated these two periods was the shift occurring in the nineteenth century 
from landed to middle-class rule and the rise of individualist philosophy. In turn, the 
twentieth century diverged from both previous periods in two significant ways. First 
with the rise of Universalism which saw the development of the welfare state and then 
with the rise of Individualism in the second half of the century promoting a string of 
policy reforms. Second, this century was characterized by an erosion in overt class 
distinctions (Whiteside, 1996). Despite these changes, hierarchy and inequality 
featured as core elements of these societies. In the eighteenth century it was religion 
and property that organized society in a hierarchical manner. In the nineteenth it was 
overt class distinctions and religion, and finally during the twentieth century society 
was hierarchical and unequal because of class, poverty and market inequalities.  
Another constant element observed between the three periods under analysis refers to 
practices of representation towards the lower classes in English society. The poor were 
represented in harsher or more lenient ways, with poverty being understood as a social 





poverty. As indicated by  Himmelfarb, poverty in twentieth-century England “is most 
decidedly not the same thing as it was in the age of Smith, Malthus, Cobbet and 
Dickens” (Himmelfarb, 1985, p. 533). During the eighteenth century the poor were 
depicted as “ignorant, worthless, evil and incompetent” and the system of poor relief 
was based on distinctions between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor (Viner, 1968, 
p. 29; Black, 2001; Sherman, 2001, Brundage, 2002).  
In a similar fashion, nineteenth-century representations also put an accent on the 
character of the poor, seen as the root of the problem. Conversely, during this period 
poverty was seen as inevitable. During the early twentieth century perceptions of the 
poor echoed previous pessimistic tendencies. They were portrayed as constituting a 
disease and as defective members of society. Although these perceptions gradually 
withered, they resurfaced in the 1980s and 90s. Once again the poor were seen as 
responsible for their misfortunes (Mack and Lansley, 1985, p. 4). What is more welfare 
claimants were described as “scroungers” (Abercrombie and Warde, 2000, p. 438). 
What makes this highly significant in discussions regarding English paternalism is that 
such representations of the poor sustained the unequal character of society which gave 
impetus to discourses of protection and accentuated the duty and responsibility felt by 
the higher classes and the state.  
4.4.2 The Poor Law, the New Poor Law and the Welfare State  
In terms of practices directed towards the poor, the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
share much in common. The objective of practices under the Elizabethan Poor Law 
and the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 was to deter and discipline the pauper 
(undeserving poor). This was particularly reflective of the institution of the 
workhouses (Pointer, 1969; Slack, 1990, p. 40). The nature of these practices can be 
understood within the framework of controlling as a means to instill order. This is 
supported by the framing of poverty as a social problem. Benevolence appeared 
characteristic of Poor Law practices involving the deserving poor and acts of charity 
by individuals belonging to the higher orders of society. Benevolence also describes 





between the Welfare State period and the previous ones is that help was provided to 
people irrespective of whether they needed it or not. As characterized by Sleeman 
(1973, p. 1), the twentieth century featured “an excessive care for the needs of all”.  
The discontinuity brought forward by the establishment of the welfare state, between 
state protection for some and state protection for all, marked a radical break from 
previous periods. The extension of universal state-protection has been explained as 
being the result of the two World Wars witnessed in the twentieth century (Whiteside, 
1996). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify practices of selective targeting within the 
welfare state as it is to identify practices intent on control. A good example of the latter 
are policies on drug control (Marwick, 2003, p. 114). In fact from the 1980s onwards 
there was an increase in the targeting of welfare benefits. The underlying objectives 
were to “roll back” the state, give help to those most in need and inculcate personal 
responsibility in people. The reforms carried out during the later part of this period 
where disciplinary in character and thus similar to the treatment of the “undeserving” 
poor during the nineteenth century. What is more, practices towards children and the 
elderly were characterized by benevolence.    
4.4.3 Justifications / Discourses  
As the previous sections have demonstrated, representations of the poor and 
explanations as to the origins of poverty served as a powerful tool for the justification 
of a number of policies under the Elizabethan Poor Laws, the Poor Law Amendment 
Act 1834 and the Welfare State. Constant in discourses appearing in the periods 
examined were the concepts of duty and responsibility. What changed was the agent 
who was to carry the duty and responsibility towards the poor. Throughout the 
eighteenth century the higher classes (landed aristocracy) and parishes were 
responsible for poor relief. With the turn of the century, this duty and responsibility 
gradually became the concern of the state. Although its role expanded considerably, 





The duty/responsibility to protect the poor was justified by the view that they were 
unable to protect themselves. The family analogy but also civilizational references 
inhabited discourses of the time. In fact the family analogy was also apparent in the 
period preceding it. With the coming of the welfare state, discourses exemplified a 
duty and responsibility universal in character, not attached to any particular 
group/class in society. Coexisting with this was a discourse of rights and 
responsibilities regarding welfare claimants visible throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century (Dwyer, 2008). In practice, however, the welfare state did not fully 
abide by the Universalist principles that influenced its establishment. For example, the 
Ministry of Housing in arguing for the abolition of the Rent Act made the following 
plea “We just cannot have these poor wretched creatures kicked into the streets”; “we 
have to reintroduce control” (Banting, 1979, p. 30). What is more, discourses of 
protection appeared in the 1980s towards those seen as vulnerable (Wilding, 1983).  
In accordance with the above, certain features appear which have lived through the 
centuries, characteristic of English paternalism. These are: inequality, difference, a 
sense of duty and responsibility and practices of protection and control and 
benevolence. Distinguishing between Thatcher’s government and those that came 
before it, Holme (1992, p. 405) puts emphasis on benevolence as a core characteristic 
of paternalism in England. He argues that “during Mrs. Thatcher’s period of 
government, much of the benevolence which makes paternalism tolerable, and which 
indeed might be argued to be its only justification, was stripped away, leaving the bare 
bones of an authoritarianism without kindness exposed to view”. Although in some 
respects this is true, the analysis carried above showed that help was provided to those 
seen as vulnerable and in need. In saying this I acknowledge that poverty and 
inequality rose increasingly during her time and government and made the poor, 
poorer. I am not arguing that paternalism was as strong as it was in the eighteenth or 





4.5 Towards a Formulation of British Paternalism 
At the outset, this chapter clarified that British Paternalism, the subject of this research 
project, originated with English Paternalism. Its British variant results from the 
extension of English paternalism from the core to the periphery. The intimate 
relationship between domestic and external spheres has been catalogued by a number 
of academics. Lawes for example noticed a shift during 1815-1833 from foreign to 
domestic issues, accompanied by a willingness to reform (2000). Both policy-makers 
and men of affairs shifted their attention back to England. For men of affairs this shift 
resulted from perceiving the subjects in the periphery as not grateful enough for all 
they had given them (Botsford, 1924, p. 289).  
Further, the emergence of a new philanthropic spirit in the mid-eighteenth century in 
the domestic and international spheres was, according to Botsford, due to “England’s 
awakened responsibility for the moral and religious welfare of its world empire” 
(Botsford, 1924, preface). These instances show that the domestic and international 
arenas influence each other in multifarious ways. The same also applies to British 
paternalism. Several avenues are available to examine how British paternalism 
developed and to identify its defining characteristics. One is to look at how English 
paternalism manifested itself in England’s relations with its first colonies in the US 
and Australia. Another avenue, is to look at the relations between England and its 
closest neighbors (Ireland, Scotland and Wales). Their close proximity to England and 
the very complex relations between England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales are aspects 
that have informed my decision to pursue this avenue, rather than study England’s 
relations with its first colonies. 
The nature of England’s relations with these three neigbouring nations has been 
characterized by Hechter as instances of “internal colonialism” (Hechter, 1975). 
Colonial experiences elsewhere were highly influenced by English practices, 
discourses and representations at work in Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Although 
conquered in the twelfth century, these territories were politically incorporated at 





was integrated politically with England. For Scotland this happened in 1707 through 
the Act of Union, which saw the establishment of the United Kingdom. Finally Ireland 
was incorporated in 1801 (Hechter, 1975).  
Union with each territory was accompanied by policies of control and the imposition 
of English culture and institutions. For example in Wales, English land law, courts 
judges and the Church of England were imposed after the Union. Both Ireland and 
Scotland ceased to have their respective Parliaments after the Union. In contrast to 
Wales and Ireland, Scotland after the Union of 1707 retained its legal system and saw 
the institutions of church and education unaffected (Raftery, Mcdermid and Jones, 
2007). The manner in which the three territories were administered after the Union 
follows the pattern identified in the previous sections. According to Cannadine both 
England and Britain were hierarchical societies. Wales, Scotland and Ireland were 
administered by social leaders connected with Westminster and Whitehall. As in 
England, it was those at the top of the hierarchy who had the power over the rest of 
the population (Cannadine, 2002, p. 11).  
It is crucial to highlight that incorporation through the Union did in no way signify 
equality between the territories. In the British Isles practices of differentiation were 
based on a clear distinction between Anglo-Saxons and Celts. The former embodied 
“the best” where as the latter stood for “the rest” (O’Connor, 2006, p. xii). Prior to the 
nineteenth century, England was differentiated from the periphery through its superior 
institutions (Horsman, 1976). The nineteenth century saw the emergence of practices 
of differentiation based on conceptions of race (Hechter, 1975; Horsman, 1976). 
Horsman notes that English thought in the nineteenth century was based on 
conceptions of an Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy (1976, p. 387). Whether it was 
through institutions or race, these practices of differentiation sustained the hierarchical 
relations between core and periphery.  
Accompanying practices of control and practices of differentiation was a discourse of 
benevolence. Hechter observes how the Unions were considered as “beneficial” since 





societies” (1975, p. 68). All this is consistent with academic conceptualizations of 
paternalism in intra-societal relations addressed in Chapter 3.  The previous sections 
focused on showing the manner in which English paternalism manifested itself in 
England in the space of three centuries in the area of poor relief. In order to provide 
an adequate comparison and a sketch of British paternalism, it is important to continue 
investigating the area of poor relief.  
Having provided a general description of the relations between England and each of 
Scotland, Ireland and Wales, the remainder of this section will focus exclusively on 
the relation between England and Ireland in the nineteenth century as regards poor 
relief. Out of the three sets of relations, that between England and Ireland is the most 
relevant and illuminating. Ireland, unlike Scotland or Wales, did not, prior to the 
nineteenth century, have any legal provisions for poor relief. As such, it stands as a 
good candidate to explore how English paternalism was exported by English political 
elites to Ireland. These political elites in their encounters with the periphery exported 
a paternalistic ethos they possessed which was, in turn, informed by the external sphere 
back to England. 
4.5.1 The Practices, Discourses and Representations of English Officials 
and the Irish Poor Law of 1838  
A review of the literature on English practices, representations and discourses 
pertaining to the Irish Poor Law establishes the prevalence of the concepts of 
hierarchy/inequality, obligation/duty, control/protection, and benevolence. Although 
Ireland was incorporated with England in 1801, inequality and hierarchy is a core 
characteristic of their relationship. For Edward Said England’s relation with Ireland is 
typical of an imperial relation. Despite geographical proximity he argues that “the one 
relationship that does not change is the hierarchical one between the metropole and 
overseas generally, between European-Western-white-Christian-males and those 
peoples who geographically and morally inhabit the realm beyond Europe” (Said, 





The hierarchical and un-equal relationship between the two was also present in English 
representations of the poor in Ireland. For example English travelers drew a clear 
distinction between the state of the poor in England and those in Ireland. The state of 
the poor in Ireland was seen as a consequence of the backward state of the country and 
of people’s character. Crossman (2013, p. 12) argues that the poor in Ireland were 
“represented almost as a different race, closer to savages than to civilized people”. 
Hence in the English mind the Irish were seen as representing “the other” rather than 
“the self”.  Differentiation between the English and the Irish was effectuated in the 
nineteenth century through class  and race and resulted in the superiority of the former 
and the inferiority of the latter.  
However, not all English officials shared the view that saw English and Irish as 
essentially distinct and opposite. Lengel (2002, p. 10) argues that before 1846 English 
middle-class perceptions of the Irish were not based on a racial differentiation. Instead 
their perception was shaped by the belief that all had the ability to improve. This view 
was also shared by the Whigs. However, although the Irish were in this case seen as 
having the ability to improve, it was considered that this could only be accomplished 
after “generations of tutorship under English law and the English middle-class” 
(Lengel, 2002, p. 10). In essence England was to act as the teacher and guide Ireland 
into becoming better. What unites these distinct perceptions of the Irish is that both 
saw England, her laws and institutions as constituting “the” remedy.  
Feelings of English duty and responsibility did result from practices of differentiation 
between the English and Irish. Even when the Irish were not seen as the complete 
opposite of the English, they were still seen as unable to develop left to their own 
devices. Thomas Sadler was a strong proponent for the establishment of a Poor Law 
in Ireland. In discussing the poor Irish he argued in Parliament that “the poor creatures 
who take refuge here I do not blame. Absenteeism has deprived them of bread, and its 
consequences driven them forth from their country; on the contrary, I would receive 
and relieve them till a better system is established in their own country” (Lowe, 2000, 
p. 130). Although this relates to Irish immigration to England it is still instructive in 





The objective of the Poor Laws as discussed by George Nicholls, one of the three 
Commissioners in charge of administering the operation of the Poor Law Amendment 
Act 1934 in England and later sent to Ireland to judge whether the Act was suitable to 
Ireland, also displays a degree of benevolence. For him the Poor Law in England and 
Ireland had as an objective to “relieve the community from the demoralization as well 
as from the danger consequent on the prevalence of extensive and unmitigated 
destitution” (1856, p. v). Further, the policies and practices attached to the Poor Law 
in Ireland display, as was the case in England, elements of control, deterrence and 
benevolence. The presence of these elements results from the fact that the Irish Poor 
Law was based on the English model of 1834.  
That the two were increasingly similar in their application was inevitable. However, 
as Gray notes, the objective in Ireland was not to reform the pauper but rather focused 
on the absentee landlord who was seen as responsible for the “economic backwardness 
of Ireland” (2012, p. 25). Nevertheless the workhouse system guided by the eligibility 
principle was established in Ireland and stayed in Irish popular memory as a symbol 
of suffering and degradation (Gray, 2012). The structure of Irish workhouses was the 
same as those in England and Wales, designed by the same architect, who incorporated 
the principles of discipline and classification in the very structure of the workhouses 
(Gray, 2012). Another commonality observed was the distinction made among the 
poor subject to relief. Like in England, the distinction between “deserving” and “un-
deserving” poor was employed (Crossman, 2013). 
Benevolence, as was the case in nineteenth century England, was accorded to the 
deserving poor, whereas the undeserving were subject to punishment and deterrence 
(Crossman, 2013). Discourses supporting the establishment of a Poor Law in Ireland 
bring forth another aspect of the relationship between the English and Irish. The 
exportation of the English Poor Law was seen as a method of teaching the Irish poor. 
In trying to get support in Parliament Sadler stated: “let them be taught again to 
entertain feelings of respect and affection towards their superiors” (quoted in Lowe, 
2000, p. 149). According to this, the deferential relationship between rich and poor 





need for the Poor Laws was justified as a way to deal with absentee landlords. Sadler 
argued that these classes “had duties to perform as strictly and righteously due, as 
those it exacts from poverty” (cited in Lowe, 2000, p. 136). 
Control and supervision was also characteristic of the administration of the Poor Laws 
in Ireland. Primary responsibility rested with the English Poor Law Commission. The 
resident Commissioner in Dublin had a team of assistant commissioners from England 
and Ireland. It was only in 1847 that an Irish Commission for the Poor Laws was 
established (Crossman, 2013). This reflects the perception that the Irish needed to be 
taught, they needed to learn how to administer the Poor Laws by those who knew best 
and once they were deemed ready they would be given a degree of responsibility. 
4.6 Conclusion  
The objective of this chapter was to identify the characteristics underlying British 
paternalism, to be employed as markers for its identification in the following chapters. 
This was accomplished by taking into account paternalism’s specific context of 
emergence and development in England and its exportation to Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland. Since British Paternalism originates in English paternalism, the chapter first 
moved to the identification of the latter. This was accomplished by investigating the 
structure of English society, its institutions and policies directed at “vulnerable 
groups” of society such as “the poor”, “women”, and “the lunatic” in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After identifying how English paternalism 
expressed itself in each period in the practices, discourses and representations of 
English officials, a comparative analysis was initiated.  
The comparative analysis exposed certain variations in the structure of English 
society, in policies put in place to deal with the lower classes, and in practices of 
representation vis-à-vis the poor. For example hierarchy and inequality were central 
aspects of eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century English society. That did not 
mean that the different groups in society were differentiated in the same way. In the 





whereas in the nineteenth century distinctions were based on class and religion. 
Although English society in the twentieth century followed the Universalist 
philosophy of the time distinctions between Englishmen were made based on class, 
poverty and market inequalities.  
Aside from exposing variations, the comparative analysis identified the elements 
characteristic of English paternalism by drawing on the features found present in all 
three periods under analysis. These are: hierarchy/inequality, difference, a sense of 
duty and responsibility and practices of protection and control and benevolence. 
Paternalism’s persistence throughout these three centuries reflects Holmes’ (1992, p. 
404) argument that it results from “a combination of constitution and culture”. The 
idea that superiority engenders duty towards the less fortunate, who are in need of 
protection and sometimes require control, is a hallmark of English paternalism. 
Having provided a description of English paternalism the chapter moved to address 
the relations between England and the periphery in the nineteenth century by focusing 
on Ireland. This section investigated how English paternalism was exported to Ireland 
by looking at practices, discourses and representations on poor relief. A correlation 
between paternalism at home and abroad was expected given that those arguing for 
certain policies and in charge of drafting them into law at home, are also the ones in 
charge policy formulation in the periphery. This analysis conducted brings forth some 
important observations and conclusions concerning British paternalism in line with 
what was presented in Chapter 3. 
When exported from the core to the periphery, paternalism retains its core 
characteristics. English practices, discourses and representations on Irish poverty 
display hierarchy/inequality, protection/control, benevolence and obligation/duty. 
Although the same characteristics define practices, discourses and representations 
within but also outside England, the meaning ascribed to them was subject to a degree 
of variation. At the same time, however, it is possible to discern a difference between 
domestic and external practices, discourses and representations. In the domestic sphere 





relation between England and Ireland was based on class and race. The superiority of 
the English was highlighted against the inferiority of the Irish in multiple ways.  
Differentiation was also visible in explanations procured regarding the causes of 
poverty in England and Ireland. In Ireland poverty resulted from a character flaw in 
the Irish and from the backward state of the country. Duty and responsibility were 
visible in both realms. In English society it was a feeling shared by the higher class 
towards the poor laborers. In Ireland, it was English officials who had a duty and 
responsibility towards the lesser Irish. In both cases practices of differentiation and 
the hierarchy and inequality defining their relationship resulted in feelings of duty 
from the “superior” group to the “inferior” group. Practices of protection and control 
in England and Ireland bring forward similarities. First and foremost the English 
established their system of compulsory poor relief in Ireland. The workhouses in both 
countries functioned as a place of terror for the pauper who entered them. Given that 
English institutions were seen as superior, they were exported to Ireland in the hope 
to benefit the Irish poor. Unlike practices established domestically, those instilled in 
Ireland had as an object to teach and guide the Irish so that they could reach a higher 
state of development. Although the Irish were represented as “the other”, the English 
believed that if provided with the right English guidance and help they could improve.  
This chapter, then, has identified the following as defining characteristics of British 
paternalism: hierarchy/inequality, difference, a sense of duty and responsibility and 
practices of protection and control and benevolence. Each characteristic informs on 
the ideologies prevalent in England, the structure of its society, its policies and its 
history. The next chapter will identify the manifestation of this British paternalism in 
Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the nineteenth century in Greece 
1821-27, the Sudan 1896-98 and India 1830-1860. It will employ the characteristics 





5 British External Paternalism in the 
Nineteenth Century: Greece, India 
and the Sudan   
In this chapter I examine three cases of British interventionism which will reveal how 
English paternalism, as examined in the previous chapter, finds an ideological, 
discursive, and practical continuity in Britain’s relations to foreign others. The first is 
the Allied intervention in the Greek struggle for independence 1821-27. The case of 
Greece has been widely employed in the literature to demonstrate the origins of 
humanitarian intervention. Current interpretations rest primordially on religion as the 
primary factor for humanitarian interventions in the nineteenth century. By taking the 
same case I aim to show that religion is but one element amongst many present during 
the intervention and that British paternalism manifested itself in the practice and 
discourse of Britain.  
The second case I examine is British rule in India during 1830-60. It is a case found 
in post-colonial literature, used to draw parallels between imperialism and more 
current events. I employ the case of India in order to show continuity in British 
paternalism and build on my counter-interpretation of nineteenth century British 
interventionism. The third case I explore is the British intervention in the Sudan 1896-
98 that enables me to show that nineteenth century interventions did not predominantly 
focus on white, Christian people and that British paternalism of this period is not 
ultimately defined by the element of religion. The identification of British paternalism 
in the above cases will involve the analysis of texts, focusing on the dominant 
discourses, representations and practices. I am most interested in the practices, 
discourses and representations of the British elite, politicians and officers on the 
ground. Within each case I look for the elements I have previously identified as 






5.1 British Paternalism During the Greek Struggle for 
Independence 1821-27 
The cases of Greece 1821-27, Syria-Lebanon 1860-61 and the Bulgarian agitation 
1876-78 are presented by the humanitarian intervention literature as instances of 
nineteenth century practices of humanitarian intervention. Since Britain was not 
involved in Syria-Lebanon I only focus on the case of Greece and how it has been 
interpreted in the literature. On the whole, interpretation centers on the religious aspect 
of the struggle, Christianity being presented as the driver of the intervention. Bass for 
instance argues that British identification with the Greeks resulted in the creation of a 
“Pan-Christian solidarity” (2008, p. 6). The intervention is also seen as the result of 
the various accounts revealing the massacres taking place in Greece (Bass, 2008; 
Simms and Trim, 2011). Alternative motives for intervention such as Britain’s 
national interest have also been addressed by some (Finnemore, 2003; Simms and 
Trim, 2011). 
In Simm and Trim (2011) Britain’s strategic considerations are addressed in 
presenting the Realist case for intervention. Finnemore (2003) acknowledges the 
existence of geostrategic factors while at the same time calling for the preponderance 
of humanitarian considerations presented as the catalyst of the intervention. At odds 
with most interpretations, scholars such as Chesterman argue that the intervention in 
Greece does not constitute a historical precedent for practices of humanitarian 
intervention (Chesterman, 2000; Rodogno, 2012). Despite this, the European 
intervention in Greece is labelled as the first instance of HI recorded in the nineteenth 
century by the majority of scholars in this literature (Frank and Rodley, 1973; Wheeler, 
2000; Ocran, 2002; Finnemore, 2003; Bass, 2008; Simms and Trim, 2011; Weiss, 
2012).  
Seen in this light, scholars use this case to argue for radical change in interventionary 
practice and discourse in the Post-Cold war era in terms of who is intervened upon, 
stressing normative changes that have occurred. In the analysis that follows I provide 





beginning of the insurrection in 1821 until the decisive battle of Navarino in 1827 
when Britain, France and Russia intervened. What scholars on humanitarian 
intervention fail to acknowledge is the existence of paternalism; the complex 
interconnection between practices, representations and discourses embedded in 
interventions.  
Before I begin identifying British paternalism in the case of Greece some background 
information is essential. Greece was under Ottoman rule since 1453. The first 
insurrectional movement of the Greek struggle for independence began in March 1821 
in the Peloponnese (Finlay, 1877). The Greeks rose against their Ottoman oppressors 
and sought to become independent. The uprising was inspired by the French 
Revolution of 1789 and the enlightenment principles accompanying it. A few months 
after the start of the insurrection approximately 20,000 Muslims were killed, an event 
scarcely noticed in Europe (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). In 1822 the people of Chios 
stood up to the Turks. The massacre of the Greeks which resulted was one of the most 
documented events during the struggle (Schwartzberg, 1988; Rodogno, 2012).  
The plight of the Greeks was strongly supported by fellow Greeks living in Europe 
and the Philhellene movement consisting of Europeans who wanted to help the Greeks 
in their struggle. Greek Committees were established in various European countries 
including Germany, Switzerland, France and England (Penn, 1938). To deal with the 
insurrection of his subjects, in 1824 the Sultan sought the aid of Mohammed Ali of 
Egypt. In return for his aid in providing a navy and an army the Sultan allowed him to 
acquire the Morea (Abbott, 1916). The Pasha’s son Ibrahim was the one leading the 
Egyptian conquering mission in the Morea that began in February 1825. By December 
Ibrahim Pasha managed to quash most of the resistance.  
Rumors of an upcoming “barbarization project” led by Ibrahim travelled fast in Europe 
(Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). The provisional government of Greece asked Britain 
for protection. However, Britain turned down the request, maintaining her position of 
neutrality (Cowles, 1990). In 1826 the St Petersburg Protocol was drafted and signed 





offer of mediation (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). On July 6th 1827 the three powers 
(France, Britain and Russia) signed the Treaty for the Pacification of Greece in 
London7. In accordance with the Treaty they imposed an armistice upon the Greeks 
and the Turks, obeyed only by the Greeks (Abbott, 1917). The treaty also provided for 
mediation between the two parties and the possibility for Greece to become “a 
dependency of Turkey” (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015, p. 116).  
The Turks rejected the provisions of the treaty and continued diffusing violence. 
Finally the fight for independence culminated with the battle of Navarino. On October 
20, 1827 the fleets of Britain, Russia and France combined their forces and under the 
command of admiral Codrington defeated the Egyptian and Turkish fleets (Cowles, 
1990). Britain maintained a position of neutrality during the first five years of the 
Greek struggle for independence and was concerned with limiting Russia’s potential 
of going on a full-scale war with the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, as the following 
will show, British paternalism manifested itself in the discourses, practices and 
representations of the British political elite and of the British public.  
Let us now address how each paternalistic element manifested itself in the case of 
Greece, starting with benevolence. Benevolence is a characteristic visible in both 
practices and discourses relating to Greece. In discourses benevolence is discernible 
in the justifications brought forth by the British political elite stressing the importance 
of an intervention on behalf of the Greeks. The perceived need for Britain to intervene 
in the Greek struggle was justified in terms of benefiting the Greeks. There are 
instances where benevolence is clearly articulated in British discourse. For instance, 
the Times wrote in 1824 “the struggle must succeed and must lead to an improvement 
not only of Greece but of Asia” (The Times, July 21st, 1824). In a similar line the 
newspaper read in 1826 “England and France are equally animated by the desire to 
see Greece released from bondage” (The Times, February 15, 1826).  
                                                 
7 The Treaty of London was signed by Britain, France and Russia and referred to the pacification of 
Greece. It specified the steps to be taken by the signatory powers in order to effectuate the pacification 





British public opinion and correspondence between British political elites and officers 
demonstrate how British action was perceived as mandatory in order to benefit Greece. 
In 1834 in a House of Commons debate Sir R. H. Inglis (MP for Dundalk) in 
presenting a petition from White Roothing in Essex on behalf of the Greeks stated “in 
perfect consistency with this rule of Conduct, government had used, and would 
continue to use, not only with Turkey, but with Austria, and every other state, every 
legitimate means in their power to obtain for the Greeks, not merely protection and 
security, but the revival and independence of their nation” (HC Deb 19 May 1826, 
c1272). Similarly in a dispatch addressed to the Greek leader, Prince Mavrocordato on 
September 10th 1827, General Edward Codrington the British Commander in chief in 
the Mediterranean  writes that “England can have no other object than the welfare of 
Greece” (Bourchier, 2012, p. 452).  
Discourses relating to the treaty for the pacification of Greece of 6th July 1827 further 
prove the existence of benevolence. On the matter Mr. Brownlow (MP for Armagh) 
was of the opinion that “it was conceived in a good spirit – it emanated as a love of 
independence” (HC Deb 31 January 1828, c72). Most revealing as to the existence of 
benevolence are discourses articulated by a great number of British Philhellenes and 
members of the London Greek Committee, established in 1823. Its members included 
Stanhope, Jeremy Bentham, Lord Byron, Bowring and Blaquiere. For instance, 
Stanhope the Commissioner of the London Greek Committee, argued in 1823 that “the 
object of the committee is to give freedom and knowledge to Greece” (St. Clair, 1972, 
p. 162). Articulated in this manner, freedom and knowledge are seen as the goal to be 
attained for the benefit of Greece. It was not only a matter of aiding the Greeks in their 
struggle of independence, it was also about supporting the regeneration of Greece and 
the transmission of knowledge from England (St Clair, 1972). Stanhope was among 
those British Philhellenes who were strongly convinced of this.  
Adding to this, the president of Magdalene College at Oxford, Martin Routh, argued 
in 1823 that “as a philanthropist, therefore, I feel myself disposed to assist the cause 
of suffering humanity in a country distant indeed, yet particularly interesting on many 





of infidels” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 81). This can be seen as a depiction of the sense of 
duty and obligation felt by the British due to religion. However, this also informs on 
the manner in which Christianity also indicated benevolence, the giving and helping 
of our fellows. It is not an issue of the Greeks being Christian but of “us” the British 
and what this entails.  
Practices undertaken during the revolt also exhibit benevolence. These refer to actions 
carried out by the London Greek Committee and British Philhellenes such as fund-
raising and writing pamphlets. Additionally, a number of them including Lord Byron 
joined the fight on the side of the Greeks to assist them (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015). 
The London Greek Committee also helped the Greek government obtain a loan since 
the money raised from fund-raising initiatives was barely sufficient (Zegger, 1970). 
All these practices were in nature benevolent, providing help and assistance in all these 
different ways. Although they were not carried out by the British government, they 
are both relevant and important because members of the London Greek Committee 
included Members of Parliament such as Sir Francis Burdett and John Hobhouse as 
well as many others constituting the British elite (Zegger, 1970). For its part, the 
British government provided help through diplomatic means. With its allies, the 
government drafted treaties to end the conflict and offered mediation to both parties 
engaged in the conflict.  
Let us now consider the second element defining British paternalism, obligation/duty, 
linked to representations of “the other”. The analysis of British discourses brings 
forward the ways in which this sense of British duty and obligation towards the Greek 
population developed. The first is captured through the tendency to omit atrocities 
committed by the Greeks and over-exaggerate those committed by the Turks, evident 
in British correspondence and in newspapers covering the event. For example the 1821 
massacre of Muslims did not evoke much in Europe whereas the massacre of Greeks 
in Chios in 1822 was widely discussed, analyzed and labelled as “barbaric”. Such 
practices of differentiation showcase a British identification with the Greeks and a 
dissociation with the Turks. In turn these practices gave life to feelings of duty and 





In discourses the Greeks were represented as similar to the British through a common 
religion and civilization, creating the in-group. Consequently, the Greeks were seen as 
“the self”, the European, and not as “the other”. In contrast, the Turks were depicted 
as barbarians and constituted the “out-group”, the “other”. What follows will show 
how the tendency of Philhellenes8 to represent the Greeks as “the basis of our 
civilization” accentuated this identification. Secondly, British obligation and duty was 
given life through strategies of legitimation evident on a number of occasions in the 
texts analyzed. Through these, the character of Britain and the British individuals 
involved comes to the forefront. Britain comes forth as superior and bound to lending 
a hand to a fellow Christian and civilized people.  
As mentioned above, British identification with the Greeks rested in the first instance 
on the manner in which Greeks and Turks were represented in discourse. As far as the 
Turks are concerned, the majority of texts accord them the most negative 
characteristics also visible in the description of their actions. For instance, in a dispatch 
to the British ambassador in Constantinople Lord Strangford in 1821, Foreign 
Secretary Castlereagh on the subject of the Porte’s reprisals against the Greek subjects 
wrote that “the sultan’s government perseveres in its endeavors to strike terror into the 
minds of its Greek subjects” (Prousis, 2011, p. 171). In another dispatch between the 
two, Strangford gave an account from the Morea, Epirus and Cyclades in 1821. He 
stated that “the slaughter of the Greeks both before and after the battle was prodigious, 
and several baskets of ears and tongues have been exhibited at the Porte” (FO 78/98). 
A year later, in Parliament, Wilberforce the Leader of the Christian Evangelicals in 
the House of Commons described the Turks “as enemies of Christianity and freedom” 
(cited in Rodogno, 2012, p. 70). Coupling that, the Turks were characterized as “the 
most weak, contemptible, vie-stained tyrants that ever polluted the earth on which they 
trod, vilifying and degrading the fairest part of the creation” (Rodogno, 2012, p. 75). 
Continuing the list of negative traits, the Turks were also described as a cruel, 
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aggressive, barbarian race posing an active threat to Western civilization (St. Clair, 
1972). In strike contrast, the Greeks were assigned the most positive traits and 
identified with the British through religion and civilization. Discourses articulated by 
Philhellenes are particularly illuminating in these respects. This is because calls to 
action were justified on the basis of the ancient Greek civilization. The main themes 
of Philhellenic discourses on Greece are well encapsulated by the following (1822): 
Greece… that land, the fostering nurse of civilization, where the spirit of 
antiquity still seems to linger amidst its olive groves, its myrtle bowers, and 
the precious relics of its splendid edifices, where both sacred and profane 
history unite forming the most interesting associations; where Socrates taught 
the lessons of his incomparable ethics, and a still greater than Socrates 
disclosed the mysteries of the unknown God to those that sat in darkness. 
(quoted in St. Clair, 1972, p. 58)  
Identified in such a manner, Greece was seen as encapsulating “civilization”, the 
European. Philhellenes were comprised among others of poets and writers. The nature 
of the identification of the British with the Greeks is further demonstrated in Percy 
Shelley’s poem “Hellas” written in 1821. In the preface he writes  
We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their 
root in Greece…The Modern Greek is the descendant of those glorious beings 
whom the imagination almost refuses to figure to itself as belonging to our 
king, and he inherits much of their sensibility, their rapidity of conception, 
their enthusiasm, and their courage. (quoted in St Clair, 1972, p. 54) 
This can be seen as a strong vehicle pushing for British action on behalf of Greece by 
the public. In a similar manner, Jeremy Bentham, a member of the London Greek 
Committee, described the Greeks as “the first enlightened nation” (cited in Bass, 2008, 
p. 78). Further, Edward Blaquiere explained his reasoning for helping the Greeks by 
saying he was “enthusiastically favored to Grecian freedom, not less from a sense of 
religion than of gratitude to their ancestors” (Blaquiere, 1825, p. 117). Such 





in response to the 1822 Scio massacre that “the most civilized, cultivated, and 
interesting people, the flower of Greece, have been, the greater part, exterminated” 
(cited in Bass, 2008, p. 71). 
Further, in a public meeting held in 1823 at the Crown and Anchor Tavern covered by 
the Times and attended by a number of MPs, Lord Milton a member of the London 
Greek Committee spoke of the nature of the Greeks. Some in England presented the 
events taking place in Greece as a contest between two barbarous nations. In response, 
Lord Milton defended the Greeks arguing that “if the Greeks were barbarians who was 
it that had made them so?” (The Times, May 16, 1823). Not only were the Greeks 
assigned the most positive of traits in the texts analyzed but there is evidence pointing 
to the fact that Greece was seen as “the self”. In the same meeting,. John Sydney 
Taylor argued that “If Englishmen were pursued like wild beasts, they would turn on 
their hunters with no very calculating rage” (The Times, May 16, 1823). It can be 
assumed from this that both being Europeans and civilized, Britons and Greeks when 
faced with the same situation would act in a similar manner.  
The processes of legitimation conducted by the British are equally significant in 
furthering their sense of duty and obligation towards their “fellow” Greeks. For 
instance, in 1826 the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Stratford Canning, 
in a dispatch to the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, described the ongoing 
situation in Greece as follows: “Sir, the situation in Greece appears to become more 
critical everyday…It would seem, in short, that without a miracle the Greek 
insurrection cannot be much longer maintained” (FO 78/142). Further, in 1827 the 
Times read “Our assistance is required by the descendants of those whose glorious 
literature has formed our taste” (The Times, 29 November 1827). What is apparent 
from the above is that Britain represented itself as the only one able to secure the 
Greeks and as such had an obligation to do so. At the same time, these also bring to 





of Philhellenes such as “All are looking forward to Lord Byron’s9 arrival, as they 
would to the coming of a Messiah” (Bass, 2008, p. 105).  
British obligation and duty also emanated from British representations of civilized 
conduct and permissibility. This is clear in a dispatch to Count Lieven, the Russian 
General and ambassador to London, in 1827 where Canning stated that “a contest so 
ferocious, leading to excess piracy and plunder, so intolerable to civilized Europe, 
justifies extra-ordinary intervention, and renders lawful any expedients short of 
positive hostility” (quoted in Marriott, 1918, p. 218). This is also the case pertaining 
to Britain’s position vis-à-vis the alleged barbarization project against the Greeks. In 
the instructions given to the Duke of Wellington who represented England at the St 
Petersburg conference in 182610, Secretary Canning shared Britain’s position on the 
alleged plan of depopulation. He stated that “supposing the fact true, it may surely be 
questioned whether a warfare of such a nature can be tolerated by Christian nations” 
(FO 881/165).   
Religion and most importantly Christianity could not be absent from the justifications 
offered for British action. On the whole, Christianity was seen as entailing certain 
duties towards the Greeks. For example, in the Times, Lord Bentinck argued that “he 
felt it to be the duty of every man who has any regard for freedom, for religion, for 
humanity to use his best endeavors in favor of the cause of civil and religious liberty” 
(The Times May 16 1823). Some years later, the Times wrote “what England can do 
with such perfect ease and safety she is, we think, in policy and honor, bound to do on 
this occasion so important to the whole of Christendom” (The Times, 13 May 1826). 
Further, Blaquiere, a Philhellene, and former British naval officer talked about the 
duties dictated by religion and Christian charity (The Times, June 19, 1827).  
Legitimation through religion largely emanated from the Philhellene movement in 
Britain. But Christianity was also a justification articulated in Parliament. Wilberforce, 
the leader of the Christian Evangelicals in the House of Commons, in demanding 
                                                 
9 The official agent of the London Greek Committee. 
10 The Duke of Wellington was sent to St Petersburg to consolidate relations of alliance between the 





military intervention in response to events in Chios exclaimed “it was rather a disgrace 
that the great European powers had not already driven back a nation of barbarians, the 
ancient and inveterate enemies of Christianity and freedom, into Asia” (cited in Bass, 
2008, p. 69).  Protection, a further element defining paternalism, was also present in 
Britain’s practices and discourses enacted during the Greek struggle for independence. 
Protection describes on the one hand the nature of practices undertaken by paternalists 
and on the other calls for the need of protection.  
The identification of protection is particularly interesting because it can be seen as an 
antithesis to the manner in which obligation and duty are articulated and represented. 
In order for the need of protection to be justified, British texts tend to represent the 
Greeks as different to the British. In some cases this entails representing the Greeks as 
incompetent. However, what has previously been presented as the engine of the sense 
of obligation and duty fits well to illustrate protection. In the same manner, 
representations of difference and incompetence helped justify further the need for 
protection. This shows the extent to which the elements constituting paternalism are 
interdependent. The British government was, after 1825, taking actions that can be 
seen protective in nature.  
Two sets of practices describe the involvement of the British government during the 
Greek war of independence. The first consisted of diplomatic efforts like drafting 
treaties and offering to mediate between the two parties. Britain along with France and 
Russia signed the St Petersburg Protocol in 1826 and the London Treaty in 1827. Both 
were attempts to resolve the conflict by offering mediation. If these efforts succeeded, 
the Greeks would no longer be in danger from the rumored “barbarization project” of 
the Turks. It is in this sense that these diplomatic efforts contained protection.  The 
second set were a mixture of forceful and non-forceful actions. When in 1827 the Porte 
rejected the armistice British vessels were tasked with preventing Turkish and 
Egyptians assistance (men, weapons, vessels) from reaching Greece (Bass, 2008).  
Force was employed by the Allied navy against the Turkish and Egyptian fleet during 





the end result of these efforts. In conformity with my arguments presented in Chapter 
3, coercion need not be a defining feature of paternalistic practices. In the case of 
Greece, Britain did not intervene by force against their wishes. As the Protocol relative 
to the affairs of Greece signed at St. Petersburg on April 4th 182611 stated, “His 
Britannic Majesty having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices, 
in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte” (HC Deb 31 January 
1828, c87). Through a mixture of diplomatic and military efforts Britain and her allies 
protected the Greeks and provided them the opportunity of gaining independence. 
In discourse the need for protection was articulated in a number of ways. First, it was 
justified through the vivid accounts of the atrocities committed by the Turks. In 
relation to the alleged extermination project against the Greeks, Augustus Granville 
Stapleton, the private secretary of George Canning, referring to Ibrahim Pasha wrote  
he was laboring to blot out of existence a whole Christian people, and to 
establish a new Barbary State on the shore of the Mediterranean. Mr. Canning 
held this to be a casus belli, giving all nations a right to interfere by force, and 
accordingly he consented to the Greek treaty, which admitted of a forcible 
interference, if necessary to prevent the consummation of the atrocious design. 
(1866, cited in Rodogno, 2012, p. 89) 
Further, in a dispatch to Lord Strangford, Castlereagh stated on the subject of the 
Porte’s reprisals against the Greek subjects that “the sultan’s government perseveres 
in its endeavors to strike terror into the minds of its Greek subjects” (Prousis, 2011, p. 
171). Similarly, Sir R. H. Inglis in a Commons Sitting read the following petition from 
White Roothing in Essex on behalf of the Greeks: “That the petitioners beg to 
recommend to the compassionate regard of the House the deplorable condition of our 
fellow Christians, the Greeks, now suffering under the merciless rage of the 
Mahomedan tyranny” (HC Deb 19 May 1826, c.1274). 
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Following the same justification, Mr. Brownlow in the Commons in 1828 asked “was 
it not plain that the object of the horrible warfare carried on there was the extinction 
of the Greek nation in that devoted land?” (HC Deb 31 January 1828, c72). On another 
occasion a similar case was made in the House of Commons. Wilberforce stated that 
“he knew of no case in which the power of a mighty country like England could be 
more nobly, more generously, or more justifiably exerted than in rescuing the Greeks 
from bondage and destruction” (Bass, 2008, p. 69). Further, in a correspondence to the 
Tsar on the 28th October 1821 Castlereagh argued  
Ought the Turkish yoke to be forever riveted upon the necks of their suffering 
and Christian subjects; and shall the descendants of those, in admiration of 
whom we have been educated, be doomed in this fine country to drag out, for 
all time to come, the miserable existence to which circumstances have reduced 
them? (Schwartzberg, 1988, p. 146) 
This is also evident in newspaper coverage. In response to the massacre in Chios the 
Times wrote that the Greeks were subject to “immediate and total annihilation…we 
know not that any tragedy on record ever produced in this country a movement of 
deeper horror than this recital of the atrocities” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 69). The above 
demonstrates that protection was justified in terms of necessity, in terms of 
Christianity. Necessity was articulated in a manner that gave no choice to the British 
but to move to the immediate protection of the Greeks. Christianity was employed, 
here again as a manner to identify the Greeks as “the self”. 
The last component of British paternalism I will now address is based on dominant 
representations of incompetence and difference which sets a defining line between the 
paternalists and the subjects of their intervention. Here, the latter are identified not 
only as different but also as being incompetent to act left to their own devices. This is 
clearly contained in British texts relating to the Greek struggle. The preceding sections 
have demonstrated and stressed how the Greeks were represented as the “self”, which 
drove discourses of duty and obligation. However, representations of difference were 





For example, General Gordon, a Philhellene and a British army officer, stated that  
whatever national or individual wrong the Greeks may have endured, it is 
impossible to justify such ferocity of their vengeance, or to deny that a 
comparison instituted between them and the Ottoman generals, Mehmet 
Aboul-abad, Omer Vironi, and the Kehaya Bey would give to the latter the 
palm of humanity. Humanity, however, is a word quite out of place when 
applied either to them or to their opponents. (quoted in Finlay, 1877, p. 192)  
What is evident here is that the Greeks were portrayed as similar to the Turks, as 
ferocious and barbarian-like. Adding to this observation, a British Philhellene 
cautioned that some were of the opinion that the “Greeks themselves are barbarians 
and far surpass the Turks in atrocities” (cited in Bass, 2008, p. 64).  
Similarly, W.H. Humphreys, a Philhellene, described the modern Greeks in his journal 
as “debased, degraded, to the lowest pit of barbarism” (cited in Rodogno, 2012, p. 66). 
In Britain, this discourse of Greek barbarism existed alongside the one praising Greek 
civilization and culture. The Tories in particular insisted on moral equivalence 
between the Greeks and the Turks (Bass, 2008). Greeks were depicted as barbarians 
as a result of the atrocities committed during the first years of the insurrection. 
Although the discourse of Greek barbarism was acknowledged and supported by 
various people including Philhellenes, some of whom were in Greece and witnessed 
the violence and cruelty, it was the discourse praising Greece and civilization which 
succeeded in bringing forth an intervention on behalf of the Greeks.  
The Philhellenes put tremendous effort to counter the moral equality argument. Even 
when they acknowledged the cruelty and barbarity with which the Greeks conducted 
themselves, they nevertheless excused it, attributing it to years spent under Turkish 
influence and hardship. Additionally, Greek excess, unlike Turkish conduct, was 
excused and seen as overwhelmingly exaggerated. In relation to Greece’s violent 
conduct in Tripolizza in 1821, Blaquiere argued “when all the concomitant 
circumstances which led to the excesses at Tripolizza are made known, they will 





civilized troops of Europe in many circumstances during the last fifty years” (Bass, 
2008, p. 65). It is particularly interesting that the violence and cruelty committed by 
the Greeks was paralleled with the conduct of other Europeans rather than the Turks.  
Finally, on a number of occasions the Greeks were described as “unfortunate” in 
British correspondence. In a dispatch to Castlereagh on the 26th of June 1821 
Strangford argued in response to the massacre of Aivalis’ Greek inhabitants that “I 
thought that it would be highly proper to make some efforts on behalf of these 
unfortunate people” (Prousis, 2011, p. 196). Further, the Greeks were seen as weak. 
In his book, Bass shows that for the Liberals of the time if military or diplomatic force 
was to be used, it should be on the side of the weak, not on the side of tyrannical 
empires (Bass, 2008). As we will see the case of Greece shares common elements but 
also some differences with the case of India.  
5.2 British Paternalism in British India 1830-60 
Various aspects of nineteenth century British India have captured the attention of post-
colonial scholarship and of scholars addressing humanitarian interventions. Their 
interpretation of the case and the objective for which it is studied differ considerably. 
One of the preoccupations of post-colonial scholarship is the making of connexions 
between past and present discursive practices. As argued by Charles (1995, p. 152) 
“the new world order may well be a new version of the old, and the new discourse, a 
new rendition of the old”. Nineteenth century India is one of the most cited cases 
employed to demonstrate parallels with current interventionary discourses and 
practices (Orford, 2003; Chowdhry and Nair, 2004; Duara, 2004; Sheldon, 2009). 
Scholars refer to certain aspects of British India or certain important developments 
during the nineteenth century. Sheldon (2009) investigates the case of famines in India 
from mid-nineteenth century onwards in the context of colonial development theory. 
Further, the period 1830-50, characterised by extensive reforms, has been studied by 
the literature in order to enlighten on present interventionary discourse and practice. 





2003; Duara, 2003). By looking at educational reforms, Orford (2003, p. 133) shows 
that “the pedagogical imperative” in force then continues to shape interventionary 
discourse today and how heroic narrative constructing images of “the self” and “the 
other” are still relevant, taking as an example the current case of Australian 
intervention in East Timor in 1999. The period following the Indian mutiny in 1858 
and the subsequent changes which have taken place in the administration of India have 
caught the interest of the literature because they were seen as presenting a renewed 
sense of British superiority (Duffield and Hewitt, 2009). Lastly, the post-colonial 
literature treats India as the case where the colonizing mission flourished and which 
flagrantly displays the binary opposites which accompanied it (Duara, 2003).  
The case of India is also discussed outside post-colonial scholarship. Finnemore 
(2003) sees India as an example of colonial humanitarianism whose mission was to 
civilize.  It is for her an empirical instance of infantilization in practice. In Barnett’s 
study of the history and expansion of humanitarianism, the 1837 famine in northern 
India is explored in an attempt to address colonialism and compassion. For him 
paternalism denotes “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by 
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values 
of the person whose liberty is being violated” (2011, p. 34).  
Paternalism serves two objectives in his study, to identify “who is the human that 
demands our compassion” and “how do we know what is best for another person” 
(2011, p. 36). Barnett argues that the 1837 Indian famine and the response of British 
authorities exemplify “how feelings of obligation to distant strangers in the colonial 
context could produce tragic forms of paternalism” (2011, p. 62). The British 
authorities dealt with the famine by establishing works of public utility. According to 
Barnett the British  
were taking the unprecedented step of protecting the population, accepting a 
new humanitarian responsibility consistent with a general reluctance to adopt 
open-ended responsibilities and…limit the endlessly rising costs of direct 





Despite British efforts, the situation of the people did not improve. Given that Barnett 
explores the 1837 Indian famine and illustrates certain aspects of paternalism, I am 
looking at another aspect, education. This is because practices and discourses on 
education are more representative of the ideology of the time. By focusing on 
Parliamentary debates and on the practices and discourses of the British colonial 
authorities I show how the elements I have identified as constituting paternalism 
manifested themselves. My conceptualization of paternalism differs from Barnett’s, 
as it is more inclusive and allows for the identification of practices where coercion is 
absent.   
Since the choice of case studies is based on pre-existing literature, my focus will centre 
on British India during the period 1830-60. I pay special attention to educational 
reforms and to events after the mutiny of 1858 dealing with administrative reforms. 
This allows me to further develop my counter-interpretation to what has been offered 
by the humanitarian intervention literature, which argues for the determining impact 
of religion in 19th century interventions and its focus on rescuing Christians. The case 
of India is enlightening in many respects. First, as argued by historians working on 
India, it is in that country that the notion of civilizing mission developed and spread 
to the rest of the British Empire. Second, it is employed by the post-colonial literature, 
which echoes many of the arguments I seek to bring forth. Namely, that the past is in 
the present. 
I now move to provide a background of the case. When compared to other British 
colonial possessions, India constituted an anomaly in that it was the East India 
Company (EIC) and not the British government that governed it. Britain officially 
established her rule over India on 28 June 1858. In 1833 the charter of the Company 
was extended to another twenty years. At that moment the Company lost its 
commercial side and retained its sovereign status. From 1830 to 1850 India underwent 
far-reaching reforms, her land and tax systems, civil laws, administration and 
education were, as historian Bernard Porter observes, “moulded in a new more English 
image” (1996, p. 33). In 1857-58 the Government of India was faced with a mutiny at 





this, the administration of India was transferred from the East India Company to the 
Crown (Bose, 1916).  
The following analysis will pay close attention to discourses advanced by prominent 
figures who were involved in Indian affairs, particularly in the area of education, such 
as Thomas Babington Macaulay and Sir Charles Trevelyan. In proceeding to the 
analysis it is important to be aware of the different positions surrounding debates on 
education during the 1830s. The two main positions consisted of the Anglicists and 
the Orientals. The Anglicists wished to reform and develop India on an English model, 
including educating the natives in the English language, whereas the Orientals pushed 
for a more local approach, keeping the language and customs of the natives. An 
additional point concerns the propagation of the Christian religion to India. The 
government of India and the British government did not wish to interfere in the 
religious convictions of the people of India. The propagation of the Christian religion 
was, after 1831, left to missionaries. 
Let us now consider how benevolence manifested itself in British discourses and 
practices in India during the period under examination. Policies relating to education, 
the judiciary and the general administration of India clearly display benevolence. In 
the sphere of education English was established as the medium of instruction. As far 
as higher education was concerned three Universities were established (Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras) in 1857 (Jarayam, 2004). Additionally, the 1830s saw a 
remarkable advancement in infrastructure through the construction of roads, railways 
and the establishment of telegrams and electric grids (Sheldon, 2009). The perceived 
need for British action and interference in these areas was justified as being for the 
benefit and general welfare of the native population of India.  
For instance, on the debate regarding the language to be used to educate the natives, 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, a legal member of the governor general’s council,12 
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argued that “the English tongue is that which would be the most useful to our native 
subjects” (Minute on education 1835). Similarly Charles Trevelyan believed that 
English education would result in “a decided change for the better in the character of 
the people” (cited in Singh, 1996, p. 125). Such justifications are also observed in 
discourses relating to the entire education system in the late 1850s. During a debate in 
the House of Lords on 19 February, Earl Granville, the Lord President of the Council 
stated that “every thinking man in the present day was of opinion, our real object in 
our government in India must be the benefit of the people governed, and that therefore 
we must do our best to elevate them in the scale of social and moral being” (HL Deb 
19 February 1858, c1729).  
Benevolence can also be observed as the justification brought forth regarding reforms 
in the judicial system. In 1833 the Law Commission was charged with remedying 
anomalies in the law of India. For Wolryche Whitmore, the MP for Wolverhampton it 
was mandatory to improve the law in India and the Commission’s efforts “would have 
the effect of encouraging the settlement of Europeans, which circumstances would 
prove the greatest blessing to that country” (HC Deb 10 July 1833, c502). As regards 
the administration of India by the East India Company, it was described on benevolent 
terms by some in Parliament. During the same debate Macaulay stated “I see a 
government anxiously bent on the public good. Even in its errors I recognize a paternal 
feeling towards the great people committed to its charge…I see evils but I see the 
government actively employed in the work of remedying those evils” (HC Deb 10 July 
1833, c522). 
Benevolence is also observed as the justification provided by British discourses in 
debates on the future administration of India, following the mutiny which terminated 
in 1858. Debates focused on the transfer of the administration of India from the East 
India Company to the Crown. On the issue, T. Baring (MP for Huntingdon) argued in 
the House of Commons in 1858 that “the great object of the Government and of the 
House ought to be to promote the welfare of our Indian fellow-subjects” (HC Deb 12 
February 1858, c1293). Similarly, Viscount Palmerston, elected thrice as Prime 





to the British nation, will result there from” (HC Deb 12 February 1858, c1291). In a 
later debate, Viscount Palmerston similarly stated “I am persuaded that a change from 
the authority of the East India Company to that of the Crown would have a most 
salutary and powerful effect upon the native mind of India” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, 
c2040). Espousing the welfare of the Hindoo people was claimed to be a sentiment 
shared by the British public in the late 1850s. As conveyed by Sir Erskine Perry, a 
British Liberal Politician who served as a judge in India “what they desired was, to 
see the people of India prosperous, happy, and improving under our rule” (HC 12 
February 1858, c1311).  
The analysis of British discourses also reveals the varied ways in which British 
obligation and duty towards the Hindoos developed and flourished. At a general level, 
obligation and duty were due to the mere possession of India by the British. As 
articulated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir George Cornwall Lewis ) “we have 
incurred certain obligations towards the people of India which we are bound to fulfil” 
(HC Deb 12 February 1858, c1331). That was also the position held by A. Mills during 
a debate in April on the future government of India by the Crown. He argued “it is the 
duty of the Imperial government to legislate for the home government of India” (HC 
Deb 30 April 1858, c2028). Further, Macaulay believed that “the British government 
had a responsibility to the Indian population” (cited in Bearce, 1961, p. 177). 
This is also the case in the argument brought forth by Lord Brougham, a member of 
the House of Lords, regarding problems encountered with the administration of justice 
and police in India. It was, he argued, “the imperative duty of the government, the 
Parliament, and the country, to apply all the resources of their talent, knowledge and 
wisdom” (HL Deb 11 March 1853, c17). Further, The Governor General of India, Lord 
Bentinck, in 1834 maintained that “British rule is committed to ending the vices, the 
oppression, the despotism, the barbarous and often cruel customs that had been the 
growth of ages” (cited in Brown, 2008, p. 38).  
Obligation and duty can also be seen as due to Britain’s superiority in a number of 





of education, obligation and duty were not only as seen as due to Britain’s superiority, 
but also to the role taken by the British as “educators”. Of course this can be interpreted 
as a natural consequence of representations of superiority. Obligation and duty as 
owed to the role taken by the British as educators is clear in Macaulay’s argument 
regarding the issue of education proceeding in the English language. According to him  
we have to educate a people who cannot at present be educated by means of 
their mother tongue. We must teach them some foreign language. The claims 
of our own language it is hardly necessary to recapitulate. It stands pre-eminent 
even among the languages of the West (Minute on education, 1835).   
Superior knowledge and culture was another factor attached to British superiority. 
According to Trevelyan who was an advocate of the Anglicist position, promoting 
English education for the natives “the past history of the world authorizes us to believe 
that the movement, English education, taking place in India, if properly directed…will 
end in bringing a decided change for the better in the character of the people” (cited 
in Singh, 1996, p. 124-125).  
Years later, these convictions were still very much alive. In a despatch sent to India in 
1853 by the Board of Control in charge of overseeing the East India Company it was 
stated that “it was a public duty and a public advantage that the people of India should 
receive Western education” (HL Deb 19 February 1858, c1726). In the same year, 
Lord Glenelg (Charles Grant) who had previously served as president of the Board of 
Control and as secretary of state for war and the colonies was of the opinion that “it 
was not only the duty but the mission of this country to India, to communicate to the 
natives of India the best education which it was in their power to give them” (HL Deb 
11 March 1853, c25). Similarly, in 1858 Earl Granville asserted in a debate in the 
Commons “it was the duty, as it was the privilege, of the British government to 
improve the education of the swarming population who were subject to this country in 
India” (HL Deb 19 February 1858, c1725). He further argued that “every thinking man 





be to benefit the people governed, and that therefore we must do our best to elevate 
them in the scale of social and moral being” (HL Deb 19 February 1858, c1729).  
The following quote from Jacob’s the Brigadier General displays in full force Britain’s 
perceived superiority and moral force as it existed throughout the period under 
investigation:  
We hold India, then by being in reality, as in reputation a superior race to the 
Asiatic; and if this natural superiority did not exist, we should not, and could 
not, retain the country for one week. If, then we really are a morally superior 
race, governed by a higher motives, and possessing higher attributes that the 
Asiatics, the more the native Indians are able to understand us, and the more 
we improve their capacity for so understanding, the firmer will become our 
power. Away, then, with the assumption of equality; and let us accept our true 
position of a dominant race. So placed, let us establish our rule by setting them 
a high example, by making them feel the value of truth and honesty, and by 
raising their moral and intellectual powers. (cited in Hutchins, 1967, p. 26) 
The role of educator taken on by the British concurs with a greater aim, that of 
civilizing and developing the Hindoo population. Responsibility and duty here can be 
understood as owing to these larger goals. Here again the superiority of Britain is 
brought forth as bestowing certain duties upon Britain towards the Hindoos. For 
example, on the subject of reforming the laws of India Macaulay stated that “our 
freedom and high civilization render this improvement, desirable as it must always be” 
(HC Deb July 10 1833, c531). In a debate in the Commons in 1858 on the issue of 
transferring Indian affairs from the East India Company to the Crown, Viscount 
Palmerston argued that  
power has been entrusted to us for other and better purposes; and without 
pointing to anything particular, I think it is the duty of this nation to use it in 
such a manner as to promote, as far as they can, the instruction, the 
enlightenment, and the civilization of those great populations which are now 





Attached to this was his conviction that “we have a great duty to fulfil in India” (HC 
Deb 12 February 1858, c1292).  
What I have presented so far shows that British discourses conveyed that British 
responsibility and duty were due to Britain’s possession (EIC) or prospective 
possession of India (Crown), to the role of the British as educators, which stemmed 
from the superiority of their country. Adding to this is the place of religion as 
conferring certain duties and obligations. For example, on the question of why India 
was given to the British, Daniel Wilson the evangelical bishop of Calcutta asserted 
that “it was so that we may be put upon our probation – that it may be seen whether 
we will communicate to India and the world the immense blessings of God which have 
been committed to our trust” (quoted in Brown, 2008, p. 196). According to Lord 
Glenelg “we were called upon by all that we owed to God, as well as man, and at any 
hazard, to exercise that duty” (HL Deb 11 March 1853, c25). Similarly Mr Blackett 
(MP for Newcastle upon Thyme ) in a debate in the House of Commons argued that 
“nothing was more important for Christian rulers than to provide the blessings of 
education for the people” (HC Deb 24 June 1853, c765). Religion played its part in 
promoting Britain’s duty and responsibility. The place of Christianity was decisive in 
discourses of missionaries who after 1813 proceeded to do their work in India in full 
force. At a general level, the British government espoused neutrality on matters of 
religion and culture.  
Let us now turn our attention to another element defining paternalism, protection. 
Locating the element of protection in British paternalism involves paying close 
attention to the interconnections which exist between this and other elements 
constituting it. What fuels calls to protection in this as in the previous case examined, 
are British representations of the Indians. The mere representation of the Hindoos as 
incompetent and as the complete opposite of the British, grounds acts of protection on 
the part of the British. The element of protection in the case of British rule in India 
(EIC and Crown) is intriguing because it does not connote protection from physical 
danger but it can be understood as protecting the Hindoos from themselves. 





is more, the nature of the practices undertaken during the period examined of British 
rule in India also concur with this observation. The policies in question relate to the 
system of higher education and to the administration of the country. From 1835 
onwards the system of higher education in India followed a Western system of 
education and learning. Arabic and Sanscrit were replaced by English as the language 
of instruction (Jayaram, 2004, p. 86).  
Additionally, as mentioned previously, in 1857 three universities were established in 
Bombay, Calcutta and Madras modelled on the University of London (Jayaram, 2004). 
In the area of administration following the mutiny the British put in place what 
Thompson and Garratt (1935, p. 476) describe as “a paternal system”. European ideas 
guided governing practices and knowledge, and information was provided by District 
Officers who were predominantly British. As far as educational policies are concerned, 
British authorities transplanted Western education and British thought and civilization 
in India. Such line of action was necessary since it was believed that the Hindoo did 
not know what was best for him.  
On the subject, Macaulay argued in his Minute on Education in 1835 that “it would be 
bad enough to consult their intellectual taste at the expense of their intellectual health. 
But we are consulting neither. We are withholding from them the learning which is 
palatable to them” (Macaulay’s minute 1835). This shows that protection was 
interpreted as a call for civilizing and developing the Hindoos. The objective of 
civilizing through language was clearly articulated by Macaulay. He argued that “the 
language of Western Europe civilized Russia. I cannot doubt that they will do for the 
Hindoo what they have done for the Tartar” (Macaulay’s minute 1835). The latter 
brings forth a number of points. First, it concurs with what I have suggested that 
protection equalled civilizing the natives. Second, this quote also brings forth the 
interplay between representation and protection. Before Russia became civilized she 
was considered in Macaulay’s words as “being in a state as barbarous as that in which 






India was at that moment represented as being in Russia’s state before it was civilized. 
Therefore, with the guidance of Britain, India could reach a higher level of civilization. 
This idea of protecting through civilizing was also accompanied by the idea of 
protection as supervision. This idea was visible in the policy pursued by the EIC as 
regards the administration of justice. As explained by Mr Mangles who served as an 
MP and Chairman of the EIC after 1857,  
the Indian government (East India Company) had gone about the principle of 
selecting the best Natives to hold those offices to administer justice in the first 
instance, employing English judges to oversee them in the performance of their 
duties. That was the only way in which the people of India could be educated 
into a fitness for self-government. (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2058).  
This shows that this guiding and superintending was of essence because the Hindoos, 
as it was claimed, could not govern themselves. In the aftermath of the mutiny British 
parliamentarians called for the need to protect the Hindoos. During a debate on the 
issue of transferring the administration to the Crown Lord Harry Vane (MP for 
Durham Southern) argued in 1858 that “India was still overrun by hordes of a 
licentious soldiery, and complete tranquillity could not be expected for many months, 
it was absolutely necessary there should be a vigorous government to administer 
affairs in that country” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2019). Imminence required that a 
decision be taken so that the people could be protected.  
The last paternalistic element I now turn to is difference and incompetence, intimately 
tied to practices of representation. The manner in which the Hindoos were represented 
in British discourse fuelled calls to protection and framed at the same time the feelings 
of obligation and duty on the part of the British towards the Native population. British 
representations of the Hindoos prove to be an important medium through which British 
paternalism operated and flourished. Generally, the British represented the Hindoos as 
different. As such they were seen as representing “the other”. The Hindoos were seen 
as different in terms of culture, language, religion, their character and their 





remarks that the reformers of the 1830s viewed India as “the land of superstition and 
despotism” (Bearce, 1961, p. 158). This is also reflected in Bentinck’s view of India 
as “a country cursed from one end to the other by the vice, the ignorance, the 
oppression, the despotism, the barbarous and cruel customs” (cited in Bearce 1961, p. 
162). One such custom was the sati, whose abolition was celebrated as “the abolition 
of a barbarous custom” (HC Deb 04 June 1830, c1356). 
The character of the Hindoos was also seen as different when compared to the British. 
In explaining the problems encountered by the EIC in the administration of justice in 
India, Mangles asserted that “the greater part of the defects which existed arose from 
the inherent difficulties of our position, from the character and habits of the people 
with whom we had to deal and from the utter impossibility of making the natives 
instruments of good government all at once” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2058). Further, 
the Indian race was according to Macaulay “a race debased by three thousand years of 
despotism and priestcraft” (cited in Vohra, 2001, p. 68). The Hindoos were also seen 
as different because of their language. According to Macaulay “the dialects spoken 
among the natives of this part of India contain neither literary nor scientific 
information, and moreover are poor and rude” (Macaulay’s minute 1835).  
A proposal was made in Parliament in 1853 that admissions to the civil service in India 
should be effectuated by examinations. This was to apply to both natives and 
Europeans. At the moment the proposal was brought forth natives were not admitted 
in the civil service. On that Macaulay argued that “I do not blame those who do not 
admit them, for it is my belief that there is not in India a young Native whom it would 
be a kindness to the Native population to place, at the present moment, in your civil 
service”. However he argued that “as soon as any young Native of distinguished parts 
should, by the cultivation of English literature, have enabled himself to be victorious 
in competition over European candidates, he would, in the most honourable manner, 
by conquest, as a matter of right, and not as a mere eleemosynary donation, obtain 
access to the service” (HC Deb 24 June 1853, cc757-758). This shows that natives 
were differentiated from the British and Europeans in general on the basis of not 





What accentuated further this differentiation and the representation of the Hindoos as 
the other were British perceptions of masculinity. Trevelyan spoke confidently in 1838 
of the time when Indians would “grow to a man’s estate” (cited in Hutchins, 1967, p. 
76). This concurs with Macaulay’s caricature of the Bengali as “soft, devious, servile, 
indolent and effeminate” (cited in Duara, 2004, p. 80). What is more, the Hindoos 
were represented as child-like. Prof Horace Wilson was an English Orientalist who 
resided many years in India and was employed in various departments of the civil 
government. In his article in the Times in 1840 argued that “a common characteristic 
of men of learning and of the Hindus especially, was a simplicity truly childish and a 
total unacquaintance with the business and manners of life…where this feature was 
lost, it was chiefly by those who had been long familiar with Europeans” (The Times, 
25 June). 
The above corresponds with observations made by current literature, that the colonized 
people of India took in the eyes of their British guardians the role of adopted children 
in the family of the British Empire (Blue, Bunton and Croizier, 2002). This manner of 
representing the Hindoos resulted in them being seen as incompetent. For instance, on 
the subject of the government of India Bill, Mr Blackett did not think that the opinions 
of the Natives could assist them towards the conclusion as to what the government of 
India should be (HC Deb 24 June 1853, c765). Further in a Commons debate on the 
future government of India in 1858 Sir Francis Baring stated that “we could not let 
India govern itself” (HC Deb 30 April 1858, c2030). Echoing the above, Mill argued 
in 1852 that “I do not think you could make a native Governor General, but I think 
natives might in time be appointed to many of the highest administrative offices” 
(1990, p. 65).  
Of crucial importance is the fact that not all Hindoos were seen as “the other”. British 
texts are illuminating in this respect in that they show evidence of a double sense of 
identification. The educated classes were seen as closer to the “self”, as allies of 
Britain. This identification was owed to the fact that this segment of the population 
was educated on British standards. Similarly, Macaulay argued that “in India, English 





at the seats of government” (Minute on education, 1835). As a result of such 
identification these educated classes were seen and spoken of in a different light in 
relation to the rest of the Native population. For example, Macaulay argued regarding 
appointments to the civil service that “we ought if possible to take such measures that 
this service may consist entirely of picked men, of superior men, taken from the flower 
of the youth of India” (HC Deb 24 June 1853, c749). 
5.3 British Paternalism During the Anglo-Egyptian 
Intervention in the Sudan 1896-98 
The British intervention in the Sudan which took place in 1896-1898 constitutes the 
third case I address to provide a holistic representation of the manner in which British 
paternalism manifested itself in the nineteenth century. Despite not constituting part 
of empirical investigations of the interventionist literature, the case of the Sudan helps 
to consolidate my argument regarding British paternalism to a considerable extent. It 
also aids me in countering contemporary interpretations of nineteenth century 
interventions based on religion (Christianity). As the following analysis will reveal, 
paternalism manifested itself in the Sudan in similar but also in distinct ways to the 
case of Greece and India. Before presenting the ways in which British paternalism was 
manifested in the Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan some background 
information is necessary.  
The history and the relations between Egypt, the Sudan and Britain are of a complex 
nature. Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1882 when it was occupied by 
British forces during the Anglo-Egyptian war (Neillands, 1996). The Sudan was an 
Egyptian possession since the early nineteenth century. Following a revolution by the 
Madhists in the Sudan against their Egyptian administration, Egypt abandoned the 
Sudan in 1884-5. A decade later, the British and Egyptians got involved in the Sudan. 
This was undertaken through three expeditions: the Dongola expedition in 1896, the 
Berber and Atbara expedition in 1897, and the battle of Omdurman in 1898 (Neillands, 





“Dervishes” in the territory whose name was given to them by the British to Mahdi’s 
followers (Neillands, 1996). Although the scope of this chapter does not extend to the 
aftermath of the British expedition, it suffices to say that it culminated with the 
establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over the Sudan in 1899 (Daly, 
2003).  
Let us first turn our attention to the way benevolence appeared in British discourses 
and representations of the Sudan. In the discourses analyzed, British benevolence is 
evident not only in debates in the House of Commons but also in British 
correspondence. On the subject of moving forward in the Sudan Mr. Henry Seton-Karr 
(MP for St Helens until 1906) argued in 1896 that  
it was the best for Egypt and for the Soudan, was absolutely necessary for the 
security of the country…..it would lead to the Soudan provinces, and even the 
Equatorial provinces, at some time being thrown open to civilization, the 
present tyranny of the Madhi being put an end to, and the security and 
prosperity of Egypt finally secured. (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1537) 
What is remarkable about the case of the Sudan, as clearly illustrated by the above, is 
that justifications for British involvement rested as much on the benefits and interests 
that would be afforded to both Egypt and the Sudan. Indeed, the interests of Egypt and 
the benefit it would acquire by Britain moving into the Sudan were overwhelming the 
justifications offered. In a debate in 1896 in the House of Commons, Mr. John Morley 
(MP for Montrose Burghs) stated that “It had been decided that it would be for both 
the present and the permanent interest of Egypt that an advance should be made up the 
valley of the Nile” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1489). Similarly, the Secretary of state 
for the colonies Mr. Chamberlain argued that “the present policy of the government is 
confined to the immediate needs of Egypt” (HC Debate 20 March 1896, c1512).  
Justifications found in British discourse concerning British involvement in the Sudan 
also took a more a general direction. This is clearly illustrated in Mr. Labouchere’s 
(MP for Northampton ) statement in the House of Commons in 1896 where he argued 





world, to be smashed” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1513). Further, the military 
expedition into the Sudan was to allow Egypt to re-conquer parts of it. On this, the 
Lord of the Treasury argued that “we do not think that it is a loss, but a gain, to 
civilization that Egyptian influence should be extended southwards in the way we 
propose” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, 1489). In terms of practices the British assisted the 
Egyptians militarily in various ways. Help was provided in terms of troops. British 
soldiers were after 1897 fighting with the Egyptian army. Additionally, gunboats were 
produced in Britain for the Egyptian government (The Times, 17 March 1896).  
Obligation and duty figured in an equally intriguing way in British justifications. Here 
again, the British displayed a double sense of duty and obligation. On the one hand, 
they conceived that they had an obligation towards Egypt to assist her in gaining back 
the Sudan, due in part to their occupation of Egypt and the duties and obligations 
thereby conferred to them. On the subject of moving into the Sudan Mr. J. Morley 
argued in the Commons that “I say that no possibility of fulfilling our duty to the 
people who are actually within our frontier exists so long as Dervish power continually 
threatens the peaceable industry of those people by the sudden raids and incursions” 
(HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1507).Britain’s role in Egypt as conferring certain duties 
and obligations was clearly articulated by Mr. Ronald Munro-Fergusson (MP for Leith 
District of Burghs) who in a Commons debate in February 1897 argued that “we are 
trustees” referring to Egypt (HC Deb 5 February 1897, c1496). Similarly, Mr. Pierpont 
(MP for Warrington) stated that “England being in a position of a foster-mother to 
Egypt, would be very wrong, indeed, not to take every possible means to maintain the 
safety of the country she had taken in charge” (HC Deb 5 February 1897, c1510).  
On the other hand, Britain seemed to feel it a duty to assist the Sudanese. As the MP 
for Forest of Dean, Sir Charles Dilke stated “it was our duty to restore” what he 
labelled “civilization” to the whole of the territory inhabited by these tribes (HC Deb 
20 March 1896, c1549). This illustrates that duty and obligation towards the Sudanese 
was justified in terms of Britain being the carrier of civilization, which in itself carried 
certain duties and obligations. Additionally, the concept of responsibility figures 





Exchequer argued in the Commons in 1897 “these responsibilities are not nearly so 
great or so special as our responsibility for the inhabitants of the Soudan” (HC Deb 5 
February 1897, cc1448). He also argued that “here is a case in which we may fulfil 
that responsibility which undoubtedly rests upon us” (Hansard, HC, Deb 5 February 
1897, c1449). This double sense of duty, obligation and responsibility can be clearly 
inferred by the following quote. In 1897, the Times published from their correspondent 
in Cairo that: “in the interests of trade, civilization and humanity England’s help will 
be given until Dervish tyranny throughout the Sudan has been superseded by a good 
government” (The Times 3 Nov 1897). The objective here was to help the Egyptians 
on the one hand and bring civilization to the Sudan on the other.  
Moving on to the element of protection, it is visible in the case of the Sudan towards 
both the Sudanese and the Egyptians. In regards to Egypt practices undertaken were 
of a military nature. Having previously been reformed according to British guidelines, 
the Egyptian military was during the Sudan expedition led by a British Commander 
known as Sirdar (Dighton, 2016). The three expeditions in the Sudan (Dongola 1896, 
Berber and Atbara 1897 and Omdurman 1898) showcase the actions undertaken by 
the British on the side of the Egyptians. From 1897 onwards British military personnel 
joined the Egyptian army composed of Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers and took part 
in battles fought against the Dervishes in the Sudan. The British were fighting 
alongside the Egyptians to protect their territory from the Dervishes. As far as the 
Sudanese are concerned, it was the outcome of these actions which were to protect the 
Sudanese, in terms of bringing to them the benefits of civilization.  
This point is illustrated by discourses relating to the aftermath of the Dongola 
expedition of 1896. For example, Lord Cromer, the Consul-General in Egypt  stated 
“a large territory has been redeemed from barbarism and again placed under civilizing 
influence” (The Times, October 24, 1896). Further, calls to protection were justified 
by citing atrocities committed by the Dervishes and the nature of their administration. 
The Dervishes were described as looting the inhabitants on the Blue Nile (FO 
407/147). Making the case stronger, the Times argued for the need to “liberate these 





and Under-Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Mr. George Curzon stated in the 
Commons that “we should endeavor to rescue the poor people of Khartoum” (HC Deb 
5 February 1897, c1474). Further, Mr. Seton-Karr in making his case for British 
involvement in the Sudan argued that “with this policy the present tyranny of the 
Madhi will be put to an end” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1537).  
Finally, let us address the last elements comprising paternalism, difference and 
incompetence. British representations of the Egyptians labeled them as similar-but-
different. By nature the Egyptians were seen as the “other”. However, they were 
represented as similar because of British influence since the occupation. Whatever was 
positive about Egypt was because of Britain. The otherness describing the Egyptians 
can be observed in terms of the capabilities and capacities ascribed to the Egyptians. 
On the subject of Dongola, Colonel Blundell (MP for Ince) argued that “Egypt if she 
stood alone, could not possibly forego the opportunity that presented itself of re-
conquering that lost province of Dongola” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, c1531).  
This position was also held by a number of military advisers in the government who 
held that Egyptian forces would need to be materially supported by English troops in 
the event of extensive operations since they could not be relied upon (HC Deb 3 July 
1896, c730). The latter does not only provide the grounds on which differentiation was 
constructed on the part of Britain but equally informs on the need for Britain to 
“assist”. In parallel, the Dervishes were described as a “savage foe” by Francis 
Grenfell, the General Officer commanding the force in Egypt in light of the battle of 
Omdurman (The London Gazette, Sep 30, 1898).  Additionally they were described 
as “a mongrel and despicable people” (HC Deb 20 March 1896, cc1517).  
Further, the Times in April 9th 1986 read “The Sudanese were it was said always 
aggressive and threatening”. Similarly, Mr. Courtney who had previously served as 
under-secretary and Financial Secretary for the Treasury and was at the time MP for 
Bodmin, stated that “the inhabitants of the Sudan were fierce, strong warlike and above 
all fanatical people” (The Times, April 9, 1896). These were complemented by the 





these ways that the British represented the Sudanese and more particularly the 
Dervishes as inferior. The Sudanese were inferior because of their peculiar character 
and temperament. British discourses put an accent on this by also differentiating 
between the Egyptians and Sudanese. For example the Times wrote “the Sudanese are 
less intelligent than the Egyptians, they are clumsy and slower at learning their drill” 
(The Times, May 11, 1896).   
Apart from being seen as inferior to the British and Egyptians, the Sudanese also 
figured in British representations as victims. In 1896 the Times wrote “The unfortunate 
inhabitants of the Sudan groan under an oppression as cruel as that of the Turk” (The 
Times, May 11, 1896). The Sudan itself was also described as a territory “fraught with 
melancholy and tragic association” by Mr. John Morley (MP for Montrose Burghs) in 
the House of Commons (HC Deb, 20 March 1896, c1478). By being depicted as 
victims the Sudanese were in turn seen as incompetent. They could not rise up to the 
Khalifa or protect themselves. All in all, the British seemed to identify more with the 
Egyptians than the Sudanese. Seen on a gradient, the Egyptians tilted more towards 
“the self” than the Sudanese who were clearly portrayed as “the other”.  
5.4 British Paternalism in the Nineteenth Century 
Having presented the ways in which the core elements defining paternalism figured in 
the cases of Greece, India and the Sudan, I now move to a comparison of these three 
cases. I first provide a visual representation of British paternalism in each case 
showing the interconnections between the four elements constituting British 
paternalism. Then, by drawing on the commonalities and differences observed in the 
cases I bring forth the manner in which paternalism manifested itself in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse in the nineteenth century. Before proceeding 
with the comparison, a general observation is in order. Although each historical period 
under investigation has some identifying elements due to culture, society and the 
context in which Britain intervened, each case has its peculiarities. Nineteenth century 


















Figure 3 British Paternalism in the Sudan 1896-98 
The above diagrams illustrate that all four components of paternalism were identified 
in the three cases considered. Also apparent are commonalities and differences across 
the three cases in terms of how paternalism manifested itself. Let us first turn to the 
similarities. Common to all cases are justifications espousing benevolence, negative 
representations of the subjects intervened upon, references to civilization and 
representations of British superiority. Starting with benevolence, the British 
interventions in Greece, India and the Sudan were all justified as being for the benefit 
of each population respectively. The wording used is similar but not identical. The 
intervention in Greece was justified as having for an object “the welfare of Greeks” 
and their independence. The Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan was justified 
as being “the best” for both Egypt (security) and the Sudan (end of tyranny; 
civilization).  
In India interference by the EIC was justified on the grounds of “benefiting the people 
of India” and as being “for the good of the people”. British rule (Crown) was justified 
as having a positive effect on the natives. A parallel can be drawn with what was 
observed in Chapter 4. The benevolence characterizing relations between the upper 
classes and lower classes in England is also characteristic of Britain’s relations with 
the peoples of the territories investigated in this chapter. The second commonality 





Greeks were described as “barbarians”, the Sudanese as “fanatical people” with a 
peculiar character and the Hindoos as “a race debased by many years of despotism”. 
As a result the British perceived the Greeks, Sudanese and Hindoos as different from 
“us”. Through these practices of differentiation the subjects of intervention constituted 
“the other”. In both India and the Sudan these representations constituted the source 
for British obligation and duty. In all three cases they were part of justifications of 
protection.  
Further, British representations established the Greeks, Hindoos, Egyptians and 
Sudanese as incompetent. The Greeks and Sudanese were seen as victims whereas the 
Hindoos and Egyptians had limited capabilities. Either way, the representation of the 
subjects of intervention as incompetent fueled discourses of protection. This is 
consistent with representations of the poor in England, observed in Chapter 4. A 
corollary of these representations is the perceived superiority of Britain, present in all 
cases. British superiority in the case of Greece and the Sudan was based on its military 
capabilities. In India, however, the British were superior to the Hindoos by way of 
their culture, language, race and knowledge. Finally, in all cases the concept of 
civilization was mobilized. In Greece it functioned as a means to identify with the 
Greeks whereas in India and the Sudan it constituted partially or exclusively the 
objective to be attained.  
Commonalities were observed in only two of the cases investigated pertaining to 
paternalism’s manifestation. For instance, a pattern of discourse was evident in Sudan 
and Greece. Both populations were described as “unfortunate” in discourses calling 
for British intervention. In the case of the Sudan the Times read “The unfortunate 
inhabitants of the Sudan groan under an oppression as cruel as that of the Turk” (The 
Times, May 11, 1896). In the case of Greece, Strangford argued that “it would be 
highly proper to make some efforts on behalf of these unfortunate people” (FO 78/99). 
Equally interesting is that the discourse on the Sudan refers to the Turks, i.e. to those 





Moreover, in both India and the Sudan (in relation to Egypt), obligation and duty 
manifested in a comparable manner, based on Britain’s perceived role. In both, British 
influence was established, in India through the EIC and in Egypt as a result of 
occupation. In relation to Egypt, Britain was seen as a “trustee” or “foster-mother”. In 
India Parliamentarians represented the role of a British man as that of “educator”. 
Lastly there is a common element shared between Greece and India, the place of 
religion and Christianity. In both it served as a way to boost feelings of British 
obligation and duty. The British spoke of what it meant to be Christian and the duties 
that resulted therefrom.  
The differences observed between the three cases are equally enlightening. Taking up 
the issue of religion once more, it was only in the case of Greece that Christianity was 
the means through which the British positively identified with the Greeks. It is this 
bond and that of the civilization they were perceived to share which resulted in British 
conceptions of duty and obligation towards them. However, religion was only one of 
the ways in which obligation and duty developed. My interpretation counters pre-
existing ones, which see religion as the primary motive for the intervention in Greece. 
The case of the Sudan helps downplay the religious component of nineteenth century 
interventionism. Here, the British did not cite Christian duties, discourses were not 
informed by religion. As discussed above, obligation and duty during the Anglo-
Egyptian intervention in the Sudan focused on civilization and on Britain’s perceived 
role in Egypt.  
Another point of differentiation relates to the peculiarities of the intervention in the 
Sudan. Here, paternalism manifested itself on two fronts. It operated both on the side 
of Egypt and of the Sudan. Further, the three cases are distinguished by British 
practices of representation locating “the self” and “the other”. It is particularly useful 
to grasp these practices of representation as operating along a spectrum. In the British 
mind the inhabitants of the Sudan and India constituted “the other” because of their 
radically different character, customs and culture. In contrast the Egyptians were seen 
as closer to “the self”, resulting from Britain’s occupation of Egypt in the early 1880s. 





case it was because they were Christian and also referred to as the first enlightened 
nation.  
Despite the fact that both Greeks and Egyptians were represented as the self, protection 
was justified in terms of incompetence and difference. A more precise way to see these 
representations is as “the self but not quite”. This is also consistent with binary 
oppositions such as strong/weak, saviour/victim. The subject of intervention is 
identified with in certain cases in order to foster feelings of obligation and duty. 
However the paternalist’s need to protect will almost certainly rely on representations 
of difference and incompetence. These in turn sustain the hierarchic and un-equal 
relations between the paternalist and the paternalized. As we saw in Chapter 4 the 
representation of the poor in England maintained the un-equal character of society. 
Lastly, British representations of natives in India touches upon a very core element of 
paternalism, the family analogy. The Hindoos were seen as “child-like” and as the 
antithesis to masculinity. Although the Egyptians were not represented in this manner, 
Britain was seen as Egypt’s foster-mother. This coincides with what was presented in 
Chapter 4 with regards to internal paternalism vis-à-vis the poor. 
A further point of differentiation refers to practices of protection. In the three cases 
investigated the British acted in various ways, pursuing distinct policies, all of which 
were protective in nature. In each case protection meant something different. During 
the Greek insurrection, British naval forces fought against the Turkish and Egyptian 
fleets. The British navy was also charged with blocking access to ammunition and 
forces from reaching Greece. The objective here was to ensure the physical protection 
of the Greek population. During the Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan force 
was employed against the Dervishes in the Sudan. The Egyptian army was led by a 
British commander and included British officers.  
The British were protecting the territorial integrity of Egypt and the inhabitants of the 
Sudan by defeating the Dervishes. In contrast, in India practices of protection did not 
include a military aspect. By administering the territory, by ruling over the inhabitants 





British were protecting the Hindoos from themselves, just like the upper classes in 
England were protecting the poor from themselves. In India it was about offering 
protection through civilization.  
Despite the differences observed among these three cases, paternalism did manifest 
itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse during the 19th century. The 
empirical chapters that follow will establish a similar degree of continuity in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 we see how 
paternalism’s characteristics are manifested across historical eras, and that what 
changes is the context, the justifications and the language employed. The following 
chapter will turn attention to the Mandate period and address how paternalism 






6 British Paternalism During the 
Mandate Period 
In contrast to current interpretations of nineteenth century practices of humanitarian 
intervention, the previous chapter demonstrated that religion was not the primary 
motive of interventions, but rather that it was one of numerous elements present in 
Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse. With the same objective in mind, this 
chapter will focus on the Mandate period (1920-1948). From the outset, the Mandate 
period seems to differ in significant ways from nineteenth century imperialism. This 
is due to the codification in international law of new norms and concepts such as 
mandate, trust and development.  
Further, the Mandate System introduced and established the idea that self-government 
would become a reality for certain ex-colonial people. The Mandate System also added 
a new class of territories with a different standing in international law. Indeed, until 
1919 there were only two types of British dependent territories: colonies and 
protectorates (Chidzero, 1961). In order to attain the objective set for this chapter I 
will first address the relevant sections of the Covenant of the League of Nations (CLN) 
dealing with the establishment of the Mandate System. This will enable me to 
extrapolate the main themes and concepts crucial in understanding the political climate 
and mindset of the period under examination. Then, I will engage with current 
interpretations of the period and the Mandate System by the post-conflict 
reconstruction literature. 
Following this I move to the analysis of two British Mandated territories, Palestine, a 
“Class A” mandate, and Tanganyika, a “Class B” mandate. In the case of Palestine I 
focus on specific areas subject to British interventionism (administration, education, 
land and agriculture, and the mandate and Balfour declaration). Within each area, I 
identify the four elements I have established in Chapters 3 and 4 as defining 
paternalism. Similarly in my examination of Tanganyika I look at the following areas 





identify in each how paternalism manifested itself. Finally, I compare the two case 
studies while at the same time making reference to British interventionism beyond the 
Mandate system, focusing on Britain’s relationship with its colonies in Africa.  
6.1 The Mandate System of the League of Nations 
The Mandate System was established through the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. At 
the time of its inception, it was perceived as an innovation in international law. Its 
framers saw the system as a means to improve upon colonialism, and as “a step toward 
the amelioration of the excesses of European colonial policies” (Dumbuya, 1995, p. 2; 
Sluglett, 2014). The establishment of the Mandate System is of crucial importance 
because it incorporated “new” concepts and norms in international law guiding state 
practice. The concepts “mandate” and “trust” are such examples. Also significant is 
the Mandate System’s objective. It acknowledged that former Turkish and German 
territories would, once developed, attain self-government. In order to fully grasp what 
the Mandate system sought to accomplish and the ideas guiding it, this section looks 
at the Covenant of the League of Nations (CLN) and the articles relating to the 
Mandate System. The first step in delineating the meaning of the concept mandate is 
to focus on Article 22 of the CLN, which reads as follows:  
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the state which formerly governed them 
and which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under 
the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the 
principle that the well-being and development of such people form a sacred 
trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should 
be embodied in this Covenant… The best method of giving practical effect to 
this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to 
advanced nations who…can best undertake this responsibility, and who are 
willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as 





The three sentences in bold I have emphasized above embody the main themes of the 
Mandate System in terms of representation, objectives and underlying ideology. The 
first sentence in bold establishes that the people subject to a mandate are not yet able 
to stand by themselves. Such representations link the subjects of a mandate with a 
certain vulnerability and incapacity (mental and material). The second sentence in bold 
informs on the twin objectives of the mandate, namely the well-being and development 
of the people.  These objectives were to form a “sacred trust of civilization”. These 
two sentences are complementary in that the representation of the people as unable to 
stand by themselves necessitates the formation of a trust of civilization whereby they 
would be developed and looked after.  
The third sentence in bold is important because it establishes who is seen as the best 
candidate for this trust. In keeping with the dichotomy civilized/uncivilized apparent 
in the first two, the candidates most suited to take on the trusts were “civilized” 
(advanced) nations. Their resources, experiences and geographical proximity, it was 
thought, rendered advanced states able to prepare mandated territories for self-
government (Chowdhuri, 1955). Article 22 of the Covenant brings forth the following 
concepts: civilization, trust, inability/incapacity, development and hierarchy. The 
above clearly defines the concept of mandate, which was seen as the act of protecting 
and developing peoples who are not able to do so on their own. The underlying belief 
was that only with the help, guidance and tutelage of advanced nations would the less 
advanced nations be able to achieve the goal of self-government. 
Although Article 22 described uniformly the people subject to the Mandate System, it 
also established a classificatory mechanism in order to distinguish between the 
territories to be mandated. These territories were divided into three classes. “Class A” 
mandates consisted of former Turkish colonies: Iraq, Syria including Lebanon, and 
Palestine including Transjordan. “Class B” mandates incorporated former German 
colonies of Central Africa: Togoland, Cameroon, Tanganyika and Rwanda-Burundi. 
Lastly, “Class C” mandates included the territories of South West Africa and the 
Pacific islands (Chesterman, 2004, p. 14). This classification was based on European 





line with this, a territory’s developmental level was among the chief elements defining 
the nature of the mandate for each territory of every class. 
As stated in Article 22(3) of the Covenant “the character of the mandate must differ 
according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the 
territory, its economic condition and other similar circumstances” (in Nele, 2005 
annex). In order to fully grasp the basis of the classification undertaken by the League 
of Nations and the importance of civilization and development in that regard there is 
a need to turn to paragraphs 4-6 of the Covenant. According to paragraph 4 “certain 
communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of 
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice”. In contrast to this, 
paragraph 5 states that “other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such 
a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory” 
(in Nele, 2005 annex). Lastly, paragraph 6 states that “there are territories, such as 
South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which…can be best 
administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory” (in 
Nele, 2005 annex).  
According to this, Class A mandates received administrative advice, Class B mandates 
necessitated administration and Class C mandates were to be administered as integral 
portions of the Mandatory’s territory. The level and degree of a Mandatory’s 
involvement was directly related to each territory’s perceived stage of development. 
The notion of development contained in the Covenant was intimately tied to that of 
civilization and to the ability or inability of a territory to exercise self-government. In 
essence the classification of territories in three classes was based on “perceived 
differences in development and levels of civilization” (Crawford, 2002, p. 262). The 
use of the term “stages” to connote the level of a territory’s development suggests a 






The literature on interventionism that takes account of the significance of the Mandate 
System is that which deals with state-building and post-conflict reconstruction, 
particularly with the peculiarities of foreign administration of territories. The focus of 
these writings rests on the aims, viability and relevance of foreign administration in a 
post-colonial world. Another, or rather inter-connected, preoccupation is to find ways 
in which to deal with failed states. The Mandate system of the League of Nations along 
with its successor the Trusteeship System of the United Nations are analyzed with a 
view to demonstrate continuity in current practices of territorial administration 
(Jackson, 1998; Stahn, 2001; Bain, 2003; Chesterman, 2004; Caplan, 2007). In 
showing continuity, these scholars question the argument that practices of transitional 
administration in the post-cold war era in countries like Kosovo, East-Timor, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Eastern Slavonia are fundamentally new. In fact they argue that 
the continuity observed points to a resurrected practice of Trusteeship (Bain, 2003; 
Chesterman, 2004; Wilde, 2008).  
Going back in time, Jackson and Bain trace the origins of transitional administration 
and of the concept of trusteeship to eighteenth century British India (1998; 2003; Matz, 
2005). As observed by Jackson, “Britain held the responsibility of the civil condition 
of British India until it could stand on her own feet and become a full and equal 
member of the family of nations” (1998, p. 9). In examining the Mandate System, 
scholars focus on the three classes of mandates (Crawford, 2002; Chesterman, 2004; 
Matz, 2005). The mandates conferred upon Britain (Palestine, Iraq, Togoland, British 
Cameroon, Rwanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, South West Africa and Pacific islands 
(Nauru) along with those conferred upon the other Allied powers are interpreted in a 
general sense as cases embodying the idea of “trusteeship”. 
Jackson clearly shows the place of Trusteeship in the Mandate System by referring to 
Article 22 of the CLN. Accordingly he argues that “tutelage of such peoples was 
entrusted to certain advanced nations and exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf 
of the League of Nations” (1998, p. 9). As briefly discussed above, this idea of 





territory’s level of development was the determining criterion for the need of foreign 
administration.  
This is seen as equally true for the Mandate system where the language of 
“development” and “civilization” constitute the cornerstones of the system (Crawford, 
2002; Wilde, 2008). What binds scholars working on the subject of foreign 
administration of territory are these concepts of “trusteeship” and “trust”. Apart from 
establishing that the concept of trusteeship describes current foreign administrations 
and displays a parallel with previous such practices, scholars such as Jackson and Bain 
further interrogate the concept and its relationship with paternalism. In doing so, they 
bring to the forefront the manner in which both the mandate and trusteeship systems 
display paternalistic elements (Jackson, 1998; Crawford, 2002; Bain, 2003; Nele, 
2005).  
The relationship between Trusteeship/Mandate System and paternalism is discussed 
in terms of ideology. For Bain “the idea of Trusteeship presupposes the belief that the 
interests of such people (non-European) the moral and material conditions of their 
happiness must be represented on their behalf” (2003, p. 11). Similarly, for Jackson 
“Trusteeship involves paternalism on an international scale…treating governments 
and citizens of foreign territories as children”. Additionally he argues that paternalism 
presupposes “taking at our own initiative responsibilities that lie outside our sphere of 
jurisdiction and operation in the desire to do some good…placing people who live 
there under our control and care without the consent of the government” (1998, p. 12). 
Both scholars in their analyses clearly demonstrate some paternalistic elements 
ingrained in the Mandate System and the Covenant in terms of assumptions, the 
hierarchy and inequality presupposed and the feeling of responsibility towards the 
people inhabiting the territories under mandate.  
Coercion is identified by both Jackson and Bain (1998, 2003) as characteristic of 
Trusteeship’s paternalistic tendencies. For Jackson Trusteeship involves coercion in 
that the people of a foreign country are placed “under our control without the consent 





the loss of liberty of those placed under a trust (2003). In my conceptualization of 
paternalism coercion need not be defining of paternalistic practices because in certain 
cases authority is legitimated by the objects of intervention (government and public 
opinion). However, in both cases addressed in this chapter there were no governments 
and public opinion consulted, or if there was the consultation was not taken into 
account. Consequently I agree with Bain and Jackson regarding coercion. Although 
Bain and Jackson describe Trusteeship as paternalistic, their investigation does not 
extend to individual mandatories but rather is confined to the general principles of the 
League of Nations’ Mandate System.  
6.2 British Paternalism and the Mandate over Palestine 
The presence of Britain in Palestine pre-dates the bestowment of the territory upon 
Britain by the League of Nations in the early 1920s. Britain occupied Palestine during 
World War I thereby ending the 700 year-old Muslim rule. In order to gain a good 
grasp of British Policy in Palestine and the main articles of the Mandate it is crucial to 
go back to the year 1917 when the Balfour declaration was first issued (Shepherd, 
1999). In issuing the declaration, Balfour, the then British Foreign Secretary, stated 
that  
His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (From Arthur James Balfour to the 
Leader of the British Jewish Community, Lord Rothschild, November 2nd, 
191713) 
                                                 





The significance of this declaration cannot be stressed enough, as it was an issue most 
frequently debated in Parliament especially during the 1920s. Further, its significance 
is due to the incorporation of the declaration of 1917 into the Mandate for Palestine, 
which came into operation on September 29th 1923 (El-Eini, 2006). In terms of 
population Palestine was inhabited by a majority of Arab Muslims and Christians and 
a minority of Arab and non-Arab Jews14. The relations between the Arab and non-
Arab communities, especially between the Arab Muslims and Jews (non-Arab) were 
far from amiable. Revolts were commonplace. In 1929 Arab Muslims revolted for 
want of protection against Jewish land buyers and Jewish immigration from Europe 
(El-Eini, 2006).  
The British administration strove to fulfil the obligations under the mandate in the 
areas of administration, education, land, agriculture and immigration. Despite British 
efforts, the situation in Palestine could not be settled as the British had hoped in 1917. 
Consequently numerous commissions were established and sent to Palestine to gather 
information for the formulation of policies. Examples include the Shaw Commission 
(1929-1936) and the Peel Commission of 1936, which recommended the partition of 
Palestine (Fieldhouse, 2006). British policy in the territory was guided exclusively by 
the Mandate for Palestine (hereafter referred to as MFP) document distinct from the 
CLN examined above. The MFP included provisions so as to comply with the 1917 
Balfour Declaration. Article 2 of the MFP is a good starting point in bringing forth the 
cornerstone of British policy. According to Article 2:  
The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such 
political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the 
establishment of the Jewish national home as laid down in the preamble, 
and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for 
safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, 
irrespective of race and religion. (MFP) 
                                                 
14 The British referred to Arabs and Jews, two categories constructed on the basis of race, hence leaving 
out Arab Jews. For this reason, in what follows I make distinctions when referring to a specific 





According to this, the establishment of a National Home for the Jews was one of the 
main duties of the Mandatory complemented by that of safeguarding the rights of the 
non-Jewish community (Arab Muslims and Christians). The main objective, as stated 
above, was the development of self-governing institutions. Consequently, the British 
viewed that they had in Palestine a double obligation and duty. Apart from being 
dictated by the Mandate as to their obligations, the British through their representation 
of the people in Palestine enhanced those feelings of obligation and duty. Arguments 
delivered in Parliament on the issue of the National Home for the Jews attest to that. 
For the most part, there was a tendency to refer to the greatness of the Jewish nation 
and race. 
As expressed by Balfour in the House of Lords  
their position and their history, their connection with world religion and world 
politics, is absolutely unique. There is no parallel to it, there is nothing 
approaching to a parallel to it, in any other branch of human history…do not 
forget what part they have played in the intellectual, the artistic, the 
philosophic and scientific development of the world (HL Deb 21 June 1922 
vol 50, c1017).  
Such arguments focusing on Jewish greatness tended to approach the Jews closer to 
British conceptions of “the self” and enhance the need to protect and help them. 
Although the Arab Muslims were represented at times positively and at times 
negatively they were never seen as inhabiting the realm of “the self”. Neither did they 
fit into representations of the “other”. As Mr Morrison stated in the Commons “when 
we are dealing with the Arabs we are not dealing with a backward, primitive people, 
such as there are in the equatorial parts of Africa” (HC Deb 24 November 1938, 
c2007). The Arabs and especially the Arab Muslims inhabited a middle space between 





Despite the fact that there were many pro-Zionists in Britain not everyone celebrated 
the development of a National Home for the Jews15. Opponents of the policy stressed 
the inequalities produced by one of the articles of the mandate which demanded the 
establishment of a Zionist Executive that would be involved in the administration of 
the country (HL Deb 21 June 1922, c994-1023). There was also an element of 
“benevolence” in discourses relating to the acquisition of the mandate by Great Britain 
and her role in Palestine. In his Speech of June 3rd 1921 Sir Herbert Samuel, the first 
High Commissioner of Palestine, spoke of the British government as “the trustee under 
the mandate for the happiness of the people of Palestine” (FO 371/6374).  
In like fashion, Mr. Ormsby-Gore the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State stated 
in the Commons that “it is the object of the British government and of the British 
administration in Palestine to promote the harmony and development of all races and 
creeds in Palestine” (HC Deb 02 July 1923, c15). According to this Britain was to 
administer Palestine for the interest and future of its people. In conjunction with such 
opinions, the mandate and more specifically the National Home policy was justified 
on moral grounds and British interests were not seen as influencing British policy. It 
is true that Palestine was of strategic interest for Britain until the end of the war. 
However, after that Britain claimed to be administrating the country for the benefit of 
its inhabitants. This is consistent with Lord Lamington’s statement in the Lords:  
we as a country have absolutely no interest in Palestine, nor indeed in Syria. 
We have no commercial interests there except Thomas Cook & Son’s tourist 
agency…Palestine is not essential from a strategic point of view…we are now 
undertaking a distinct burden of government on behalf of the Jews, and not on 
behalf of British interests. (HL Deb 29 June 1920, c1014)16 
The following sections will investigate the areas of British involvement in Palestine 
dictated by the Mandate and the general objective of the national home policy. As the 
                                                 
15 Lord Sydenham (Baron Sydenham of Combe) stated in the Lords ‘I sympathize entirely with the 
wishes of the Jews to have a National Home but I say that this National Home must not be given if it 
cannot be given without entailing gross injustices upon other people’ (HL Deb 21 June 1922, c1021). 
16 Similarly a British official in the administration stated that ‘Palestine was for most of us an emotion 





following sections will show Article 2 of the Mandate for Palestine guided policies on 
immigration, land and the administration of the territory. Apart from these areas, 
British involvement in education will also be investigated. 
British policy in the area of immigration was encapsulated by Article 6 of the Mandate 
(MFP), which was to comply with the objective of the National Home policy. 
According to Article 6 “The administration of Palestine…shall facilitate Jewish 
immigration under suitable conditions” (MFP). In carrying this responsibility forward, 
the British developed a system through which they would control the number of 
immigrants entering the territory with the advisory opinion of the Jewish Agency 
(Shepherd, 1999). The main lines of British policy on immigration were issued in the 
1922 Churchill White Paper. According to the White Paper, the number of immigrants 
allowed in Palestine depended on the “economic absorptive capacity” of the territory 
(Fieldhouse, 2006, p. 155). Throughout the mandate a large number of Ordinances on 
immigration were issued because of Arab Muslim contestation.  
Further, at certain critical moments during the mandate immigration was suspended or 
even restricted either because of rioting or because the economic absorptive capacity 
of the territory had reached its limit. Apart from developing a system to regulate 
immigration the British also issued the 1924 Palestinian Citizenship Order in Council 
whose goal was to facilitate Jewish settlement in Palestine by enabling Jewish 
immigrants to acquire Palestinian citizenship (Report on Palestinian Administration 
1923 – hereafter RPA). The policies adopted on immigration display a certain level of 
protection towards the Jews and the Arabs (Arab Christians and Muslims). First, the 
large flow of European Jews in the territory was a move towards enabling the further 
development of Jews in Palestine. Protection is here understood in terms of providing 
a place to thrive. Second, the control of immigration through the principle of economic 
absorptive capacity protected both Jewish settlers and the three Arab communities by 
ensuring that the level of unemployment did not surpass immigration numbers.  
The large flow of European Jews was justified through the Balfour Declaration and 





seen as in need of help and emphasis was put on the hardships they had endured. This 
is visible in Colonel Wedgwood’s statement in the Commons where he argued that  
when we remember the conditions under which the Jews have lived for 
centuries in Poland, Russia and Rumania, where they have been deprived of 
any chance of economic freedom, and we have a chance of establishing these 
people under the British flag upon a freehold where they can become producers 
for themselves and real pioneer settlers on the land; when we have this chance 
of providing a refuge and freedom, I think we ought to seize the opportunity. 
(HC Deb 30 April 1929, c1476) 
The need of protecting European Jews gained more ground with Hitler’s rise to power 
in the 1930s. For example Ramsey MacDonald argued in 1938 that “the tragedy of a 
people who have no country has never been so deep as it is this week. The sympathy 
of our own countrymen, their anxiety to do everything they can to help the persecuted 
Jews has never been so firm as it is today” (HC Deb 24 November 1938, c1989). In 
1933, the British administration in Palestine granted a number of administrative 
concessions – 3,000 immigration certificates (1933 RPA). The latter policy was in 
nature protective. Through these certificates the British trustee was ensuring the 
physical protection of persecuted German Jews in Germany.  
With respect to British policies on administration, these had as an objective to develop 
self-government as stated by Article 2 of the MFP. As regards the general 
administration of the territory, the British pronounced their role as “Trustees of the 
Holy Land” (HC Deb 02 July 1923, c15). That Britain was the trustee of Palestine was 
visible in the manner in which Britain administered the territory since its occupation 
in 1917. First through the 1920 Order in Council, the British set up a civil 
administration (Shepherd, 1999). A year later, the High Commissioner Churchill 
established an advisory council of twenty members consisting of 10 British members, 
4 Arab Muslims, 3 Arab Christians and 3 Jews (Segev, 2001). Despite the absence of 
legislative power, the establishment of the advisory council ensured the representation 





Two points are worth noting. First the British constituted the majority in the council, 
due perhaps to their position of “trustee”. Second, the seats allocated in the council 
did not reflect the fact that in majority the population were Arab Muslims. What is 
more, the Jews were given an advisory role in government headed by the Jewish 
Agency as dictated by the Mandate, whereas the Palestinian Arabs (Muslim and 
Christian) were given no such representation17 (Shepherd, 1999). In 1922, the 
Palestine Order in Council was issued, setting up a government for the territory. It 
defined the powers of the High Commissioner, giving him absolute power in 
administration (RPA 1922). The High Commissioner was accompanied by the 
Executive Council constituted of British Officials (Shepherd, 1999). Moreover, the 
1922 Order in Council made provisions for the establishment of a Legislative Council.  
However, with two failed attempts at constituting a Legislative Council due to Arab 
discontent with the Balfour Declaration, the High Commissioner continued to hold 
full legislative powers and worked in consultation with the Advisory Council which 
by 1928 consisted only of official members (Statement of Policy by United Kingdom, 
1930). The development of self-governing institutions in Palestine should have been 
a straightforward matter since the territory belonged to Class A mandates. However, 
due to the animosity between the two communities constant delays were taking place. 
This explains to some degree the holding of full legislative powers by the High 
Commissioner. Although the administration did not succeed in the advancement of 
representative institutions at the national level it did make certain moves at the local 
level. In exercising their role as trustees the British were holding power until it was 
safe to hand it over to the two communities.  
Generally, there was a certain preference for the Jews (European or not) in Palestine, 
visible in their employment in government. Although in the 1920s the Arabs 
constituted 40% of men employed in the senior civil service, none occupied a post 
higher than that of assistant head of central departments or district officers 
(Fieldhouse, 2006). This is revealing in terms of representation. A mixture of positive 
                                                 
17 The British administration formulated a proposal for the establishment of an Arab Agency in 1923, 





and negative traits were attached to the Arabs (Arab Muslims). For instance, Lord 
Snell (MP for Woolwich East ) argued in a Lords debate “we must remember that 
whilst they are a lovable, generous and chivalrous people they were associated with 
methods which do not belong to the modern world” (HL Deb 27 June 1934, c177).  
On the prospective partition of Palestine, an issue linked with the administration of the 
territory, Captain Cazalet in defending partition stated in the Commons that  
We have in Palestine, rightly or wrongly, two different forms of civilization, 
side by side. On the side of the Jews we have a civilized nation which is modern 
and up to date, while on the side of the Arabs…we have a civilization which 
resembles more the sixteenth than the twentieth century (HC Deb 24 
November 1938, c2076).  
It becomes apparent how in the British mind the Jews and specifically the European 
Jews were seen as closer to “the self” and the Arab Muslims as closer to “the other”. 
What demarcated the European Jews and the British from the Arab Muslims was their 
perceived level of development (“civilization”).  
Let us now turn to the area of education. Although education was voluntary in 
Palestine, the British administration undertook initiatives to develop the education 
system. As early as 1922 the total number of elementary schools established amounted 
to 265 (1922 RPA). The two largest systems of schools were those organized by the 
government employing Arabic as the language of instruction and those organized by 
the Zionist Executive in which pupils were taught in Hebrew (1926 RPA). The 
government was principally responsible for supporting Arab Muslim education. The 
British were not involved in matters of Jewish education, as the Jews were seen as able 
to provide educational services for themselves. This view is reflected in Colonel 
Wedgwood’s statement in the Commons that “the business of the Government is to 






Such views resulted from British distinctions on the respective level of civilization 
and ability of the Arab Muslims and Jews. As stated by Colonel Wedgwood in the 
Commons “The Jews are of course in Palestine, the higher civilization” (HC Deb 30 
April 1929, c1479). As a result of such representations the Arabs were seen as needing 
the most help, guidance and development. A central issue in education was the 
language of instruction. According to the British the English language was key. For 
the likes of Mr Ormsby Gore this would be done gradually, as he argued in a House 
of Commons debate: “we hope to introduce and encourage the teaching of English 
gradually, but not where it is contrary to strong local sentiment. If people want Arabic, 
to force English upon them would be most undesirable” (HC Deb 21 November 1927, 
c1396). The English language was seen as paramount for the improvement and 
development of the people of Palestine as was the case in India discussed in Chapter 
5. There is, however, a distinctive difference between the two cases. In India the 
natives were not consulted since they were seen as unable to know what is good for 
them. This demonstrates a point made above regarding the representation of Arab 
Muslims as somewhere between “the self” and “the other”.  
When the issue was raised in the House of Commons Colonel Wedgwood asked “Why 
can we not teach them the only language in which they will ever be able to become 
self-governing? ...Teach people to think in English, to think about justice, to think 
about freedom. That is the foundation of any possible real civilization of the native 
races in our Empire” (HC Deb 30 April 1929, c1485). This shows how in the British 
mind, the English language functioned as a marker of civilization and that its 
introduction as a language of instruction would in the long term benefit the Arabs since 
it would get them closer to achieving self-government. Since 1924, English was 
principally taught in Higher elementary and Secondary schools in Government schools 
and in Private Muslim schools. English as the principal medium was only employed 
in the Evelyne de Rothschild’s school and in the schools of the Alliance Israélite (1924 
RPA).  
Policies on land and agriculture, too, were guided by the National Home Policy and 





the Mandate, the British had to ensure the close settlement of Jews on the land (MFP). 
To a large degree the British were involved in the agricultural training and education 
of existing and future farmers and cultivators. They were teaching farmers how to 
grow on the land and which crops should be given priority. To that end the 
Government’s Agricultural Development department put in place a program to 
introduce high value crops and techniques for improved seeds. Additionally, the 
development of cash crops such as tobacco was encouraged through the 1925 Tobacco 
Ordinance, as well as the cultivation of dates. These were seen as most beneficial 
economically for the country. In terms of education, officers from the department 
provided advice to farmers and distributed seeds (El-Eini, 2006).  
According to the 1932 Report on the administration of the territory the objective of 
improving farming methods was that “the fellah [farmer in Arabic] may become as 
nearly self-supporting as possible” (1932 RPA). However, these practices were not 
only geared towards the Arab Muslim population of Palestine. As stated in the 1925 
Report on the Administration of Palestine “the Department of Agriculture advises 
Jewish colonizing agencies on land development, farming methods, control of animal 
and pest disease and agricultural education” (1925 RPA). Further, agricultural 
education was extended to schools through school gardens in order to prepare future 
cultivators under the supervision of government instructors (RPA 1932). In order to 
provide efficient agricultural education in government schools, the administration 
trained government teachers in agricultural matters (RPA 1930).  
Although all sections of the population received training, education and advice, the 
increased ability of the European Jews was emphasised in Parliament on a number of 
occasions. In a Commons Debate Malcolm MacDonald argued that “since 1922 more 
than 250,000 Jews have entered Palestine and settled there. Their achievement has 
been remarkable. They have turned sand dunes into orange groves” (HC Deb 24 
November 1938, c1989). British policy in agriculture demonstrates how protection 
was in the case of Palestine equated with development. Education was of course the 
task of British personnel who trained and advised the people because they did not 





population who although they were seen as the “higher civilization” still needed 
supervision. There is also a certain hidden benevolence is these practices. The British 
were teaching the people of Palestine how to become better producers and introduced 
the crops they believed would be most advantageous to them in the long run. 
Apart from agricultural education, the British also had to deal with issues relating to 
the large flow of European Jews and their settlement on the land. It is crucial to note 
that the land question was one of the most disputed issues during the mandate. To 
remedy problems caused by the large flow of Jews from Europe, numerous ordinances 
were issued to facilitate Jewish settlement and protect the Arab population inhabiting 
the land. As regards the facilitation of Jewish settlement, the British administration 
issued the 1920 Ordinance. The Ordinance removed discrimination resulting from the 
Ottoman legislation, hence giving the opportunity to all people to acquire land and 
register it in their name (RPA 1923). Further, the 1924 Palestinian Citizenship Order 
in Council facilitated the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship (RPA 1923).  
For the Arab population a system was put in place to deal with displaced Arabs as a 
consequence of Jewish settlement. The Arabs were placed on the Register for 
displaced Arabs and land to re-settle was provided. Also, tenants were in the 1920s 
protected against eviction through the establishment of Land Transfer Ordinances, 
allowing them to retain maintenance land to support themselves (Shepherd, 1999). 
Further through the 1929 Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, cultivators were 
protected from distress following changes in land ownership (RPA 1929). The above 
demonstrates that policies on land were of a protective character and were directed 
towards both the Arab and Jewish communities. Their objective was to protect and 







Figure 4 Interconnections of the elements defining British paternalism in Palestine 
The above diagram illustrates how British paternalism manifested itself in Palestine. 
Benevolence was observed in both British discourse and practice. In conjunction with 
the mandate (MFP) principles, the British justified their administration as being for 
the benefit of the whole population. This was particularly so as regards the Balfour 
Declaration which was a much contested issue by the Arab Muslim population. Steps 
taken towards the agricultural education of both Jews and Arabs contained a certain 
degree of benevolence. The British were teaching both communities how to grow on 
the land and which crops to prioritize. The MFP and British discourses brought forth 
a double sense in which obligation and duty in Palestine developed. British obligation 
towards each community differed significantly.  
Visible in all sectors analysed was a positive identification with the Jews and more so 
with the European Jews, and a negative identification with the Arab Muslims. Seen on 
a continuum the Jews were seen as closer to “the self” whereas the Arab Muslims as 
closer to “the other”. At certain moments the Jews were even treated as collaborators 
rather than subjects of development. The case of Palestine bears close resemblance 
with the case of Greece and the Sudan discussed in Chapter 5. The Jews in Palestine 
and the Greeks display how paternalism develops vis-à-vis “the self”. On the other 





towards “the other”. British obligation and duty is most apparent in the manner in 
which the British administered the territory by holding full legislative powers. This 
shows how the role of trustee was put in practice.  
Policies relative to education, agriculture and land further demonstrate how protection 
in Palestine signified development for self-government. British administrators were 
teaching, guiding and supervising both Jews and Arab Muslims until they were able 
to manage their own affairs. The extent of these practices was even more pronounced 
in the case of Arab Muslims. The presence of difference/incompetence has been 
referred to while demonstrating how other paternalistic elements were manifested. 
Throughout the mandate there was a visible preference for the Jews and especially for 
the immigrants who arrived from Europe. What differentiated the Jews from the Arab 
Muslims was their perceived level of civilization and ability for development. As we 
will shortly see, the British Mandate over Tanganyika (Class B) shares similarities 
with the case of Palestine.  
6.3 British Paternalism and the Mandate over Tanganyika 
Tanganyika was a multi-racial territory inhabited by Africans, Asians and Europeans 
(Chidzero, 1961; Dumbuya, 1995) occupied by Britain during World War I. Soon after 
the war ended Britain became the Mandatory power for this Class B territory, formerly 
an ex-German colony. Prior to the ratification of the Mandate in 1922 the British 
established a provisional civil administration in 1917. It was headed by Horace Byatt 
who served as first Governor of Tanganyika until 1925 when Sir Donald Cameron 
took over (Chidzero, 1961). Tanganyika under Sir Horace Byatt witnessed extensive 
reconstruction efforts in all areas as a consequence of the war. In terms of 
administration the British set up a Legislative Council in 1926 constituted by British 
official members and unofficial members.  
Additionally, the institution of Native Authorities was established. These policies were 
undertaken in the framework of the system of native administration (indirect rule) 





model of administration employed by the British in their colonies. The idea was that 
Africans were to be administered through their indigenous institutions (Listowel, 
1968). Under the system of native administration the British pursued a number of 
measures to develop the natives in the areas of education, land/agriculture and 
governing institutions. Further, the Mandate for Tanganyika (MFT) obliged the British 
to deal with the issues of slavery, forced labor, control of arms affecting Class B 
mandates in particular.  
In 1922, through the Involuntary Servitude Ordinance slavery came to an end in 
Tanganyika (Listowel, 1968). What guided policy-making in Tanganyika throughout 
most of the mandate was the concept of the “paramountcy of native interests”, which 
put the interests of the native community first (Chidzero, 1961). Another important 
development during the Mandate was the prospect for closer Union of the East African 
territories. A number of British officials wanted to unite the territories of Uganda 
(protectorate), Kenya (colony) and Tanganyika (mandate) in economic and 
administrative terms. Although this issue dominated British debates during the 1930s, 
it never materialized due to strong opposition by British Parliamentarians.  
Let us now address British discourse and practice in the administration of Tanganyika. 
The first step taken by the British in Tanganyika was the establishment of a civil 
administration through the 1920 Order in Council. The latter established Sir Horace 
Byatt as the Governor of Tanganyika and established an Executive Council headed by 
British officials to assist him (Listowel, 1968). Under this Order the Governor was 
given full powers to legislate. At a local level, the British granted certain powers to 
recognized chiefs through the Native Authority Ordinances established from 1921-23 
(1921 RTT18). Although the chiefs acquired certain powers these were limited and 
controlled by District Officers. Until Cameron’s arrival as Governor in 1925, Byatt 
retained full powers of legislation.  
These initial steps in administration showcase how the British practiced their position 
as “trustee”. The limited participation of natives in local administration and the control 
                                                 





exercised by District Officers displays a certain level of protection. The British saw 
the natives as not able to administer themselves, needing to be taught how to do so; it 
was Britain’s duty bestowed upon her. The idea of trust was ingrained in the Mandate 
and articulated repeatedly in Parliamentary debates. As argued by the Duke of 
Devonshire in the Commons, “His Majesty’s Government regard themselves as 
exercising a trust, on behalf of the African population” (cited in Dougherty, 1966, p. 
207). This observation is consistent with Edward Said’s analysis of the Occident’s 
representation of the Orient. Said (1995) argues that knowledge is intimately tied with 
domination and authority. In what I have presented authority results from the 
knowledge that the British have or perceive to have of the Africans. By representing 
them through various stereotypes, the Africans are seen as the complete opposite of 
Europeans (British).    
The second wave of administrative development took place with Cameron’s arrival 
and the establishment of indirect rule. This policy stemmed from Lord Lugard’s 
administration in Northern Nigeria using traditional institutions in local government 
(Whitehead, 1981). In establishing indirect rule in Tanganyika, Cameron believed that 
“the people would derive material as well as moral advantage from it” (1939, p. 90). 
As such, the policy was seen as benefiting the natives. Cameron made changes to the 
administration of the territory by setting up a Legislative Council in 1926. This move 
put a stop to the full powers of legislation previously enjoyed by the Governor. The 
Council was constituted by thirteen official members: six members of the Executive 
Council and seven high-ranking officials. Additionally, the Council comprised a 
maximum of ten unofficial members. In 1926, there were five European and two Asian 
members (Listowel, 1968). Composed in such manner, the Council gave full powers 
to British Officials and excluded the Africans. Also the allocation of five seats to 
Europeans demonstrates how Europeans were seen as British collaborators in 
Tanganyika. The first African unofficial member was appointed in the 1940s. 
Cameron’s justification regarding the exclusion of Africans from the Council is 
representative of British opinion on the matter. He argued that “the native community 





sufficient command of the English language to take part in debates of the Council; 
indeed to understand what is being said” (cited in Dumbuya 1995, p. 135).  
This policy of exclusion informs on British perceptions of the Africans. The natives 
were seen as “the other”. They were described as primitive, backward and uncivilized 
(Madden and Drawin, 1994) which in turn denied them any ability and capacity. As 
we have seen before in the cases of India and Palestine, in the British mind the English 
language constituted the path to civilization and progress. It acted as a demarcating 
line between the African and the British. In policies of administration discussed so far, 
the British either held ultimate power or official majority. On this point, Lord Milner 
argued in the House of Commons that “the only justification for keeping official 
majority in any colony is that we are convinced that we are better judges, for the time 
being, of the interests of the native population than they are themselves” (cited in 
Taylor, 1963, p. 41).  
This reiterates the observations made above regarding the place of the native in the 
British mind and the practice of British duty as trustee. Additionally, the British 
believed that they knew what was in the best interest of the natives and acted 
accordingly. In conjunction with the establishment of the Legislative Council, 
Cameron issued the 1926 Native Ordinance which amplified pre-existing provisions. 
The major change was that District Officers were to supervise the chiefs rather than 
command them. Justifications offered regarding the need for these Officers resonate 
with what has been presented above. Cameron (1939, p. 77) argued that  
in the UK and the Dominions the people are literate and educated and have 
through the course of many generations imbibed the precepts of law and order 
which must regulate the conduct of a civilized people; they can readily learn, 
through the newspapers and otherwise, the day to day acts and regulations of 
the government which affect their lives. This is not so in Tanganyika or in the 
protectorate of Nigeria. Other means must therefore be found for 





This illustrates how the natives were represented as direct opposites of the British. The 
British were educated and literate whereas the natives were primitive and ignorant.  
As the above has shown, the nature of British administration was of a protective nature 
and justified as being in the native’s best interests. So far, the manner in which the 
British administered Tanganyika has brought forth how feelings of duty towards the 
natives were the result of their role as “trustee” and the negative representation of the 
natives. The perception of Tanganyika as part of the British Empire, indistinguishable 
from British colonies and protectorates also fuelled obligation and duty. In Parliament, 
Tanganyikan affairs were discussed under the headings of colonial development and 
colonial policies. For instance, during a Commons debate in 1925, Mr. Amery argued 
that “Tanganyika has now been permanently incorporated in the British Empire. It is 
a delusion that it is any less British than any other colony” (Dougherty, 1966, p. 204)19.  
Although this shows how British obligation towards the natives was strengthened, it 
also provides an insight into British motives and interests in Tanganyika. British 
interests and motives as regards the territory were made obvious by calls for a closer 
political union among Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. Through this union the British 
would be able to permanently secure Tanganyika within the British Empire (Chidzero, 
1961). British discourse and practice relating to education is equally enlightening. 
According to article 3 of the MFT “the Mandatory…shall undertake to promote to the 
outmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants” 
(cited in Chidzero, 1961, p. 259). This responsibility extended to education, land, 
labour and agriculture.  
The British were extensively involved in the education of natives. This was especially 
so after 1925, when the success of indirect rule was attributed to the education 
accorded to chiefs (Listowel, 1968). Advances in education were visible before 1925. 
As early as 1919 steps had been taken to reopen government schools and training for 
teachers. The plan envisioned, written in the RTT (1920), was to “open elementary 
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schools in all District Headquarters and larger villages”. Progress was slow due to 
financial shortages which also resulted in cutting back on provisions for European 
staff. An interesting element of education policy in Tanganyika relates to who was 
seen as best suited to oversee the education of natives. According to the 1921 RTT “so 
far as the education of natives is concerned, the position of the European is that of 
legislator and guide”. In line with this, Europeans framed the syllabus, were 
responsible for the direction of studies and effectuated inspections. In turn, native 
teachers applied the principles put in place by Europeans (RTT 1921). 
During World War I, schools in Tanganyika were shut down and teachers took 
employment in other sectors. To overcome the consequences of the War on the 
education system in the territory, the British administration undertook a number of 
initiatives. One such initiative was the training of old teachers in Dar-es-Salaam. This 
was seen as necessary because old teachers had either forgotten their previous training 
or did not possess knowledge of the English language. Education in the early 1920s 
was structured in the following way: First, pupils underwent a three-year elementary 
course taught in Swahili. Apart from learning reading, writing, simple arithmetic, 
geography and hygiene, students also acquired knowledge in husbandry through 
plantations attached to government schools. Second, those who were successful went 
on to receive primary education for an additional three years in Dar-es-Salam, a school 
supervised by a European headmaster and in which English was the language of 
instruction (RTT 1921).  
The above illustrates the protective character of practices in the area of education. 
Europeans were tasked with supervising both the education system and native 
teachers. The natives required guidance and training because they were seen as 
backward. These observations coincide with what was discussed in the area of 
administration. This also holds true for education after Cameron’s arrival, despite 
changes owed to the introduction of indirect rule, which emphasized the importance 
of educated chiefs. Although open to all residents of Tanganyika, the education system 
focused particularly on educating the sons of chiefs and sultans (Kaniki, 1980). A 





for the elite (Listowel, 1968). Most natives received education through boarding 
schools. The education received by students in these two systems differed 
considerably and resulted in education for leaders and education for the masses. 
Education for the masses concentrated on teaching natives various trades.  
Further differentiation between the communities of Tanganyika operated through 
distinctions in the education syllabuses of Europeans, Africans and Asians. European 
schools were literary and employed the English language. In contrast African schools 
were vocational and taught in the vernacular (Kaniki, 1979). The segregation instilled 
among the three races and particularly among the Africans and Asians was seen by the 
British as maintaining divide and rule. It ensured that a common cause for political 
ends would not develop (Coulson, 1982). Despite this segregation, the education 
system established by the British formed part of their development policy, carrying 
forward their duty as mandatories. The ideas guiding the education system established 
by the British in Tanganyika are summarised in the Report of the Commission for 
Closer Union (RCU 1928-29). The Report stated that “the general object of education 
should be to raise the average standard of intelligence of the whole community” 
(Report of Sir Samuel Wilson 1829-1830).   
As was the case in the early 1920s, education or its regulation was seen as a task not 
to be wholly entrusted to natives. As stated in the 1928 RCU “only from the non-
natives can the native peoples obtain the education which will enable them to advance 
to higher levels of civilization and turn to advantage the natural resources of land” 
(Report of Sir Samuel Wilson 1829-1830). As discussed above, education in 
Tanganyika was of a protective nature, involving the training and guiding of native 
teachers, and the instruction of English at certain levels. It has already been observed 
how English was perceived as a sign of development and civilization, employed as an 
argument for the exclusion of Africans in the Legislative Council. By teaching the 
natives English the British saw themselves as developing their mental abilities and 





British education policy in Tanganyika also reveals a degree of benevolence. British 
policy was guided by the belief that educating the natives in the way they did was for 
their long-term benefit. It is important to reiterate at this point that education in 
Tanganyika focused mostly on educating present but also future chiefs. The education 
of the masses was not the first priority of British administration. The explanation for 
this rests on British conceptions of the African. The Director of Agriculture in 
Tanganyika stated in 1925 that “only 5% of all African students have sufficient 
intelligence to profit from academic instruction” (cited in Kaniki, 1980, p. 272). As a 
result of the depression in the 1930s a number of radical changes were instilled which 
included the expansion of elementary education, the reduction of post-elementary 
levels of education and the reduction of English courses (Kaniki, 1980).  
Let us now look at British policy on land and agriculture, also based on Article 3 of 
the MFT. British officers engaged in the agricultural education of native farmers. They 
taught them how to cultivate new cash crops and how best to improve existing ones 
(Listowel, 1968). For example in 1920 the British distributed a large amount of seeds 
to encourage the cultivation of cotton by the natives (RTT 1920). In the early 1920s 
agricultural education was seen as paramount. As stated in the 1921 RTT “great 
importance is attached to agricultural instruction, with a view to stimulating 
production by the native” (RTT 1921). British officers were also teaching the natives 
less wasteful methods of husbandry. The importance attached to agricultural education 
continued throughout the mandate.  
The objective of the British in the area of agriculture was, as Cameron stated, “to 
induce the native to become a producer directly or indirectly, that is to produce or to 
assist in producing something more than the crop of local foodstuffs for himself and 
his family” (cited in Coulson, 1982, p. 43). This on its own points to the fact that 
development (economic, educational) was one of the main objectives of British 
administration. The teaching and guiding provided by British officials to the natives 
would enable them to become successful farmers and growers. Apart from training 
cultivators and farmers, the British administration established agricultural education 





British agricultural policy regulated the cultivation of crops, giving priority to sisal 
and rubber seen as strategically significant for the British war effort. Cotton, once 
promoted to the natives for cultivation, lost its significance in the 1940s. In order to 
stop the production of cotton the administration decreased the price of cotton and 
increased the price of rice and groundnut (Coulson, 1982). Accordingly, British 
Agricultural policy in Tanganyika during the 1940s was geared towards supporting 
the war effort by controlling the cultivation of crops.  
Moving on to land appropriation in Tanganyika, it is worth noting that on the whole it 
was based on the policy of “paramountcy of native interests”. As a result transfers of 
land from natives to non-natives were not permitted except with the sanction from the 
Governor (RTT 1921). In line with the policy of paramountcy the British 
administration established the 1923 Land Ordinance according to which  
the whole of the lands of the Territory, whether occupied or unoccupied…are 
hereby declared to be public land…under the control and subject to the 
disposition of the Governor, and shall be held and administered for the use and 
common benefit, direct or indirect of the natives of the territory, and no title to 
the occupation of and use of any such lands shall be valid without the consent 
of the Governor (cited in Taylor, 1963, p. 57).  
This bears similarities with the need to hold the majority in the Legislative Council 
discussed above. The British administration held power in their own hands because of 
their duty as Mandatories and also because the Africans were not seen as being ready 
yet for any power. Additionally, the words employed in the land ordinance exhibit 
benevolence. The land was to be administered for the benefit of the natives. The latter 
was interpreted very generally by the British. Indeed land alienation to non-natives 
was justified in such a manner. According to Cameron:  
There are certain agricultural processes which European enterprise and capital 
can undertake but which are beyond the capacity of the African tribesmen and 
will be beyond their capacity for a long time to come. If land is available and 





my view, it is directly contrary to the interests of the country as a whole for the 
government to refuse to admit that enterprise and capital and attempt to hold 
the land under a dead-head. (Chidzero, 1961, p. 226) 
The argument he presented to the Legislative Council bore great similarity, as 
Cameron argued that “non-native settlement should be encouraged wherever the 
climate is suitable and adequate areas are available without depriving the native 
population of sufficient land for its own use, provided always the transport facilities 
are available to evacuate the produce” (cited in Taylor, 1963, p. 60). During his time 
as Governor of Tanganyika 2,013,097 acres of agricultural land were alienated.   
 
Figure 5 Interconnections of elements defining British paternalism in Tanganyika 
The above diagram illustrates how British paternalism manifested itself during 
Britain’s administration of Tanganyika. In all areas investigated, the elements defining 
British paternalism (benevolence, obligation/duty, protection and 
difference/incompetence) have now been identified. Benevolence was present in 
discourses relating to administration, education, land and agriculture. The holding of 
legislative power, of official majority in the Legislative Council and the control of 
land by the British were all justified as being for the benefit of the natives. As far as 
obligation and duty are concerned they emanated from obligations ingrained in the 
Mandate for Tanganyika. These feelings were also enhanced by British 





primitive and backward. For some British Parliamentarians obligation and duty 
resulted from the perception that Tanganyika was incorporated in the British Empire.  
The element of protection in the case of Tanganyika manifested itself in the practice 
and discourse of the British. In discourse, protection was tied to the political, economic 
and educational development of the natives. The British were protecting the natives 
from themselves and their intervention would eventually lead to a more developed 
civilization. In pursuing their role as “trustee” the British believed that eventually the 
natives would acquire the skills and knowledge for responsible government. On the 
ground, British personnel and Europeans were involved in the training and education 
of natives. In addition they supervised and controlled the system of education. The 
same applied to administration where natives had limited participation in government.  
Lastly the element of difference and incompetence manifested itself in British 
representational practices. In general, the natives were seen as capable of progress but 
at a very slow pace and only with the guidance afforded by British officials. The 
incapacity of natives was based on the fact that they had limited or no knowledge of 
the English language. This being said, not all natives were seen as capable of progress. 
The British focused on developing a class of elites who would have the ability to 
practice self-government at some point in the future. In the mind of the British the 
natives were demarcated from “the self” on the basis of civilization and progress.  
The analysis I have undertaken also informs on British interests in Tanganyika. 
Consistent with British colonial policies and mindset, Tanganyika benefited the 
metropole economically via exports while benefiting the natives at the same time. This 
was most pronounced during the 1940s. Plans for the establishment of an East African 
Federation were in part based on British interest. Its successful establishment would 
lead to Britain further consolidating her Empire. The case of British administration in 
Tanganyika also offers some wider conclusions as regards British policy in Africa 
during the mandate period, which will be further discussed in the following section. 
Suffice it to say for the moment that Britain conceived that they were exercising a trust 





6.4 Comparing Events: British Paternalism during the Mandate 
Period   
So far, I have demonstrated how each element defining paternalism manifested itself 
in the case of Palestine and Tanganyika. To identify the particularities of British 
paternalism during the Mandate period I now move to a comparison of these two cases.  
The comparison will focus on drawing commonalities and differences in paternalism’s 
manifestation in British practices, discourses and representations. It will be 
accompanied by certain observations relating to British colonial policy. This will 
allow to draw more definite conclusions regarding British paternalism during the 
Mandate period. 
 
Figure 6: British representations of communities residing in Palestine and Tanganyika seen on a continuum of 
“the self” and “the other”. 
The above is a visual illustration of British representations of the peoples of each 
mandated territory. In both territories certain communities were identified as “the 
other”. In Palestine the people belonging to this group were the Arab Muslims and in 
Tanganyika the native Africans. Their identification as “the other” was based on the 
concepts of civilization, capability, backwardness and development. Although 
differentiation was based on the same concepts, the Arab Muslims as citizens of a 
Class A Mandate were naturally seen as less backward, uncivilized and incapable than 
the natives of Tanganyika. It is more accurate to describe the representation of Arab 
Muslims as inhabiting a space between “the self” and “the other”. This renders the 





contrast, the Jews, and especially European Jews residing in Palestine, were seen by 
the British as being closer to “the self” owing to religion and civilization.  
That European Jews were seen as closer to conceptions of “the self” did not signify 
that they were represented in equal terms to the British. A more precise way of 
interpreting this is that European Jews were seen as “the self but not quite”. This was 
also the case for the Greeks addressed in Chapter 5. The European Jews were seen as 
the higher civilization in Palestine but there was also attached to them a certain 
vulnerability, they were seen as objects of suffering. These observations point to the 
fact that “otherness” was a crucial component of British administration in both 
Palestine and Tanganyika. British conceptions of “otherness” were more pronounced 
towards the Arab Muslims in Palestine and the natives of Tanganyika. These were 
visible in discourses and practices in British administration, agricultural reforms, land 
alienation and education.  
An example of practices demonstrating “otherness” is the exclusion of Arab Muslims 
from key government positions in Palestine and the exclusion of natives in Tanganyika 
from the legislative council. These practices also inform on perceptions of incapacity 
and inability, a direct result of representing these communities as backward and 
uncivilized. The perception of “otherness” was crucial in the exercise of Britain’s role 
as trustee of both territories. The concept of “otherness” was also applicable to British 
dealings outside the Mandate System. During the Mandate period (1919-1948) Britain 
was not actively involved in military interventions, it was mainly preoccupied with its 
African and Asian colonies. The way in which the British represented the Africans in 
Tanganyika was akin to the way in which all natives were represented in the African 
colonies. Of special importance is the fact that when discussing Africans in Parliament 
the British very rarely differentiated between territories. An African was an African, 
s/he was not a Tanganyikan, a Nigerian, a Kenyan, or a Rhodesian – they were all 
uncivilized and backward people. 
Within British discourses, obligation/duty, benevolence, difference/incompetence and 





similar ways. First, it emanated directly from the League of Nations and the acquisition 
of the mandates. Second, it was enhanced by the perception that Britain’s role was to 
act as “trustee” of both territories. By representing Arab Muslims as close to “the 
other” and Africans as “the other” the British felt it their duty to develop and civilize 
them. It is also true that a positive representation of the Jews in terms of religion and 
history bred feelings of obligation and duty as did the focus on their hardships. In fact 
much of what was done in Palestine had as an epicentre the policy of a Jewish National 
Home. What differentiates Palestine from Tanganyika in terms of obligation and duty 
is that the latter was at certain points during the mandate seen as forming part of the 
British Empire – a direct result of its status as a Class B Mandate. 
Development towards self-government, the object of the mandate system coincided 
with British colonial policy of the period. At the time there was an awakening of the 
idea that at some point colonial people would be capable of self-government and that 
British policy should in some respects prepare for that eventuality. Both concepts of 
trustee and development are visible in British discourses discussing colonial policy. 
This is exemplified in the Kenya White Paper of 1923 according to which:  
In the administration of Kenya His Majesty’s Government regard 
themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African 
population…But there can be no room for doubt that it is the mission 
of Great Britain to work continuously for the training and education of 
the Africans towards a higher intellectual, moral and economic level 
than that which they had reached when the Crown assumed the 
responsibility for the administration of this territory (cited in 
Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa 1930). 
The above reiterates the crucial points of administration in both Palestine and 
Tanganyika, the concept of trustee and the British mission to educate. Although this 
is more pronounced in Tanganyika, the case of Palestine also displays moves towards 





between mandate and colonial policy also figured in Cameron’s statement of 1939, 
where he argued that  
the terms of the mandate in the case of Tanganyika did not trouble or 
preoccupy my mind in any way; the principles embodied in that document 
were in complete accord with which I had become so accustomed in the 
administration of Nigeria – the ordinary and recognised principles of British 
colonial administration. (quoted in Chidzero, 1961, p. 2)  
Another point of convergence between the two mandates was the tendency to justify 
British administration and policies in education, agriculture, land, representation in 
government as being for the benefit of the communities. This was equally seen as 
guiding colonial policy. According to the speech of Baron Passfield on 23 June 1930 
“the government of every colony equally with the government of a mandated territory 
is under an express obligation to promote the welfare and advancement in civilization 
of its native population” (Madden and Drawin, 1994, p. 25). In terms of practices 
undertaken and policies initiated both cases display protection. Some practices were 
geared towards protection from harm and others were carried out as protection of the 
people from themselves, protection as development. 
In comparing the two cases, protection as development was more pronounced in 
Tanganyika, as Palestine was a country seen on “the threshold of modern 
development” (HC Deb 17 July 1929, c489). The stronger emphasis on development 
in Tanganyika is a corollary of the classification of these territories by the CLN, which 
classified Palestine as a “Class A” mandate and Tanganyika as a “Class B” mandate. 
Accordingly, Britain was to provide administrative advice in Palestine in contrast to 
being responsible for the administration of the territory in Tanganyika (CLN). Despite 
this, in both mandates British administrators held full legislative powers. In Palestine 
this was the case throughout the mandate, whereas in Tanganyika this lasted until the 
establishment of a Legislative Council in 1926. The latter did not give legislative 
powers to Africans, decisions at the national level were left to the British Europeans 





In Palestine, the High Commissioner held full legislative powers because of the 
animosity of the two communities, which rendered difficult the task of British 
administration. Practices geared towards protecting the natives from themselves are 
visible in both mandates as regards Arab Muslims and native Africans. In Palestine, 
Arab Muslims occupied minor posts in the senior civil service as opposed to Christian 
Arabs and Jews. In Tanganyika, native Africans were excluded from the Legislative 
Council until the 1940s. Further, Natives authorities and the Ordinances established in 
Tanganyika gave some powers to chiefs but entailed an increased amount of 
supervision from District Officers. These practices reflect to a large extent British 
representations of incapacity and inability. Additionally, they exemplify how Britain 
exercised its role as “trustee”. In Tanganyika, the idea of trusteeship was more 
pronounced, as the Africans were seen as not able to administer themselves yet and as 
needing guidance and training. As a corollary, the system of indirect rule was 
employed in order to first teach Africans responsible government through their own 
institutions.  
Further, in both mandates the British took steps in the development of the territories 
by focusing on education, agriculture and the construction of infrastructure. The focus 
is here again on Arab Muslims and on Africans. In education, the British focused on 
bringing the levels of literacy up, on teaching via the English language at certain higher 
levels and on teaching better methods of cultivation. In the case of Tanganyika, a 
certain level of control is also visible in the practices undertaken by the British. This 
was particularly so in agriculture. The British administration controlled the crops to 
be cultivated by increasing or decreasing their price. Agricultural instruction was also 
accorded to Jews in Palestine. Practices undertaken towards the Jews in Palestine were 
also of a protective nature. As demanded by the Balfour Declaration, a large flow of 
European Jews were allowed to settle in the territory and restrictions to the possession 
of land were abolished in order to allow these immigrants to develop in Palestine.   
The practices and policies undertaken with the goal of development in these two 
mandates and particularly in Tanganyika bear close resemblance with those found in 





British colonies in East and Central Africa where no African could be found above the 
level of minor clerk (Brown and Louis, 1999, p. 235). As regards representation of 
natives and the constitution of a Legislative Council there is a resemblance between 
Tanganyika and India in the late nineteenth century. It first began with government 
officials in the majority and gradually elected official and un-official members (Brown 
and Louis, 1999, p. 236). Additionally, indirect rule, which was the model of 
administration adopted, was widely employed in British colonies and protectorates 
albeit with some modifications from territory to territory. As argued by Cameron in 
regards to indirect rule “the principle is not a new one – that of administering a more 
primitive people through their own indigenous institutions” (Cameron, 1939, p. 79). 
Direct rule practiced in some territories bore a resemblance to the arrangement in 
Palestine.  
The way in which the British practiced Trusteeship in the mandates was already 
illustrated above by holding majority or by restricting the representation of certain 
communities. In fact, the mandate principles guiding British policy in Palestine and 
Tanganyika shared many aspects with British colonial policy. The concept of 
trusteeship can be seen as a blueprint for thinking and acting towards the natives, 
particularly in Africa. The convergence between mandate policy and colonial policy 
is very well illustrated through British discourses. In his Memorandum dated 23rd of 
July 1923, the Duke of Devonshire spelled out Britain’s general policy. He stated that 
“as in the Uganda protectorate, so in the Kenya colony the principle of trusteeship for 
the natives, no less than in the mandated territory of Tanganyika is unassailable. This 
paramount duty of trusteeship will continue as in the past, to be carried out under the 
secretary of state for the colonies by the Agents of the Imperial government” (Madden 
and Drawin, 1994, p. 21). 
The findings of my examination of British paternalism in Palestine and Tanganyika 
are similar to what Hetherington (1978) observed in British Paternalism and 
Africa:1920-1940. She too notes the prevalence of British paternalism in this period 
and the centrality of Britain’s superiority and her role as “a development agency” 





of interests in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse. As was the case during 
the colonial era, there is no doubt that there were interests in the mandate period. 
Britain’s occupation of Palestine during WWI was guided by strategic considerations. 
It provided a “foothold in the region” and its proximity to Egypt allowed Britain to 
ensure a better protection of its possessions (Shepherd, 1999, p. 7).  
Tanganyika’s relevance lay in its proximity to Uganda (British protectorate) and 
Kenya (British colony). Mandates and colonies also carried an economic significance 
through trade and exports to the metropole. Be it as it may, the consistent presence of 
British paternalism during both the colonial era and mandate period reveals something 
interesting regarding paternalism’s role in the production of British interventionism. 
During the colonial era Britain had a very considerable amount of power allowing her 
to act as she pleased. A discourse was not needed to justify its practices. Nevertheless 
a whole discourse developed.  
The same is true of the mandate period. Britain was among the winners of WWI and 
international law gave her legitimacy. The Mandate system established that certain 
advanced nations were to act as trustees of less advanced nations. And yet, this chapter 
has demonstrated the development of a specific discourse accompanied by a certain 
way of doing things. Interests do not explain differences in the way British 
interventions are conducted. They cannot account for differences in representations or 
in the way that practices developed. Paternalism on the other hand makes that possible. 
Paternalism can be best characterised as a feature of British interventionary practice 
and discourse, one that gradually becomes embedded in the very fabric of the 
international system. The Mandate System itself was based on a paternalist ideology. 
The next chapter will establish a similar degree of continuity in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse focusing on the period covering the Cold-War 







7 British Paternalism 1945-1999 
This chapter looks at British interventionary practice and discourse from 1945 to 1999. 
Contemporary literature tends to divide this period into two: “the Cold War” and 
“Post-Cold War” periods. These two periods are differentiated by their structural 
characteristics. The Cold War Period was defined by bipolarity, deterrence and a 
limited role for the UN in international affairs. In contrast the Post-Cold War up until 
1999 was characterized by unipolarity and UN activism in international affairs. By 
differentiating the two periods in terms of the structure of the international system 
arguments of novelty in relation to military interventions are able to develop. The Post-
Cold War period is presented as enabling interventions on humanitarian grounds 
(Newman, 2009). As presented in the literature review in chapter 2 empirical studies 
on humanitarian intervention argue that the Cold War has brought along far-reaching 
changes to the practice and discourse of humanitarian intervention. The changing 
variables identified are norms regarding the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Newman, 2009; Weiss, 2012; Abiew, 1999), the 
international environment, expanded notions of security (Weiss, 2012), the purpose 
and justifications of interventions (Falk, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Newman, 2009; Welsh, 
2004) and the definition of who counts as human (Finnemore, 2003; Simms and Trim, 
2011).  
Unlike current empirical investigations on military interventions I am interested in 
investigating and identifying paternalist continuity in the practice and discourse of 
British interventions in this period. As such I do not endorse the constructed categories 
of Cold War and Post-Cold War periods and instead treat them as one period. In doing 
this, however, I fully acknowledge the occurrence of change in the context in which 
interventions occur. As such this chapter takes account of the context in terms of 
normative and legal developments and gives special attention to Britain’s overall 
foreign policy. It is not expected that British paternalism will be as pronounced in 
Britain’s interventionary discourse and practice during the entirety of the period under 





This could be a direct result of the influence on the context in which British 
interventions took place. The period 1945-89 can be characterised as a peculiar period 
in structural terms. The world was divided in two camps and the objective was to 
accumulate as much military capability as possible as a way to deter the other side. 
Britain was focusing on maintaining international order, on sustaining its military 
influence around the world and on ensuring its security.  Be it at it may, Barnett (2011) 
has amply documented in his work Empire of Humanity, that Britain was a strong force 
in the area of humanitarian aid. Its discourse and practice along with that of British 
humanitarian organizations was characterised by paternalism. Indeed, it is possible to 
identify British paternalism in the area of humanitarian aid towards Germany, 
Rhodesia, Vietnam and Nigeria in Parliamentary debates and newspapers where 
British citizens wrote letters to newspapers calling for the need to send aid.  
The case studies I employ to expose continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice 
and discourse are: the reconstruction of Germany 1945-49, the Malaysian Indonesian 
Confrontation 1963-66 and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The case of 
Germany was chosen for three main reasons. First, according to secondary literature 
it is seen as a case of post-conflict reconstruction (Knowles, 2013), which places it 
within the scope of my research. Second, it lends itself to comparisons with the 
Mandate cases investigated in the previous period because of the involvement of the 
concept of development. Third, it enables me to show the form of British paternalism 
towards a Western European country during this period. As Europe was a central part 
of Britain’s foreign policy it is interesting to see the manner in which paternalism 
exhibited itself. Just like the case of Greece analyzed in Chapter 5, Germany could 
potentially bring forth differences in representational and identification practices when 
intervention is undertaken in a European country. The case of Greece brought forward 
how the British represented the Greeks as “the self but not quite”.  
The case of the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation was selected because it combines 
different policies and objectives characterizing the period. Malaysia was first a colony 
until 1957 when it was granted its independence and joined the Commonwealth. 





the fight to contain communism in South East Asia. In addition the Malaysian-
Indonesian confrontation is an example of a trend in British military interventions 
highlighting how Britain rarely intervened alone. Due to economic strains Britain 
tended to seek help from Allies. Lastly, the intervention in Kosovo 1998-99 was 
chosen because it is one of the examples of humanitarian intervention cited by the 
empirical literature in order to stress not continuity but change in Western states’ 
interventionary practice and discourse. 
This chapter will be structured as follows:  
The first section will provide an overview of the period by focusing specifically on the 
context. This will involve looking at the development of new norms and concepts and 
at the overall structure of the international system by focusing on the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights, on the UN Charter and on the Cold War. Through this overview I 
will show normative change as well as continuity between this period and the one 
preceding it. The following section will shift attention from the general to the 
particular by looking specifically at British foreign policy between the years 1945 and 
1999. This will help bring forward the main tenants guiding British policy-makers in 
decisions taken relating, but not exclusively, to military interventions.  
Next, I will concentrate on the British occupation and reconstruction of Germany 
(1945-49) so as to present the manner in which paternalism expressed itself in British 
practices and discourses. To that end this section will focus on British administration, 
democratization and education efforts. With the same objective in mind the following 
section will analyse the case of the Malaysian Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66. The 
focus here will be on Britain’s overall policy and on its response to Indonesia’s 
Confrontation policy against Malaysia. The last case to be analysed will be that of the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999. This section will concentrate on the three main 
practices defining both the international and British response towards Slobodan 
Milosevic: the condemnation of atrocities, the threat of the use of force and the use of 





cases addressed in this chapter in order to show similarities but also differences in 
terms of British paternalism’s manifestation.  
7.1 1945-1999: The Normative and Geopolitical Context 
The period 1945-1999 witnessed important developments in a number of areas of 
international politics. These developments touched upon perceptions of “us” and 
“them”, relations among states, the conduct of war and values. Throughout these years 
the UN and NATO were established, the UN declaration of human rights and the 
Genocide Convention were adopted, decolonization progressed, the Cold War 
dynamics of alliances, deterrence and bipolarity set in, and issues of sovereignty vs. 
human rights became prominent. These had varying degrees of influence on the way 
in which British paternalism expressed itself. Before moving to an analysis of three 
instances of British intervention carried out in the period under investigation it is 
imperative to take a closer look at the context in which these took place.  
7.1.1 New Concepts and Norms?  
The new concepts and norms featuring in the period under examination are best 
explored by looking at the UN Declaration of Human Rights (DHR), the Genocide 
Convention and the UN Charter. In one way or another they all have one commonality: 
averting harm and promoting equality. Normatively, this period saw a move towards 
universalizing humanity and the promotion of human rights, starting with the UN DHR 
of 1948, which put an accent on the rights and freedoms all human beings were 
allowed to enjoy. A look at some of its articles is quite instructive to bring forward the 
significance of such a development. According to Article 1, “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.  
Continuing, Article 2 states that “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 





language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status. (UN DHR, emphasis added) 
The words I have emphasized above constitute a far-reaching change from what was 
observed during the Mandate period in Chapter 6. The terms “reason” and 
“conscience” break the barriers previously employed to differentiate among peoples. 
It reinforces the idea that all peoples have rights and freedoms, which was lacking 
thirty or so years prior to this declaration. It highlights that brotherhood and equality 
are attributes that should characterize relations among people. The influence of human 
rights during this period can be seen from the very beginning by taking a look at the 
dismantling of Empires. According to Finnemore (2003, p. 67-71) decolonization 
brought about a shift in the understanding of who is human and as a result humanity 
became universalized.  
This, however, does not mean that previous conceptions of “trust” and guidance 
disappeared overnight. British decolonization can be seen as a mixture of the old and 
new. On the one hand the preponderance of human rights and their value were given 
paramount importance. In discussing decolonization in Africa in a Commons debate 
in 1959 Mr Benn argued “we cannot be uncommitted when it comes to freedom in 
Africa. In the world in which we live this is the greatest change of all – human dignity 
and human rights are now just as indivisible as peace” (cited in Porter and Stockwell, 
1989, p. 52). On the other hand, however, Darwin and Porter’s analysis (1984; 2004) 
of British decolonization demonstrates the persistence of the father and child analogy. 
Human rights continued to play a significant part throughout the period reaching their 
peak in the 1990s particularly in relation to the use of force by states. 
Another great development in this period was the establishment of the UN Charter, 
which came into force in October 1945. The main purpose of the UN according to 
Article 1 was  
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 





bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (UN Charter)  
In relation to the use of force, Article 2(4) stated “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations” (UN Charter). Both the UN DHR and the UN Charter 
bring to the fore ideas of unity, acceptance, freedom and peace. They can be seen as a 
response to the devastating repercussions of World War II. Peace, stability and 
security were taken as the concepts to be guiding the future of the world.  
7.1.2 The Cold War 
It is impossible to provide an overview of the context during 1945-1999 without 
discussing the Cold War. Its characteristics (bipolarity, deterrence, state primacy, 
geostrategic considerations) came to dominate the international system and define it 
for a little over forty years (Greenwood, 2000). Its main protagonists were the United 
States and the Soviet Union. However, its repercussions were felt on a worldwide 
scale. Not a continent was left undisturbed. Countries were either allying themselves 
with the two superpowers or became non-aligned. Either way they were implicated in 
the East-West struggle. The Cold War was as much about territorial supremacy as it 
was about spheres of influence (Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian, 2003). Generally this 
has been described as an international struggle between rival ideologies: capitalism 
and communism (Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian, 2003). 
Allies of the two superpowers were more often than not involved in conflicts around 
the world by committing troops, weapons, bases and so on. Examples of such conflicts 
were the Vietnam and Korea wars. The process of decolonization was influenced to a 
considerable degree by the conflict. For example Britain was highly concerned and 
did all it could to ensure that countries on the brink of independence were following 





influence. Further, the Cold War also had dramatic implications on the powers of the 
UN Security Council in terms of enforcing peace and stability. The powers of veto 
held by each of the two superpowers made action against aggression of one state by 
another impossible to implement.  
Despite the dimensions it took, the Cold War was mainly fought between the US and 
the Soviet Union. As far as British Foreign Policy is concerned the ideological struggle 
against communism was not alone in influencing it. According to Hopkins, Kandiah 
and Gillian (2003) the Cold War did not cause a change in the minds of British policy-
makers regarding the international status of their country. For a considerable part of 
this period, British policy-makers held the belief that Britain still had influence as well 
as an important role to play. The following section will continue this discussion more 
thoroughly by looking at Britain’s foreign policy from 1945 to 1989. 
7.2 Britain’s Foreign Policy  
Winston Churchill’s conception of three circles, devised in 1951, is a good illustration 
of the main preoccupations underlying Britain’s foreign policy from 1945 to 1989. 
According to this, Britain was seen as occupying an important position between the 
three circles comprising the Atlantic, Europe and the Commonwealth. Frankel (1975, 
p. 157) interpreted this three-circle conception as “pronouncedly egocentric, the effect 
of which can be likened to that of geographical projections focusing upon one’s 
country: by the sheer method of representation the country becomes the centre of the 
earth”. Indeed this reflects the basis upon which Britain’s foreign policy was guided 
for most of this period. According to Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian (2003) the Cold 
War did not produce a change in the UK’s view of its position in the world, until 1956 
that is. Similarly McCourt (2014) notes that British foreign policy makers behaved as 
if Britain was still a great power.  
A central aspect of Britain’s foreign policy during this period is its intimate link with 
defence policy. Among Britain’s priorities were the defence of its position, its 





a stress on the importance of its bases world-wide and was obsessed with acquiring 
nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter the Soviet Union. The formation of alliances 
was a crucial aspect of its foreign policy, the most important of which was its relations 
with the US. Lord Carrington’s (Minister without Portfolio) statement in a Commons 
debate in 1963 is a good illustration of the main tenets of Britain’s foreign policy 
objectives from the end of WWII to 1989:  
The first, of course—and it is paramount—is to prevent war. The second—and 
hereafter I name them in no particular order of priority—is to protect British 
interests. The third is to assist our friends and Allies in the Commonwealth and 
outside should trouble arise. The fourth is to play our part in the containment 
of Communism all over the world. These are sizeable aims and they entail 
heavy commitments for us. (HL Deb 19 November 1963, c233) 
In drawing a continuing line between WWII and its aftermath Marr argues that “the 
world after the war was still a world of war” and goes on stating that “from Greece to 
Korea and Malaya; from Kenya to the Falklands, Ireland to Iraq, Britain would always 
be fighting somewhere. The most serious enemy became Communism” (2008, 
Prologue). The spread of Communism was seen as posing a threat to Western societies 
and to civilization (Hopkins, Kandiah and Gillian, 2003). Consequently Britain 
entertained interest in small states and new nations. It was also extensively involved 
in its colonies on the road to independence. According to Woodhouse (1961, p. 168) 
Britain’s interest in small states and new nations was partly motivated by moral 
obligations and he goes as far as to say that these moral obligations could be 
considered as humanitarian. Britain’s main objective was not to leave a vacuum that 
would give Communism an opportunity to take over. 
Changes to British foreign policy can be observed after 1989. According to Gaskarth, 
Porter and Edmunds (2014, p. 2) the end of the Cold War signalled an end to 
“existential calculations” connected to the national interest in foreign-policy-making. 
They also observe that a different conceptualization of the national interest occurred 





underlying the fact of interconnectedness. 1989 signalled an end to the way in which 
the international system was structured during the previous 45 years. A review of the 
literature reveals that the most pronounced changes in this area occurred after 1997 
with the rise of Tony Blair and New Labour to power. Britain’s foreign policy from 
that point on could be described through three components: an ethical dimension, 
Europe, and efforts to become the bridge between the US and the EU (Daddow and 
Gaskarth, 2011).  
The ethical dimension was articulated by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in 1997. He 
argued that Britain “must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic 
rights on which we insist for ourselves”, further adding that human rights were to be 
“at the heart of our foreign policy” (cited in Daddow and Gaskarth, 2014, p. 4). 
Although this differentiates the main tenants guiding Britain’s foreign policy between 
1945-1989 and 1989-1999 its involvement in wars does not. Its soldiers were sent to 
Iraq in 1998, to East Timor and Kosovo in 1999, and to Sierra Leone in 2000 
(Williams, 2005). These were described as enforcement operations, and had human 
rights and democracy as their main objectives. 
7.3 The British Occupation and Reconstruction of Germany 
1945-49 
7.3.1 Background 
The occupation and reconstruction of Germany by the Allied Powers began with the 
signing of the Potsdam Agreement on August 2, 1945. This Agreement laid the 
foundations for the treatment of Germany in the initial control period in the four zones 
of occupation (US, GB, FR, and Russia). According to Jarausch’s analysis of Allied 
reconstruction efforts, the Potsdam Agreement defined the goals of occupation as 
follows: “while the German people needed to atone for the “dreadful crimes” they had 
committed, they were at the same time to receive an opportunity to prepare for the 





2006, p. 24). Reconstruction in Germany was based on four main principles: 
denazification, demobilization, de-industrialization and democratization (Marshall, 
1989). These principles underscored the primary motive of the occupation and 
reconstruction of Germany by Britain, which was to ensure that Germany would not 
be able to threaten either Britain or her allies in the future. British policy was then 
primarily driven by security concerns (Turner 1989).  
As per the directive of the Potsdam Agreement the beginning of occupation in the 
British zone saw the establishment of a military government under Sir Bernard 
Montgomery, who acted as military governor (Knowles, 2013). Democratization in 
the area of administration and institutional development moved at a fast pace in the 
British zone and elections at the local level took place in 1946. During the same year 
British and US military governors signed an agreement relating to the formation of a 
bi-zone, economic unit of their respective zones. In the following year, elections at 
Land level took place, and negotiations between the British and Americans resulted in 
their zones being unified. 
In 1948 the London Programme was put in motion with the twin objectives of bringing 
the economic revival and the political reconstruction of the Western zones of 
Germany. Following these developments the Soviet Union responded with the Berlin 
blockade, which lasted from 1948 to 1949, and the Berlin Airlift. It involved blocking 
Western access to Berlin (Shlaim, 1983). Finally in 1949 two independent states were 
formed in Germany. One included the French, US and British zones, and the other the 
Soviet zone (Knowles, 2013). This signaled an end to British occupation as practiced 
during the previous 4 years (Watt, 1965). 
7.3.2 Administering and Democratizing the British Zone in Germany 
Policies pursued in the British zone on democratization followed the 1945 Potsdam 
Agreement (hereafter PA), whose directives were “to prepare for the eventual 
reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful 





stated that “the administration in Germany should be directed towards the 
decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility”. 
Local self-government was to be restored as soon as possible. The process of 
democratization headed by the Administration and Local Government division of the 
Control Commission for Germany involved building democratic institutions, adjusting 
the electoral system, decentralizing the machinery of administration and governance, 
and politically re-educating the Germans towards a democratic way of thinking 
(Ebsworth, 1960; Marshall, 1989). The primary threat towards the attainment of 
objectives set was Nazism. Hence, its eradication was the first step towards the road 
to democracy.  
The second step involved altering/influencing the German mind so as to think in a 
democratic way. On the whole British opinion towards Germany and Germans was 
more often negative than positive. This was particularly true during WWII. In the eyes 
of the majority of British politicians and the public the problem they were faced with 
in Germany was one to do with Germans’ national character. Such conceptions were 
due in most part to Lord Vansittart who served as Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
British Foreign Office and as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government during 
1938-1941. He authored numerous anti-German pamphlets, articles, books and letters 
to newspapers (Goldman, 1979). For Vansittart the character of Germans was a danger 
in itself due to a flaw in the German national character (Marshall, 1989). During war-
time planning discussions on the treatment of post-war Germany Lord Vansittart 
remarked that “the Germans are the most ghastly fact in history…they have committed 
cruelties hitherto undreamed by man. It is the old story, the logical climax of a people 
whose soul has not been civilized” (HL Deb 7 December 1943, c117).  
Polls carried out in 1943 indicated that these ideas reached all sections of British 
society. Forty three percent of those questioned hated or had no sympathy for the 
Germans (Goldman, 1979). In spite of this, Vansittart’s views were contested by 
people in policy-making circles, clergymen and pacifists. Additionally British opinion 
was influenced greatly by stereotypes established in the two World Wars (Watt, 1965). 





towards Germans. According to him “the image of misery and desolation emanating 
from Germany gradually softened the attitude of the British public, which saw itself 
as morally superior to the vengeful German”. 
The nature of practices undertaken in the realm of democratization display a mixture 
of control and cooperation. This observation rightly describes the situation on the 
ground. It is, however, important to clarify that on the whole London held a harsher 
position towards the treatment of Germans than that of the people responsible on the 
ground working on behalf of the British government. Practices concerning 
democratization involved interference, supervision and working in partnership. 
However, partnership did not connote equal standing. How can two parties be 
considered of equal standing when one is constantly supervising and overseeing every 
step taken? British officers were working with their German counterparts and through 
individuated relationships managed to convey British influence.  
This is first visible in practices undertaken to build democracy from the bottom-up 
giving the Germans political responsibility and power in a step-by-step process. This 
approach was a way to control the transfer of political responsibility to Germans and 
enable them gradually to familiarize themselves with a democratic society 
(Foschepoth, 1986, p. 402). An example of this is related to denazification practices 
in the political realm. The British military government was wholly responsible for 
vetting Germans who were to be given positions of responsibility. When in 1946 the 
Germans took over this vetting process British officers maintained the power and right 
to make final decisions regarding appointments, and especially those relating to high-
level positions (Ebsworth, 1960). 
Similarly in the area of local government the British re-worked the Local Government 
Act (Deutsche Gemeindeordnung) in place since 1936 and issued it under a 
Government Ordinance in 1946. The officers of the Control Commission for Germany 
were tasked with helping German authorities get acquainted with the new reforms 
introduced, which they did until 1949 (Ebsworth, 1960). Hence, the interference of the 





took place in autumn 1946. British involvement at Land level followed the pattern 
described. In December 1946, Ordinance no. 57 gave the Länder constitutional rights 
but did not include federal or central powers (Jürgensen, 1983). Since December 1946 
the right of self-government was passed to the Germans (Marshall, 1989). However, 
limits were placed on the extent of self-government, limits of power. The Germans 
were allowed to develop their own initiative although all draft constitutions were to be 
reviewed and approved by the British. The Legislative powers of the Länder were 
limited to regional subjects. Finance, economic control and justice were areas worked 
out by a German administration, whose responsibility remained with the British until 
a central government formed.   
Interestingly, Ebsworth (1960, p. 132) described this practice as “a kind of extension 
of the trusteeship principle” and argued that “it worked quite well”. Indeed the concept 
of trusteeship does describe well the nature of practices in the British zone. What 
distinguishes the case of reconstruction in Germany from the Mandate cases of 
Palestine and Tanganyika analyzed in the previous chapter is the lack of references 
relating to civilization and backwardness. The British in this case saw themselves as 
the guardians of Europe more generally. It was about keeping Europe safe by keeping 
the Germans on a leash. In a way the British were protecting the Germans from 
themselves. This fits well with the British view of a problematic German national 
character. Through such views the Germans were identified more often than not as 
“the other”.  
With the guidance, supervision and sometimes control on the part of the British this 
“other” could eventually come closer to the self. Democracy was key to remedying 
the faults of the Germans. Although Britain was to help Germany in its reconstruction, 
sentiment or empathy was not a feeling generally shared in Britain. In fact harshness 
and anger for what the Germans had done was at the back of everyone’s mind. An 
example of this is Bevin’s statement in the House of Commons where he argued that  
It must not be forgotten that crimes were committed and millions of Germans 





clean. We must behave like decent and sensible human beings and not like 
Nazis, but I appeal to the country not to allow itself to begin indulging in 
sloppy sentiment. It will not do the Germans any good, and it will only result 
in misleading them. (HC Deb 22 October 1946, c1518). 
Not everyone followed Bevin’s position. Some Parliamentarians displayed a more 
lenient attitude towards the Germans. A good example of this position is Nigel Birch’s 
statement in a Commons debate in October 1946 where he argued that  
My last point is a plea for mercy. There was a time when mercy was a virtue 
which people valued. That time now seems to have gone. I cannot help feeling 
that we have drunk up some pollution from the blood of the Nazis. People so 
often say that the Germans would have done worse. Of course they would—a 
thousand times worse. Cannibals eat missionaries, but that is no reason why 
missionaries should eat cannibals. How often do we hear statements made, 
particularly by the Lord President of the Council, starting, "We do not love the 
Germans." It is difficult to love one's enemies, but it would be much more 
hopeful if someone began by saying, "We are trying not to hate the Germans” 
(HC Deb 22 October 1946, c1487).  
What comes out from this but also from Bevin’s statement is the way in which the 
British were seen as complete opposites to the Germans. Birch presented the difference 
between an Englishman and a German through a powerful analogy ascribing negative 
characteristics to the Germans and positive characteristics to the English. He called on 
the British to be true to who they are, meaning that they should be merciful towards 
the Germans. In Bevin’s statement the British were different to the Germans based on 
the fact that they were human beings. This resulted in complete dissociation with the 
Germans and represented the British as superior to them. Equally important is that 
both statements did not distinguish between a German and a Nazi, they were seen as 
one and the same, they were all bad.  
The British government felt they had a responsibility, a duty in Germany. In certain 





victorious ally and believed to be part of the leading nations. A certain asymmetry 
existed between Germany and Britain. Germany was experiencing “zero hour” 
whereas Britain was not only great but also felt great (Lee, 2001). British superiority 
was also fueled by British democratic institutions. According to a Preamble to a key 
British Policy document “Our democracy, the strongest in the world, is the result of 
our character and our country. It flourishes best in British soil, but we export it and 
carefully tended, it blossoms in different lands” (cited in Welch, 1989, p. 6).  
The sense of duty and responsibility was not confined to Germany but extended to 
Europe as a whole. In a debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons Mr 
Zilliacus (Gateshead) argued that “In Europe we have a special responsibility under 
the Atlantic Charter and under the Teheran and Potsdam Agreements” (HC Deb 23 
October 1946, c1713). Britain saw itself as responsible for ensuring peace, stability 
and security in Europe. The way in which the sense of duty and superiority mixed is 
clearly illustrated by Bevin’s statement in the Commons when he shared his belief that 
“We are in Germany partly to clear up the mess which Hitler caused, and the Germans 
would be very much worse off if we were not there” (HC Deb 22 October 1946, 
c1487). 
As for Communism during the first years of German reconstruction, it was not the 
threat it later came to be. This does not mean that the British were not starting to be 
suspicious about the Soviet Union’s intentions. Although opinion on this in the 
empirical literature is mixed it would be unwise to rule out that the prospect of 
Communist influence in Europe was not worrying Britain. For Turner, Labor’s post 
war foreign policy was influenced by a suspicion of communism. Indeed, he argues 
that “by 1946 the principal post-war threat was felt to be the Soviet Union” (Turner, 
1989, p. 21). The possibility of communism spreading to the British zone became real 
with the merger of the Social Democratic party with the German Communist party 
forming the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the Soviet Zone in February 1946. 
Concurring, Lee (2011) identifies a level of hostility towards the Soviet Union even 
before the end of the war by figures such as Attlee and Bevin. Communism as a threat 





7.3.3 Re-education in the British Zone: The School System and the 
Political Re-education of the Media 
A good starting point for understanding British policy on re-education is to follow 
Christopher Knowles’ characterization of British occupation in Germany as a 
“benevolent occupation”. According to him “positive effect was more likely when 
they created the conditions for the German people to act for themselves, rather than 
imposing solutions by force or decree” (2013, p. 84). This is also true for practices in 
administration and democratization. Control, informality, cooperation, supervision 
and guidance are characteristic of policies pursued by the military government and the 
Education Branch of the Control Commission for Germany (British element) 
(hereafter EBCCG) during 1945-1949. Re-education instead of punishment was the 
outcome of war planning discussions (1942-43) in Britain, which came to characterize 
post-war policy towards Germany. Re-education was an umbrella word devised to 
include a multitude of sectors and areas such as the school system (primary, secondary 
education and universities), its structure, the training of German teachers, the political 
re-education of the German public and the re-education of prisoners of war. The 
EBCCG included a number of sections responsible for universities, schools, teacher 
training, youth, textbooks etc. (Murray, 1978). 
British policy-makers presented education/re-education as the bedrock of their policy 
in Germany. It was seen as the path through which a democratic Germany would arise. 
Re-education was meant to alter the German mind or as Lord Nathan put it in a Lords 
Debate the “purge of minds” (HL Deb 23 Oct 1945, c431). Interestingly, the chosen 
terminology was not liked by a majority working in the Education Branch (Robert 
Birley, Herbert Walker, Heinz Koeppler20) in Germany and by some in the Foreign 
Office. In a note to the Foreign Office dated 18 August 1948, Walker, the Deputy 
Director of the Education Branch, wrote “We detest the word re-education as much as 
the Germans do. This is an Education Branch not a “Reeducation Branch” (cited in 
Jürgensen, 1983, p. 226). Robert Birley, the educational adviser to the Education 
                                                 





Branch also shared this strong dislike towards the concept of re-education (Birley 
1978).  
At the core of the distinction education/re-education lie conceptions about the 
Germans and the methods to be applied in order to establish democracy in Germany. 
Sigrid Fretloh-Thomas (1998) presents Vansittart as a strong defender of re-education 
and distinguishes his approach from people like Birley, Walker, Victor Gollancz and 
Koeppler. Due to his insistence on the problematic German character, re-education for 
Vansittart was not impossible but it would take a very long time and needed to be 
based on tight control (Fretloh-Thomas, 1998). In contrast, those adhering to the 
concept of education did not focus on German stereotypes. They acknowledged 
German culture and the possibility of a change of outlook (Hearnden, 1978, p. 43)21.  
From the outset, the occupation and reconstruction of Germany was seen as a new 
experiment for Britain, something never attempted before. The British Zone Review22 
spoke of Germany as “Britain’s greatest test” given that she was going “to administer 
a very highly cultured and very highly organized European country” (cited in Fretloh-
Thomas, 1998). Although Britain had a long history of administering colonial 
possessions, never before did she have to reconstruct a European country let alone 
educate it. What becomes apparent from the start is that the administration and 
reconstruction of Germany was distinguished from all past British endeavors from the 
mere fact that Germany was a highly cultured and organized European country.  
It becomes somewhat difficult to forge a link between British educational 
reconstruction in Germany and colonial policies in this period. British colonial policy 
in Africa did not have a clear strategy regarding education in the colonies until the 
1925 White Paper on Education Policy in British Tropical Africa made its appearance 
(Whitehead, 1989). In fact it is only after WWII that serious considerations were given 
to the issue of education. Education was seen as the way through which Africans 
would be taught to take responsibility for running their own affairs. Although 
                                                 
21 This example serves well as an illustration of a point made earlier in respect to administration and 
the difference of views between London and those engaged in Germany on the ground. 





Germany and African colonies were very different there is a common element found 
in discourses. In a Paper entitled Education Policy in Africa 1947 the following was 
written “Above all in education the role of HM Government, and of the Colonial 
Administrators, was to help the African people to help themselves” (Whitehead, 1989, 
p. 281). In a way this bears resemblance with the policies pursued in re-educating 
Germany discussed below.  
During the first months of occupation the military government followed the directives 
provided by the PA concerning education according to which “German education shall 
be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make 
possible the successful development of democratic ideas” (cited in Birley, 1978, p. 
46). Security considerations were at the base of this. According to Squadron-Leader’s 
argument in the Commons: “The educational system of Germany must be handled so 
as to provide that a Hitler or a Kaiser cannot rise again, and it may be that the lives of 
people in this country may come to depend on that” (HC Deb 03 April 1947, c2294). 
In accordance with the Potsdam Directives during the initial phase of occupation the 
Education Branch practiced tight control in relation to denazification. It involved 
screening books and school text-books and choosing the right kind of educators once 
all known Nazi supporters were removed (Ebsworth, 1960; Watt, 1965; Becker, 1978). 
Although control rightly describes the objective of British policies in the domain of 
education, it was done through collaborating with German educationists that had lived 
through the denazification process and German education authorities. In order to 
assess new books to be published and used in schools a Textbook Committee was set 
up which included German educationists and British advisers. This Committee was 
charged with receiving books to be published and sending back comments if they 
spotted any sign of nationalist sentiment (Birley, 1978, p. 55). In a sense it was about 
re-building the school system not only in structural terms (buildings) but in its entirety 
(books, teachers, methods of teaching).  
During this period of practical educational reconstruction the cooperation and 





importance. In his article “British Education Policy after 1945 and the Problem of re-
educating Germany” Jurgensen puts an accent on the collaboration between these two 
parties. He argues that “the building-up of an absolutely natural and trustful 
cooperation between those of the two nations concerned with education created an 
atmosphere of confidence” (1983, p. 235). The special place of this relationship for 
the re-education of Germany was re-emphasized in 1947 in an article in the Times 
which wrote “the most hopeful sign for the future is the excellent relationships formed 
between British education officers and the German teachers and educational officials” 
(The Times, 4 February 1947). 
A change occurred towards the end of 1946 relating to the responsibility of education 
in the British zone. The British military government, which held the control and 
responsibility for German education in its zone, handed over this control and 
responsibility to the Länder governments through Ordinance No. 57 (Welch, 1989). 
Reflecting on this a year later the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (John Hynd), 
a Minister in charge of the Control Commission, argued in the House of Commons 
that “There may be mistakes, and it may be a slow process. Handing over the 
responsibility to Germans has led to a certain amount of inefficiency, but they cannot 
learn to administer unless they have the opportunity of doing so” (HC Deb 03 April 
1947, c2300). The Germans were given a chance to learn by doing it themselves.  
However, they were never left on their own.  In fact, according to Birley, the 
educational adviser to the Education Branch, despite this transfer of control and 
responsibility, the military government “retained a role of general supervision and the 
giving of advice and assistance” (Birley, 1950, p. 32). Supervision and the giving of 
advice and assistance related to German educationists, educational institutions and the 
German education authorities in carrying out reforms in Education. Staff from the 
Education Branch positioned at Land Level were, according to Ebsworth who was 
involved in the Administration and Local Government Division of the Control 
Commission for Germany, “most in touch with German officials and educational 





According to a Memorandum listing their duties after the issuing of Directive No. 57, 
Education control officers were “to advise teachers and others about suitable reading 
in connection to their special interests” among other things and were expected to hold 
an approach towards Germans combining “courtesy and firmness”. Above all the 
Memorandum encouraged ECOs to convey a level of sincerity when giving advice to 
Germans (FO 1050/1177). Consequently British policy after Ordinance 57 was more 
about influencing through personal contact rather than forcing methods of re-
education on them (Welch, 1989). It was also about conveying advice in a manner that 
exemplified a genuine concern to help. 
By influencing German educational authorities, educationists and the German public, 
the British could ensure that the necessary educational reforms were put in place and 
carried out by Germans for Germans. Universities were seen as those most in need of 
reforms. As a result, a University Commission was formed under the orders of the 
Military Governor in 1948 in order to review the situation in Universities and propose 
recommendations. The Commission was composed by twelve members, ten of whom 
were German and represented Universities, the Education Ministry, the Catholic and 
Protestant Church and the Trade Unions. The non-German members consisted of Lord 
Linsday of Birker (Master of Balliol College, Oxford) and Professor von Salis of 
Zurich (FO 1050/1057).  
In order to help in bringing their recommendations to fruition, Birley argued during a 
meeting held in his office in December 1948 that the University Commission’s report 
had to be disseminated as widely as possible in order “to influence German public 
opinion in the greatest possible extent” (FO 1050/1057). To these ends he wrote to 
representatives of Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Holland urging them to 
disseminate the Report in their respective countries. He argued that “there are many 
serious minded Germans who are anxious to see reforms take place in German 
Universities”. The dissemination of the Report in neighboring countries would, 
according to Birley, “lighten their task by giving them confidence. This will help them 





This also brings forth how the British helped, and above all supported those like-
minded Germans who wanted to see a better Germany. 
The British model was not imposed but attempts at influencing via British values and 
institutions did take place. In describing the main lines pursued in education after 
Ordinance No. 57 Birley stated that   
As a piece of deliberate policy the members of the Branch have been deployed 
as widely as possible in order that they might influence German education by 
personal contacts with individuals. Their main task has been to get to know 
those persons, teachers and officials who have it in them to create a new and 
healthy education in Germany, to help and encourage them, and to put them in 
touch with the world outside their own country (Birley, 1950, p. 42).  
According to this the Education Branch pursued an informal approach in dealing with 
the education and the re-education of German educationists. Birley believed that what 
was needed was to help German educationists “develop a sense of personal 
responsibility for the affairs of the state” (1978, p. 54). Coupled with the identification 
of cultural isolation of not being in touch with the rest of the world British policy 
focused on exchange programs between British and German educationists. This is 
where attempts at influencing via British values can be observed. For example, 
German teachers were encouraged to travel abroad and especially to Britain in order 
to learn about different manners of educating (Birley, 1978). Teacher training students 
were taking part in exchanges between British and German students (FO 1050/1032). 
There were also courses offered in the British zone to teachers so that they could learn 
techniques in order to teach their subject accompanied of course by British teachers 
(Birley, 1978).  
In addition, English Weeks were taking place until 1948 in Land Niedersachsen. These 
courses lasted from 1 to 5 days and involved the presentation of the British way of life 
(FO 1050/1021). A parallel can be observed with policies and conduct discussed above 
in the area of administration. German teachers were not the only ones whose horizons 





Consequently British attempts at influencing via British values and the British way of 
life extended to school children, universities and source material for teaching. School 
children in Germany were encouraged to correspond with school children in Britain 
in an attempt to re-connect them to the outside world (FO 371/64386). As far as 
Universities were concerned, a scheme was endorsed during the end of 1946. Learned 
journals were sent from Britain to Universities and Technical colleges. This scheme 
was based on Birley’s conviction that “we have a special responsibility to restore their 
intellectual links with English thought and scholarship” (FO 371/64386). 
Policies pursued by the Education Branch during and after the period they held 
responsibility for education in Germany were based on the SHAEFF Educational 
Manual issued in 1945 to guide British educational staff. According to the manual 
No attempt should be made to force on German educational 
institutions any principles of education or methods of teaching 
which are not desired by and indeed do not emanate from the 
Germans themselves. The long-term aim is to establish in German 
education the former standard of respect for objective facts and to 
extend this standard to fields in which it did not formerly operate. 
Also to foster in German education interest in the ideas of popular 
democracy, freedom of opinion, the press, religion. (cited in 
Balfour, 1987, pp. 27–28) 
The main line of the Manual was that education in Germany was to be carried out by 
Germans for Germans. The policies described earlier were in line with directions 
included in the above manual. Given that the British were occupiers they had to tread 
lightly. Germany was not a British colonial possession, it was a European country. 
Even when the British had the chance to make changes in education in Germany 
during the first months of occupation, they didn’t. On this Balfour argued that “any 
change which the British might have tried to make would have met with tooth-and-
nail opposition from almost all the non-Nazi members of the teaching profession” 





engaged in “a very cautious educational and cultural policy” (1978, p. 269). In doing 
so the British encouraged the restoration of the old order which German educationists 
wanted.  
Although British policy in Germany followed the SHAEFF manual and a stress was 
put on influencing rather than imposing British values and institutions, Englishmen 
and women involved in Germany’s educational reconstruction strongly believed in the 
superiority of the English system and its ability to help the Germans in their endeavors 
to build a better and stronger educational system. In her article entitled “Problems in 
German Education-Secondary Schools” published in Die Welt, Miss E. Davies, a 
member of the Education Branch, stated that “those of us who came to work in 
Germany and have studied her great tradition of learning and her arts believe, however, 
that in our own educational system there are elements of universal value which if 
sympathetically considered by German educationists can help them to lay the 
foundations of democracy in Germany” (FO 1050/1192). Apart from the beneficial 
effect that elements of the British educational system would bring to Germany if 
adopted, Davies’ argument also brings forward a positive representation of Germany 
residing in her older traditions.  
From what has been described, the policies pursued in education were not so much of 
a protective nature as such. It could be said that British education officers were helping 
the Germans help themselves by acquiring a supervisory role. German educationists 
were under training and their trainers tried to guide them towards the “right” path. This 
applied to German education authorities as well. Education Control Officers not only 
provided advice to German education authorities at Land Level but were also 
supervising to see how they were progressing with education reforms. British officers 
were laying the ground so that Germans could proceed to re-educate themselves. This 
point coincides with Viola Klein’s observations relating to youth education in 
Germany. She argues that “the victors were to provide the means to assist this process 
of self-education…give the Germans the mental tools and leave it to them to finish the 
job” (1947, p. 81). At this level it is possible to see a certain degree of benevolence in 





The sense of duty and responsibility towards this group of Germans who worked for 
a better future for Germany is well expressed by Birley in an Address he gave at 
Chatham House in 1949 stating that “there are men and women there who are trying 
to create a better tradition and that they still need our help. To leave them now would 
be to leave them too soon” (Birley, 1950, p. 43). What becomes apparent from this 
and from what I have presented above is a somewhat positive representation, an 
identification not with all Germans but with those people (teachers, officials) who 
worked for the establishment of education in the British zone. In accounting for her 
work in the Education Branch, Davies writes “It was recognized that there were two 
Germanies and one would be prepared, indeed eager, to work with us for the benefit 
of the children of Germany” (1978, p. 95). This type of thinking worked in a way to 
bring these Germans closer to “the self” and further away from being seen as “the 
other”.  
In contrast to the education and re-education of German teachers and reforms in the 
educational system, the Public Relations and Information Services Control (PR/ISC 
branch) of the Control Commission was directly intervening in order to change the 
German public’s thinking by controlling British-sponsored media and newspapers. 
The work undertaken by this branch concerned the political re-education of Germans. 
Instead of influencing through personal contact or guiding and supervising as was the 
case with the re-education of teaching staff, the ISC was involved in the manipulation 
of British-sponsored media. The objective was the projection of British values and the 
British way of life and not the re-establishment of German culture.  
According to a Foreign Office paper circulated in May 1945 “the media were to re-
educate the German public so that they may unconsciously become more accessible 
to the ideas and standards for which Britain stands” (Welch, 1989, p. 225). During the 
first months of occupation the content of newspapers was guided by Directives issued 
to British officers. According to the Directive of May 12, 1945 “common 
responsibility for Nazi Crimes” was to dominate the way in which information was 
presented (cited in Balfour, 1987, p. 32). In accordance with the directive Germans 





of June 8 called for a clear distinction between active and passive guilt where the latter 
would be “atoned for by hard work, restitution and a change of heart” (quoted in 
Balfour, 1987, p. 32). According to Balfour the ISC attempted to produce “a Germany 
which was a free and a responsible society” by disseminating information regarding 
Nazi war crimes and cruelties, up-to-date reports relating to the Nuremberg trials and 
presenting the consequences of their war in other countries (Balfour, 1987, p. 30).  
Welch’s detailed study on British re-education policy provides some valuable 
information regarding the policy pursued by the ISC branch of the Control 
Commission. According to Welch the ISC employed both collective responsibility and 
collective guilt to achieve its aims in an interchangeable fashion. To demonstrate this 
he cites Major Alec Bishop’s (head of PR/ISC in 1945) decision “to emphasize 
German war guilt as long as it was considered psychologically desirable” (1989, p. 
221). Both Welch and Balfour recognize that the desire to keep a clear distinction 
between collective responsibility and collective guilt was not met in practice.  
It is important to note that the policy pursued by the ISC and that relating to the re-
education of German educationists was in accordance with the SHAEFF educational 
technical manual which called for re-education to be undertaken by Germans for 
Germans. After the initial period of occupation, the ISC allowed papers to be run by 
Germans instead of British officers by retaining control over what was published. 
Germans were given a license to publish and had strict guidelines to adhere to in 








Figure7. Interconnections of elements defining British Paternalism in Germany 
The above diagram provides an illustration of how British paternalism was part of 
discourses and practices during Germany’s reconstruction. Benevolence was 
expressed in the manner in which policies were executed. Although originally the 
British government had a certain preference for punishing the Germans, that was not 
the policy followed on the ground. Cooperation was the way in which reconstruction 
efforts proceeded. Especially in the area of education, it was a process of personal 
relations. In discourses, benevolence was not as clearly articulated as in other cases 
analyzed. Here it took on a more general expression. It was for the good of Europe as 
a whole. Obligation, duty and responsibility were in a first instance a result of the 
Potsdam Agreement. The British government felt obligated to act and proceed with 
the reconstruction of Germany because it signed the Agreement. Second, it related 
very much to democracy and Britain’s values, its own track record with democracy.  
Third, those feelings were also fueled by the need to protect Europe and ensure its 
security and order within the region. As one of the victors of WWII and its position in 
the world, this task, it was felt, fell on Britain. The element of protection also makes 
itself visible here albeit being more about helping and supervising. Helping and 





primarily about controlling the Germans. In terms of representation, for the most part 
the Germans were depicted as “the other”. Primarily this rested on the conviction that 
what was wrong with the Germans was a result of a fault in their national character. 
However, as pointed out before proximity with the Germans did soften this belief. 
Additionally, with time but also with depictions of the massive suffering of Germans 
after the war there seems to have been a softening of attitudes. Nevertheless, the 
articulation of British superiority was a constant throughout efforts to reconstruct 
Germany. 
7.4 The Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation: 1963-66 
The previous section concentrated on an instance of British interventionism towards a 
European country during the first few years after the end of WWII. This section will 
focus on the 1960s. During the 1960s Britain was engaged on multiple fronts. 
Decolonization was still underway and it was now the turn of Britain’s African 
colonies to gain independence. In addition Britain’s attention was also on Far East 
Asia, where its colonies were also on the road to achieving independence. It was a 
matter of reconciling decolonization with British influence and geostrategic 
advantage. Britain attempted to keep her bases in Far East Asia so as to ensure order 
and security and stand against Communism in that region. Further, Britain during the 
1960s also attempted to join the EEC twice (1963, 1967) but was blocked by France. 
With all this in mind this section will proceed with the investigation of a sphere of 
older influence. Unlike Germany, Malaysia was, prior to its independence in 1957, a 
British colony. 
7.4.1 Background 
The roots of Indonesia’s Confrontation policy against Malaysia lay in the formation 
of the Malaysian Federation, which was to comprise Malaya, the Crown colony of 
Singapore and the Borneo territories of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo (Tuck, 





their demands for seeking further the opinion of the peoples of North Borneo delayed 
the establishment of the Federation from August to September 1963. The British 
position for the need of the Federation rested on attaining two objectives. The first 
related to the need to contain communism. The percentage of Chinese in Singapore, 
Borneo and Sarawak was significant. Establishing the Federation, it was thought, 
would make it possible to ensure that the Chinese would remain a minority in 
population and in political representation (Kahin, 1964). The second involved securing 
peace and stability in the region. 
The confrontation was a low-intensity guerilla war (Jones, 2001) primarily focusing 
on the borders between Indonesian Borneo, Sarawak and Sabah. During the 
confrontation, which lasted from April 1963 to August 1966, Indonesia employed 
various diplomatic and military pressures against Malaysia (Subritzky, 2000). The 
military side of confrontation involved cross-border raids, terrorism, insurgency and 
subversion (Tuck, 2013). Britain and its Commonwealth partners New Zealand and 
Australia went to aid in defending Malaysia. The main political actors in the 
Confrontation were Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Subandrio, its President Achmed 
Sukarno and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tunku Rahman. The military side of 
Indonesia’s Confrontation began in April 1963 and slowly escalated. In January 1964 
mediation attempts took place between the parties involved led by Robert Kennedy as 
US special presidential envoy, which concluded in a cease-fire (Llewelyn, 2006).   
The cease-fire was meant to allow a UN mission to enquire whether the people of both 
Sabah and Sarawak wished to be part of the Malaysian Federation. The enquiry 
concluded that the people wished to be part of it (Gregorian, 1991). Regrettably the 
cease-fire was broken by Indonesia in the following months. The peak of the escalation 
was said to be between August and September 1964 when Indonesia attempted both 
seaborne and airborne landings on mainland Malaysia (Gregorian, 1991). In 1965 
Singapore took the decision to secede from the Federation following political tensions 
(Tuck, 2013). Shortly thereafter, Indonesia experienced a coup d’état led by a group 
of leftist military officers (Llewelyn, 2006). In April 1966 the Malik-Razak meeting 





crisis officially came to an end with the signature of the peace treaty in Bangkok on 
11 August 1966 through which Indonesia recognized Malaysia as a legitimate state 
(Subritzky, 2000).  
7.4.2 British Responses to Indonesia’s Confrontation 1963-65 
Britain’s policy vis-à-vis the military aspect of Confrontation against Indonesia, which 
lasted from April 1963 to early 1966, was both defensive and offensive. Although 
Britain undertook an offensive line of policy with cross-border raids in mid-to-late 
1964 its overall policy and stance were considered defensive. In line with a defensive 
posture, British personnel were helping the Malaysian military to counter the 
Indonesian threat in various ways at the borders of Sarawak and Sabah in North 
Borneo. British troops had the following tasks: defend the border, identify and defeat 
Indonesian incursions, and reassure the local population (Tuck, 2013). British aid in 
the defence of Malaysia also included the reinforcement of troops stationed in other 
areas usually occurring after an escalation in Confrontation tactics and frequency 
coming from Indonesia. In essence British personnel were to counter and not instigate 
any attacks. According to Mathew Jones’s (2001) analysis of the Confrontation the 
policy of British policy-makers consisted of standing up to “the bully”.  
Additionally British personnel were involved in leaflet dropping in the Borneo jungle 
in 1965. As described by Mr Haley, Secretary of State for Defence, in response to a 
question in the House of Commons, “From time to time the security forces in Eastern 
Malaysia assist the civil authorities by distributing leaflets as part of a joint campaign 
to warn the local population against Indonesian infiltration tactics” (HC Deb 12 May 
1965, c70W). This brings forward another aspect of the campaign which involved 
winning the “Hearts and Minds” of the native population in Borneo, part of Major 
General Walker’s strategy in that territory as commander of the security forces. His 
strategy also included working closely with civil and police powers and intelligence 
gathering (Gregorian, 1991). The nature of British policies is well summarized by Mr 
Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, who in response to a 





December 1963 stated that “British forces were being made available to support in 
combating Indonesian intervention in Sarawak, and Sabah” (HC Deb 05 December 
1963, cc1335). 
During the summer of 1964 following Indonesian attempts to reach mainland 
Malaysia by sea and air Britain shifted to a more proactive policy against aggressions 
committed by the Indonesian military (Llewelyn, 2006). This policy was offensive in 
nature and involved cross-border raids into Indonesian Borneo. In response to military 
pressure by Indonesia on the frontier in Borneo the Cabinet in Britain took the decision 
to sanction counter-battery fire against Indonesian gun and mortar positions. Hot 
pursuit across the border was also practiced up to a distance of 3,000 yards which itself 
became extended gradually to 10,000 in the span of a few months. These cross-border 
raids were codenamed CLARET. They were deniable cross-border operations in the 
jungle under the command of General Walker and targeted Indonesian bases (Tuck, 
2004).  
In nature these practices can be seen as encapsulating the concept of protection. It was 
about pushing the enemy away and defending a territory against aggression. It was a 
collaborative effort of the governments of Malaysia, Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand. Throughout, the actions described above demonstrate that Britain was 
essentially protecting the territorial integrity of Malaysia. It concerned the physical 
protection of the people and of the territory. It was not about protecting them from 
themselves but rather from a very real threat, Indonesia. It could be argued that these 
defensive practices in Malaysia displayed benevolence. The military was lending a 
hand to its Commonwealth partner and worked alongside it. These remarks and 
observations also apply to the offensive part of operations sanctioned by the British 
Cabinet. Defense and self-defense was the main objective, which reflects the majority 
of actions undertaken by the British military and its partners.  
Urgency was a feeling conveyed consistently by the media, the British government 
and Parliamentarians. Newspaper articles covering the Confrontation delivered this 





aggressive acts undertaken by the Indonesian regular and irregular armies. For 
instance the Guardian wrote in May 8, 1964 that “Sukarno’s saboteurs and terrorists 
in Singapore and Borneo are doing their best – although not a very good – to intimidate 
the local population” (The Guardian, May 8 1964). In September 13th 1964 the 
Observer published an article which read “more British troops, ships and weapons 
have been rushed to Malaysia to counter guerilla raids which have now spread from 
Borneo to mainland Malaysia.” (The Observer, 13 September 1964). The imminence 
of another attack or the escalation of the situation was also called for by newspapers 
covering unfolding events in Malaysia. Some were even describing the situation as a 
war. During the Confrontation, headlines in British newspapers read “Border-line 
war”; “Our War in Asia” (The Guardian 1964; The Observer 1964). 
The need for British involvement in the defence of Malaysia and the need for further 
reinforcement of the troops were justified in a number of ways in Parliament. The most 
recurring were the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Treaty of 1957 and Malaysia’s position 
as a Commonwealth member. There was agreement in the House among all parties 
that Britain had to defend Malaysia from Indonesia. Britain portrayed itself as the 
protector of Commonwealth “partners” and especially newly formed states like 
Malaysia. Obligation was the most common term employed to characterize the need 
for British involvement. In responding to a question regarding why British men are 
sent abroad the Prime Minister stated that “We have an obligation to Malaysia and we 
have a more unwritten obligation to members of the Commonwealth who ask for our 
help” (HC Deb 17 June 1964, c1321).  In conjunction with these justifications it is 
possible to observe in British discourses regarding British military support in Malaysia 
reference to Britain’s role in sustaining international order and peace in South East 
Asia. In a Lords Debate Lord Carrington stated that “The Queen’s speech also tells us 
that the Government will continue their efforts to provide peace and stability in South 
East Asia” (HL Deb 14 November 1963, c129).  
Within British discourses differentiation is also apparent. The manner in which 
Malaysia and Indonesia were represented set them apart from Britain and also 





different to the British conception of “the self” but did not occupy the same space on 
the continuum where “the self” and “the other” reside. On the one side Malaysia was 
seen as vulnerable and fragile and consequently as needing and indeed seeking help. 
The Guardian stressed in May 8th 1964 that “not a single deliberately aggressive action 
has Malaysia offered against Indonesia so far” (The Guardian May 8th 1964, p). The 
terms employed to describe what was happening and the insistence on identifying 
Malaysia as victim and Indonesia as aggressor is an example of how this was 
accomplished. Newspaper articles and arguments in Parliamentary Debates stressed 
how Malaysia was being aggressed by Indonesia by giving details of specific 
instances.  
Although the act of asking for help from the Malaysian Government was necessary 
for any British involvement as per the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, it 
nevertheless figured in discourse as a manner to accentuate Britain’s role and further 
accentuate Malaysia’s representation as a victim. A good example of this is Mr. 
Bottomley’s response to a question relating to Indonesian aggression where he stated 
that “Malaysia and Singapore are exposed to Indonesian aggression and seek our 
assistance to meet that aggression” (HC Deb 02 November 1965, cc135-36 W).  In 
addition Malaysia was seen as unable to deal with her situation on her own. Writing 
to Macmillan, Selkirk (14 June 1963) voiced that “The Malayans themselves have 
discovered the complete inadequacy of their own defence without British support. To 
let them down now would be to change their whole relationship with the UK and quite 
probably, allow in forms of government which are wholly alien to the present leaders 
in Malaya” (cited in Jones, 2001, p149). Coinciding with this line of reasoning the 
Guardian wrote a year later about the Malaysian army that it “is new, inexperienced 
and still limited to eight battalions” (The Guardian 8th May 1964). 
On the other side, Indonesia was identified as the aggressor and Sukarno its president 
as the evil in this affair. Since 1963 Sukarno was seen as displaying an antagonistic 
attitude against the formation of Malaysia (HL Deb 14 November 1963, c135). This 
is not only clear in British discourses but also in newspaper articles covering the 





Jones notes in his work on the Confrontation “the British were developing a personal 
fixation with the bellicose Indonesian President” (2001, p. 172). The media described 
him as “a vain and ambitious man” and argued that “his aggressive tactics are 
indefensible” (The Observer, 13th September 1964). More generally the media made 
sure to clarify in all instances where negotiations were taking place that their failure 
was a result of President Sukarno not agreeing to terms and put stress on his aggressive 
attitude. For instance in January 1964 the Times wrote that Indonesia “was unwilling 
to stop supporting guerilla raids into North Borneo” (The Times, January 11, 1964).  
The representation of Malaysia as the victim and Indonesia as the aggressor was 
further intensified by comparisons between the two. Some comparisons focused on 
the type of government each possessed. For instance, Mr. David Mitchell (MP for 
Basingstoke) argued in a Commons debate on Defence that “The contest between 
Malaysia and Indonesia presents the classic example in history of the giant dictatorship 
and the small democracy” (HC Deb 23 November 1964, c958). Others made a point 
to bring forward a positive image of Indonesia in terms of its general character and its 
stance during the Confrontation.  In a Commons debate on July 19 1965 Sir Charles 
Mott-Radclyffe described Malaysia as “a newly independent country…with no 
aggressive intentions” and as a country which did “nothing wrong” (HC Deb 19 July 
1965 c1183). Malaysia was also differentiated from Indonesia as an “example of 
human welfare and racial cooperation” (HC Deb 17 June 1964, c1290). Through these 
representations it is possible to discern how Malaysia and Indonesia did not inhabit 
the same position on the continuum of “the self” and “the other”. By differentiating 
Malaysia from Indonesia in more positive terms based on democracy and character, it 
could be argued that Malaysia was seen as closer to “the self”. 
Further, a look at British justifications in discourses on Malaysia’s defence also reveals 
their benevolent character. On the whole British Parliamentarians agreed that it was 
an issue of helping Malaysia. Mr Denis Healey argued that what they were doing in 
Malaysia constituted “a human responsibility” (HC Deb 17 June 1964, c1290). On 
similar lines Mr Paget in defending the help given to Malaysia in a Commons debate 





idea of fighting for Malaysia was still voiced in parliamentary debates. Sir Charles 
Mott-Radclyffe argued in a Foreign Affairs debate that “we are fighting a battle for 
the freedom of Malaysia” (HC Deb 19 July 1965, c1183). Taking these arguments 
together helps bring forward how for many but not all British engagement in the 
Confrontation, the addition of troops and the aid in military defence were undertaken 
in order for Malaysia to gain its territorial integrity and be free.  
In discussing the benevolent element identified in British discourse during the 
Confrontation it is equally important to have a look at the overall context in which this 
British military intervention took place. In congruence with the majority of Britain’s 
military interventions during this period the national interest and strategic 
considerations played a part. It is quite impossible to find a case in which Britain 
intervened and had no interests whatsoever. It is only logical given the context in 
which these interventions were taking place. The case of Malaysia is no exception.  
Britain’s interest in the Confrontation in Malaysia was partly motivated by her base in 
Singapore. Wider political and military interests were at stake. Fundamental was the 
prevalent Whitehall assumption that Britain was, and should remain, a global power. 
A significant British military presence in Southeast Asia was one means of 
consolidating this idea of partnership with the Americans. By contributing to the 
containment of communism in the region, Britain was able to present its bona fides to 
the United States as a dependable senior ally in the Western alliance (Subritzky, 2000, 






7.4.3 Summary  
 
Figure 7 Interconnections of elements defining paternalism in Malyasia 
An overview of discourses and practices relating to Indonesia’s policy of 
Confrontation against Malaysia brings to the surface all elements I have identified in 
previous chapters as core characteristics of British paternalism. Benevolence can first 
be seen in the type of practices undertaken by the British military sent to Malaysia. 
Their benevolence rests in that they were carried out for the defence of the territory 
against aggression. Discourses voiced in Parliament focused on concepts such as 
freedom, altruism, helping etc. According to this the policy of the British government 
and its military personnel was fighting for Malaysia for the future of a young country. 
The British military sent to Malaysia was working tirelessly for the defence of 
Malaysia’s territorial integrity. Duty was not a term employed in discourses pertaining 
to Malaysia, however, obligation was. This feeling of obligation was seen as due to 
the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Treaty of 1957 and to the Commonwealth link binding 
the two countries. Both were overwhelmingly employed in order to call for protective 
action on behalf of Malaysia.  
Protection is also visible in both practices and discourses during the Confrontation. 
Britain was supporting its Commonwealth ally by providing troops when necessary 
for the defence of its borders (patrolling, fighting incursions). In this case protection 





Concurring with this, discourses equalled protection with defence. It was not about 
developing the country but rather about defending it from physical danger. The last 
element, which refers to difference/incompetence, was also present. There were two 
ways the British practiced differentiation. The first involved differentiating between 
the British and the Malaysian government and the other between the Malaysians and 
Indonesians.  
The Malaysians were seen as “the other” because they were seeking aid and as such 
were seen unable to deal with the developing situation on their own. Their military 
capabilities more than their mental capabilities were the reason for this conception. 
The second was a differentiation between the Malaysians and Indonesians where the 
former were “the victim” and the latter “the aggressor”. Representations putting an 
accent on the democratic government of Malaysia did move it further from 
conceptions of “the other” and closer to “the self”. All these manners of differentiation 
can be seen as pushing for action by Britain but also as reinforcing the feeling of 
obligation towards them. 
7.5 The Kosovo Intervention of 1999: Operation Allied Force  
The case of the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation analysed above permitted to 
demonstrate the persistence of British paternalism during the 1960s. The following 
two decades were characterised by a relative decline in hostilities between the East 
and the West. Appeasement defined the relations between the US and the USSR. 
During the 1970s Britain finally managed to join the EEC and completed its 
withdrawal East of Suez. This section will move my investigation from the 1960s to 
the Post-Cold War era.   
7.5.1 Interpretation by the Empirical Literature  
The NATO-led Kosovo intervention is part of a number of Post-Cold war cases cited 
in the empirical literature looking at humanitarian interventions. Among the examples 





without explicit UNSC authorization for humanitarian ends and because the chosen 
method of intervention was bombing. As such it is employed by many scholars in 
order to investigate questions of legitimacy and legality when it comes to humanitarian 
interventions. Investigations focusing on the legitimacy of this intervention base 
themselves on certain principles that define legitimate interventions such as 
proportionality, necessity, use of force as last resort and a positive humanitarian 
outcome. Basing his analysis on these determinants Wheeler concludes that Kosovo 
is not a good model of humanitarian intervention (2000).  
However, he also notes that “the international reaction to the Kosovo case marks a 
watershed in the society of states and that we should expect to see it exhibiting a new 
solidarity in response to any future cases where states intervene to end atrocities 
without UNSC authorization” (Wheeler 2000, p. 297). Coming from a legal 
perspective, Teson argues that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was justified (Tesón, 
2003). Equally, Farer sees the Kosovo intervention as ethically and legally premised 
on massive violations of human rights (2003). A majority of scholars accept that the 
Kosovo intervention fulfilled requirements of “just cause” but failed to fulfil the other 
requirements (Morris, 2004). Aside from looking at the legality and legitimacy of the 
Kosovo intervention, scholars employ it to bring forth how interventions in the 1990s 
are different from previous ones conducted. 
In a first instance Kosovo is seen as demonstrating a new activism on behalf of the 
UN Security Council in employing its Chapter VII powers into issues that used to be 
considered as matters internal to a state (Chesterman, 2000; Finnemore, 2003; 
Wheeler, 2000; Weiss, 2012). It demonstrates how internal matters became labelled 
as “threats to international peace and security”. In a second instance Kosovo is seen 
as an example where justifications for the use of force contained humanitarian 
elements whether being about human rights or to avert crimes against humanity 
(Finnemore, 2003; Roberts, 1999; Wheeler 2004; Weiss, 2012). Despite this, scholars 
such as Roberts and Mayall (1999; 2000) also argue that Kosovo was not purely 
justified on humanitarian considerations. For Mayall it consisted of a mixture of 





to showcase a shift in who is protected. According to Finnemore post-1945 
interventions are directed towards non-whites, non-Christians and non-Europeans 
moving away from religiously motivated interventions (2003). As such her argument 
is based on the idea that the humanity worth protecting has expanded due to normative 
changes. 
7.5.2 Background  
The story of Kosovo had its roots in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and events there 
were influenced by the incidents in Bosnia in the early 1990s and the Dayton 
agreement. The territory is constituted by a majority Albanian population (90%) and 
a minority of Serbs, Romani, Bosniaks, Turks and others. Both Kosovo Albanians and 
Serb authorities claimed exclusive rights to the territory. Kosovo Albanians called for 
independence whereas Serb authorities wanted Kosovo to be constitutionally part of 
Serbia (Calic, 2000). The situation in Kosovo deteriorated on 28 February 1998 when 
Serb security forces led by Slobodan Milosevic took violent action against the KLA 
(Kosovo Liberation Army) (Morris, 2004). Civilian casualties and displacements of 
population resulted from these clashes. In response, on March 31, 1998 the UN 
Security Council adopted resolution 1160 under Chapter VII, which condemned the 
actions of the security forces and those of the KLA, a paramilitary underground force 
(Morris, 2004). Milosevic justified the actions undertaken by the Serb Security forces 
against the KLA as a response against terrorism.  
During the summer of 1998 Serb forces instigated another wave of attacks on Kosovo 
Albanians. In September NATO threatened air strikes in an attempt to put a halt to 
human rights abuses and push for negotiations (Morris, 2004). Additionally, on 23 
September the UNSC adopted resolution 1199 according to which hostilities should 
cease, and urged both Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to 
improve the humanitarian situation (Morris, 2004). These resolutions were 
accompanied by diplomatic efforts to put an end to the fighting. Negotiations 
culminated with the October 15-18, 1998 Holbrooke Agreement with Milosevic, 





monitors, and NATO aerial verification (Roberts, 1999). However, the slaughter of 
Kosovo Albanians by Serb security forces in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999 
ended the Holbrook Agreement (Roberts, 1999). NATO’s threat of force since 
September 1998 became a reality on 24 March 1999, marking the beginning of the 11-
week NATO bombing campaign against the FRY, entitled Operation Allied Force 
(Roberts, 1999). The NATO bombing campaign ended with the 10 June 1999 
settlement (Roberts, 1999).  
7.5.3 Condemning Actions in Kosovo - Milosevic and the KLA 
The condemnation of violence in Kosovo can be seen as part of a set of actions taken 
by the UNSC urged by The Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia23 of which 
Britain was a member. The UNSC condemned the situation in Kosovo on 31 March 
1998 through Resolution 1160. The resolution imposed an arms embargo and 
condemned “the excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians” and 
“terrorist acts by the KLA” (UN SC 1160). In practice, the condemnation of violence 
and the sanctions imposed can be seen as protective in nature. The main objective was 
to put a stop to the fighting between the Serb Security forces and the KLA in order to 
prevent further civilian casualties through diplomatic means. Indeed, the resolution 
also called for the withdrawal of special police units and a stop to actions taken by 
Serb security forces that affected civilians. Other sanctions imposed upon Belgrade 
included a ban on visas for senior members of authorities in Belgrade and a freeze on 
credits for investment by the Serbian government.  
Prior to the UNSC’s condemnation of actions in Kosovo, acts committed in the 
territory were the subject of debates in the Houses of Parliament in Britain. Both the 
British government and members of Parliament unanimously condemned the atrocities 
committed against the civilian population. From the start the Kosovo Albanians were 
identified as the main target of violence and hence the group needing protection. Both 
the Serb security forces and the KLA were seen as the culprits. This was conveyed by 
                                                 





Robin Cook the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in his 
statement in the House of Lords on March 10, 1998 arguing that “Belgrade cannot 
claim that such extra-judicial killings are a purely internal matter. The international 
community has a legitimate right and a duty to condemn such gross violations of 
human rights”. In relation to KLA actions he stated that “We strongly condemn the 
use of violence for political objectives, including the terrorism of the self-styled 
Kosovo Liberation Army. But terrorism cannot be used as the pretext for 
indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population” (HL Deb 10 March 1998, 
c128). Apart from identifying the two parties at fault for the suffering incurred by 
civilians this statement also brought forward that human rights were threatened. 
Additionally, it stressed that the actions of the Serb Security Forces were an 
international concern and not merely an internal matter. 
All MPs present in the debate of March 10th unanimously condemned the violence in 
Kosovo and backed diplomatic efforts undertaken by Britain and the Contact Group, 
the EU and the UN. The condemnation of both parties resulted in representing them 
as the complete opposite to “the self”. The Serb government was seen as violating 
human rights, a sacred principle of European states. Despite this, discourses in the 
Commons did leave a window open for the possibility that the FRY could in the future 
be part of Europe and its democratic nations. The plight of the Kosovo Albanians was 
contained in discourses regarding the condemnation of atrocities. They were discussed 
in terms of victimhood and referred consistently to their suffering. Statistics were the 
most employed method in Parliament, in the press but also in official speeches by the 
British government to convey the extent of the problem and the need to act. For 
example Cook argued in the Lords on March 10th that “The security operations around 
Dreniza in the past week appear to have left at least 80 people dead…Of the 51 corpses 
released yesterday by the Serb police, less than half are believed to have been men of 
military age. The local press report that 12 were children, 13 were women and 4 were 





7.5.4 The Threat of Using Force  
From May onwards the Serb security forces continued their violent and repressive 
operations, which escalated during the summer of 1998. Responding to a KLA 
offensive the Serb Security Forces intensified their attacks on ethnic Albanians. In 
view of this the UNSC passed resolution 1199 on September 23rd 1998. With this 
resolution the UNSC drew attention to the gravity of the situation, to civilian 
casualties, to the many displaced persons and refugees. The UNSC also stated that it 
was “Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation 
throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe” (UNSC 
Resolution 1199).  The next day NATO warned of air strikes if the Serb security forces 
did not put an end to the fighting. As the situation deteriorated further NATO approved 
an activation order on October 13, 1998, which permitted preparations for a limited 
bombing campaign (Hodge, 2006). On the 24th of October of the same year the 
International Contact Group comprising Britain among others secured UNSC 
Resolution 1203 under Chapter VII, “determining that there was a threat to regional 
peace and security and that there was an imminent humanitarian catastrophe” (cited in 
Keohane, 2000, p. 79). 
The need to take action in the form of threatening with the use of force was voiced in 
British Parliamentary debates consistently at various times since the fighting first 
intensified in February 1998. Within these debates it is possible to observe how the 
Kosovar Albanians were identified as victims. One way this was done was by focusing 
on their current but also previous oppression. A good example of this is Baroness 
Ludford’s statement in a House of Lords debate on October 12th where she argued that 
“the sad fact is that all this comes against a background of a decade of human rights 
violations against the ethnic Albanian population who make up the 90% of Kosovo’s 
population” (HL Deb 12 October 1998, c753). Similarly, The Lord Bishop of Hereford 
argued that “The story of Kosovo is a story of nearly 10 years of sustained and 
systematic bullying of the 90 per cent Albanian population by the 10 per cent. Serb 






The representation of Kosovo Albanians as victims and as suffering greatly was also 
displayed in discourses through the use of statistics. The numbers of people killed and 
displaced were cited in debates frequently. As Baroness Symons of Verham Dean 
stated in the same October debate “The excessive actions of the security forces in 
Kosovo and their acts of wanton destruction of people's homes and livelihood have 
forced 300,000 people—more than 15 per cent of the population—to flee their homes” 
(HL Deb 12 October 1998, c774). This does not only bring forward an image of the 
Kosovo Albanians as suffering, as victims but also conveys the sheer level of atrocities 
and the need to do something to protect them or act on their behalf. Further, 
justifications offered in favour of threatening force focused on Milosevic and the Serb 
security forces. The behaviour of the Serbian security forces was seen as “intolerable”, 
pushing for the need to threaten force. “Ethnic cleansing” was the term used to 
characterise what Milosevic and the Serb security forces were doing. As Baroness 
Ludford stated in a Lords debate “President Milosevic is engaged not only in brutal 
repression of his own citizens but also in indiscriminate violence amounting to ethnic 
cleansing” (HL Deb 12 October 1998, c753).  
Although military action was not on the table quite yet, Parliamentarians voiced the 
need for it and especially for the use of ground troops, which they framed as “a 
humanitarian necessity” on the grounds of human rights violations and in terms of 
saving lives. If an intervention took place it would be for the people. As Cook argued 
on October 19th “If we are obliged to take action we shall do so on behalf of the people 
of Kosovo and in particular to ensure that they can have democratically elected 
politicians” (HC Deb 19 October 1998, c963). Additionally the use of force was 
justified by a need to protect the Kosovar Albanians from Milosevic who was seen as 
“a national and an international menace”. On that The Earl of Carlisle argued in a 
Lords debate that “his hands and those of his henchmen are dripping with blood. He 
has to be deterred from the use of force. I would welcome the use of airstrikes, 
followed by the use of ground forces, to protect the people of Kosovo” (HL Deb 12 
October 1998, c768).  In view of the situation unfolding in Kosovo parliamentarians 





watch. Such stance was accentuated by framing the situation in Kosovo as 
“increasingly dangerous”, “extremely dangerous” and as a “matter of deepening 
concern”.  
7.5.5 The Use of Force: Operation Allied Force  
The use of force materialised in Kosovo on 24 March 1999 when NATO conducted 
an air-strike campaign against the Serb Security forces, which lasted for eleven weeks. 
During that time NATO flew around 40,000 sorties. It was a tactical campaign against 
the Serb forces responsible for killings and expulsion of citizens (Daalder and 
O’Hanlon, 2000). As stated by George Robertson’s briefing of March 25th the 
objective was “to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe by disrupting the 
violent attacks currently being carried out by the Yugoslav security forces against the 
Kosovar Albanians and to limit their ability to conduct such repression in the future” 
(The Guardian, 25 March, 1999). Support for the use of force in Kosovo and for the 
use of ground troops was voiced by British Parliamentarians and by the British 
government since the summer of 1998. The continuing violence against civilians and 
the breakdown of diplomatic talks pushed the decision for NATO air strikes. The 
Rambouillet Peace Conference reached a deadlock when the Serbian government 
refused to sign the peace agreement (Schnabel and Thakur, 2000). NATO air strikes 
were employed as a way to bring Milosevic back to the negotiations so as to bring a 
solution to the situation and protect the ethnic Albanian population (Daalder and 
O’Hanlon, 2000). 
Debates in Parliament on the use of force focused on the legality and legitimacy of 
such a course of action. Those in favour justified the use of force through concepts 
such as humanity and human rights. It was also done by putting an accent on the level 
of humanitarian tragedy, on the devastation caused to people and property and on the 
duty of certain states to act in such circumstances. Cook’s statement in the House of 
Commons a day after the air-strike campaign began is a good example of the way in 
which British discourse for action was constructed. In explaining why air strikes took 





The solid basis for that unity is our common revulsion at the violent repression 
that we witness in Kosovo. Since March last year, well over 400,000 people in 
Kosovo have at some point been driven from their homes. That is about a fifth 
of the total population. In Britain, the equivalent would be over 10 million 
people. We have seen villages shelled, crops burned and farm animals 
slaughtered—not for any legitimate military purpose, but as acts of ethnic 
hatred. (HC Deb 25 March 1999, c536)  
Here again the use of statistics is apparent in order to convey the tragedy of the 
Kosovar Albanians. Through this they are depicted as incurring immense suffering, 
being victims of a relentless oppression and the victims of violence unable to protect 
themselves in any way.  
The incident in the village in Racak in January 1999 where 45 people were killed was 
also part of the many incidents that took place since 1998 documented in justifications 
offered for the use of force in Kosovo. Parliamentarians in justifying the air-strikes 
made a reference to television shots of the situation on the ground. For example. 
Michael Howard (Folkestone and Hythe) argued in a Commons debate that “There 
can be no doubt that what we have seen in Kosovo is a humanitarian crisis. Who can 
forget the television pictures of massacres, such as that at Racak?” (HC Deb 25 March 
1999, c542). In conjunction with this came a discourse focusing on duty, morality and 
the protection of the Kosovar Albanians. In the same debate Mr Livingstone said: “It 
is the duty of the nations that have the military power to protect individual 
communities from systematic genocide by evil regimes. Milosevic is not a democrat” 
(HC Deb 25 March 1999, c573). The Serb security forces and Milosevic in particular 
were depicted in the most negative terms, seen as primarily responsible for the tragic 
turn of events in Kosovo. Milosevic was described as a ruthless oppressor, as someone 
who chooses violence over dialogue. George Robertson, the UK Defence Secretary, 
writing in the News of the World drew similarities between Milosevic and Hitler. He 





Indeed news coverage of the atrocities committed in Kosovo can be seen as 
accentuating the need to act, the need to protect the civilian population. In relation to 
the Racak massacre the Guardian published an article on January 17th 1999 entitled 
“The village that died when the butchers came at dawn” (The Guardian, 17 January 
1999). Aside from constituting part of justifications for action by Parliamentarians and 
the British government, the media can also be seen as one way through which British 
public support for the operation was gained. The Guardian published an article on June 
1st 1999 showcasing British public support. According to the article British support 
for military action against Serbia was 54% in favour (BBC, 28 March 1999). In 
discussing British poll results regarding British and NATO action over Kosovo it is 
important to highlight that different polls display different percentages. Despite this in 
all published polls the percentage of those in favour always surpassed those against 
military action in Kosovo.   
Tony Blair’s well-documented Chicago Speech delivered in April 1999 is another 
good illustration to show the way in which the use of force was justified in the case of 
Kosovo. According to the empirical literature this speech is seen as heralding “a 
doctrine of the international community”. For Blair the humanitarian war in Kosovo 
was “a just war based not on any territorial ambitions but on values”: “We cannot let 
the evil of ethnic cleansing stand” (Tony Blair 24/4/1999). In a certain way the feeling 
of duty and responsibility was fuelled by values, by the need to uphold human rights. 







Figure 8  Interconnections of elements defining British Paternalism in Kosovo. 
The above diagram serves to illustrate how paternalism manifested itself in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse during the NATO Kosovo intervention. It also 
aids in illuminating the interconnections between the four elements constituting 
British paternalism during the different phases of the conflict covered. Benevolence is 
identifiable in the diplomatic and military measures deployed since March 1998. The 
condemnation of atrocities, the threat of use of force against the FRY and the NATO 
air-strike campaign were justified as undertaken on the behalf of the Kosovo 
Albanians and for their protection. 
The element of obligation and duty is discernible in a number of ways. First, it can be 
seen as emanating from Britain’s position as a NATO member, a member of the 
UNSC, a member of the Contact Group and from holding the EU presidency from 
January to June 1998. Additionally the feelings of obligation, duty and responsibility 
can be seen as arising from vivid representations of the appalling situation in Kosovo, 
which was an issue of human rights violations. Human rights were seen as values of 
immense importance characterising the conduct of democratic states. Because 
Milosevic and the Serb security forces were violating the human rights of the citizens, 





responsibility was framed in discourses as that of the international community that 
Britain was a part of.  
Protection in Kosovo was seen in terms of physical protection but also in terms of 
protecting values. The threat of use of force and the air strikes were represented as 
protective actions in an attempt to stop killings but also displacements of the 
population. Discourses on protection were fuelled in majority by representing the 
Kosovar Albanians as victims and as unable to respond to what is being done to them. 
Also calls to protection were justified by labelling the situation as “ethnic cleansing” 
and portraying Milosevic as ruthless, evil and an oppressor. Difference and 
incompetence were also an important part of the intervention in Kosovo. What is 
visible in British discourses are three separate sets of representation. The first relates 
to the Kosovar Albanian population, which was represented as the victim and as 
unable to react. The second relates to the KLA who were seen as terrorists and as part 
of the problem in Kosovo. What is crucial to point out is that although the KLA were 
represented as “the other” because of terrorism they were not as negatively represented 
as Milosevic and the Serb security forces. In fact attention focused predominantly on 
Milosevic and the Serb Security Forces. The group most differentiated from the self 
was Milosevic and the Serb security forces because they were violating human rights, 





7.6 Comparing Events: British Paternalism in Germany, 
Malaysia and Kosovo 
7.6.1 Representations 
 
Figure 9: British representations of people and countries on a continuum of “the self” and “the other”. 
The above figure provides a good illustration of the ways in which the British 
represented the countries and their people subject to intervention discussed in this 
chapter. In all three cases subject to a British intervention some parties and in some 
cases all parties were represented as constituting “the other”. During the reconstruction 
of Germany the British representation of the Germans as the other was based on a 
problem identified at the level of their character (aggressiveness). This otherness 
identified in Germans was also due to an inability on the part of the British to 
distinguish between being a Nazi and being a German. However with time, 
perceptions of Germans shifted towards a more lenient and even positive attitude due 
in most part to the suffering they were submitted to after the war. News of famine and 
devastation in Germany appealed to a portion of the British public.  
For these reasons the Germans are placed somewhere in the middle of the self-other 
continuum. The fact that Germany was part of Europe geographically and culturally 
and was seen as key to Europe’s problems (economically) could explain why they 
have secured a place on the continuum which is somewhat closer to conceptions of 
“the self” than of “the other”. It is important to highlight that British personnel on the 





reconstruction of their country. In contrast, the interventions in Malaysia 1963-66 and 
Kosovo 1999 bring forward another pattern of representation. In both, Britain 
intervened on behalf of one party as a response against the aggression of another. 
Practices of representation in these cases bring forward the existence of levels or types 
of otherness. In the case of Malaysia the British represented both the Malaysians and 
Indonesians as “the other”, as complete opposites to representations of the self. 
However, this otherness was based on contrasting grounds. Malaysia was depicted as 
“the other” because of its status as a victim and its inability to cope with the situation 
at hand. Its territorial integrity and freedom were threatened. Conversely, Indonesia 
was represented as the other because it was “the aggressor” in this particular situation. 
The British represented Indonesia in this manner by focusing almost exclusively on 
one man, President Sukarno, and his character. Although both Malaysia and Indonesia 
represented “the other”, the British also identified with Malaysians through 
democracy. As a result Malaysians are placed on the continuum between Germany 
and Indonesia.  
This pattern of a two-type otherness is also present in the case of Kosovo. The 
otherness of the Kosovar Albanians was premised on their depiction as victims by 
focusing on the level of tragedy and their suffering. The Serb Security Forces and the 
Serbian Government were represented as the other by being identified as the 
aggressive party. An additional similarity is the fixation of the British on one man, 
Slobodan Milosevic. Just like president Sukarno of Indonesia he was seen as evil, as 
a bully. The same pattern of identification observed towards Malaysians also applied 
to Kosovar Albanians. Their identification as victims ascribed a vulnerability to the 
Kosovo Albanians and called upon the British to protect them because they could not 
do it themselves. At the same time, however, the British also identified with them. In 
British eyes the Kosovo Albanians constituted a different kind of “other”. For this 
reason they are placed below the Malaysians and between the Germans and Serbs.   
What these cases have in common is that differentiation was based in part on character. 





conceptions of the self, brought forward in previous chapters. One can be seen as the 
self but not quite just as one can be seen as the other – a victim or an aggressor. As 
such, although both are identified as constituting the other, the one identified as the 
aggressor is the one seen as the complete opposite from the self. In all cases the way 
in which those subject to intervention were represented helped to intensify and justify 
the need for Britain to get involved, the policies pursued and also justified its presence. 
7.6.2 Discourses 
British discourses relating to the three cases reveal the presence of obligation/duty, 
protection, benevolence and difference/incompetence. In all three cases feelings of 
obligation and duty developed in relation to Britain’s perceived role on the 
international scene. Both in Germany and Malaysia Britain felt it had a duty and an 
obligation to maintain peace, security and democratic principles as well as containing 
communism. In Kosovo Britain’s role related to upholding values such as human 
rights. Feelings of obligation and duty were also connected to Agreements and Treaties 
Britain was a party to. In Germany and Malaysia Britain was bound by previous 
Agreements. Its involvement in the former was based on the Potsdam Agreement and 
in the latter on the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Conversely in Kosovo duty 
and obligation featured in relation to Britain as a NATO member, a permanent member 
of the UN Security Council and its EU presidency term during part of the Kosovo 
incident.  
The cases of Germany and Malaysia both display a trend in British interventions in 
the years 1945-1989. During this period, Britain primarily intervened in places where 
treaties or agreements were put in place (treaties of friendship; defence agreements). 
The manner of presenting or representing a situation, especially its gravity, was 
another way obligation and duty become visible in discourse. In Germany obligation 
and duty was fuelled by presenting the devastation and the food crisis taking place in 
the British zone. In Malaysia British policy-makers and the media consistently called 
for urgency in dealing with the Confrontation, which was presented as escalating or 





further accentuated by media coverage of the devastation putting an accent on human 
suffering and citing the number of dead and displaced. 
Within discourses relating to each case it is possible to observe benevolence. Despite 
being articulated in distinct ways it constituted part of justifications for the policies 
pursued. In justifying the need for threatening and using force policy-makers argued 
that they were doing so on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians and in response to human 
rights violations. Contrasting this, in discourses vis-à-vis the reconstruction of 
Germany and British involvement in Malaysia justifications took a more general 
approach. It was about securing peace and stability in a region (Europe, South-East 
Asia). Although justifications on the issue of sending troops to Malaysia focused in 
majority on more general considerations, concepts such as freedom and altruism did 
figure in some arguments articulated in Parliament. All three cases display similarities 
relating to the way in which the need for protection was justified. Despite the fact that 
protection meant something else in each case as will be discussed in the following 
section thoroughly the way it was articulated in discourse displays a convergence.  
Representing Malaysia and the Kosovar Albanians as “the other” pushed for calls to 
action, calls to protection. In both cases this translated into seeing them “as victims” 
of aggression unable to stand up to the bully on their own. What differentiated 
discourses of protection in the two cases was that discourses towards Malaysia focused 
on the protection or rather defence of a territory where as in Kosovo discourses 
focused on the suffering population. In the case of Germany, their representation as 
“the other” was employed not to justify protection in terms of physical protection but 
translated into protection from themselves. It was about re-education and providing 
them with personal responsibility. Britain was to help Germans enable them to develop 
on more acceptable lines (on democratic lines).  
7.6.3 Practices  
The objective of British policy and the nature of practices undertaken in all three cases 





of policies pursued in Germany, Malaysia and Kosovo were quite different. 
Convergence can be observed in the cases of Malaysia and Kosovo on the grounds 
that both were subject to military involvement and protection signified territorial or 
physical protection. It is important to note that although Germany was also subject to 
a military intervention, the period examined in this chapter addresses the 
reconstruction efforts after the war.  Hence, in the case of Germany protection tended 
to connote development. In essence in Malaysia and Kosovo more pronounced was 
protection from harm whereas in Germany it involved protection from themselves.  
The interventions in Malaysia and Kosovo share some points. The first is the military 
aspect of intervention and second the protective nature of practices undertaken. Other 
than these the cases are quite distinct from one another. For one, protection in Malaysia 
connoted the defence of its territory against aggression. This involved sending troops 
on the ground and naval ships in the area. Second, it concerned the territory more than 
the people. This of course could be owed to the fact that the situation in Malaysia was 
one of confrontation and not a full out war. It was a mixture of diplomatic and military 
measures. British troops patrolled borders, fought off incursions around the border in 
North Borneo and committed cross border operations during part of the episode. 
Effectively Britain was aiding in the defence of Malaysia. 
Conversely in the case of Kosovo Britain’s policy focused on the protection of people 
(Kosovar Albanians). They were protecting Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing 
and those who as a result had to flee. They were attempting to avert a growing 
humanitarian crisis. Britain was not acting alone in Kosovo, it took part in larger 
NATO operations. Practices in Kosovo involved diplomatic and military measures. 
First Britain condemned the practices of both parties committing violence (the KLA 
and the Serb Security Forces). Second, as violence against the Kosovo Albanians 
continued Britain along with its NATO allies threatened Slobodan Milosevic with the 
use of force which the finally employed in the form of air-strikes. These air-strikes 
targeted the base of operations of the Serb Security forces in an attempt to push 





The case of Germany as referred to above sets itself quite apart from the other two 
under analysis. In this case it was about developing Germany. It was about rebuilding 
it entirely in all areas after the devastation resulting from World War Two. It was about 
protecting the Germans from themselves. Reconstruction in Germany was undertaken 
in areas such as industry, economy, education, administration. Policies pursued can be 
understood as protection through development. In the British zone of Germany British 
personnel were controlling, supervising and giving back power to Germans in a step-
by-step process. The policy of control was also accompanied by cooperation between 
British personnel and Germans. The British never voiced the intention of being “a 
trustee” for Germany.   
All of the above reveals how paternalism existed in all three cases under examination. 
In revealing its existence the chapter has also demonstrated that British paternalism 
manifested itself differently in Germany, Malaysia and Kosovo. In part this is due to 
the specificities of each case and in part due to the context in which they took place. 
Despite differences, paternalism does make its appearance in all three, which helps to 
question arguments of historical novelty regarding interventions of the 1990s. In 
demonstrating the existence of British paternalism during this period the Chapter does 
not strive to make a causal correlation between British policy and paternalism. British 
involvement in Germany’s reconstruction, its support for Malaysia’s defence and 
military intervention in Kosovo did not take place because of British paternalism. In 
all three cases interests had a role to play in decisions to get involved. In Germany 
interests revolved around future national and economic interests once Germany would 
land on its feet. In Malaysia its interests were geostrategic in nature but also referred 
to peace and security. Finally in Kosovo the national interest was reconceptualised and 
defined in global terms. 
The analysis conducted in this chapter brings forward some important conclusions. 
The first is that paternalism and all its constitutive elements were a part of Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse during this period. British paternalism was not 
the cause for interventions and the existence of interests in all three interventions does 





worth fighting for changes (territorial integrity, independence of a nation, human 
rights, democracy). That is a reality. This has been amply illustrated throughout this 
chapter. The language employed changes, the means also change (depending on the 
case). Third, arguments advanced by the empirical literature on humanitarian 
intervention can be seriously questioned by the existence of British paternalism in all 
cases analysed. For example, the concept of a common humanity and the argument 
that the definition of who is human has changed can be put into question. Paternalism 
as was shown in Chapter 3 relates to unequal relations and is based on making 
distinctions between “us” and “them”. The fact that the same states intervene in 
faraway places or nearby and that paternalism is identified in their discourse and 












8 British Paternalism in the Twenty-
First Century: The Responsibility to 
Protect and the 2011 NATO-led 
Intervention Libya 
In this chapter I will engage with the literature on the Responsibility to Protect 
(referred to as R2P or RtoP) with the objective of identifying paternalism in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse in the twenty-first century. Doing so will enable 
me to fulfil the second objective of my research, which entails demonstrating 
continuity in British interventionism from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century.  
According to the R2P literature, interventions following the adoption of the R2P 
principle by the UN General Assembly in 2005 are different when compared to those 
of the 1990s. This difference is accounted for in normative terms. The R2P is presented 
as a radically different and new alternative to the humanitarian intervention doctrine, 
and praised for solving the tension between intervention and sovereignty (Evans, 
2008; Bellamy, 2015; Thakur, 2016a). Instead of viewing R2P as an alternative to 
humanitarian intervention and as heralding a new era for intervention and human 
protection I will show that it is continuity and not change that best characterises the 
move from humanitarian intervention to R2P. I will demonstrate that interventionary 
practice and discourse in this period contains paternalistic elements but also that R2P 
itself is paternalistic.  
Since its adoption by the UN General Assembly in 2005, the R2P has been referred to 
in 25 resolutions pertaining to cases involving the protection of people from genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (ICRtoP). In addressing the 
R2P’s normative development, its implementation, its novelty but also its problems 
the empirical literature has focused on Darfur 2006 (Evans, 2008), Libya 2011 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Serrano, 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2012; Bellamy, 
2013; Paris, 2014; Ziegler, 2016a), Kenya 2007 (Luck, 2010), Cote D’Ivoire 2010 





2013) and South Sudan 2013 (Alison, 2016; Rossi, 2016). Amongst these Libya is the 
case employed by the literature to illustrate the R2P’s normative and precedential 
novelty. There are a few prominent cases of military interventions framed through the 
R2P and undertaken without the consent of the host state’s government. Libya 
constitutes such as example. Given that I stand to illustrate that the R2P does not 
constitute a radical change in a state’s interventionary practice and discourse I will 
take the case employed by scholars engaging with the R2P.  
Further, the case of Libya fulfils another of my requirements, which is that there 
should be British involvement. In fact Britain was, along with France, very actively 
involved in pushing for the need of establishing a no-fly zone in Libya, and in the 
framing of both UNSC resolutions (1970; 1973) that informed the UN’s reaction. 
Resolution 1970 called for coercive measures short of intervention against the Gaddafi 
regime such as travel bans, and the freezing of assets (S/RES/1970). Resolution 1973 
went one step further, calling for the establishment of a no fly zone and the use of “all 
necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya (S/RES/1973). Third, because the 
R2P developed as a result of failings and tensions that occurred during the Kosovo 
intervention, a case analysed in the preceding chapter, Libya lends itself as a very good 
candidate to evaluate change and continuity in interventionary practice and discourse 
between the 1990s and the 21st century.   
I will begin my investigation by first presenting the conceptual tenets of the R2P by 
focusing on primary documents such as the 2001 report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and on the 2005 Outcome 
Document of the World Summit, establishing the international community’s 
acceptance of R2P. Doing so will enable me to interrogate some if its central principles 
pertaining to conceptions of sovereignty and the evolution from a right to a 
responsibility. This will also allow me to show in a first instance that conceptually 
R2P is itself paternalistic. Additionally, drawing on the critical literature I will 
interrogate propositions of normative and conceptual novelty advanced by proponents 





Then, I will move on to the empirical part of the chapter which will attempt not only 
to identify paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in Libya but 
also follow on, on the argument that R2P itself is paternalistic. First, I will present 
current academic interpretations of the NATO Libyan intervention and situate myself 
in opposition to those arguing that the case is an example of R2P’s precedential 
novelty. Second, I will provide a background to the case by situating Libya within the 
wider Arab Spring movement, describing the beginning of hostilities and outlining the 
UN’s response to Colonel Gaddafi’s violence against the Libyan people. Following 
this my analysis of the case will centre on the UN’s initial response to Gaddafi’s 
repression and on the subsequent military intervention undertaken by the UN and 
NATO. By looking at the initial UN response guided by resolution 1970 and the 
subsequent military response guided by resolution 1973 while focusing on Britain’s 
practice and discourse I will identify the intervention’s paternalistic character.  
8.1 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): New Norm, New 
Language? 
The concept of the R2P appeared in a 2001 report prepared by an international 
Commission (ICISS) sponsored by the Canadian government entitled ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect’ (Axworthy, 2012). Then in 2005 the R2P was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly and its members during a World Summit of Heads of State. 
From that time onwards scholars and policymakers have presented the R2P as a new 
normative development in dealing with mass atrocities (Thakur and Weiss, 2009; 
Orford, 2011a; Bellamy, 2015). Many have argued that in introducing the R2P concept 
ICISS reconciled intervention with sovereignty, thereby ending a decade-long debate 
on humanitarian interventions (Alex J Bellamy, 2009; Popovski, 2010). Debates on 
humanitarian intervention during the 1990s were about whether or not there was a 
right to intervene in other countries for human rights purposes. The issue of what 
should be done with suffering strangers and the restrictions imposed on intervention 





Humanitarian interventions during the 1990s brought to the fore problems and 
tensions in need of being addressed in cases where interventions took place and in 
those where there was no response. In particular, Kosovo and Rwanda are often cited 
by the literature and policy-makers, albeit for different reasons, as the two most 
problematic cases of humanitarian intervention (Popovski, 2010; Orford, 2011a; 
Axworthy, 2012; Burke-White, 2012; Thakur, 2016b). In Rwanda the international 
community’s response was too little and in Kosovo NATO’s actions were debated as 
to their legality and/or legitimacy since there was no prior Security Council approval 
(Jennifer M Welsh, 2016). A year after NATO’s Kosovo intervention Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, in presenting his annual report to the UN General Assembly in 
2000, posed the following question: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every 
precept of our common humanity?” (2000 report).  
As a response to this plea, the ICISS presented their report, which brought forward a 
reconceptualization of humanitarian intervention. Within the report its contributors 
made their objective clear when they stated “We want no more Rwandas, and we 
believe that the adoption of the proposals in our report is the best way of ensuring that” 
(ICISS). Ramesh Thakur, one of the authors of the report writing over a decade after 
its publication, remarked that “R2P was the ICISS answer to reconciling the neuralgic 
rejection of humanitarian intervention by the Global South with the determination of 
the North to end atrocities” (2016b, p. 417). It is possible to identify three main 
contributions of the R2P as enunciated in the ICISS report and adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 2005.  
The first refers to the introduction of new language to talk about humanitarian 
intervention. ICISS rejected the term “humanitarian intervention” and instead referred 
to “intervention” or “military intervention” (ICISS). As envisioned by the 
Commission, the R2P was not about “a right to intervene by one state on the territory 
of another state” but rather about “a responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001, p. 11). 





protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, 
from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS, p. viii).  
As a result attention is drawn away from the intervening states to “where it should be 
most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance” 
(ICISS, p. 15). Through this move, Hopgood argued, the idea of civilian protection 
was incorporated as an expectation (2014, p. 183). In addition, for him the idea of 
sovereignty as responsibility was revolutionary since it established that “the 
international community had a duty to step in when states failed” (2014, p. 186). 
Despite giving primary responsibility to the state for the protection of its population, 
in the end the international community still figures as the savior of victims of atrocity 
crimes. What is problematic with this re-characterization is that it does not place a 
legally binding obligation on states to intervene or as Cunliffe notes “there is no 
identifiable agent formally obligated to act or intervene in a particular situation” (2010, 
p. 84). Another issue with this formulation is that in the event that the international 
community will respond militarily then it will usually be the same powerful states who 
carry out the intervention because as Moses puts it “there are no higher powers” to 
ensure accountability by states  (Moses, 2013, p. 130). 
The second contribution of the R2P is that it provided a re-characterization of the 
concept of sovereignty. Instead of conceptualizing “sovereignty as control” ICISS re-
introduced the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” (ICISS, p. 12) drawing from the 
work of Francis Deng on Internally Displaced People (Deng, 1996). Sovereignty as 
responsibility entails three assumptions. First, each state is responsible for protecting 
the safety of its people. Second, each state is responsible to its own citizens and to the 
international community. Finally, “the agents of state are accountable for their acts of 
commission or omission” (ICISS, p. 13). The ability of a state to protect its population 
judges whether that state can retain fully its sovereign powers (Axworthy, 2012). What 
this does is to emphasize that sovereignty entails duties and responsibilities. The fact 
that states are accountable for their actions is a shift from previous guarantees of 





Among critics of this reconceptualization of sovereignty, Cunliffe argues that it 
“pushes states in the realm of paternalism” (2010, p. 81). Because states at the national 
level are held accountable to the international community states end up having 
“responsibilities for their people rather than to their people” (2010, p. 81).  
The third contribution of the R2P is that prevention is seen as its number one priority. 
The ICISS report clarifies that the R2P should be understood as encompassing three 
components: “the responsibility to react, to prevent and to re-build” (ICISS, p. 17). 
Military intervention is seen as the last resort, a policy to be pursued when all other 
measures have failed. Apart from narrowing the scope of the R2P to four crimes, 
namely “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” 
(Outcome Document, par. 138), the Outcome Document of the World Summit where 
the General Assembly and its member states adopted the principle, incorporates the 
shift in language from humanitarian intervention to responsibility to protect, the 
reconceptualization of sovereignty as responsibility and the primacy of prevention.   
According to Welsh, the Outcome Document clarifies certain aspects of the R2P 
further. For example, she argues that “while the R2P directs attention to the plight of 
individuals suffering from egregious forms of violence and persecution, it does so in 
a way that respects and strengthens state sovereignty” (2016, p. 5). In contrast, others 
have criticized how the R2P is understood in the Outcome Document. Many have 
argued that in an attempt to secure its adoption, the UN General Assembly has 
sacrificed the concept’s novelty under ICISS (Popovski, 2010; Burke-White, 2011). 
For example Popovski points to the fact that the concept only applies to previously 
recognized international crimes (2010). Additionally the Outcome Document does not 
include the ICISS’s call of restraint towards the P5 in using their veto power. For all 
the advancements that the concept is seen to make this is quite problematic when 
military intervention is contemplated. Ultimately the decision to intervene or not 
resides in the same five powerful countries. 
Within the Outcome document, two paragraphs (138 and 139) refer to the R2P. The 





to the international community’s efforts to help states. The second details the 
responsibilities of the international community to protect populations collectively 
through non-coercive and coercive means if necessary. After 2005 the main challenge 
was to translate the concept of the R2P from words to deeds. In 2009 the Secretary 
General’s Report “Implementing the R2P” provided a framework for implementing 
the principle, identifying to those ends a three-pillar strategy. Pillar One addressed the 
protection responsibilities of the state, Pillar Two the issue of international assistance 
and capacity building and Pillar Three the timely and decisive response by the 
international community (p. 7-9).  
A major issue highlighted by academics since 2005 has been the contestation of the 
R2P by many states. The post-2005 revolt against the R2P was according to Bellamy 
“in large part due to a continued association between humanitarian intervention and 
the R2P” (Focarelli, 2008; Alex J Bellamy, 2009, p. 111). Russia, China, Algeria, the 
Philippines and Brazil began questioning the commitment they had made in 2005 
(Bellamy, 2009). Algeria made the case that differentiating between humanitarian 
intervention and the R2P was difficult. Members of the Non-Aligned Movement 
opposed the R2P because it could be seen as a medium through which great powers 
could impose their interests and values on weaker states (Focarelli, 2008). Ziegler, 
writing in 2016, gives a more up-to-date view on this issue by following R2P in 
practice and argues that contestation by the non-western world still exists despite calls 
that R2P is an emerging norm (2016a). 
The main issue of contestation centred on seeing the R2P as a way of legalizing 
humanitarian intervention or, as Bellamy put it, “governments saw R2P as a Trojan 
horse for legitimizing unilateral intervention” (2008, p. 617). In reviewing the for and 
against positions of member states in the General Assembly and the Security Council 
Focarelli concluded that “humanitarian intervention implementing the R2P is not only 
feared as imperialistic by several weak states, but it also fails to find unconditional 
support even amongst the most powerful states” (2008, p. 209). Bellamy’s solution to 
remedy the continued association between the two concepts was to propose a need to 





(2009). However, as will be shown later in the chapter there are issues with the 
implementation of the R2P acknowledged by both its proponents and critics (Evans, 
2016; Ziegler, 2016a). When the concept is translated from words to deeds, especially 
in relation to military intervention, it is possible to observe continued contestation 
focusing on the concept’s ability for abuse by powerful states, issues of selectivity, etc 
(Ziegler, 2016a). 
All in all the R2P concept is presented as novel in that it re-conceptualizes 
humanitarian intervention as R2P by bringing forth a different understanding of 
sovereignty, guarding against abuse, introducing a multiplicity of methods and tools 
in dealing with atrocity crimes and directing attention to those in need. Despite the 
introduction of the R2P and its endorsement by the UN General Assembly and its 
inclusion in numerous Security Council resolutions, the term humanitarian 
intervention is still widely employed in the literature (Chesterman, 2011; Kuperman, 
2013; Paris, 2014). Does this reflect an enduring continuity between the two concepts? 
Has the R2P not remedied the issues it was meant to? Are weaker states less likely to 
be intervened upon?  
8.2 The R2P: From Words to Deeds 
Since the adoption of R2P by the UN General Assembly in 2005, the Global Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect has catalogued 62 instances when the R2P has been 
referred to in Security Council Resolutions (GCforR2P). Examples include resolutions 
pertaining to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi 2006, South Sudan 2011, 
Yemen, 2011, Cote D’Ivoire 2011, Libya 2011, Mali 2012, Somalia 2013, 2016, Syria 
2014. Prevention was seen as a primary objective of R2P as conceptualized by ICISS 
and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005. The literature has identified the 
case of Kenya in 2008 as an example of preventive diplomacy under R2P (Luck, 2010; 
Bellamy, 2015; Sharma, 2016). However, due to the fact that Pillar III interventions 





attention to Cote D’Ivoire 201124, Libya 2011 and Syria since 2011. Academic 
engagement with these three cases revolves around addressing R2P’s normative 
development, its implementation, tensions and issues of R2P in action or inaction.  
Both the cases of Libya and Cote D’Ivoire have been described as the only instances 
of military action authorized by the UNSC (Evans, Thakur and Pape, 2013; Paris, 
2014) and as indicating R2P’s normative development (Serrano, 2011, Bellamy and 
Williams, 2011). For Serrano, the UNSC’s swift response to both cases displayed a 
shift in actions undertaken by the Council in regards to mass atrocities (2011). For 
Bellamy and Williams these two cases were indicative of “a new politics of protection” 
(2011, p. 826). Despite both cases being examples of coercive force under R2P, Libya 
is that which has been most extensively studied and debated. The overt scholarly focus 
on Libya rests on a number of factors. First, Libya has brought forth most issues and 
tensions when military action is undertaken under R2P (Dunne and Gelber, 2014; 
Thakur, 2016b). Second, it has attracted attention because of its consequences on the 
norm itself and on responses or rather the lack thereof, to atrocity crimes following it, 
such as in Syria.  
One of the topics surrounding academic engagement with the intervention in Libya 
revolves around whether it should be interpreted as signalling a model for 
implementing R2P or an exception. Opinions regarding this have been somewhat 
mixed. At the time of the intervention in Libya, R2P proponents Thakur and Evans 
described it as “a textbook case for coercive military intervention” indicating the 
manner in which intervention regarding mass atrocities should work (Evans, Thakur, 
Pape, 2013, p. 205). In opposition, Richard Falk argued against viewing Libya as a 
precedent and cautioned that “its repetition should be avoided” (2011, para. 6). Since 
then, the debate on this issue has resulted in a unanimous agreement between 
proponents and critics, establishing Libya as an exception rather than a model for 
intervention (Bellamy, 2011; Hehir, 2013; Thakur, Evans, Pape, 2013; Engelbrekt, 
Mohlin and Wagnsson, 2014).  
                                                 





For those addressing R2P’s normative development, both resolutions (1970 and 1973) 
passed by the Security Council on Libya are of major significance, particularly UNSC 
resolution 1973 which has been described as “the first of its kind” (Bellamy and 
Williams, 2011; Paris, 2014; Doyle, 2015). Resolution 1973 authorised UN member 
states to “take all necessary measures” in order to protect civilians and to enforce the 
no-fly zone established in Libya (S/RES/1973). In reviewing R2P’s normative 
development 10 years on, Bellamy refers to resolution 1970/1973 on Libya and 
resolution 1975 on Cote D’Ivoire as “landmark resolutions” embodying change and 
bringing about “a politics of protection” (2015, p. 165).  
A number of scholars pointed to the fact that resolution 1973 marked the first time that 
the UNSC approved using force for human protection against the will of a government 
(Bellamy, 2011; Williams, 2011). Bellamy and Williams argued that despite “the use 
of all necessary means” being authorized by the UNSC in respect to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan and Cote D’Ivoire not long before Libya, those cases 
involved Blue Helmet operations which take place with the consent of respective 
governments (Bellamy and Williams, 2012). Consequently, resolution 1973 
exemplified that the Council entered into new political terrain (Bellamy and Williams, 
2012). This contention has not remained unchallenged by critics.   
Without downplaying the normative significance of the R2P concept in general, 
Chesterman assessed the legal significance of the resolution. By citing the cases of 
Somalia 1992 and Srebrenica 1993 where the Council authorized “the use of all 
necessary means” so as to provide conditions for humanitarian relief and the setting 
up of safe havens, he concludes that resolution 1973 was not legally significant (2011, 
p. 279). Further, Hehir cites the case of Southern Rhodesia of 1965 in an attempt to 
downplay the precedential value of the resolution by its proponents, while at the same 
time guarding against exaggeration (2013a). Aside from its normative significance the 
resolution has also been subject to criticism regarding the wording used. Falk warned 
that the phrase “use of all necessary means” in Libya is vague enough as to allow 





this is an issue which applies to most military interventions authorized by the UNSC 
throughout the years, and constitutes part of the standard wording employed. 
The influence of the R2P in relation to decision-making and UN’s response on Libya 
has also been the subject of academic discussion. For some, the R2P played an 
important role in bringing about the Council’s decision to authorize the use of force. 
For Serrano the R2P was “a key ingredient” in bringing about a decisive and timely 
response (Serrano, 2011, p. 93). While emphasizing that UN officials framed the 
response in Libya in R2P terms from the very beginning, Bellamy and Williams follow 
scholars who acknowledge that a number of other factors such as regional consensus 
and Gaddafi’s international standing also influenced UN decision-making (2012; 
Dunne and Gelber, 2014). For others like Hehir, however, R2P’s influence was 
minimal in bringing about a coercive response. He points to the fact that in both 
resolutions the term R2P figures once and that presidential speeches by David 
Cameron and Barak Obama on Libya made no mention of R2P (2016).  
Further, the interventions in Libya and Cote D’Ivoire and the lack of response in Syria 
have called for a crucial re-assessment of the R2P and its Third Pillar. Academics have 
presented the problems resulting from these cases and the tensions exhibited by Libya 
specifically and its repercussions for the future of R2P. Issues of implementation have 
been acknowledged by both proponents and critics of the concept (Serrano, 2011; 
Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Doyle, 2015; Welsh, 2016; Thakur, 2016). Serrano 
(2011) and Bellamy and Williams (2011) identify both Cote D’Ivoire and Libya as 
cases demonstrating the need for more implementation in regards to R2P. In relation 
to Libya, Doyle (2015) lists the lack of clarity in invoking Pillar III and the lack of 
clear guidelines in managing the intervention as problems exposed by the case. Evans 
(2015, p. 16) has characterised Libya and Syria as constituting a “mid-life” crisis for 
R2P. 
Critical appraisals of Libya identify tensions and issues characteristic of Pillar III 
responses. While addressing the operation and aftermath of the intervention, Paris 





intervention” (2014). He identifies 4 structural problems: “the mixed motive problem, 
counterfactual problem, conspicuous harm problem and inconsistency problem” 
(2014, p. 570). In fact, the inconsistency problem has also been identified by Hehir 
(Hehir, 2013a), Hopgood (2014) and Holmes (2014) referring to the inconsistency in 
international responses to atrocity crimes. Both Hopgood and Holmes illustrate this 
through the cases of Darfur 2003 and Sri Lanka 2009 where the UN did not intervene 
under R2P (2014, 2014). Through the examination of these cases Hopgood concludes 
that “we must not expect an intervention where vital stakes or conflicting interests are 
at stake” (2014, p. 181).  
This is in line with fears expressed by UN member states regarding the abuse of the 
norm by powerful states. Ziegler has presented the BRICS’s (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) resistance to R2P as rooted in the recognition that Western 
powers have frequently been inconsistent in promoting R2P norms (2016b). The latter 
is also relevant to another problem that has resulted from the intervention in Libya, 
which relates to the mandate being extended beyond the protection of civilians to 
include regime change. Soon after the intervention scholars acknowledged that the 
extension of the mandate brought forth questions relating to the relationship between 
regime change and the R2P (Serrano, 2011; Williams and Bellamy, 2011; Falk, 2011). 
Indeed, it has been argued that it has had an impact on the UN’s response in Syria 
2011 and on the R2P more generally (Kuperman, 2013; Paris, 2014; Welsh, 2016).   
In reviewing how contemporary academic and non-academic scholarship interprets 
the case of Libya, it is important to acknowledge those contributing an interpretation 
which distinguishes them from the conventional narrative of events adhered to by 
most. Kuperman’s article “A model humanitarian intervention?: Reassessing NATO’s 
Libyan Campaign” constitutes such an example. He questions whether Gaddafi 
targeted unarmed civilians, whether NATO’s primary goal was to protect civilians and 
finally he addresses how the situation would have unfolded had NATO not intervened 
(2013). Another more recent example is Fabrice Arfi’s book entitled Avec les 





the relationship between the then French president Nicolas Sarkozy and Gaddafi 
(2017).  
All in all, the above has shown that the most problematic and highly criticised aspect 
of the R2P, by UN member states and academics, is Pillar III and coercive force25. 
Critical appraisals of the case of Libya reveal important issues with the R2P in practice 
such as inconsistency, mixed motives, double standards. These have led UN member 
states to be wary of R2P’s Pillar III, seen as a way through which powerful states can 
exert their influence and use the concept as they see fit. In commenting on the 
apprehension of some UN members to the R2P, Doyle states that “the only response 
is to acknowledge that the world remains un-equal, and that R2P cannot itself correct 
that” (2015, p. 140).  His argument reinforces my own in arguing for the existence of 
continuity in interventionary practice and discourse.  
Indeed the international system remains hierarchical and unequal. In saying this, 
however, it is crucial to point to the recent increasing influence of the BRICS in the 
UNSC and on responses to mass atrocities. My interpretation of the case of Libya 
follows those critical of the R2P such as Paris, Kuperman, Hehir, Cunliffe and Falk. 
In fact Paris, in presenting the structural problems of R2P points to the fact that they 
pertain to tensions in the “strategic logic” of preventive humanitarian interventions 
(2014, p. 570). As such this could help draw a continuing line between military 
interventions since the nineteenth century. Additionally, my objective in this chapter 
could be seen as building on criticisms that identify a certain relationship between R2P 
and paternalism (Cunliffe, 2010, 2016, 2017; Falk, 2011).  
In response to the “triumphant spirit” evident in Western elite circles at the time of the 
intervention in Libya, Falk argued that “there is a heavy dose of implicit paternalism, 
condescension, and passé consciousness present if the West is to be identified as the 
best hope for the future because it managed to pull off this Libyan intervention” 
(2011). His observation gives particular weight to the argument I advance in this 
                                                 






chapter consistent with that of my research project. By engaging with the case of Libya 
I aim to identify paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the 
twenty-first century.  
The concept itself and criticisms levelled against it when implemented suggest that 
paternalism will be present in the case of Libya and reflect not a new but rather an 
older way of talking about intervention and of responding to it. As far as the concept 
itself is concerned the terms protection and responsibility have been previously 
identified in Chapter 3 as constituting two characteristic elements of my 
conceptualization of paternalism. The remaining part of this chapter will primarily 
engage with Libya and, when needed, reference will be made to other R2P cases.  
8.2.1 Background to the Intervention 
During February 2011 anti-government demonstrations took place in Libya influenced 
by the Arab Spring movement, which originated in Tunisia in 2010, and spread to 
Egypt, Bahrain and Syria (Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Paris, 2014). The objective 
of demonstrators in Libya was to call for democratic elections and a new government, 
thus ending Gaddafi’s forty-year rule (Garland, 2012). The peaceful demonstrations 
which began on 15 February in the city of Benghazi quickly spread to other cities 
around the country. Two days later the Gaddafi government responded to these 
demonstrations through the use of force but also by blocking communications 
(Engelbrekt, Mohlin and Wagnsson, 2014). From that point onwards the situation 
turned into a violent conflict between Gaddafi’s security forces and the Interim 
Transitional National Council (ITNC also referred to as NTC or TNC), an armed 
opposition group formed on February 27th based in Benghazi and composed of 
civilians, teachers, students and professional soldiers who defected from the 
government’s army and wished to see Gaddafi removed from power (Garland, 2012).   
The demonstrations in Benghazi and in other cities all around Libya and Gaddafi’s 
efforts to forcefully suppress them since February 17th attracted the attention of various 





actions against civilians. On February 22 the UNSC issued a statement condemning 
the violence and use of force and urging the Libyan government “to meet its 
responsibility to protect its population” (SC/10180).  Similarly, on February 25 the 
UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution relating to the human rights situation 
in Libya, acknowledging the deaths of hundreds of civilians, condemning “the recent 
gross and systematic human rights violations committed in Libya” and requesting that 
the government meet “its responsibility to protect its population” (A/HRC/RES/S-
15/1). The regime’s actions were also condemned by regional organizations such as 
the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and 
the EU.  
On the 26th of February the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1970 condemning 
the “widespread and systematic attacks in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” against 
civilians, noting that they “may amount to crimes against humanity” (S/RES/1970). 
The resolution made use of R2P language by “re-calling the Libyan authorities’ 
responsibility to protect its population” (S/RES/1970).  Through this resolution the 
UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter referred the situation in Libya to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), and called on member states to effectuate an 
arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze of people associated with the Gaddafi 
regime (S/RES/1970). The conflict between Gaddafi’s forces and the rebel opposition 
continued. 
Gaddafi had managed to regain control of parts of the country the rebels had acquired 
and in mid-March he moved towards the city of Benghazi in order to put an end to the 
rebellion (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). In his first report, the ICC’s prosecutor 
presented estimates of 500-700 deaths for February alone and a total of more than a 
thousand since the beginning of violence (Report ICC). On March 1st the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 140,000 people had fled Libya 
since the beginning of hostilities (UNHCR 1 March 2011). From a reluctance to 
interfere keeping a cautious stance towards events in Libya, the UK and France led 
calls for a no fly-zone during March and with Lebanon drafted a resolution submitted 





It is crucial to point out at this point that both governments previously entertained good 
economic relations with Gaddafi. In fact, Britain had in 2009 sold 21.7 million pounds 
worth in defence equipment to the Gaddafi regime (Davidson, 2013). Their draft 
resolution was approached with considerable caution by the US and opposed by 
Germany (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). Regional organizations such as the Arab 
League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Conferences and 
the African Union voiced support for the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya 
(Hehir, 2013b; Tocci, 2016). On March 9 the leader of the NtC Mustafa Abdul Jalil 
called for a need to establish a no-fly zone so as to prevent further casualties (Garland, 
2012). On March 17th the UNSC passed resolution 1973, which restated “the 
responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population” and 
demanded an immediate ceasefire (S/RES/1973).  
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the resolution permitted member states 
to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilians and civilian populated areas and to 
enforce the no-fly zone policy (S/RES/1973). While resolution 1970 was passed 
unanimously, resolution 1973 passed with ten votes in favour and five abstentions 
from Russia, India, Germany, China and Brazil, who favoured a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict (SC/10200). During discussions that took place following the vote, 
representatives of countries that supported the resolution based their position on two 
points. The first stressed that Gaddafi did not abide by resolution 1970 and the second 
pointed to upcoming violence on civilians as Gaddafi’s forces moved to recapture 
territories held by the opposition. Representatives agreed that the protection of 
civilians was the only objective (SC/10200).  
The day after the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, Gaddafi called for a cease-fire. In 
reality, however, the fighting never stopped in Mistrata and Adjabiya and Gaddafi’s 
forces were approaching Benghazi (Garland, 2012).  On 19 March the military 
intervention in Libya began by a coalition of countries in an effort to implement the 
mandate of UNSCR 1973 (Garland, 2012). On 25 March NATO took over the 
command of the military intervention under the codename Operation Unified 





population using “all necessary means”. The operation targeted pro-regime forces, 
their military installations and air defence systems. In relation to the R2P continuum 
the military intervention fell under Pillar III (coercive responses).  
During the conflict in Libya, the face of the opposition, the NTC, formed an interim 
government on March 23. It was recognised as the legitimate authority and 
representative of the Libyan people by a number of countries such as France, the US, 
the UK and Qatar (Tocci, 2016) and support to the Council was given by Italy, 
Portugal, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the EU (Garland, 2012). 
Aside granting recognition to the NTC, states also aided the rebels in various ways. 
As reported by the Washington Post in April 2011 the US and its allies (France, UK, 
Italy) sent assistance and military advisers to the opposition (Washington Post April 
20). Finally the conflict came to an end in October when Muammar Gaddafi was killed 
and the NTC took power (Hehir, 2013). 
8.2.2 Responding to Libya: Britain’s Interventionary Practice and 
Discourse, R2P and Paternalism   
Having provided a background to NATO’s involvement in Libya, this section will 
look at the intervention focusing specifically on Britain’s involvement in terms of 
discourse and practice. How did British politicians, parliamentarians and the media 
frame the intervention in Libya? How did the British public react to events unfolding 
in Libya and to the use of force? What practices did Britain along with other UN 
members undertake? What was the professed intent behind the freezing of assets, 
travel bans and the military campaign? What classificatory mechanisms were at play? 
What was Britain’s role and how was she represented through British discourse? These 
questions provide a gateway to the identification of paternalism in Britain’s 
involvement in the NATO intervention in Libya despite arguments of normative 
novelty articulated by politicians and academics in light of the use of R2P terminology. 
Let us first address the nature of practices initiated in Libya. In reviewing the nature 





pronounced as in other cases examined. It is in British discourses and representations 
that paternalism manifests itself most evidently. In the case of Libya, British practices 
were not about protecting the people from themselves, nor about teaching them the 
British way of life and culture or pointing them towards the right path in terms of 
cultural, economic, governmental development. British practices in Libya fell in two 
categories: military and diplomatic. In regards to the military aspect of the policy 
pursuant to UNSCR 1973, Britain contributed through ELLAMY. The latter was the 
codename given to the British military effort engaged in both air and sea operations. 
The military campaign undertaken by a coalition of states, led by Britain, France and 
the US focused on striking military targets. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was involved 
in strike attacks against Gaddafi’s security forces and key Libyan installations (RAF). 
Specifically, RAF Tornado GR4s were used to strike tanks, armoured vehicles and 
ammunition bunkers (MOD 28 March). Sea operations included the deployment of 
frigates such as HMS Cumberland and HMS Westminster and the launching of 
Tomahawk missiles from a submarine (Telegraph 19 March 2011). The objective of 
these operations was the protection of the population. Indeed, the air attack on March 
19 prevented Gaddafi’s forces from entering Benghazi and hence ensured the physical 
safety of the Libyan people in Benghazi.  
In the diplomatic sphere Britain undertook a number of initiatives towards the NTC, 
the opposition to Gaddafi’s reign. It is here that the paternalistic nature of practices 
becomes more visible. Britain through its diplomatic missions to Libya and to the NTC 
was providing help, which took two forms, one related to material and the other to 
practical assistance. Material assistance involved the supply of non-lethal equipment 
to the rebels such as telecommunication equipment and body armour. The British 
procured the civilian police force with body armour, police uniforms, high visibility 
vests and t-shirts, and communication equipment. According to Mr Hague this 
material help was going to enable “the NTC develop responsible security forces and 





Practical support was offered through diplomatic missions constituted by diplomats 
and military advisers by a number of countries including Britain. In April, a British 
military liaison team was sent to Libya. British military officers provided the rebels 
with help and advice on how to set up a command and control structure (Kuperman, 
2013). It was about enabling them to better themselves in terms of organization, in 
order to be in a better position against Gaddafi’s security forces. That the rebels needed 
all the help they could get was acknowledged a number of times in parliamentary 
discussions. They were seen as disorganized. Although Britain did not send ground 
troops or train the rebels in order to ameliorate their fighting skills, they did offer help 
and advice. Britain was indirectly involved in the rebels’ fight against Gaddafi.  
Further Britain was part of a multinational coalition of experts sent to Benghazi in 
order to carry out a stabilization assessment for the immediate post-Gaddafi Libya. 
According to Hague “this support has been requested by the NTC and will help them 
ensure that they administer territory under their control to international standards and 
to protect the aspirations of the Libyan people” (FCO 13 May). The military campaign 
undertaken by the coalition of states and the diplomatic missions sent to make contact 
with the NTC and provide assistance fall into my conceptual framework defining a 
paternalistic practice. As I have argued in Chapter 3, a paternalistic practice may or 
may not involve coercion. A country may accept an intervention in its territory by 
another country, because it has already internalized the paternalistic relationship as 
normal.  
In the case of Libya, the intervention was undertaken without the consent of the 
Gaddafi regime. As a result, the intervention is characterised by coercion, seen by the 
majority working on paternalism as defining a paternalistic practice. However, the 
intervention in Libya also demonstrates that it was subject to a legitimation of 
authority. The international community argued that the Gaddafi regime had lost all 
legitimacy. From March onwards, many states accepted the NTC as a legitimate 
authority representing the wishes of the Libyan people. Although the NTC was not 
acting as the government of Libya, its position as the representative of the people is 





international community to “fulfil its responsibility to protect without any direct 
military intervention on Libyan soil” (cited in Garland, p. 121). According to this, the 
NTC recognised that it needed help by the international community, accepting the 
paternalistic relationship as normal.  
British discourses and representations are more revelatory as to paternalism’s 
manifestation in Libya. Benevolence, one of paternalism’s defining components, can 
be identified by looking at the way in which intent was justified in discourse. The 
freezing of assets of the Gaddafi regime and anyone associated with it as well as travel 
bans imposed as a result of resolution 1970 were justified as being for the benefit of 
the Libyan people. In his statement to the House of Commons on February 28 the 
Prime Minister stated that “we should be clear that for the future of Libya and its 
people, Colonel Gaddafi’s regime must end and he must leave. To that end, we are 
taking every possible step to isolate the Gaddafi regime, to deprive it of money, to 
shrink its power and to ensure that anyone responsible for abuses in Libya will be held 
to account” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c24). 
Similarly, Hague, speaking to the BBC on February 27, said that “of course it is time 
for Colonel Gaddafi to go, that is the best hope for Libya” (BBC). A month later, 
Hague reiterated his argument stressing that Gaddafi had to be removed because “the 
Libyan people must be able to have a more representative government and determine 
their own future” (MOD 18 March). Further, justifications regarding resolution 1973 
voiced in Parliament are equally interesting, demonstrating that the invocation of the 
R2P principle in the Libyan case did not remove the need to justify interventionary 
practices. The need to gain legitimacy for military intervention remained.  
In a Commons debate dealing with resolution 1973, Edward Miliband, MP for 
Doncaster North and Leader of the Labour Party from 2010 to 2015, enumerated the 
tests to be satisfied to ensure the legitimacy of an intervention under R2P: right 
intentions, last resort and proportionality. In regards to the test of right intentions he 
argued that “our intentions are right: we are acting to protect the Libyan people, to 





humanity” (HC Debate 21 March 2011, c716). This is an example of a more general 
trend observed in British discourses on Libya, justifying the intervention as undertaken 
for the Libyan people and more specifically for their protection. 
During the course of the same debate David Cameron made explicit that the military 
action which commenced on March 19 “was about protecting civilians, protecting life, 
and giving the Libyan people a chance to determine their own future” (HC Debate 21 
March 2011, c704). Likewise, the Ministry of Defense Dr Fox speaking on Sky News 
about the coalition activity in Libya stated that “The UN Resolution is very clear that 
what we are about is protecting the civilian population. It was very clear that the 
regime was going to attack Benghazi, a city of a million people. We are protecting 
them from that particular fate” (MOD 28 March). 
The intent of protecting the people of Libya was also articulated in parliamentary 
debates and beyond on the issue of contingency planning in the form of a no-fly-zone 
preceding resolution 1973.  Speaking to the BBC on this issue, UK Defence Secretary 
Fox argued that “if it were to be carried out it would be for the protection of the civilian 
population, yes” (MOD 10 March). Reiterating this argument, Cameron stated during 
a Commons debate that “I am very clear that a no-fly zone is something that we should 
consider, because it may help to stop atrocities being committed against people who 
want a more democratic future” (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c32).  
Looking back on the decision to implement a no-fly zone in Libya Baroness Kennedy 
of The Shaws expressed the logic behind her decision saying that “I supported the 
creation of the no-fly zone in Libya, feeling that it was absolutely for the right reasons: 
we have to step in to prevent the killing of innocent civilians” (HL Deb April 1 2011, 
c1472). Apart from establishing the benevolent intent of practices by invoking the 
protection of the population and the prevention of harm, the above also brings forth 
something very interesting pertaining to practices of representation and identification. 
The Libyan people were depicted as victims seen as unable to swiftly respond to what 
was being done to them by the Gaddafi regime. Such representations enabled and 





This point is further accentuated in Cameron’s argument urging for the need to 
continue pushing for the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya. In making his case 
in the House of Commons he asserted that “Every day, Gaddafi is brutalising his own 
people. Time is of the essence and there should be no let-up in the pressure we put on 
this regime” (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c27). Further, the Libyans were described as 
“defenceless”, as “being under threat” and were presented as “suffering” (HC Deb 21 
March 2011, c715; HL Deb 1 April 2011 c1454; HC Deb 5 April 2011, c921). 
The imperative to act, the need to take swift action to protect the Libyan people was 
established by arguments of demonstrable need. This rested on a negative 
representation of both the Libyan people and of the Gaddafi regime and his security 
forces. A good example of this is Lord Stirrup’s statement to the Lords where he 
argued that ‘those civilians need protection because they are under threat from 
Gaddafi’ (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1454). While the military intervention was 
underway Mr Mitchell stated that ‘As I speak, the people of Libya continue to suffer 
at the hands of Gaddafi’s troops. In Misrata, fighting continues. Although accurate 
information is hard to obtain, there are reports that up to 200 deaths have occurred in 
the past week and that hundreds more people have been injured’ (HC Deb 5 April 
2011, c921). Although both the Libyan people and Gaddafi’s regime were represented 
in British eyes in a negative manner, distinctions were made. The Libyans were 
negatively represented because of what they were going through, they were seen as 
the victims of the regime. The Gaddafi regime and his security forces were seen as 
constituting the number one threat to the people of Libya. As a result, the British and 
the international community had to intervene.  
There is something interesting and peculiar in the way in which British discourses 
justified action in Libya. As demonstrated above, the need for contingency planning 
in the form of a no-fly zone, the sanctions imposed and military action were intended 
to protect and benefit the Libyan people. However, discourses also bring to light how 
actions pursued in Libya were based on a dual objective. Actions were justified as 
being for the benefit of the Libyan people and for the benefit of Britain and Europe. 





questioning the need for contingency planning during a debate on February 28. He 
stated that “what we want—I would argue it is in our interest and in that of the whole 
world, including the Libyan people—is the swift removal of Colonel Gaddafi from his 
position” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c34).  
A month later he expanded on this by asking “do we want a situation where a failed 
pariah state festers on Europe’s southern border, potentially threatening our security, 
pushing people across the Mediterranean and creating a more dangerous and uncertain 
world for Britain and for our allies as well for the people of Libya?” (HC Deb 14 
March 2011, c27). This duality of intent was also present in discourses pertaining to 
military action in Libya. In his interview on BBC Radio 5 on March 20 \ Hague 
explained the logic behind the intervention stating that “First of all people were being 
slaughtered by the Gaddafi regime, they were appealing for help, the Arab League 
unanimously appealed for a resolution and a no fly zone and it’s in our national 
interests to do so because, a Libya wholly dominated by a Gaddafi regime that had 
become a pariah state could be a source of extremism and terrorism on the southern 
boundaries of Europe for some time to come” (FCO 20 March). Accordingly, concerns 
regarding British and European interests centred on terrorism and immigration.  
What becomes visible from this is that justifications for action in Libya were presented 
as a win-win situation. By intervening Britain and the international community would 
avert mass atrocity crimes and at the same time guarantee their common national 
interests. The presence of a dual intent in British discourse does not in itself indicate 
paternalism’s absence. It does however call for a need to interrogate this further. Why 
is it that at a time when the international community embraces the R2P establishing 
paternalism normatively, Britain at least domestically justifies the intervention 
through a win-win strategy? The manner in which British domestic justifications were 
articulated in regards to Libya needs to be seen in a wider perspective relating to 
Britain’s past interventionary practices.  
A look at British discourses exemplifies a link between Iraq and the uneasiness voiced 





about Britain’s role in leading contingency planning calling for the establishment of a 
no-fly zone. During a Commons debate on March 14 the Prime Minister attempted to 
ease those concerns by distinguishing between Libya and past experiences. He argued 
that “what we are seeing in Libya is different. It is an uprising of a people against a 
leader, and it is quite different. No one is talking about invasions, boots on the ground 
and the rest of it” (HC Deb 14 March 2011, c30). 
During the same debate Cameron responded to concerns voiced by a member 
regarding the possibility of being drawn into another war of attrition in the Middle 
East with the following:  
Let me try to reassure my hon. Friend, and through him people who are 
concerned about this matter. There is no intention to get involved in another 
war or to see an invasion or massive amounts of ground troops. That is not 
what is being looked at. What is being looked at is how we can tighten the 
pressure on an unacceptable, illegitimate regime to give that country some 
chance of peaceful transition. We would let down ourselves and the Libyan 
people if we did nothing and said that it was all too difficult. (HC Deb 14 
March 2011, c37) 
The tendency to draw a line of differentiation between Iraq and Libya in order to ease 
opposition in Parliament can be observed during debates that took place while the 
military intervention was underway. Here Cameron stated that Libya “is different from 
Iraq. This is not going into a country and knocking over its Government, and then 
owning and being responsible for everything that happens subsequently. This is about 
protecting people and giving the Libyan people a chance to shape their own destiny” 
(HC Deb 21 March 2011 c710). Equally, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen said “we are 
clear that Libya is in no sense a repeat of Iraq. Our role in Libya is primarily the 
protection of civilians” (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1148). 
Additionally it could be argued that the need to justify intervention in Libya as being 
for the dual benefit of the Libyan people, Britain and Europe stems from the fact that 





public fatigue and a decreased willingness by Parliamentarians to support further 
British military interventions. On this Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con) argued 
that “After two interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the British public have not the 
slightest appetite for getting involved militarily in a third Muslim country” (HC 
Debate 7 March 2011, c654). Similarly David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab) 
remarked that “there seems to be in the House and certainly in the country at large—
and I believe it is the right attitude to take—no appetite for military intervention in 
Libya” (HC Deb 7 March 2011, c653). While Britain was debating action in Libya, 
British troops were still stationed in Afghanistan and although most British forces 
withdrew from Iraq in 2009, the British Navy had just completed the task of training 
local troops.  
Despite opposition to British involvement in Libya in the domestic realm, public 
fatigue and the shadow left by Iraq and Afghanistan, the British government’s policy 
on Libya was backed by Parliament and by the British public. On 2 March MPs voted 
in favour of employing force in order to enforce UNSCR 1973 and in favour of British 
involvement in the operations. The vote was 557 in favour and 13 against (FCO 22 
March). According to an opinion poll of the Financial Times/Harris conducted 
between March and April 37% of those asked supported the intervention, 36% were 
against and 28% remained neutral (Clements, 2013). Although this opinion poll does 
not reflect an overwhelming majority supporting military intervention, on the whole 
opinion polls conducted during the Libya campaign reflect these results. The 
difference between those for and those against was minimal. In Britain the intervention 
has been broadly supported, though it has also provoked strong opposition from a 
minority including former MP George Galloway and MPs Jeremy Corbyn and 
Caroline Lucas (Garland, 2012, p. 28). 
In assessing the existence of British paternalism in the R2P case that is Libya, it is 
informative to look at justifications offered in British discourse revealing British 
obligation/duty/responsibility. This involves looking at strategies of classification and 
the ways in which the self and the other are represented. How does the framing of the 





previous cases of British interventionary practice and discourse analysed? What has 
changed?  To begin with, both terms, duty and responsibility, figure in British 
discourse as a result of invoking the R2P principle in the case of Libya. What this 
means is that the British sense of duty and responsibility towards the Libyan people 
stemmed in part from the presence of the principle itself.  
This point is illustrated by arguments conveyed in a Lords debate in April on Libya. 
Baroness Falkner of Margravine stated that  
now, in Libya, we have put into practice the principle that every individual 
state has the responsibility to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Where a state falls down on this 
responsibility, the rest of us will move to afford that protection within the 
framework of the United Nations, and it is right that we should do so. (HL Deb 
01 April 2011, c1451) 
Following the same line of argument Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws declared that  
the principle is simple. It is that we have a responsibility to protect our citizens 
from killing and ethnic cleansing, but we also have a responsibility to others. 
If a country is unwilling or unable to do so, or if the Government of a country 
are in fact the perpetrator of the violence, the international community 
has a duty to launch a military intervention (emphasis added, HL Deb 01 
April 2011, c1472).  
The fact that Libya was seen as a case where R2P was applicable brought in 
discussions of international and British responsibility and duty. Additionally, 
Baroness Kennedy of the Shaw’s explanation of the principle brings forth another 
interesting point. The last part of her argument highlighted in bold is not explicitly 
stated in the 2005 Outcome document relating to the R2P. It can be seen as a way 
through which to justify the need for military intervention by by-passing the 
theoretical premises of the principle. Within this phrase paternalistic elements are 





This can be further demonstrated by looking at parliamentary debates dealing with 
resolution 1973 and the military intervention in Libya. For instance in discussing 
resolution 1973 Miliband stated that “the resolution is about our responsibility to 
protect the Libyan people – no more no less” (HC Deb 21 March 2011, c718-22). In 
presenting his position in this debate he stated that “a debate is often conducted about 
rights to intervene, but this debate is about not rights but responsibilities” (HC Deb 21 
March 2011, c716). In line with this, Malcolm Bruce (Gordon) (LD) voiced that “it is 
important to explain clearly not only to the British people but to the wider international 
public that the responsibility to protect means just that. It does not involve a right or a 
permission; it is actually a duty to engage in a situation such as this” (HC Deb 5 April 
2011, c936). Through these, emphasis was put on the fact that Libya was to be 
discussed in terms of a responsibility and not a right. What becomes visible here is 
how the invocation of the R2P imposes the language of responsibility and duty, it 
permits a certain narrative to develop which, as the following will demonstrate, is 
imbued with an older British paternalistic attitude.  
Aside from discussing British responsibility through the R2P principle directly, 
Parliamentarians also spoke of a collective responsibility and global duty. A good 
illustration of this is the argument put forth by Lord Howell of Guilford, Minister of 
State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, regarding the enforcement of the no-fly 
zone and aerial bombardments.  For him these actions showed as he said that “we are 
doing our full bit, and more than our bit, in carrying out a global duty” (HL Deb 01 
April 2011, c1444). For Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, Libya evoked not a 
global duty but a collective responsibility. In his speech at Chapultepec in Mexico City 
he contrasted Iraq with Libya arguing that “the action being taken in Libya today is 
right. It would be a terrible tragedy if the mistakes of Iraq led to a retreat from the 
principle of liberal interventionism, from the principle that we have a collective 
responsibility to support freedom and protect human rights around the world” (FCO 
29 March).  
This brings forward a link between British feelings of responsibility and duty and 





Liberal interventionism is quite interesting at a time when a new principle, the R2P is 
that which is seen to apply to Libya. Why? Well, simply because the R2P theoretically 
was developed in an attempt to move away from concepts and principles which gave 
primacy to Western states and created a dichotomy between the Liberal West and 
Illiberal other which needs help. Oddly enough, although Cameron discussed Libya as 
an R2P case and along with Sarkozy pushed for both UNSC resolutions to be adopted, 
on September 5 during a Commons debate he characterized the intervention as a 
“practical, liberal, Conservative intervention” adding that “It is a way of thinking” 
(HC Deb 5 September 2011, c35).  
This link is also made visible in a Lords debate in April by Baroness Kennedy of the 
Shaws, who, supporting action in Libya, argued that “there are times when we have to 
act. If human rights have any meaning at all, we have a duty to safeguard the humanity 
of people around the world” (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1472). While putting an accent 
on democracy as a basis for a British moral obligation Hague voiced that “Britain has 
a moral obligation to assist those who seek the democratic privileges that we enjoy in 
this country” (The Telegraph 18 March, 2011). Accordingly Britain, along with the 
other members of the international community, was seen as the guarantor, the 
protector of human rights, democracy and of the people and therefore had no choice 
but to take decisive action in Libya.   
Britain’s role as the protector of people and as espousing a sense of duty and 
responsibility was also seen as a result of Gaddafi’s actions. It could be said that 
Gaddafi’s actions fueled the British sense of duty. According to Ms Harman 
“Gaddafi’s attacks on, and threats to, his own people, and particularly his threat to 
show no mercy to Benghazi, imposed a clear duty to prevent the slaughter of innocent 
people, and we support that action” (HC Deb 5 April 2011, c928). A similar argument 
was made by Baroness Falkner of Margravine. In supporting the government’s plan to 
propose the establishment of a no-fly zone she stated that “we know from the 
barbarous nature of his regime that we may well have to intervene on the responsibility 
to protect to take those minimal measures implied in a no-fly zone” (HL Deb 28 





Given that Britain presented herself in this role she could not remain a bystander. It is 
important to again highlight the power of representational practices. As I discussed 
earlier, the need to take action and British duty were based on representing Gaddafi as 
“the threat”.   
Britain’s role as guarantor and protector of people’s rights, freedom and democracy 
did not end with Libya. In fact it is possible to observe how it was seen as applicable 
to the wider context of the Arab Spring. In respect to the situation in the Middle East 
and North Africa Cameron argued that “what is happening in the wider Middle East 
is one of those once-in-a-generation opportunities—a moment when history turns a 
page. The next page may not be written, and it falls to us to seize this chance to fashion 
a better future for the region, to build a better relationship between our peoples, and to 
make a new start” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c26). Likewise, Hague argued that “it 
is vital for the people of these countries and the rest of the world that the international 
community play a coherent and ambitious role in supporting their aspirations. The 
British government are deeply committed to that endeavor” (HC Deb 7 March 2011, 
c645).  
Most revelatory as to Britain’s role as facilitator for democracy is Lord Soley’s 
statement in the Lords where he argued that  
we should look at this as a process where our role is to encourage and promote, 
without being embarrassed about it, democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights. These are not just western concepts. Many societies throughout history 
and around the world have shown these attributes; they might not have used 
the same words or the same structures, but that is what they have done. There 
is bound to be a natural desire for freedom in people, and we need to stand up 
and speak for it. (HL Deb 01 April 2011, c1478)  
According to this, Britain becomes the spokesperson for all those people who wish to 
turn to democracy. Since they have had it for a long time this in a sense gives them a 
certain know-how and the ability to play a role in assisting the people of this region to 





Despite the fact that the British believed they had a role to play in the wider Middle 
East and North Africa in respect to democracy and freedom they only intervened 
militarily in Libya. Human rights violations were also taking place in other countries 
in the region. However, Britain did not follow the same line of action as it did in Libya. 
Was it a lack of ability or willingness which precluded responses such as the one in 
Libya to extend to other countries in the region? The government’s official position 
regarding inaction outside Libya was expressed by the Prime Minister in various 
debates in both Houses of Parliament in the following way: “the fact that you cannot 
do the right thing everywhere does not mean that you should not do the right thing 
somewhere” (HC Deb 18 March 2011, c619). A variation of this was also articulated 
in discussions relating to the situation in Syria. Hague argued that “we will always do 
what we can to protect people’s freedom of expression, but of course we are not 
universally able to do so in every country of the world” (HC Deb 07 June 2011, c38).  
Action in Libya and inaction elsewhere in the region was justified in Britain by 
differentiating Libya from other cases in the region. For example Cameron made the 
case that “what is happening in Libya is different. The situation is that of a people 
rising up against their leaders and wanting a more democratic future, and then us 
watching as, potentially, those people are destroyed by that dictator” (HC Deb 18 
March 2011, c619). Coinciding with this, Hague argued that  
The United Kingdom believes that the people of all these countries must be 
able to determine their own futures. That is why in all of them we argue for 
reform not repression, and why in Libya, supported by the full authority of the 
United Nations, we have acted to save many lives threatened by one of the 
most repressive regimes of them all. This will continue to be our approach as 
change continues to gather pace in the Middle East. (HC Deb 24 March 2011, 
c1115) 
Accordingly, Libya was in a sense unique owed to the extent of Gaddafi’s repression 





Moving on, unlike other countries experiencing the Arab Spring, in Libya Britain and 
the international community invoked the R2P. The latter, I argue, enabled the 
development of a narrative displaying an older British paternalistic attitude. This 
becomes evident when we look at British discourses on Libya focusing on Britain’s 
ability, its history and military capacity to intervene which can be seen as the basis 
upon which feelings of duty and responsibility vis-à-vis Libya originated. Essentially 
it requires looking at how the need for British involvement in Libya was justified.  
In responding to his constituents’ questions regarding the need for British involvement 
in Libya Dan Jarvis (MP (Lab) for Barnsley Central) stated  
It is because we have no real choice. This country has a long history of standing 
up for justice and the rule of law, of standing up for the protection of the 
vulnerable and of standing up for the men, women and children whose own 
Governments have persecuted and abandoned them. Our country and our 
people should not walk by on the other side of the street, ignoring the weak, 
the lost, the unprotected and the dispossessed. Walking on by is not an option 
because we know that the right thing to do is to stand up for others when we 
can and when it is legally and morally the right thing to do. (HC Deb 5 April 
2011, c939) 
This brings forth how the British represented their role in Libya, which related to a 
British way of doing things reflected through history. In this narrative the Libyan 
people embody the group identified by Jarvis as “the weak, the lost and the 
unprotected”. 
By representing the Libyan people in this manner the British had a duty and 
responsibility to react, to help them as they could not do it on their own. This is in line 
with a third element I ascribe to paternalism, difference/incompetence. Additionally, 
duty and responsibility are seen in terms not of Britain’s role but in terms of what it 
means to be British. For example, Malcolm Bruce (Gordon) (LD) argued that “the UK 





this is not a hugely British responsibility—other than the fact that we are the kind of 
people we are” (HC Deb 5 April 2011, c937). 
British involvement in Libya was also expressed in terms of a British and Western 
ability. Soon after resolution 1970 was passed by the UN, Cameron called for the need 
to prepare contingency plans arguing that “it is the job of leaders in the western world 
in particular to prepare for all eventualities and all the things that might happen, 
particularly if Colonel Gaddafi unleashes more things on his own people” (HC Deb 2 
March 2011, c292). This not only brings forth a sense of responsibility to lead 
preparations in the event of an escalation in Libya but also a sense of superiority and 
know-how.   
This Western or even British ability to meet the challenges brought about by the 
situation in Libya is further reflected in Cameron’s explanation regarding the need for 
Britain to be part of the group of countries implementing SCR 1973:  
We have one of the finest armed services in the world. We are one of the 
world’s leading military powers, and we also have huge strength in diplomacy, 
soft power and development. We should not play a disproportionate part, but I 
think that we should play a proportionate part alongside allies such as France, 
America and the Arab world. (HC Deb 18 March 2011, c629) 
The existence of representational practices in British discourses on Libya has already 
been referred to above. I showed how identifying negatively with the Libyan people 
enabled a British sense of duty and responsibility to come forth. It equally reinforced 
calls to action. The British felt that they had to swoop in and save, protect the people 
because they were represented as suffering, as victims. Alongside these negative 
representations, British discourses also included positive representations of the Libyan 
people. The British identified with them because they were fighting back and because 
they were fighting for democracy.  
This point is reflected in Ann Clwyd’s (MP (Lab) for Cynon Valley) argument vis-a-





February 28 she said “I think that we all wish to record our tremendous admiration for 
the courage and tenacity of the Libyan people—men, women and children—who are 
fighting the dictator with their bare hands” (HC Deb 28 February 2011, c35). 
Comparably Cameron argued “We should support and say how much we admire those 
brave people who are standing up in their own country asking for greater freedoms 
and greater democracy—for things that we take for granted in our own country” (HC 
Deb 2 March 2011, c297).  
With this admiration comes a positive identification. The British identified with the 
Libyan people because they were fighting for a democratic future. This by no means 
meant that they represented them as “the self”. If this were the case there wouldn’t be 
a need to intervene on their behalf. Hence, on the continuum of “the self” and “the 
other”, the Libyan people occupied a position that saw them moving closer to “the 
self” and distanced from “the other”. The mixture of positive and negative 
representations of the Libyan people is reflected in Cameron’s statement in the 
Commons. While praising them for their efforts he argued “they took the initiative, 
although we were able to help them” (HC Deb 5 September 2011, c45). Underlying 
this is the idea that it was a British push that eventually enabled them to stand a chance.  
Up until now I have demonstrated that there is a basis to the argument that the 
invocation of R2P in Libya enabled an older British paternalistic attitude to resurface. 
The British pointed to their role as protectors of the people of Libya and the guarantors 
of human rights and democracy as a result of a certain British ability and historical 
precedent. Additionally practices of representation whereby “the self” is differentiated 
from “the other” enabled the articulation of a narrative in which the Libyans were 
victims, the Gaddafi regime “the threat” to be abolished and Britain the saviour.  
Is this specific to Britain, or is it possible to observe this in the practice and discourse 
of other countries involved in the multilateral military intervention in Libya? A look 
at French parliamentary debates on resolution 1973 (22 March) and on the 
prolongation of the ongoing military intervention (12 July 2011) reveals parallels with 





R2P case, French parliamentarians expressed an older French paternalistic attitude. As 
expected, protection and responsibility appeared prominently in French discourse, a 
result of applying the R2P principle on Libya. More generally, French discourse lines 
up with that of the British.  
In terms of intent, the French justified the military intervention as being for the 
protection and defense of the Libyan people. This is reflected in PM Francois Fillon’s 
statement to the Assemblée Nationale on March 22: “Il s’agit de protéger la population 
libyenne tout en excluant explicitement l’envoi d’une force d’occupation au sol” (“It 
is about protecting the Libyan people, while excluding the possibility of sending an 
occupying force on the ground”; Assemblée Nationale, 22 March). Although French 
and British discourses share similarities in terms of the way paternalism is expressed, 
they are also differentiated by the way in which the concept of responsibility is 
discussed. This is why I have termed what is being expressed in French discourse as 
French paternalism. 
In the case of France, the feeling of responsibility attached to France’s past, to its 
historical record. A vivid example of this is the argument brought forward by Jean-
Marc Ayrault, representing the leftist parties in the March 22 debate in the Assemblée 
Nationale:  
Nous sommes le pays de la liberté. Nous pensions avoir tout écrit. D’autres 
peuples renouvellent dans leur langue, aven leur alphabet, ce formidable élan 
qui nous inspire depuis 1789. Il était de notre responsabilité qu’il ne s’arrête 
pas aux portes de Benghazi, pour que les peuples arabes puissent écrire chacun 
leur histoire. Notre fierté est de les accompagner, sans les précéder, ni les 
abandonner. (“We are the country of liberty. We thought we had written 
everything. Other people in other countries are renewing in their language, and 
alphabet, this fantastic momentum that has inspired us since 1789. It was our 
responsibility that it did not stop at the gates of Benghazi, so that the Arab 
people could each write their own history. Our pride is to accompany them, 





According to this, France had a responsibility towards the Libyan people because she 
represents freedom and liberty. Consequently, her role was to facilitate, to help those 
who sought to attain it. Underneath this is the belief that France has the know-how 
required and was willing to share it with other peoples. Further, discourses reveal that 
responsibility in France was equated with a French “honor”. Just like in the case of 
Britain, the feeling of responsibility and duty refers to “who we are” (British, French) 
and the role that each one prescribes for themselves, or is prescribed by historical 
precedent.  
8.2.3 Conclusion  
This chapter engaged with the literature relating to the R2P principle with two 
objectives in mind. The first was to identify the way in which paternalism manifested 
itself in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in the twenty first century by 
taking the case of the 2011 intervention in Libya. The second was to reveal continuity 
between Libya and past British interventionary practice and discourse. In light of these 
two objectives, the chapter first addressed the conceptual underpinnings of the R2P 
principle presenting the main concepts defining it: protection and responsibility. Next, 
it shifted attention to R2P in practice, engaging with existing empirical investigations 
of the Libyan 2011 intervention. Finally, the case of Libya was analysed and 
paternalism’s defining elements were presented. Britain’s involvement was analysed 
in relation to the two lines of response: sanctions and military action.  
There are a number of significant observations and conclusions to be drawn from what 
has been presented in this chapter. The first relates to the R2P concept itself. At its 
core the concept is paternalistic. This has been pointed out by Philip Cunliffe. In 
relation to state responsibility, he contends that the R2P results in states having 
“responsibilities for their people rather than to their people” (2010, p. 81; 2016, p. 
233). The R2P enables a national and an international form of paternalism to develop. 
I argue that the international responsibility to protect conceptually presupposes and 





two. On the one side are those who protect and on the other side those who are being 
protected.  
Even though the R2P as adopted by the UNGA does not explicitly mention which 
states are more prone to intervention it still creates a taxonomy. No one expects that 
the R2P will in the foreseeable future be applied to a Western state. This has been 
suggested by the invocation and application of the R2P exclusively for the following 
countries: Cote D’Ivoire, Libya, the DRC, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, North Korea, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka and Syria. Additionally, authority is vested in the 
UNSC and its five permanent members who have the final say as to whether a military 
intervention will be undertaken. This places them in a position of power. Although 
this is not new as it predates the formulation of the R2P, it is still important.  
Equally significant observations can be made when the R2P is put into practice. The 
case of Libya demonstrates that the hierarchy and inequality on which the concept is 
built transfers from theory to practice. It is the constant presence of paternalism in the 
practice and discourse of Western states that perpetuates the hierarchy and inequality 
of the international system. Some are protectors whereas others are protected. Some 
have responsibilities because of their status as protectors of values and human kind. 
This brings forward another important conclusion relating to the R2P and paternalism. 
The case of Libya has illustrated how the invocation of the R2P enabled the 
development of a paternalistic narrative. The R2P functions as a platform allowing 
paternalism to flourish. This does not only apply to Britain. A review conducted of 
parliamentary debates in France has shown the existence of an older French 
paternalistic attitude in relation to the intervention in Libya. Consequently, by framing 
the intervention in R2P terms it enables a single country or even the international 
community to sustain a narrative where some are the protectors of the vulnerable 
people inhabiting the earth. For example, British discourses on Libya show that the 
British discussed responsibility and obligation in terms of a whole “international 





terms emphasizing Britain’s ability and the role it has played through history as a 
protector of the vulnerable. 
That the R2P serves as a platform, or enables paternalism to express itself once a case 
of atrocity crimes is seen to fall under its purview, has been demonstrated by taking 
into account the wider context in which the case of Libya took place. Although Britain 
represented itself as being the protector of human rights and freedom in the Middle 
East and North Africa, parliamentarians did not express themselves in the same way 
as they did on Libya. The terms responsibility/duty, protection do not appear in 
discussions relating to the Arab Spring. The British government and parliamentarians 
did voice concern about the situation in Syria and did take steps in order to secure a 
UNSC resolution in order to apply sanctions. Despite this activism, British discourse 
and representations on Syria did not resemble those expressed on Libya.    
The argument advanced in this chapter according to which the R2P is not new but 
rather a repackaging of something old, also holds true for the practices involved. I 
acknowledge that Libya is but one example of the R2P in practice, as I acknowledge 
that it is the only case featuring the use of force under Pillar III. Policies pursued in 
Libya, namely the no-fly zone, and the use of air power to protect civilians are by no 
means new methods for ensuring this protection.  In fact these same measures were 
employed by Britain and NATO in 1999 in Kosovo.    
The case of Libya also revealed the simultaneous existence of paternalistic 
justifications and national interest considerations. That British Parliamentarians 
justified the intervention as benefiting their national interests and the Libyan people 
does not undermine my argument. As discussed above, a broader contextualization 
shows that invoking the national interest alongside moral arguments was indispensable 
to acquire the backing of the British Parliament because Iraq was not such a distant 
memory. Weariness and fatigue necessitated such a line of argument.  
All in all, this chapter challenges the argument put forth by scholars according to 
which the R2P signals a new normative development guiding the international 





paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in Libya reveals the 
existence of an older British paternalist attitude. Consequently, I argue that the R2P is 
not new, but can be seen as repackaging the principle of humanitarian intervention 





















The aim of this research has been to counter the existing literature on interventionism 
and demonstrate continuity in the interventionary practice and discourse of states 
through paternalism, taking Britain as a test case. To achieve this objective, I 
developed a holistic working definition of paternalism following a critical and multi-
disciplinary assessment of the gaps and limitations of existing conceptualizations and 
empirical examinations of this phenomenon (Chapter 3). As per the comparative 
methodology of this research, I then deployed my conceptual framework to first 
identify the particularities of British paternalism by reconstructing the socio-
ideological history of English domestic paternalism from the eighteenth to the 
twentieth century, and showing its first deployment toward England’s closest 
neighbours (Chapter 4).  
The characteristics defining British paternalism identified in Chapter 4 were then 
employed to detect it in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse in four 
distinctive historical periods, each of which showcased several key case-studies 
mirroring those used in the literature this thesis aims to challenge (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 
and 8). Within each of these empirical chapters, continuity in British paternalism has 
been systematically exposed. What remains is to demonstrate continuity in Britain’s 
interventionary practice and discourse throughout the historical periods examined in 
this thesis. This will be accomplished in the following section. Following this, the 
chapter will summarize the main contributions and implications of this research, and 
critically consider some of its limitations while suggesting avenues for future research. 
  
9.1 General Conclusions: Demonstrating the Continuity of 
British Paternalism from the Eighteenth Century Onwards 
Each individual case of British interventionism has its own peculiarities as was 





Yet, what follows will present the elements of continuity and change I have previously 
identified throughout the empirical Chapters 5-8. Common to all three cases 
investigated during the nineteenth century (Greece 1821-27, India 1830-60, the Sudan 
1896-98) were justifications espousing benevolence, negative representations of the 
subjects intervened upon, references to civilization and representations of British 
superiority. British practices of intervention were justified as undertaken to benefit the 
population of each territory, notwithstanding differences in wording. All subjects 
intervened upon were represented in a negative manner, differentiated from British 
perceptions of “the self”, and identified as constituting “the other”. British obligation 
and duty towards India and the Sudan were based on such negative representations, as 
were justifications of protection relating to all three territories. Additionally in both 
obligation and duty were manifested through Britain’s perceived role. In relation to 
Egypt, Britain was a trustee and in India she held the role of educator. British 
superiority was articulated in terms of military capabilities (Greece and the Sudan) 
and by way of culture, language, race and knowledge (India).  
As pertains to practices of representation, while Britain identified with Greece and 
Egypt, placing them closer to conceptions of “the self”, protection in both cases was 
justified on the lines of incompetence and difference. Further, although Britain 
pursued distinct policies and acted in various ways in the three cases investigated, all 
were protective in nature. In Greece the British intervened militarily to ensure the 
physical protection of the population. In a similar manner, the British protected the 
territorial integrity of Egypt and the inhabitants of the Sudan by defeating the 
Dervishes. During the Mandate period British administration and policies in 
education, agriculture and land were justified in both mandates (Palestine and 
Tanganyika) as being for the benefit of each respective community. Obligation and 
duty manifested themselves in similar ways in Palestine and Tanganyika. They 
emanated from the League of Nations and Britain’s acquisition of the mandates and 
were further accentuated by Britain’s perceived role as “trustee”. 
Practices of representation also fostered feelings of obligations and duty. Just like 





subjects of intervention resulted in feelings of obligation and duty. As regards 
practices and policies pursued by the British administration in Palestine and 
Tanganyika they exemplified protection. Protection took two forms, protection from 
harm and protection from one’s self (protection as development). Protection as 
development was most pronounced in Tanganyika stemming from its classification as 
a Class B mandate by the League of Nations, a classification based upon a territory’s 
stage of development. Moreover practices of representation in the two mandates 
exemplified more nuances on the self-other spectrum. While the Jews (especially 
European Jews) in Palestine occupied a position more closely associated with 
conceptions of “the self”, the African natives of Tanganyika were represented as “the 
other” based on conceptions of civilization. Placed between British conceptions of 
“the self” and “the other” was the Arab Muslim community of Palestine. British 
interventionary practices, discourses and representations in both mandates shared 
aspects with British colonial policy in Africa.   
Similarly to what has been presented so far, in the third historical period (1945-1999) 
examined, all elements defining British paternalism manifested themselves. 
Benevolence was present in all three cases (German reconstruction, Malaysian 
confrontation and Kosovo) in justifications offered for the different policies pursued. 
Obligation and duty was based on Britain’s perceived international role. In Germany 
and Malaysia this role pertained to the maintenance of peace and security, democratic 
principles and the containment of communism. In Kosovo Britain’s role related to 
upholding such values as human rights. Obligation and duty also resulted from 
Agreements and Treaties Britain was a party to (Germany and Malaysia). In the case 
of Kosovo obligation and duty were fueled by Britain’s membership in NATO. 
Further, the inhabitants of the territories and parties to conflicts were differentiated 
from the British and represented as “the other”. The Germans were represented as “the 
other” as a result of their character (aggressiveness) and also because of the 
unwillingness on the part of the British to distinguish between a German and a Nazi. 
In contrast, in Malaysia and Kosovo British representations evidenced various levels 





“the other” because of their status as victims. On the other hand Indonesia and the Serb 
Security forces constituted “the other” because they embodied the threat. This was 
also the case with justifications calling for the need of protection, in which the subjects 
of intervention figured as “the other”. The policies and practices initiated by Britain 
in the three cases can be classified as protective. In Kosovo and Malaysia protection 
meant territorial or physical protection. In the case of Germany, protection translated 
into development and ultimately involved protecting the Germans from themselves. 
The British were to rebuild the country entirely by focusing on its industry, economy, 
administration and education.  
The last historical period studied looked at the most current type of interventionism 
associated with the R2P concept and examined the intervention in Libya. Here 
benevolence was incorporated in justifications regarding the application of sanctions 
on the Gaddafi regime and on the issue of military action. The need to apply sanctions 
on the Gaddafi regime was justified as being for the benefit of the Libyan population, 
since ultimately they were hoped to push Gaddafi out. The intervention was also 
justified on the grounds of protecting the Libyan population. 
British duty and responsibility manifested itself in multiple ways. First its presence 
resulted from the invocation of the R2P principle. Duty and responsibility were 
articulated in wider terms referring to the international community as a whole. Also 
Britain’s ability and its role, viewed historically, as the protector of vulnerable people 
and communities also fueled obligation and duty. Further, the Libyan people were 
represented in both a negative and positive way. They were represented as victims, 
unable to defend themselves. However, the British also identified with the Libyan 
people because they were fighting for democracy. As for the practices undertaken in 
Libya, they fell into two categories: military and diplomatic. The military campaign 
(air and sea) conducted by a coalition of states, led by Britain, the US and France had 
as their objective the protection of the civilian population. On the diplomatic side, 
Britain provided material and practical help to the NTC, thereby enabling the rebels 





The above makes apparent the similarities pertaining to each element characteristic of 
paternalism. Across the periods examined the various practices and policies pursued 
by Britain were justified as being for the benefit of the subject of intervention. 
Obligation/duty/responsibility were based on considerations regarding Britain’s role, 
its superiority and practices of differentiation that resulted in representing the subject 
of intervention as “the other”. Britain’s role as educator persisted, featuring in India, 
Tanganyika, Palestine and Germany. What is more, in certain cases 
obligation/duty/responsibility ensued from positively identifying with the people in 
whose territory Britain intervened. This was the case with the Greeks and Egyptians 
in the nineteenth century and with European Jews during the Mandate period. 
Protection, the third element defining paternalism, was present in both British 
practices and discourses. The need for protection was justified by representations of 
otherness. The Greeks, Indians, Sudanese, the Arab and non-Arab communities in 
Palestine, Tanganyikans, Germans, Malaysians, Kosovo Albanians and Libyans were 
all seen as being different to the British, thus constituting the other. This reflects 
something particular of British paternalism, the paternalist’s need to protect will 
almost certainly rely on representations of difference and incompetence. 
Indeed these groups were systematically depicted as incompetent. Incompetence took 
various forms ranging from their intellectual, military, cultural abilities and 
capabilities to their status as victims. For example, the Greeks, the Sudanese, the 
Kosovar Albanians and the Libyans were all depicted as victims suffering at the hands 
of oppressors and unable to defend themselves. In terms of practices, all were 
protective in nature. A parallel can be made regarding practices in education in India, 
Germany, Palestine and Tanganyika. Protection here referred to enabling cultural and 
intellectual development. The English language and English institutions and culture 
were seen as key.  
Finally, the British established a demarcation between themselves and the inhabitants 
of territories in which they intervened. In British eyes these people were represented 
as “the other”. It is important to note at this point that practices of differentiation did 





demonstrated differentiation was quite nuanced including such categories – as I have 
defined them – as “the self but not quite”. Additionally on the self-other continuum 
certain peoples were placed closer to “the self” or closer to “the other” or at different 
other points in between.  
Let us now consider the issue of change across the historical periods studied. 
Accounting for change period by period allows to identify the presence of a pattern or 
an evolution in paternalism. It involves looking at change in the manifestation of 
paternalism in conjunction with changes taking place in the context, norms and 
language. Let us first look at the colonial and mandate period. Although conceptions 
about the superiority of certain races over others persisted some changes did take 
place. During the mandate period race but also the stage of a territory’s development 
were at the basis of practices of differentiation. The binary civilized/uncivilized, 
present during the nineteenth century, was accompanied by that of advanced/non-
advanced. The two periods are also differentiated by the manifestation of 
obligation/duty. During the mandate period religion no longer fostered feelings of 
obligation and duty. This is also applicable to the historical periods that followed.  
Moreover practices of protection underwent a shift. During the colonial period 
protection signified physical protection as was the case in Greece and the Sudan and 
protection from one’s self as was the case in India. In contrast, in the Mandate period 
practices of protection focused exclusively on protecting the Arab and non-Arab 
communities in Palestine and the Tanganyikans from themselves. Focus was directed 
on developing these communities (economically, politically and intellectually) so that 
they could at a certain point be able to exercise self-government. In presenting these 
changes it is important to note that on most aspects the colonial period and the mandate 
period shared many similarities. The introduction of the Mandate System in 1919 did 
not radically alter British practice, ideology and discourse but rather established in 
international law policies and language previously in use. For example the concept of 
trust and development informed the practices, discourses and representations of the 





More radical changes are observed when moving from the Mandate period to that of 
1945-1999. The first relates to obligation/duty and Britain’s perceived role. During 
the Mandate period feelings of obligation and duty resulted from Britain’s role as 
“trustee” vis-à-vis Palestine and Tanganyika. In contrast during 1945-1999 Britain’s 
role changed. Both in Germany and Malaysia Britain felt it had a duty and an 
obligation to maintain peace, security and democratic principles as well as contain 
communism. In Kosovo Britain’s role related to upholding values such as human 
rights. These changes were in line with normative developments (UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, Genocide Convention), Britain’s foreign policy, the Cold War and the 
absence of war. Benevolence also manifested itself in distinct ways. Justifications 
shifted from the particular to the general and back to the particular. For example in 
both mandates, Britain justified the policies pursued as being for the benefit of the 
population. In contrast from 1945-1989 policies pursued in Germany and Malaysia 
were justified through a more general approach. Finally after 1989 the British once 
again justified their policies as being for the benefit of the subjects of intervention 
(Kosovar Albanians).  
The basis upon which differentiation was constructed also changed. It was no longer 
about civilization and race but rather about character. For instance the Germans were 
represented as “the other” because of their aggressiveness. “Otherness” also resulted 
from representing certain peoples as “victims”, as was the case in Malaysia and 
Kosovo. Finally, the objective of British policy and practices during 1945-1999 varied 
as was the case during the nineteenth century. Protection referred to physical 
protection, the protection of territory and the protection from one’s self. Lastly, change 
is also identified when moving from 1945-99 to the twenty first century. The most 
significant change identified relates to the manifestation of obligation, duty and 
responsibility. In the case of Libya, duty and responsibility figured in the discourses 
of the British political elite as a result of invoking the R2P principle. In saying this it 
is also important to note that Britain’s perception of its role vis-à-vis human rights, 
and democracy also underpinned their discourse of duty and responsibility as did their 





On the whole this comparison has demonstrated the argument of continuity regarding 
British interventionism advanced in this research. Despite changes occurring in the 
context in which interventions are undertaken, normative developments and changes 
in language and justifications, the elements constituting paternalism are consistently 
present across the historical periods investigated. As shown above, it is the definition 
of incompetence that changes, the basis of incompetence, the basis of obligation. It is 
also the manner in which distinctions are articulated that change due to what is seen 
as commonly accepted and politically correct at the time. Moreover what is viewed as 
worth fighting for is equally subject to change (independence of a nation, economic, 
political and intellectual development, civilization, territorial integrity, human rights, 
humanity, democracy or security). This stands in opposition to the literature on 
humanitarian intervention and R2P, which argues that interventions since the end of 
the Cold War have undergone significant change due to changes in the international 
normative landscape.  
9.2 Thesis Contributions 
All in all this research brings forth three important conclusions. The first relates to 
continuity and change in British interventionism. This thesis has demonstrated the 
continuity of British paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse, 
thus countering current interpretations in the literature stressing change in 
interventionism in the Post-Cold War era. Second, the thesis identified the grounding 
of British external paternalism in a long social, political, and ideological history of 
internal English paternalism. Finally it has brought forth the alignment of recent 
international norms (R2P) with the same type of paternalism that has been practiced 
by British elites over the period considered. 
This thesis thereby contributes in a number of ways to academic discussions on 
interventionism. The approach adopted here to account for continuity and change in 
Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse carries an ontological significance. As 





such sheds light on the nature of interventionist practice and ideology. The literature 
on interventionism focuses on international organizations and rarely looks at state 
interventionary practice and discourse. In contrast by focusing on the interventionary 
practice and discourse of states through the prism of paternalism, this thesis 
contributes by highlighting important aspects of state interventionism.  
The first refers to practices of representation underlying Britain’s interventionism. 
This research has shown that the self is constantly differentiated from the subjects of 
intervention. The self-other spectrum displays nuances, going beyond the binary self-
other. Even when the British political elite identify with the people inhabiting 
territories subject to intervention, ultimately discourses justifying the need for 
protection rest on representing these people as “the other”.  This shows that 
interventionist behavior has not altered due to the expansion of humanity, as argued 
by scholars working on humanitarian intervention. Rather, as I have argued 
interventionism is based on conceptions of superiority and inferiority. On the one side 
is the group who protects and on the other those who are protected. The humans who 
are in need of protection are represented as different to those affording that protection. 
The increased number of interventions in the Post-Cold War era, then should not be 
viewed as a result of expanding conceptions of humanity, because the very 
paternalistic nature of such interventions falsifies this view. 
The second aspect of state interventionism highlighted in this thesis is the relationship 
between the domestic and international realms in which states operate. I located British 
paternalism within a longer history accounting for its manifestation in England and its 
exportation to foreign countries.  To date the relationship between these two realms 
has not attracted enough scholarly attention. As was shown in Chapter 4, practices, 
discourses and representations at work in England were systematically reproduced and 
exported in the periphery. When exported outside, notably in Ireland, English 
paternalism retained its constitutive features (hierarchy/inequality, duty/obligation, 





Such parallels were also observed in the international cases and throughout the 
historical periods examined in this research. Hierarchy and inequality were central 
aspects of eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century English society, as its people 
were differentiated through religion, class, and property. The same pattern of hierarchy 
and inequality were also characteristic of Britain’s relations with the subjects of her 
interventions examined in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. The representation of the poor in 
England sustained the un-equal character of society. In the same way the 
representation of the Greeks, Indians, Sudanese, the Arab and non-Arab communities 
in Palestine, Tanganyikans, Germans, Malaysians, Kosovo Albanians and Libyans as 
“the other” sustained hierarchic and un-equal relations between the protector and the 
protected, the savior and the victim, the educator and the educated.  
It is important to note that the conclusions drawn from examining the domestic and 
external manifestation of British paternalism cannot be generalized to other countries. 
This is because it cannot be presumed that all states manifest the same kind of 
paternalism. However, the importance and value of examining the domestic and 
external realm that given states operate in has been efficiently brought forth, thereby 
highlighting the importance of taking it into account when addressing other potential 
examples. Further, by establishing continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and 
discourse the thesis makes the wider role of state paternalism distinctively visible. 
Chapter 8 on Libya has demonstrated that progressively paternalism has become 
embedded within international norms on interventionism. The R2P, presented by the 
literature as the most recent normative development guiding interventionism, is itself 
paternalistic. Conceptually, the R2P presupposes and rests on hierarchy and inequality 
in the international system. It divides the world in two. On the one side are those who 
protect and on the other side are those who are being protected. Therefore when the 
R2P was invoked in Libya, it mediated the deployment of a prior paternalistic narrative 






Let us now address the methodological limitations of this research. The first relates to 
the selection of cases examined. Given that Britain intervened extensively throughout 
history and across the globe, I could have looked at other cases of British 
interventionism. However, case-study selection was dictated by the existing empirical 
literature that my research aimed to conclusively critique. This methodological choice 
allowed me to counter the arguments in the dominant literature regarding change in 
the interventionary practice and discourse of states and intergovernmental 
organizations. A similar rationale applied to the historical periods investigated.  
The second limitation pertains to data collection and my focus on texts. In terms of 
primary data I examined correspondence between British officials and policy 
documents available at the National Archives in Kew pertaining to all cases 
investigated, except the most recent case of Libya. I was bound by the official nature 
of these texts, as not everything was included in them. Additionally, a substantial 
amount was unavailable, either destroyed or missing. I also analyzed debates in the 
British Parliament, which included more information. In these debates 
Parliamentarians spoke more freely. Sensitive information pertaining to Britain’s 
foreign policy or strategizing were not, however, disclosed. The secondary sources I 
consulted included British newspapers, historical accounts and analyses. By looking 
at British newspapers I could further shed lights on British public opinion and identify 
parallels with the discourse of the British political elite.  
Historical accounts and analyses enabled me to acquire background information 
regarding each case examined. Methodologically this approach allowed for an all-
encompassing and thorough investigation and understanding of the practice, discourse 
and representation of the British political elite in each historical period. I looked at the 
British political elite because they are those who make policy in Britain. Instead of 
focusing on texts, I could have conducted interviews with people constituting this 
political elite. This would have allowed me to acquire information directly from the 





the historical and comparative nature of the research this would not have been possible 
throughout, and hence not efficient argumentatively. 
The next limitation speaks to the approach followed. Instead of pursuing an 
ethnographic approach I chose to provide historical depth. The historical approach I 
adopted was the most suited to the objective set for this research, being to demonstrate 
continuity in Britain’s interventionary practice and discourse since the earliest periods 
covered in the existing literature. It allowed me to examine Britain’s social history and 
trace Britain’s foreign policy to its domestic policy, and identify what is characteristic 
of British paternalism by going as far back as eighteenth century English society. Had 
I employed an ethnographic approach I would have been able to gain firsthand 
knowledge from British policy-makers and observe them in their environment at a 
time when Britain was involved in interventionism. However, this would have been 
impossible for the older cases examined. Equally, an ethnographic approach would 
not have been entirely fruitful in the most recent case examined (Libya) as it took place 
seven years ago, and comparing ethnographic information would not have been 
possible across the periods examined.  
The next limitation, already referred to above, applies to the generalizability of my 
findings. I investigated western state interventionism, focusing on one particular state. 
It cannot be presumed that paternalism as manifested in Britain’s interventionary 
practice and discourse is either similar or distinct to the paternalism of other states. 
Hence, it is not possible to offer general conclusions. Instead of adopting a historical 
specific approach to study paternalism in Britain’s interventionary practice and 
discourse, I could have compared Britain to other Western states or non-Western states 
such as China. This approach would have allowed me to identify what is specific to 
British paternalism and to other national paternalisms. However, this was not in line 
with the objective of this research. To effectively examine a state’s interventionary 






At this point, it is important to reiterate the conclusions I drew regarding R2P in 
Chapter 8. In this last empirical chapter I identified how international law became 
aligned with a very old state practice. Conceptually, the R2P revealed itself to be 
paternalistic. Equally in practice it acted as a platform enabling the development of a 
paternalistic narrative in Britain but also in France. Consequently, in future work it 
would be worth expanding this particular thread to look at other national paternalisms. 
France could prove to be an excellent candidate for this task. Non-western state 
paternalism could also be explored in view of the growing significance and influence 
of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) on the UNSC and on responses to 
atrocity crimes. Paternalism is not a concept reserved to Western states. Another 
possible avenue for future work is to examine how paternalism has affected other areas 
of international policy. Due to the fact that paternalism by nature develops in the 
context of un-equal relations it can be employed to examine policies relating to 
international development and democracy promotion in certain countries – two areas 
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d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs, 87(4), pp. 
825–850. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01006.x. 
Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P. D. (2012) ‘Principles, politics, and prudence: Libya, 
the responsibility to protect, and the use of military force’, Global Governance, 18(3), 
pp. 273–297. doi: 10.5555/1075-2846-18.3.273. 
Ben-Ishai, E. (2012) ‘The new paternalism: An analysis of power, state intervention, 
and autonomy’, Political Research Quarterly, 65(1), pp. 151–165. doi: 
10.1177/1065912910388183. 
Best, G. (1971) Mid-Victorian Britain: 1851-1875. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. 
Birley, R. (1950) ‘Education in the British Zone of Germany’, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 26(1), pp. 32–44. doi: 
10.2307/3016837. 
Birley, R. (1978) ‘British policy in retrospect’, in Hearnden, A. (ed.) The British in 
Germany : educational reconstruction after 1945. London: Hamilton. 
Black, J. (2001) Eighteenth-century Britain, 1688-1783. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Blair, T. (1998) The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century. London: Fabian 
Society. 
Blaquiere, E. (1825) Narrative of a second visit to Greece : including facts connected 





&c. London: Geo. B. Whittaker. 
Blue, G., Bunton, M. P. and Croizier, R. C. (2002) Colonialism and the modern world : 
selected studies. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
Bose, S. (1916) Some aspects of British rule in India. Iowa City: The University. 
Botsford, J. B. (1924) English society in the eighteenth century as influenced from 
oversea. New York: The Macmillan Company. 
Bourchier, J. (2012) Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (2001) Langage et pouvoir symbolique, Points essais. 
Briggs, A. (1961) ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European Journal of 
Sociology, 2(2), pp. 221–258. 
Brown, J. and Louis, R. (1999) ‘The Oxford History of the British Empire : The 
Twentieth Century’, Oxford History of the British Empire, 4. 
Brown, S. J. (2008) Providence and Empire 1815-1914: Religion, Politics and Society 
in the United Kingdom. Harlow: Pearson Education. 
Brundage, A. (2002) The English poor laws 1700-1930. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Buchanan, A. (1978) ‘Medical Paternalism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7(4), pp. 
370–390. 
Buchanan, D. R. (2008) ‘Autonomy, paternalism, and justice: Ethical priorities in 
public health’, American Journal of Public Health, pp. 15–21. doi: 
10.2105/AJPH.2007.110361. 
Bueger, C. (2013) ‘Practice, Pirates and Coast Guards: the grand narrative of Somali 
piracy’, Third World Quarterly, 34(10), pp. 1811–1827. doi: 
10.1080/01436597.2013.851896. 






Burke-White, W. W. (2012) ‘Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect’, in Genser, J. 
and Cotler, I. (eds) The responsibility to protect : the promise of stopping mass 
atrocities in our time. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burrows, P. (1993) ‘Patronising paternalism’, Oxford Economic Papers, 45(4), pp. 
542–572. doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042107. 
Cain, P. and Hopkins, A. (2002) British Imperialism: 1688-2000. Harlow: Longman. 
Calic, M. J. (2000) ‘Kosovo in the twentieth century: A historical account’, in 
Schnabel, A. and Thakur, R. (eds) Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian 
Intervention : Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship. 
New York: United Nations University Press. 
Callahan, M. D. (2008) Mandates and empire : the League of Nations and Africa, 
1914-1931. Brighton: Sussex Acad. Press. 
Cameron, D. (1939) My Tanganyika service and some Nigeria,. London: G. Allen and 
Unwin. 
Cannadine, D. (2002) Ornamentalism : how the British saw their Empire. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Caplan, R. (2007) ‘From collapsing state neo-trusteeship: The limits to solving the 
problem of “precarious statehood” in the 21st century’, Third World Quarterly, 28(2), 
pp. 231–244. doi: 10.1080/01436590601153622. 
Charles, A. (1995) ‘Colonial discourse since christopher columbus’, Journal of Black 
Studies, 26(2), pp. 134–152. doi: 10.1177/002193479502600203. 
Checkland, S. (1983) British and Public Policy 1776–1939 : An Economic, Social and 
Political Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chesterman, S. (2000) Just war or just peace? : humanitarian intervention and 
international law. Oxford: Oxford Univesrity Press. 
Chesterman, S. (2004) You, The People The United Nations, Transitional 





Administration, and State-Building. doi: 10.1093/0199263485.001.0001. 
Chesterman, S. (2011) ‘“Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the 
Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya’, Ethics and 
International Affairs, 25(3), pp. 279–285. doi: 10.1017/S0892679411000190. 
Chidzero, B. T. (1961) Tanganyika and International Trusteeship. London: Oxford 
Univesrity Press. 
Chowdhry, G. and Nair, S. (2004) Power, postcolonialism, and international 
relations : reading race, gender, and class. London: Routledge. 
Chowdhuri, R. N. (1955) International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems : a 
Comparative Study. The Hague: Nijhoff. 
St. Clair, W. (1972) That Greece might still be free : the Philhellenes in the War of 
Independence. London: Oxford Univesrity Press. 
Cody, W. K. (2003) ‘Paternalism in nursing and healthcare: Central issues and their 
relation to theory’, Nursing Science Quarterly, 16(4), pp. 288–296. doi: 
10.1177/0894318403257170. 
Coulson, A. (1982) Tanzania : a political economy. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Cowles, L. (1990) ‘The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the 
Greek Question, 1825–1827’, The International History Review, 12(4), pp. 688–720. 
doi: 10.1080/07075332.1990.9640564. 
Crawford, N. C. (2002) ‘Argument and Change in World Politics Ethics, 
Decolonization and Humanitarian Interventiom’, International Studies. 
Crossman, V. (2013) Poverty and the Poor Law in Ireland 1850-1914. Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press. 
Cruikshank, B. (1999) The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 





protect”’, Review of International Studies, 36(S1), pp. 79–96. doi: 
10.1017/S0260210511000076. 
Cunliffe, P. (2016) ‘From ISIS to ICISS: A critical return to the Responsibility to 
Protect report’, Cooperation and Conflict, 51(2), pp. 233–247. doi: 
10.1177/0010836715612854. 
Cunliffe, P. (2017) ‘The doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” as a practice of 
political exceptionalism’, European Journal of International Relations, 23(2), pp. 
466–486. doi: 10.1177/1354066116654956. 
Daalder, I. H. and O’Hanlon, M. E. (2000) Winning ugly, NATO’s war to save Kosovo. 
Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
Daddow, O. J. and Gaskarth, J. (2011) British foreign policy : the New Labour years. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Daly, M. W. (2003) Empire on the Nile the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Darwin, J. (1984) ‘British Decolonization since 1945: A Pattern or a Puzzle?’, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12(2), pp. 187–209. doi: 
10.1080/03086538408582666. 
Davidson, J. W. (2013) ‘France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: An integrated 
analysis’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26(2), pp. 310–329. doi: 
10.1080/09557571.2013.784573. 
Davies, E. (1978) ‘British Policy and the schools’, in Hearnden, A. (ed.) The British 
in Germany : educational reconstruction after 1945. London: London : Hamilton, 
1978. 
Deng, F. M. (1996) Sovereignty as responsibility : conflict management in Africa. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Derrick, J. (2002) ‘The Dissenters: Anti-Colonialism in France, c. 1900–40’, in 





of Empire in France. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dighton, A. (2016) ‘Race, Masculinity and Imperialism: The British Officer and the 
Egyptian Army (1882–1899)’, War & Society, 35(1), pp. 1–18. 
van Dijk, T. A. (1997) Discourse as social interaction. London: Sage. 
Dougherty, M. I. (1966) ‘Tanganyika during the ‘twenties: a study of the social and 
economic development of Tanganyika under British mandate’, African Studies. Taylor 
& Francis Group, 25(4), pp. 197–226. doi: 10.1080/00020186608707244. 
Doyle, M. W. (2015) The question of intervention : John Stuart Mill and the 
responsibility to protect. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Duara, P. (2004) Decolonization : perspectives from now and then. London: 
Routledge. 
Duffield, M. (2009) ‘Liberal interventionism & the fragile State Linked by Design?’, 
in Duffield, M. and Hewitt, V. (eds) Empire, development & colonialism : the past in 
the present. Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, pp. 116–129. 
Duffield, M. and Hewitt, V. (2009) Empire, Development and Colonialism. Suffolk: 
Boydell & Brewer. 
Dumbuya, P. A. (1995) Tanganyika under International Mandate, 1919-1946. 
Lanham: University Press of America. 
Dunne, T. and Gelber, K. (2014) ‘Arguing matters: The responsibility to protect and 
the case of libya’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 6(3), pp. 326–349. doi: 
10.1163/1875984X-00603004. 
Dworkin, G. (1972) ‘Paternalism’, The Monist, 56(1), pp. 64–84. doi: 
10.2307/27902250. 
Dwyer, P. (2008) ‘The Conditional Welfare State’, in Powell, M. (ed.) Modernising 
the welfare state: The Blair legacy. Bristol: Polity Press. 






Edmunds, T., Gaskarth, J. and Porter, R. (2014) British foreign policy and the national 
interest : identity, strategy and security. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
El-Eini, R. (2006) Mandated landscape : British imperial rule in Palestine, 1929-
1948. London: Routledge. 
Engelbrekt, K., Mohlin, M. and Wagnsson, C. (2014) The NATO intervention in 
Libya : lessons learned from the campaign. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Englander, D. (1998) Poverty and Poor Law Reform in 19th Century Britain, 1834-
1914: From Chadwick to Booth. London: Routledge. 
Evans, G. (2008) ‘The responsibility to protect: An idea whose time has come ... and 
gone?’, International Relations, 22(3), pp. 283–298. doi: 
10.1177/0047117808094173. 
Evans, G. (2009) Statement by Gareth Evans at the UN General Assembly Informal 
Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/protect/evans.pdf. 
Evans, G. (2015) ‘The evolution of the responsibility to protect: from concept and 
principle to actionable norm’, in Thakur, R. and Maley, W. (eds) Theorising the 
Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–344. doi: 
10.1017/CBO9781139644518. 
Evans, G. (2016) ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’, 
in Goodin, R. E. and Fishkin, J. S. (eds) Political theory without borders. Chichester, 
UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Evans, G., Thakur, R. and Pape, R. A. (2013) ‘Correspondence: Humanitarian 
Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Security, 37(4), pp. 199–
214. doi: 10.1162/ISEC_c_00119. 
Fairclough, N. (2003) Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research., 





Falk, R. (1996) ‘The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order 
Challenge’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 17(2), pp. 491–514. 
Falk, R. (2011) ‘Preliminary Libyan Scorecard: Acting Beyond the UN Mandate’, 
Foreign Policy Journal. Available at: 
https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/09/08/preliminary-libyan-scorecard-
acting-beyond-the-u-n-mandate/. 
Farer, T. J. (2003) ‘Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: legality and 
legitimacy’, in Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane, R. (eds) Humanitarian intervention : 
ethical, legal and political dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (2004) ‘Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak 
States’, International Security, 28(4), pp. 5–43. doi: 10.1162/0162288041588296. 
Fieldhouse, D. K. (2006) Western imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958. Oxford: 
Oxford Univesrity Press. 
Finlay, G. (1877) A history of Greece from its conquest by the Romans to the present 
time. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Finlayson, G. (1994) Citizen, State and Social Welfare in Britain 1830-1990. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Finnemore, M. (2003) The purpose of intervention : changing beliefs about the use of 
force. London: Cornell University Press. 
Flowerdew, J. (2007) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis and Strategic Resistance’, in 
Bhatia, V. K., Flowerdew, J., and Jones, R. H. (eds) Advances in Discourse Studies, 
pp. 1–262. doi: 10.4324/9780203892299. 
Focarelli, C. (2008) ‘The responsibility to protect doctrine and humanitarian 
intervention: Too many ambiguities for a working doctrine’, Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law, 13(2), pp. 191–213. doi: 10.1093/jcsl/krn014. 
Foschepoth, J. (1986) ‘British Interest in the Division of Germany after the Second 






Frankel, J. (1975) British foreign policy : 1945-1973. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
Fraser, D. (2017) The Evolution of the British Welfare State. London: Palgrave. 
Fretloh-Thomas, S. (1998) ‘“Education for Democracy”: A New Analysis of an 
Example of Intercultural Influence.’, Oxford Review of Education, 24(3), pp. 379–403. 
doi: 10.1080/0305498980240308. 
Garland, L. (2012) ‘2011 Libyan civil war’. Delhi: White Word Publications. 
Available at: http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=841143. 
Gee, J. P. and Handford, M. (2012) The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis, 
The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis. doi: 10.4324/9780203809068.ch7. 
Glennerster, H. (2000) British Social Policy since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd. 
Goldman, A. (1979) ‘Germans and Nazis: The Controversy over “Vansittartism” in 
Britain during the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 14(1), pp. 
155–191. doi: 10.1177/002200947901400108. 
Goodell, G. E. (1985) ‘Paternalism, Patronage, and Potlatch: The Dynamics of Giving 
and Being Given To’, Current Anthropology, p. 247. doi: 10.1086/203252. 
Goodland, L. (2001) ‘Making the Working Man Like Me: Charity, Pastorship, and 
Middle-Class Identity in Nineteenth-Century Britain; Thomas Chalmers and Dr. 
James Phillips Kay’, Victorian Studies, 43(4), pp. 591–617. 
Gray, P. (2012) ‘Conceiving and constructing the Irish workhouse, 1836-45’, Irish 
Historical Studies, 38(149), pp. 22–35. 
Greenwood, S. (2000) Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91. London: Macmillan. 
Gregorian, R. (1991) CLARET operations and confrontation, 1964-1966. Fredericton, 





Hall, S. (2001) ‘Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse’, in Witherell, M. (ed.) 
Discourse, Theory and Practice: A Reader. London: Sage. 
Harris, J. (1994) The Penguin Social History of Britain: Private Lives Public Spirit: 
1870-1914. London: Penguin Books. 
Hay, D. (1998) ‘Patronage, Paternalism, and Welfare: Masters, Workers, and 
Magistrates in Eighteenth-Century England’, International Labor and Working-Class 
History, 53(53), pp. 27–48. doi: 10.1017/S014754790001365X. 
Hearnden, A. (1978) The British in Germany : educational reconstruction after 1945. 
London: Hamilton. 
Hechter, M. (1975) Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development 1536-1966. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Hehir, A. (2013a) ‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and 
the Responsibility to Protect’, International Security, 38(1), pp. 137–159. doi: 
10.1162/ISEC_a_00125. 
Hehir, A. (2013b) ‘The responsibility to protect as the apotheosis of liberal teleology’, 
in Hehir, A. and Murray, R. (eds) Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future 
of Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 34–57. doi: 10.1057/9781137273956. 
Hehir, A. (2016) ‘Assessing the influence of the Responsibility to Protect on the UN 
Security Council during the Arab Spring’, Cooperation and Conflict, 51(2), pp. 166–
183. doi: 10.1177/0010836715612849. 
Helman, G. B. and Ratner, S. R. (1993) ‘Saving Failed States’, Foreign Policy, 89(89), 
pp. 3–20. doi: 10.2307/1149070. 
Heraclides, A. and Dialla, A. (2015) Humanitarian Intervention in the Long 
Nineteenth Century. Manchester University Press. 
Hetherington, P. (1978) British paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940. London: Frank 
Cass. 





Studies, 48(3), pp. 395–438. doi: 10.1353/vic.2006.0123. 
Hidalgo Tenorio, E. (2011) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis, An overview’, Nordic 
Journal of English Studies, 10(1), pp. 183–210. 
Himmelfarb, G. (1985) The idea of poverty : England in the early industrial age. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
Hobson, J. M. (2012) The eurocentric conception of world politics: Western 
International Theory, 1760–2010, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: 
Western International Theory, 1760-2010. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139096829. 
Hodge, C. (2006) Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the Present. London: Routledge. 
Holme, R. (1992) ‘After Paternalism’, Political Quarterly, 63(4), pp. 404–412. 
Holmes, J. (2014) ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Humanitarian overview’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 6(2), pp. 126–145. doi: 10.1163/1875984X-00602003. 
Hopgood, S. (2014) ‘The Last Rites for Humanitarian Intervention: Darfur, Sri Lanka 
and R2P’, Global Responsibility to Protect. Leiden, 6(2), pp. 181–205. doi: 
10.1163/1875984X-00602006. 
Hopkins, M. F., Kandiah, M. and Gillian, S. (2003) Cold War Britain, 1945-1964 : 
new perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hopkinson, N. (1996) Humanitarian Intervention? London: HMSO. 
Horsman, R. (1976) ‘Origins of Racial Anglo-Saxonism in Great Britain before 1850’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 37(3), pp. 387–410. 
Hutchins, F. G. (1967) The illusion of permanence : British imperialism in India. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
ICISS (2001) The Responsibility to Protect - ICISS Document., Security. 
Ignatieff, M. (2002) ‘Intervention and state failure’, Dissent, 49(1), pp. 114–123. 
Jackman, M. R. (1994) The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, 





Jackson, R. H. (1998) ‘Surrogate Sovereignty ? Great Power Responsibility and " 
Failed States "’, (25), pp. 1–14. 
Jarausch, K. (2006) After Hitler Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995. New York: Oxford 
Univesrity Press. 
Jarayam, N. (2004) ‘Higher Education in India: Massification and Change’, in 
Altbach, P. G. and Umakoshi, T. (eds) Asian universities : historical perspectives and 
contemporary challenges. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Jones, C. and Novak, T. (1999) Poverty, Welfare and the Disciplinary State. London: 
Routledge. 
Jones, K. (2000) The Making of Social Policy in Britain: From the Poor Law to New 
Labour. New Jersey: The Athlone Press. 
Jones, M. (2001) Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965 : Britain, 
the United States, and the creation of Malaysia. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Jones, M. and Lowe, R. (2002) From Beveridge to Blair: The first fifty years of 
Britain’s welfare state 1948-98. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Jürgensen, K. (1983) ‘British Occupation Policy after 1945 and the Problem of “Re-
educating Germany”’, History, 68(223), pp. 225–244. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
229X.1983.tb01406.x. 
Kahin, G. M. (1964) ‘Malaysia and Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs, 37(3), pp. 253–270. 
Kaniki, M. H. Y. (1980) Tanzania under colonial rule. London: Longman. 
Keohane, D. (2000) ‘The debate on British policy in the Kosovo conflict: An 
assessment’, Contemporary Security Policy, 21(3), pp. 78–94. doi: 
10.1080/13523260008404269. 
King, S. (2000) Poverty and Welfare in England, 1700-1850: A Regional Respective. 





Klein, V. (1947) ‘Re-educate the Germans? A British Experiment’, Pi Lambda Theta 
Journal, 26(3), pp. 81–85. 
Kleinig, J. (1983) Paternalism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Knowles, C. (2013) ‘The British Occupation of Germany, 1945–49: A Case Study in 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction’, The RUSI Journal, 158(6), pp. 84–91. doi: 
10.1080/03071847.2013.869727. 
Kopelman, L. (2004) ‘On distinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable paternalism’, 
The virtual mentor, 6(2). 
Krasner, S. D. (2004) ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and 
Failing States’, International Security, 29(2), pp. 85–120. doi: 
10.1162/0162288042879940. 
Krasner, S. D. and Pascual, C. (2005) ‘Addressing state failure’, Foreign Affairs, 
84(4), pp. 153–163. doi: 10.2307/20034427. 
Kress, G. and Hodge, R. (1979) Language as Ideology. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. 
Kuperman, A. J. (2013) ‘A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO’s 
Libya Campaign’, International Security, 38(1), pp. 105–136. doi: 
10.1162/ISEC_a_00126. 
Lawes, K. (2000) Paternalism and Politics: The Revival of Paternalism in Early 
Nineteenth-Century Britain. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Leander, A. (2005) ‘The Power to Construct International Security: On the 
Significance of Private Military Companies’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 33(3), pp. 803–825. doi: 10.1177/03058298050330030601. 
Lee, S. (2001) Victory in Europe? : Britain and Germany since 1945. Harlow: 
Longman. 
Lees, L. H. (1998) The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the 





van Leeuwen, T. (2008) Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse 
Analysis, Discourse and practice : new tools for critical discourse analysis. doi: 
10.1093/acprof. 
Lengel, E. (2002) The Irish Through British Eyes: Perceptions of Ireland in the 
Famine Era. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
Lister, R. (1998) ‘From Equality to Social Inclusion: New Labour and the Welfare 
State’, Critical Social Policy, 18(2), pp. 215–225. 
Listowel, J. M.-M. H. (1968) The making of Tanganyika. 2nd ed. London: Chatto & 
Windus. 
Llewelyn, J. (2006) ‘“Diplomatic Divergence: the Japanese and British Responses to 
Indonesia”s Confrontation of Malaysia 1963–1966’’, Intercultural Studies in the 
Social Sciences and Humanities. Berlin/Heidelberg, 4(4), pp. 583–605. doi: 
10.1007/s10308-006-0081-3. 
Lowe, R. (1999) The welfare state in Britain since 1945. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Luck, E. C. (2010) ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?’, 
Ethics & International Affairs, 24(4), pp. 349–365. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-
7093.2010.00276.x. 
Lyerly, A. D. and Rothman, B. K. (2004) ‘Paternalism’, The virtual mentor, 6(2). 
Macgregor, S. (1999) ‘Welfare, Neo-Liberalism and New Paternalism: Three Ways 
for Social Policy in Late Capitalist Societies’, Capital & Class, 23(1), pp. 91–118. doi: 
10.1177/030981689906700104. 
Machin, D. and Mayr, A. (2012) How to do critical discourse analysis : a multimodal 
introduction. Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Mack, J. and Lansley, S. (1985) Poor Britain. Herts: George Allen & Unwin. 
Madden, F. and Drawin, J. (1994) The dependent empire, 1900-1948 : colonies, 





Marr, A. (2008) A History of Modern Britain. London: Pan Books. 
Marriott, J. A. R. (1918) The Eastern question : an historical study in European 
diplomacy. 2nd editio. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Marshall, B. (1989) ‘British Democratization Policy in Germany’, in Turner, I. D. 
(ed.) Reconstruction in post-war Germany : British occupation policy and the western 
zones, 1945-55. Oxford: Berg. 
Marshall, D. (1969) The English poor in the eighteenth century: A study in social and 
administrative history from 1662 to 1782, The English Poor in the Eighteenth 
Century: A Study in Social and Administrative History from 1662 to 1782. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Marsland, D. (1992) ‘The Roots and Consequences of Paternalist Collectivism: 
Beveridge and his Influence’, Social Policy & Administration, 26(2), pp. 144–150. 
Marwick, A. (1991) The Deluge : British society and the First World War. Macmillan 
Education. 
Marwick, A. (2003) British society since 1945. 4th editio. London: Penguin Books. 
Mayall, J. (2000) ‘The concept of humanitarian intervention revisited’, in Kosovo and 
the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective indignation, collective action 
and international citizenship. New York: United Nations University Press. 
McCourt, D. M. (2014) ‘Britain and world power since 1945: constructing a nation’s 
role in international politics’, p. 253. 
McKay, S. and Rowlingson, K. (2008) ‘Social Security and Welfare Reform’, in 
Powell, M. (ed.) Modernising the welfare state: The Blair legacy. Bristol: Polity Press, 
pp. 53–72. 
Michail, E. (2011) ‘After the war and after the wall: British perceptions of Germany 
following 1945 and 1989’, University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 3, 
pp. 1–12. 






Mill, J. S. (2004) ‘Principles of political economy with some of their applications to 
social philosophy.’ Indianapolis: Hackett. Available at: 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=327822. 
Morris, N. (2004) ‘Humanitarian Intervention in the Balkans’, in Welsh, J. M. (ed.) 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Moses, J. (2013) ‘Sovereignty as irresponsibility? A Realist critique of the 
Responsibility to Protect’, Review of International Studies, 39(1), pp. 113–135. doi: 
10.1017/S0260210512000113. 
Murray, G. (1978) ‘The British Contribution’, in Hearnden, A. (ed.) The British in 
Germany : educational reconstruction after 1945. London : Hamilton. 
Narayan, U. (1995) ‘Colonialism and Its Others : On Rights Considerations and Care 
Discourses’, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 10(2), pp. 133–140. 
Neillands, R. (1996) The Dervish Wars: Gordon and Kitchener in the Sudan 1880-
1898. London: John Murray. 
Nele, M. (2005) ‘Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations 
as Origin of Trusteeship’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online, 9(1), 
pp. 47–95. doi: 10.1163/138946305775160483. 
Newman, M. (2009) Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions. 
London: Hurst. 
Nicholls, G. (1856) A history of the Irish poor law, in connexion with the condition of 
the people. London: John Murray. 
Noble, V. (2009) Inside the Welfare state: Foundations of Policy and Practice in Post-
War Britain. New York: Routledge. 






O’Connor, L. (2006) Haunted English: The Celtic Fringe, the British Empire and De-
Anglicization. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Ocran, M. (2002) ‘The doctrine of humanitarian intervention in light of robust 
peacekeeping’, Boston College international and comparative law review, 25, pp. 1–
58. 
Orford, A. (2003) Reading humanitarian intervention: Human rights and the use of 
force in international law, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and 
the Use of Force in International Law. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511494277. 
Orford, A. (2011a) ‘From Promise to Practice? The Legal Significance of the 
Responsibility to Protect Concept’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 3(4), pp. 400–
424. doi: 10.1163/187598411X602008. 
Orford, A. (2011b) International authority and the responsibility to protect, 
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect. doi: 
10.1017/CBO9780511973574. 
Padavic, I. and Earnest, W. R. (1994) ‘Paternalism as a component of managerial 
strategy’, The Social Science Journal, 31(4), pp. 389–405. doi: 10.1016/0362-
3319(94)90031-0. 
Paris, R. (2014) ‘The “responsibility to protect” and the structural problems of 
preventive humanitarian intervention’, International Peacekeeping. Taylor & Francis, 
21(5), pp. 569–603. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2014.963322. 
Parker, I. (1990) ‘Discourse: Definitions and contradictions’, Philosophical 
Psychology, 3(2–3), pp. 187–204. doi: 10.1080/09515089008572998. 
Penn, V. (1938) ‘Philhellenism in Europe, 1821-1828’, Slavonic and East European 
Review, 16(48), pp. 638–53. 
Perkins, H. (1985) Origins of Modern English Society. London: Ark Paperbacks. 
Perritt, Jr, H. . (2003) ‘Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship’, UCLA 





Phillips, N. and Hardy, C. (2002) Discourse analysis: investigating processes of social 
construction, Qualitative research methods ; doi: 10.4135/9781412983921. 
Piachaud, D. (1987) ‘The Poor get Poorer’, New Society, 80(1275), pp. 11–13. 
Pilario, D. F. (2007) ‘Mapping Postcolonial Theory : Appropriations into 
Contemporary Theology’, Review Literature And Arts Of The Americas, 1(1), pp. 48–
78. 
Pointer, J. R. (1969) Society and pauperism : English ideas on poor relief, 1795-1834. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Popovski, V. (2010) ‘Responsibility to Protect’, in Malcolm, M. and Hunter, A. (eds) 
New perspectives on human security. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, pp. 203–219. 
Porter, A. N. and Stockwell, A. J. (1989) British imperial policy and decolonization, 
1938-64. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Porter, B. (1996) The lion’s share : a short history of British Imperialism, 1850-2004. 
3rd editio. London: Longman. 
Porter, B. (2004) The lion’s share : a short history of British Imperialism, 1850-2004. 
4th ed. Harlow: Pearson Longman. 
Pouliot, V. (2010) International security in practice : the politics of NATO-Russia 
diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Powell, M. (2000) ‘New Labour and the third way in the British welfare state: a new 
and distinctive approach?’, Critical Social Policy, 20(1), pp. 39–60. 
Powell, M. (2008) Modernising the welfare state: The Blair legacy. Bristol: Polity 
Press. 
Poynter, J. (1969) Society and pauperism : English ideas on poor relief, 1795-1834. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Prousis, T. C. (2011) ‘British Embassy Reports on the Greek Uprising in 1821-1822: 






Raftery, D., Mcdermid, J. and Jones, G. E. (2007) ‘Social Change and Education in 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales: Historiography on Nineteenth‐century Schooling’, 
History of Education, 36(4–5), pp. 447–463. 
Rasbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1996) Humanitarian Intervention in 
Contemporary Conflict. Cambridge: Polity. 
Reamer, F. (1983) ‘The Concept of Paternalism in Social Work’, Social Service 
Review, 57(2), pp. 254–271. 
Reckwitz, A. (2002) ‘Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in 
Culturalist Theorizing’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5(2), pp. 243–263. doi: 
10.1177/13684310222225432. 
Reitan, E. (2002) The Thatcher Revolution: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony 
Blair, and the Transformation of Modern Britain. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
Roberts, A. (1999) ‘NATO s Humanitarian War over Kosovo’, Survival, 41(3), pp. 
102–123. 
Roberts, D. (1958) ‘Tory Paternalism and Social Reform in Early Victorian England’, 
The American Historical Review, 63(2), pp. 323–337. doi: 10.2307/1849547. 
Roberts, D. (1979) Paternalism in early Victorian England. London: Croom Helm. 
Rodogno, D. (2012) Against massacre : humanitarian interventions in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1815-1914 : the emergence of a European concept and international practice. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rossi, C. R. (2016) ‘The International Community, South Sudan, and the 
Responsibility to protect’, New York University journal of international law and 
politics, 49(1), pp. 129–180. 





Said, E. (1995) Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. London: Penguin. 
Samuel, R. (1992) ‘Mrs. Thatcher’s Return to Victorian Values’, Proceedings of the 
British Academy, 78, pp. 9–29. 
Schatzki, T., Karin, K.-C. and von Savigny, E. (2001) The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory. Edited by Routledge. London. 
Schnabel, A. and Thakur, R. (2000) Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian 
Intervention. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Schwartzberg, S. (1988) ‘The Lion and the Phoenix — 1: British policy toward the 
“greek question”, 1831–32’, Middle Eastern Studies, 24(2), pp. 139–177. 
Scull, A. T. (1977) ‘Madness and Segregative Control: The Rise of the Insane 
Asylum’, Social Problems, 24(3), pp. 337–351. doi: 10.2307/800085. 
Seabrook, J. (2013) Pauperland : A Short History of Poverty in Britain. London: C. 
Hurst & Co. 
Segev, T. (2001) One Palestine, complete : Jews and Arabs under the British mandate. 
London: Abacus, 2001. 
Seo, M. K., Kim, S. H. and Rhee, M. (2013) ‘Coercion in psychiatric care: Can 
paternalism justify coercion?’, International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 59(3), pp. 
217–223. doi: 10.1177/0020764011431543. 
Serrano, M. (2011) ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and Cote D’Ivoire’, 
Amsterdam Law Forum, 3(3), pp. 92–101. Available at: 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/226. 
Sharma, S. (2016) ‘Kenya’, in Bellamy, A. J. and Dunne, T. (eds) The Oxford 
handbook of the responsibility to protect. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sheldon, R. (2009) ‘Development, Poverty and Famines: The Case of British Empire’, 
in Duffield, M. and Hewitt, V. (eds) Empire, development & colonialism : the past in 





Shepherd, N. (1999) Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine 1917-48. London: John 
Murray. 
Sherman, S. (2001) Imagining Poverty: Quantification and the decline of paternalism. 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Shlaim, A. (1983) ‘Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War’, International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 60(1), pp. 1–14. doi: 
10.2307/2618926. 
Simms, B. and Trim, D. J. B. (2011) Humanitarian intervention: A history, 
Humanitarian Intervention: A History. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511921292. 
Singh, J. (1996) Colonial narratives/cultural dialogues : ‘discoveries’ of India in the 
language of colonialism. London: Routledge. 
Skinner, R. and Lester, A. (2012) ‘Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research 
Agendas’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40(5), pp. 729–747. doi: 
10.1080/03086534.2012.730828. 
Slack, P. (1990) The English Poor Law: 1531-1782. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Sleeman, J. F. (1973) The Welfare State : its aims, benefits and costs. London: Allen 
and Unwin. 
Sluglett, P. (2014) ‘An improvement on colonialism? The “A” mandates and their 
legacy in the Middle East’, International Affairs, 90(2), pp. 413–427. doi: 
10.1111/1468-2346.12117. 
Smirl, L. (2009) ‘Plain Tales from the Reconstruction Site: Spacial Continuities in 
Contemporary Humanitarian Practice’, in Empire, Development & Colonialism : The 
Past in the Present. Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, pp. 88–101. 
Søbjerg, L. M. (2007) ‘Trusteeship and the concept of freedom’, Review of 
International Studies, 33(3), pp. 475–488. doi: 10.1017/S0260210507007619. 






Stahn, C. (2001) ‘The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East 
Timor: A First Analysis’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online, 5(1), 
pp. 105–183. 
Stefano, P. Di (2011) ‘Human Rights Violations and the Moral Permissibility of 
Military Intervention’, Peace Review, 23(4), pp. 537–545. doi: 
10.1080/10402659.2011.625869. 
Stevenson, J. (1984) British Society 1914-1945. London: Penguin. 
Subritzky, J. (2000) Confronting Sukarno : British, American, Australian and New 
Zealand diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian confrontation, 1961-5. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, F. (2017) ‘Discourses of “class” in Britain in “New Times”’, 
Contemporary British History, 31(2), pp. 294–317. 
Taylor, J. C. (James C. (1963) The political development of Tanganyika. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Taylor, M. and Lansley, J. (1992) ‘Ideology and welfare in the UK: the implications 
for the voluntary sector’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations, 3(2), pp. 153–174. 
Teson, F. (2001) The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, FSU College of 
Law, Public Law Research Paper. No. 39. 
Tesón, F. R. (2003) ‘The liberal case for humanitarian intervention’, in Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, pp. 93–129. doi: 
10.1017/CBO9780511494000.004. 
Thakur, R. (2016a) ‘Review article: The Responsibility to Protect at 15’, International 
Affairs, 92(2), pp. 415–434. 
Thakur, R. (2016b) ‘The Responsibility to Protect at 15’, International Affairs, 92(2), 
pp. 415–434. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12557. 





Responsibility to Protect, 1(1), pp. 22–53. doi: 10.1163/187598409X405460. 
Thane, P. (1978) ‘Women and the poor law in Victorian and Edwardian England’, 
History Workshop Journal, 6(1), pp. 29–51. doi: 10.1093/hwj/6.1.29. 
Thompson, E. and Garratt, G. T. (1935) Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India. 
London: Macmillan and Co Limited. 
Thompson, E. P. (1974) ‘Patrician Society, Plebian Culture’, Journal of Social 
History, 7(4), pp. 382–405. 
Thompson, E. P. (1978) ‘Eighteenth-century English society: class struggle without 
class’, Social History, 3(2), pp. 133–165. 
Thompson, P. R. (1992) The Edwardians : the remaking of British society. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
Thornton, A. . (1966) The habit of authority : paternalism in British history. London: 
Allen & Unwin. 
Thornton, S. (2009) Richard Crossman and the Welfare State: Pioneer of Welfare 
Provision and Labour Politics in Post-War Britain. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Tirman, J. (2003) ‘The new Humanitarianism: How Military Intervention became the 
norm’, Boston Review. Available at: http://bostonreview.net/world/john-tirman-new-
humanitarianism. 
Tocci, N. (2016) ‘On power and norms: Libya, Syria and the responsibility to protect’, 
Global Responsibility to Protect, 8(1), pp. 51–75. doi: 10.1163/1875984X-00801004. 
Tomlinson, J. (1991) Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. London: Pinter. 
Tuck, C. (2004) ‘Borneo 1963-66: Counter-insurgency Operations and War 
Termination’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 15(917420900), pp. 89–111. doi: 
10.1080/0959231042000275588. 
Tuck, C. (2013) Confrontation, strategy and war termination : Britain’s conflict with 





Turner, A. (2014) A Classless Society: Britain in the 1990s. London: Aurum Press. 
VanDeVeer, D. (1986) Paternalistic intervention : the moral bounds on benevolence, 
Studies in moral, political, and legal philosophy. 
Viner, J. (1968) ‘Man’s Economic Status’, in Clifford, J. (ed.) Man versus society in 
eighteenth-century Britain : six points of view. London: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 22–53. 
Vohra, R. (2001) The making of India : a historical survey. 2nd editio. Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
Watt, D. C. (1965) Britain looks to Germany : British opinion and policy towards 
Germany since 1945. London: Oswald Wolff. 
Weiss, T. (2012) Humanitarian Intervention Ideas in Action. 2nd edn. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Weiss, T. G. (2007) Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action. London: Polity. 
Welch, D. (1989) ‘Priming the Pump of German Democracy, British Re-education 
Policy in Germany after WWII’, in Turner, I. D. (ed.) Reconstruction in post-war 
Germany : British occupation policy and the western zones, 1945-55. Oxford: Berg. 
Welsh, J. (2004) ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’, 1. 
Welsh, J. M. (2004) Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. Oxford Univesrity Press. doi: 
10.1093/0199267219.001.0001. 
Welsh, J. M. (2016) ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya & Syria’, Daedalus, 
The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 145(4), pp. 75–87. 
Welsh, J. M. (2016) ‘The Responsibility to Protect at Ten: Glass Half Empty or Half 
Full?’, The International Spectator. Routledge, 51(2), pp. 1–8. doi: 
10.1080/03932729.2016.1163943. 





Society. Oxford; New York: Oxford Univesrity Press. 
Whitehead, C. (1981) ‘Education in British Colonial Dependencies, 1919‐39: a re‐
appraisal’, Comparative Education. Taylor & Francis Group, 17(1), pp. 71–80. doi: 
10.1080/0305006810170107. 
Whitehead, C. (1989) ‘The Impact of the Second World War on British Colonial 
Education Policy.’, History of Education, 18(3), pp. 267–293. doi: 
10.1080/0046760890180307. 
Whiteside, N. (1996) ‘Creating the {Welfare} {State} in {Britain}, 1945–1960’, 
Journal of Social Policy, 25(1), pp. 83–103. doi: 10.1017/S0047279400000076. 
Wilde, R. (2008) International territorial administration : how trusteeship and the 
civilizing mission never went away. Oxford: Oxford Univesrity Press. 
Wilding, P. (1983) ‘The Promise of Thatcherism’, in Thatcherism and the Poor. 
London: Child Poverty Action Group, pp. 5–6. 
Williams, P. D. (2005) British foreign policy under New Labour, 1997-2005. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Williams, S. (2011) Poverty, Gender and life-cycle under the English Poor Law. 
Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer. 
Van Wingen, J. and Tillerma, H. K. (1980) ‘British Military Intervention after World 
War Two: Militance in a Second-Rank Power’, Journal of Peace Research, 17(17b), 
pp. 291–303. 
Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. 2nd edn. 
Edited by Sage. London. 
Wodak, R. and Weiss, G. (2003) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and 
Interdisciplinarity.’, Discourse, 5, p. xi, 321 p. 






Wray, D. (1996) ‘Paternalism and its discontents: A case study’, Work, Employment 
and Society, 10(4), pp. 701–715. doi: 10.1177/0950017096104005. 
Zegger, R. (1970) ‘Greek Independence and the London Greek Committee’, History 
Today, 20(4), pp. 236–245. 
Ziegler, C. E. (2016a) ‘Contesting the responsibility to protect’, International Studies 
Perspectives, 17(1), pp. 75–97. doi: 10.1111/insp.12085. 
Ziegler, C. E. (2016b) ‘Critical perspectives on the responsibility to protect: BRICS 
and beyond’, International Relations, 30(3), pp. 262–277. doi: 
10.1177/0047117816659533. 
Newspapers 
Times,. (1824) Greece. The Times. The Times Digital Archive [online database]. 21 





Times,. (1826) The Duke of WELLINGTON'S mission to St. Petersburgh. The Times. 
The Times Digital Archive [online database]. 15 February. p. 3. [Viewed 20 June 





Times,. (1823) The Greeks. The Times. The Times Digital Archive [online database]. 









Times,. (1823) Parliamentary Intelligence: House of Commons Friday May 12. The 
Times. The Times Digital Archive [online database]. 13 May. p. 2. [Viewed 20 June 





Times,. (1827) The news from Greece-now. The Times. The Times Digital Archive 






Correspondent,. (1827) Greece. The Times. The Times Digital Archive [online 






Wilson, H,. (1840) Mill’s History of British India. The Times. The Times Digital 






Times,. (1896) The Sudan Advance. The Times. The Times Digital Archive [online 










Correspondent,. (1897) Egypt and the Sudan. The Times. The Times Digital Archive 





Times,. (1896) Lord Cromer on the Sudan Campaign. The Times. The Times Digital 





Correspondent,. (1896) The Sudan Expedition. The Times. The Times Digital Archive 





Correspondent,. (1896) The Sudan Advance. The Times. The Times Digital Archive 





Times,. (1896) Mr Courtney on the Sudan. The Times. The Times Digital Archive 









The London Gazette,. (1898) Nile Expedition 1898. The London Gazette. 30 
September. p. 5725. [Viewed 5 July 2014] Available from: 
https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/27009/page/5725  
 
Correspondent,. (1947) Schools in Germany. The Times. The Times Digital Archive 





Correspondent,. (1964) Keeping Pressure on Malaysia. The Times. The Times Digital 






Hoiden, D. (1964). Borderline war. The Guardian. ProQuest [online database]. 8 May. 
p. 12. [Viewed 20 February 2015] Available from:   
https://search-proquest-
com.sheffield.idm.oclc.org/docview/184986136?accountid=13828 
Stephens, R. (1964) Our War in Asia. The Observer. ProQuest [online database]. 13 







The Guardian,. (1999) Briefing: Defence Secretary George Robertson. The Guardian 
[online]. 25 March. [Viewed 20 February 2015]. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/mar/25/balkans11 
BBC,. (1999) UK Britons 'support Nato strikes'. The BBC. [online]. 28 March. 
[Viewed 20 February 2015]. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/306010.stm 
The Guardian,. (1999) The village that died when the butchers came at dawn. The 
Guardian. [online]. 17 January. [Viewed 22 February 2015]. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jan/17/balkans 
Freeman, Colin. and Rayment, S. (2011) Libya: British forces fire missiles at Gaddafi. 
The Telegraph. [online]. 19 March. [Viewed 20 April 2017]. Available from:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8393128/Li
bya-British-forces-fire-missiles-at-Gaddafi.html 
The Telegraph,. (2011) Libya: David Cameron has taken a dangerous gamble. The 





Great Britain. House of Commons., (1826). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (2nd series), 19 May, Vol.15, cc1271-5 [online]. London: The 








Great Britain. House of Commons., (1828). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (2nd series), 31 January, Vol.18, cc87-93 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 25 June 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds2v0018p0-
0002?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1858). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (3rd series), 19 February, Vol.148, cc1718-1730 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 27 June 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.lds3v0148p0-
0019?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1833). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (3rd series), 10 July, Vol.19, cc469-550 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 27 June 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0019p0-
0007?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1858). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (3rd series), 12 February, Vol.148, cc1260-1360 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed 27 June 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0148p0-
0016?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1858). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (3rd series), 30 April, Vol.149, cc2010-2097 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 27 June 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0149p0-
0028?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1853). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (3rd series), 11 March, Vol.125, cc1-33 [online]. London: The Stationery 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (1853). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (3rd series), 24 June, Vol.128, cc726-779 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 28 June 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0128p0-
0010?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1830). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (2nd series), 4 June, Vol.24, cc1348-1400 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 30 June 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds2v0024p0-
0027?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1896). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (4th series), 20 March, Vol.18, cc1453-1576 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 1 July 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds4v0038p0-
0014?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1897). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (4th series), 5 February, Vol.45, cc1417-1528 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed1 July 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds4v0045p0-
0014?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1896). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (4th series), 3 July, Vol.42, cc633-736 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 1 July 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds4v0042p0-
0008?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1922). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 21 June, Vol.50, cc993-1056 [online]. London: The Stationery 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (1938). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 24 November, Vol.341, cc1909-2110 [online]. 
London: The Stationery Office. [Viewed 11 December 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0341p0-
0013?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1923). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 2 July, Vol.166, cc1-226 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 11 December 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0166p0-
0001?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1920). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 29 June, Vol.40, cc972-1038 [online]. London: The Stationery 
Office. [Viewed 12 December 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.lds5lv0040p0-
0043?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1929). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 30 April, Vol.227, cc1357-1524 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 11 December 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0227p0-
0012?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1934). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 27 June, Vol.93, cc171-232 [online]. London: The Stationery 
Office. [Viewed 12 December 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.lds5lv0093p0-
0008?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1927). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 21 November, Vol.210, cc1383-1564 [online]. 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (1929). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 17 July, Vol.230, cc401-590 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 12 December 2014]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0230p0-
0003?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1963). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 19 November, Vol.253, cc207-326 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 5 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.lds5lv0253p0-
0004?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1943). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 7 December, Vol.130, cc101-142 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 5 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.lds5lv0130p0-
0004?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1946). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 22 October, Vol.427, cc1447-1632 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed 5 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0427p0-
0011?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1946). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 23 October, Vol.427, cc1633-408 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed 5 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0427p0-
0012?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1945). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 23 October, Vol.137, cc407-446 [online]. London: The 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (1947). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 3 April, Vol.435, cc2193-380 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 6 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0435p0-
0014?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1965). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 12 May, Vol.712, cc58-98W [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 6 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cas5cv0712p0-
0003?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1963). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 5 December, Vol.685, cc1335-1508 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed 7 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0685p0-
0009?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1964). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 17 June, Vol.696, cc1255-1450 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 7 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0696p0-
0008?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1963). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 14 November, Vol.253, cc121-206 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 7 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.lds5lv0253p0-
0003?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1965). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 2 November, Vol.718, cc135-162W [online]. London: 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (1964). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 23 November, Vol.702, cc879-1056 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed 9 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0702p0-
0006?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1965). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 19 July, Vol.716, cc1089-1312 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 9 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0716p0-
0006?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1965). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 4 March, Vol.707, cc1493-1700 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 10 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds5cv0707p0-
0009?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1981). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (5th series), 3 February, Vol.998, cc155-231 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 5 August 2018]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1981-02-03/debates/4f3eb345-57b3-4e6d-
9d8b-a5ef2548364b/Poverty# 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1998). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 10 March, Vol.587, cc99-206 [online]. London: The Stationery 
Office. [Viewed 20 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.lds5lv0587p0-
0002?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Lords., (1998). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 12 October, Vol.593, cc693-776 [online]. London: The 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (1998). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 19 October, Vol.317, cc935-1060 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed 20 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds6cv0317p0-
0008?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (1999). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 25 March, Vol.328, cc507-628 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 20 February 2015]. Available at: 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds6cv0328p0-
0004?accountid=13828 
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 5 September, Vol.532, cc23-48 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 10 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-09-05/debates/1109054000001/Libya  
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 28 February, Vol.524, cc23-46 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 10 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-02-
28/debates/11022819000002/LibyaAndTheMiddleEast  
Great Britain. House of Lords., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 1 April, Vol.726, cc1444-1518 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 10 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2011-04-01/debates/11040186000471/Libya  
Great Britain. House of Lords., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary Debates 
[Hansard], (5th series), 28 February, Vol.725, cc834-847 [online]. London: The 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 14 March, Vol.525, cc14-15 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 11 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-14/debates/11031411000028/Libya  
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 21 March, Vol.525, cc700-802 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 12 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-
21/debates/1103219000001/UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1973  
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 7 June, Vol.529, cc31-50 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 12 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-06-
07/debates/11060729000002/MiddleEastAndNorthAfrica  
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 24 March, Vol.525, cc1113-1130 [online]. London: 
The Stationery Office. [Viewed 14 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-
24/debates/11032467000004/NorthAfricaAndTheMiddleEast  
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 7 March, Vol.524, cc643-663 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 14 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-
07/debates/11030711000002/LibyaAndTheMiddleEast  
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 18 March, Vol. 525, cc611-632 [online]. London: The 







Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 5 April, Vol.525, cc920-968 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 15 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110405/debindx/11040
5-x.htm  
Great Britain. House of Commons., (2011). The Official Report: Parliamentary 
Debates [Hansard], (6th series), 2 March, Vol524, cc290-301 [online]. London: The 
Stationery Office. [Viewed 16 April 2017]. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110302/debtext/11030
2-0001.htm#11030269000030  
Assemblée Nationale (France) 
France. Assemblée Nationale, XIIIe législature, Session Ordinaire de 2010-2011. 
(2011) Compte rendu intégral, 22 Mars 2011. Available at : 
https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cri/2010-2011/20110144.asp.  
Archives 
The National Archives FO 78/98 ff. 226-31a, 25 May 1821, No. 40 
The National Archives FO 78/142, April 1826 No. 26, Correspondence Stratford 
Canning to George Canning 
The National Archives FO 881/165 p7. 1826 Correspondence: Secretary Canning to 
Duke of Wellington 
The National Archives FO 407/147 Greece 






The National Archives FO 1050/1057, 13 December Report of a Meeting held in the 
educational adviser’s office Bad Rothenfelde  
The National Archives FO 1050/1057, 15 December 1948 Letter from Birley to 
Professor Brandt-Rehberg (Denmark); Monsieur F. van den Borre, Ministry of 
Education Brussels- Belgium; Mr Lief J. Willhelmsen, Norwegian Embassy, 
London; Mr Rune Eriksson, Swedish Joint Committee for Democratic 
Reconstruction Sweeden; Dr. Verkade, Co-coordinating committee for cultural 
relations with Germany- Hollad. 
The National Archives FO 1050/1032, 18 November 1948 Telegram from Foreign 
Office (German Section) to Education Branch CCG (BE), Subject: Teacher training 
visits to and from Germany. 
The National Archives FO 1050/1032, 4 January 1949 Reply Education Branch 
The National Archives FO 1050/1021, 28 February 1949 Letter from Education 
Branch HQ Land Niedercachsen Hannover Principal Control Officer to Director of 
Education, Education Branch Bad Rothenfelde 
The National Archives FO 371/64386, 20 December 1946 Birley- Memorandum on 
education  
The National Archives FO 371/64386, From Control Office for Germany and Austria 
to Mr. P. R. Frazer (German Department Foreign Office). Correspondence between 
schoolchildren Germany-Britain (Control Commission request) 
The National Archives FO 1050/1192, 1949 Education Review no.19  
The National Archives FO 371/6374- 3 June 1921 Speech Sir Herbert Samuel 
Command Papers 
Great Britain. (1921) Report on Tanganyika Territory [online]. London: HMSO. 







Great Britain. (1929-30) Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa [online]. 




Great Britain. (1922) Report on Tanganyika Territory [online]. London: HMSO. 




Great Britain (1929-1930) Report of Sir Samule Wilson, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E., 




Great Britain. (1922) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 12 December 2014]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A682CABF739FEBAA052565E8006
D907C  
Great Britain. (1923) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 12 December 2014]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/CC87D3BF6E0759F3052565E800573851  
Great Britain. (1924) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 15 December 2014]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A87D21F4E57F2D0F052565E8004BACE0  
Great Britain. (1925) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 






Great Britain. (1926) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 8 January 2015]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/f7f634d2
cacb2c76052565e7006b9db9?OpenDocument  
Great Britain. (1929) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 8 January 2015]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/38BED104DB074B49052565E70054EB22  
Great Britain. (1930) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 8 January 2015]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/C2FEFF7B90A24815052565E6004E
5630  
Great Britain. (1932) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 12 January 2015]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/73F844E0122D6772052565D80053B
611  
Great Britain. (1933) Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
[online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 10 January 2015]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/AA1CA3C5176A0915052565D7005
C1BC3  
Great Britain. (1930-1931) Palestine. Statement of policy by His Majesty's 
government in the United Kingdom [online]. London: HMSO. [viewed 10 January 





League of Nations (1922) Mandate for Palestine [online]. London: HMSO. [Viewed 








League of Nations (1945) The Mandate System: Origins-Principles-Application 
[online] 30 April 1945 [Viewed 15 November 2014]. Available from:  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/C61B138F4DBB08A0052565D00058EE1B 




Great Britain. Ministry of Defence., (2011) Foreign Secretary comments on UN vote 
on Libya no-fly zone, 18 March 2011 [online].  Ministry of Defence [Viewed 7 July 
2017]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-comments-on-un-vote-on-
libya-no-fly-zone--2  
Great Britain. Ministry of Defence., (2011) Dr Fox – operations in Libya are about 
protecting civilians, 28 March 2011 [online]. Ministry of Defence. [Viewed 7 July 
2017]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dr-fox-operations-in-libya-are-about-
protecting-civilians  
Great Britain. Ministry of Defence., (2011) Dr Fox discusses Libya no-fly zone 
possibility, 10 March 2011, [online]. Foreign &Commonwealth Office. [Viewed 6 






Great Britain. Foreign &Commonwealth Office., (2011) MPs back Libya action, 22 
March 2011, [online]. Foreign &Commonwealth Office. [Viewed 6 July 2017]. 
Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mps-back-libya-action  
Great Britain. Foreign &Commonwealth Office., (2011) Deputy Prime Minister gives 
speech on foreign policy, 29 March 2011, [online]. Foreign &Commonwealth Office. 
[Viewed 6 July 2017]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deputy-prime-minister-gives-speech-on-
foreign-policy  
Great Britain. Foreign &Commonwealth Office., (2011) UN intervention in Libya: 
Foreign Secretary on BBC Radio 5, 20 March 2011, [online]. Foreign 
&Commonwealth Office. [Viewed 6 July 2017]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/un-intervention-in-libya-foreign-secretary-on-
bbc-radio-5  
Great Britain. Foreign &Commonwealth Office., (2011) Supporting the Libyan 
National Transitional Council, 13 May 2011, [online]. Foreign &Commonwealth 
Office. [Viewed 6 July 2017]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/supporting-the-libyan-national-transitional-
council  
UN Documents-  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945) available from:  
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/  







UN Press Releases 
United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Libya. 
SC/10180, 22 February 2011, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm  
United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over 
Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in 
Favour with 5 Abstentions. SC/10200, 17 March 2011, 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm  
United Nations Resolutions 
General Assembly resolution S-15/1, Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, A/HRC/RES/S-15/1 (3 March 2011), available from  
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/libya-25-february-2011.pdf  
Security Council resolution 1970, S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011), available from 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970%20%282011%29   
Security Council resolution 1973, S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011), available from 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973%20%282011%29   
Security Council resolution 1199, S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998) Available from 
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1199(1998)  
General Assembly resolution 60/1, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 
16 September 2005, A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), available from:  
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/
globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf  






UN Security Council Resolution 1977   
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011) 
United Nations Reports 
United Nations, General Assembly, We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in 




Potsdam Agreement, Protocol of the proceedings (1 August 1945). Available from: 
https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/Potsdam%20Agreement.pdf 
Other Reports  
International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor. (2011), First report of the 
prosecutor of the international criminal court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to 
UNSCR 1970, 3 May 2011. Available from:  
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A077E5F8-29B6-4A78-9EAB-
A179A105738E/0/UNSCLibyaReportEng04052011.pdf  
Other primary documents 
Macaulay’s Minute on Education (1835) available from:  
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_e
ducation_1835.html 
Evans, G. (2009) Statement to United Nations General Assembly lnformal Interactive 






UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Over 140,000 flee Libya to Egypt 
and Tunisia, UNHCR steps up efforts to support refugees and civilians in Libya, 1 
March 2011. [accessed 10 July 2017] available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d6cee2c2.html  
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013) R2P References in United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements, 18 April. Available 
from:  
http://www.globalr2p.org/publications/232  
Blair, T. (1999) Doctrine of the International Community, Chicago Economic Club, 
22 April 1999. Available from: 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26026.html  
The Balfour Declaration (1917) Available at:  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/about-aice 
